Issue 16-04B (No. 707) March 22, THAAD 2. CHINA S CORE KOREA POLICY 3. UN SANCTIONS WHICH ONE NEXT? 5.

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1 Issue 16-04B (No. 707) March 22, 2016 1. THAAD 2. CHINA S CORE KOREA POLICY 3. UN SANCTIONS 2016 4. WHICH ONE NEXT? 5. EAGLE HUNTING

1. THAAD 2 THAAD carries no warhead. It is a purely defensive system. Terminal: It destroys incoming ballistic missiles in their terminal phase of flight. High Altitude: It can reach an altitude of up to 93 miles. It poses no threat to China s offensive strategic missiles.

3 Terminal High Altitude Area Defense The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) element provides the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) with a globally-transportable, rapidly-deployable capability to intercept and destroy ballistic missiles inside or outside the atmosphere during their final, or terminal, phase of flight. Overview A. Land-based element capable of shooting down a ballistic missile both inside and just outside the atmosphere. B. Highly effective against the asymmetric ballistic missile threats. C. Uses hit-to-kill technology whereby kinetic energy destroys the incoming warhead. D. The high-altitude intercept mitigates effects of enemy weapons of mass destruction before they reach the ground. Details THAAD battery consists of four main components: Launcher: Truck-mounted, highly-mobile, able to be stored; interceptors can be fired and rapidly reloaded. Interceptors: Eight per launcher. Radar: Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance (AN/TPY-2) Largest air-transportable x-band radar in the world searches, tracks, and discriminates objects and provides updated tracking data to the interceptor. Fire Control: Communication and data-management backbone; links THAAD components together; links THAAD to external Command and Control nodes and to the entire BMDS; plans and executes intercept solutions. Rapidly deployable by being globally-transportable via air, land and sea.

2. CHINA S CORE KOREA POLICY 4 China s core policy on the Korean peninsula is to maintain the status quo; a divided Korea is a higher priority than North Korean nukes. The most recent sanctions against North Korea with China s consent must be viewed with its core policy in mind. Vox, March 3, 2016 China s Core Korea Policy On March 2, the UN Security Council unanimously approved a resolution, drafted by the US and China, punishing North Korea with some of the toughest sanctions in decades. A number of North Korean officials are sanctioned, and all cargo in and out of the country must be inspected, along with other measures. So how big of a deal is this? China is indeed getting tougher on, and less patient with, North Korea. Their alliance is under some of the greatest strain it's experienced in years, and long-term trends suggest that strain will only worsen. Nonetheless, the fundamentals of that alliance remain in force. As much as the US might like to hope there's a China North Korea breakup coming which would be a big deal, given that China's support enables North Korean bad behavior there's little reason to believe this will happen. Big picture, don't expect the status quo to change. This all makes a lot more sense if you know China's longstanding policy toward North Korea, which, like many Chinese Communist Party policies, is often boiled down a very simple slogan. In this case, it's just six words: "No war, no instability, no nukes." In other words, China has three top priorities for the Korean Peninsula, and those priorities define everything. They're ranked in order, which is to say that China's top priority is to prevent war on the peninsula, its second priority is to prevent instability (for example, by way of North Korea's collapse), and third is to prevent nuclear weapons. That helps explain why China is going to new lengths to punish North Korea for its January nuclear test (as well as a February missile test): It really wants to deter North Korea from further nuclear development, which it sees as bringing risks that could hurt China as well. But it also shows why we shouldn't expect China to do anything as drastic as abandoning North Korea altogether. China wants to preserve stability and the status quo on the Korean Peninsula, with a divided Korea and a reliably anti-western North Korea. Those are higher priorities than deterring North Korean nukes.

3. UN SANCTIONS 2016 5 CONVENTIONAL ARMS The draft resolution targets North Korea's conventional arms capabilities by closing a gap in the arms embargo that had allowed small arms and light weapons to be sent to North Korea. North Korea would instead be subjected to a full arms embargo on all weapons. It has an unprecedented ban on the transfer to North Korea of any item that could directly contribute to the operational capabilities of the North Korean armed forces, such as trucks that could be modified for military purposes. It bans states from hosting North Korean military and policy trainers and advisors. NORTH KOREAN PROLIFERATION NETWORKS The draft resolution has a new requirement that states expel North Korean diplomats who are involved in illicit activities. CARGO AND INTERDICTION PROCEDURES The draft resolution has a new requirement that states must inspect on their territory all cargo going to or coming from North Korea via land, sea or air. Previously states were only required to do this if they had reasonable grounds to believe there was illicit cargo. It calls upon states to carry out inspections in a way that minimizes impact on the transfer of humanitarian relief cargo. It would ban all flights suspected of carrying prohibited items and ban all port calls by any vessel suspected of engaging in illicit activities. All vessels belonging to Ocean Maritime Management Company Limited would be banned from entering any port. It would require states to ban the chartering of their vessels or aircraft by North Korea, unless the state determines those services are for "livelihood purposes" and will not be used by North Korea to generate revenue. It also requires states to ban their nationals from operating North Korean vessels or using North Korean flags of convenience. RESOURCES The draft resolution would ban the supply or transfer to North Korea of aviation fuel, including rocket fuel. It would ban the export of gold, titanium ore, vanadium ore and rare earth minerals. It would also ban the export of coal, iron and iron ore unless such transactions are for "livelihood purposes" and would not be generating revenue for North Korea's nuclear and missile programs.

6 FINANCIAL SANCTIONS The draft resolution would require states to freeze the assets of any entity of the North Korean government or the ruling Workers Party of Korea that is associated with the nuclear and missile programs or other prohibited activities. It would require states to ban North Korean banks from opening branches on their territory or engaging in correspondent relationships. It would require states to ban their financial institutions from opening new offices, subsidiaries, branches or banking accounts in North Korea. It would require states to close existing financial activities in North Korea if there are reasonable grounds to believe those services could contribute to North Korea's nuclear or missile programs. It would ban all public and private financial trade support to North Korea if there are reasonable grounds to believe there is a link to proliferation. NUCLEAR AND BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAMS The draft resolution would require states to prevent the transfer of any item that could contribute to North Korea's nuclear or ballistic missile programs. It would also update a list of banned chemical and biological weapons materials. FOUR ANNEXES TO THE DRAFT RESOLUTIONS 1) A list of 16 North Korean individuals to be blacklisted. This includes people based outside North Korea and involved in the country's illicit programs, such as representatives in Iran and Syria of Korea Mining Developing Trading Corp, Pyongyang's primary arms dealer, and representatives of Tanchon Commercial Bank in Vietnam and Syria. Also listed are leaders of key North Korean companies responsible for illicit programs. 2) A list of 12 North Korean entities, many of which are key North Korean government agencies responsible for illicit programs, including the National Aerospace Development Administration, the Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry, a set of banks, including Korea Kwangson Banking Corp. 3) A list of 31 vessels, with names and International Maritime Organization numbers, belonging to Ocean Maritime Management Company Limited. 4) An illustrative lists of banned luxury items: watches, aquatic recreational vehicles, snowmobiles valued at more than $2,000, lead crystal, and recreational sports equipment.

4. WHICH ONE NEXT? 7 5. EAGLE HUNTING Guess which one is to be executed next. People take part in the traditional practice of eagle hunting at a festival in Xinjiang, China Issue 16-04B (No. 707) March 22, 2016