The Establishment of the Iberian Atlantic Area Command (IBERLANT)

N ATO SECRET COPY NO. 1 NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE COMITE MILITAIRE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD Standing Group Groupe Permanent MEMORANDUM FOR THE STANDING GROUP SUBJECT: References : l6 January 1959 Pages 1-4, incl, The Establishment of the Iberian Atlantic Area Command (IBERLANT) a. ^C-M(54)42, 2 Jun 54 F. M3C 24/2 (Final), 31 Oct 50 c. STASEC 1041, 11 Apr 52 3". 58 (Revised) (Final), 12 Jul 57 e. SACLANT's msg 1O1702Z Apr 52 T, SACLANT SER 36O, 17 Jul 52 g_. TOLANT 68, 21 Nov 52 h. TOLANT 77, 18 Feb 53 T. MC 32/14, 11 Dec 58 MC 5/13 (Final), 11 Dec 58 MC 32/10, 11 Dec 57 T. MC 14/2 (Revised) (Final), 23 May 57 m. MC 48/2 (Final), 23 May 57 n. MC 70 (Final), 9 May 58 o, IPT 119/32/INFO, 30 Dec 58 p. ^SGWM-5-59, 7 Jan 59. DFM(59)4, 13 Jan 59 r. BACLANT SER C-9, 5 Jan 59 INTRODUCTION 1. This memorandum has been prepared in compliance with the instructions issued by the Standing Group on 14 January 1959. 5 ENCLOSURES 1. Background and facts bearing on the problem. 2. Terms of Ref for CINCIBERLANT. 3. CINCIBERLANT should be Fr. Flag Off. 4. CINCIBERLANT should be US Flag Off. 5. UK Views on Establishment of IBERLANT j IMS -a;--;: DISTRIBUTION: A B1 4 9 E9 10 Fll LS, - 1 N ATO SECRET

BACKGROUND 2, By previous Standing Group instructions, the International Planning Team prepared an historical record of the IBERLANT problem (see reference ). U.S. IPT Member French IPT Member 3. "Background and Facts Bearing 3. This paragraph and on the Problem" have been treated additionally and Enclosure 1 not required. attached hereto at Enclosure 1. DISCUSSION 4. The proposed Terms of Reference for the Commander-in Chief Iberian Atlantic Area (CINCIBERLANT), which are attached at Enclosure 2, were derived from the SACLANT Emergency Defence Plan 1-59 (EDP 1-59)» and from the IBERLANT Emergency Defence plan 1-58 the 1959 Emergency Defence Plan for IBERLANT has not as yet been received by the Standing Group. 5. The International Planning Team has examined the following proposals on the resolution of the IBERLANT problem: a. Reference d, which was approved by the Military Committee and the North Atlantic Council, in supersession of reference bj b. Reference o_ and Enclosure 5* which reflect the United Kingdom views; c_. Reference which reflects the French views; d. Reference r, which reflects SACLANT*s views; e_. The United States views, which support reference d and those of SACLANT (reference r ). 6. The bases for the French and United States proposals on the nationality of CINCIBERLANT are summarized at Enclosure 3 and 4 respectively. SGWM - 2 -

CONCLUSIONS 7, The International Planning Team considers, in view of the above, that there Is one predominant obstacle which is delaying the Immediate establishment of IBERLANT, along the lines proposed in references d and r; and that is, the nationality of CINCIBERLANT; a_. The French International Planning Team member considers that CINCIBERLANT should be a French Flag Officer. b. The United States International Planning Team member considers that CINCIBERLANT should be a United States Flag Officer. 8, This basic French-United States difference also applies to the SACLANT alternate proposal that a nucleus planning group be established now at Headquarters ACLANT in Norfolk. 9, The French International Planning Team member also considers that the IBERLANT area should be extended to the North to Include the current Bay of'biscay Sub-area (BISCLANT), and that there should, at the same time, be a large extension of the latter to the West, if CINCIBERLANT is a French Flag Officer. 10, The United Kingdom International Planning Team member feels that consideration should be given to including the Azores in the IBERLANT command area. 11, It had been suggested that the solution to the IBERLANT problem should be considered along with consideration on the reorganization of some of the NATO naval commands. The International Planning Team considered this suggestion, but agreed that such an examination would probably delay the establishment of IBERLANT. This, however, does not preclude the initiation of a separate examination of this broader problem, as a matter of priority. - 3 -

12. In view of the basic split at paragraph 7 above, the International Planning Team was unable to recommend action on this matter onward to the North Atlantic Council, in accordance with reference a. Additional guidance on this matter is required from the Standing Group. RECOMMENDATION 13. It is recommended that the Standing Group consider the basic French-United States split at paragraph 7 above, and provide the International Planning Team with further guidance so that action on this subject can be continued as a matter of urgency. HVF:McC (IPT: Capt Rebut, Capt Brayne-Nicholls, Col Shapiro, Capt Bruti-Libérâti) H. V. FRASER Colonel, British Army Deputy Secretary - 4 -

ENCLOSURE 1 Pages 1-4, Incl. BACKGROUND AND FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM 1. In 1950, the command structure and organization of Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) was approved except that the North Atlantic Ocean Regional Group was requested to reconsider the command arrangements for IBERLANT (DC 24/2 (Final)). It was formally activated in 1952 (STASEC 104l of 11 April 1952). The Iberian Atlantic Area Command (IBERLANT) was an integral part of this ACLANT command structure and organization. It was also included in MC 58(Revised) (Final), wherein it was stated that the question of subdividing IBERLANT was still under study, 2. Howe-ver, because arrangements, prerequisite to the establishment of IBERLANT, could not be agreed (SACLANT1s message IOI7O2 April I952, SACLANT SER 36O of 17 July 1952, TOLANT 68 and TOLANT 77), CINCEASTLANT and CINCAIREASTLANT were assigned, as an interim emergency measure, the temporary responsibility for the IBERLANT area. NATO exercises, however, have demonstrated that these interim arrangements have proven unsatisfactory. 3. IBERLANT continues as the major unresolved command and organizational problem of the NATO command structure, which is seriously hampering SACLANT1s peacetime planning to carry out his wartime mission. In realization of the seriousness of this problem, the Military Committee, in approving MC 32/14, "directed the Standing Group to take action on the matter of IBERLANT Command and submit as a matter of urgency its report to the Military Committee.1 4. In December 1958, the Military Committee in Chiefs of Staff Session expressed their serious concern (MC 5/13 (Final)) over the IBERLANT problem as follows: 1 APPENDIX A. Prospective Reassignment of forces to CINCIBERLANT - 1 _ Enclosure 1

a. It is ",.. detracting from the overall operational readiness of NATO as a whole and ACLANT, particularly"; b. It is ",.. adversely affecting planning and operational readiness in the vital approaches to Gibraltar". 5. During Its consideration of MC 32/10, the Military Committee in Chiefs of Staff Session concluded that the communications and war headquarters project ( 1,138,000) for CINCIBERLANT should remain in the Ninth Slice;and emphasized "that the organization of this command should be settled as soon as possible". 6. While the urgency to establish IBERLANT has already been agreed by the Military Committee, as Indicated above, other agreements and statement by the North Atlantic Council, MOD Portugal, and between SACEUR and SACLANT, bear directly on this problem. a. The North Atlantic Council approved MC 14/2 (Revise (Final), MC 48/2 (Final) and MC 70 (Final), and thereby provided that : (1) There would be little or no warning of attack in the type of future war envisaged by NATO, and consequently the transition from peace to war could be a matter of minutes; (2) The NATO command structure must be prepared to react Instantly in the kind of war that NATO envisages, if wartime objectives are to be achieved; (3) NATO must be operationally ready (organized, trained and equipped) in peacetime, if the NATO commanders are to be able to accomplish their assigned missions and responsibilities in wartime; (4) The first critical phase of a future war, as anticipated by NATO, will have to be fought with the command structure In being, for there will not be time to establish operational commands in time to contribute materially to NATO's initial effort. S ECRET - NATO - 2 - Enclosure 1

b_. The North Atlantic Coun cil, in approving MC 58 (Revised) (Final) in supersession of DC 24/2 (Final), additionally provided: (1) For the delineation of IBERLANT boundaries (matter of subdividing IBERLANT nor entirely settled); at Lisbon; Officer. c_. (2) That Headquarters, IBERLANT, would be located (3) That CINCIBERLANT would be a United States During the Twenty-Second Meeting of the Military Committee in Chiefs of Staff Session, the Portuguese Chief of Staff stated "that the Portuguese authorities gave Immediate agreement to the construction in the Lisbon area of the War Headquarters for CINCIBERLANT and have prepared the cost estimates relating thereto." d. Enclosed to SACLANT SER C-9 is a copy of the SACLANT- CINCAFMED agreement (concurred in by SACEUB) on the command arrangements for the Gibraltar Straits. The arrangements contained therein would be appropriate after the establishment of IBERLANT, and after the appointment of CINCIBERLANT who would assume the responsibilities of SACLANT. This agreement is quoted in its entirety below: "The settlement of the IBERLANT Command is the first requisite for sound planning in the Gibraltar Straits area,, but, pending this settlement the planning can proceed on following conditions; "a. That the boundary between SACEUH-SACLANT remains exactly as at present. "b. That the Naval Commander at Gibraltar will conduct on both sides of boundary ASW operations of naval and air units assigned by SACLANT and SACEUR to the defense of the Straits. "d. That he will be responsible to SACEUR or his (designated) subordinate for operations to East and to SACLANT for operations to West in the Immediate approaches to the Straits. When an IBERLANT Commander is appointed, the task of the Naval Commander at Gibraltar in the IBERLANT area will be assigned by him. - 3 - Enclosure 1

Md. That SACLANT will represent NATO responsibilities and requirements for forces and facilities to the westward of the boundary and will approve all plans for facilities or operations In the IBERLANT area. CINCAFMED will act in a similar capacity with regard to NATO responsibilities and requirements to the eastward of the boundary." 7. Bearing directly on this problem is the prospective reassignment of forces to CINCIBERLANÎ, which may be summarised as follows (also see Appendix A attached hereto). 1, CVS, ASW Air craft Carrier 1 2. US 1 3- DD, Destroyer 11 Cumulative teil 3 Category "A" and "B" 4. FR 3 5. US 8 6. DE, Ocean Escort 16 7- FR 6 8. PORT 5 9. UK 3 10. US 2 11. MP, Maritime Patrol A/C 12. FR 8 13. PORT 18 14. US 1 Sq (9 8. As indicated above, the military requirement for IBERLANT has already been established and agreed. It has also been agreed that IBERLANT should be established as a matter of urgency. - 4 - Enclosure 1 (Page revised by Corrig. No, 1, 20 Jan 59)

*5.. That SACLANT will represent NATO responsibilities and requirements for forces and facilities to the westward of the boundary and will approve all plans for facilities or operations in the IBERLANT area. CINCAFMED will,, act In a similar capacity with regard/to NATO responsibilities and requirements to the Eastward of the boundary." 7. Bearing directly on this problem is the prospective reassignment of forces to CINCIBERLANT, which may be summarised as follows (also see Appendix A attached hereto). Cumulative To tell S Category "A 1 and "B" CVS, ASW Aircraft Carrier 1. 2. US 3. DD> Destroyer 4. FR 5. US 6. PE, Ocean Escort 7. FR 8. PORT 1 1 11 3 8 16 6 5 9. UK 3 10. US 2 11. MP, Maritime Patrol A/C 12. FR 8 13. PORT 14. US û iw if I # JP ft 18 15 8. As Indicated above, the military requirement for IBERLANT has already been established and agreed. It has also been agreed that IBERLANT should be established as a matter of urgency.

Appendix A ' Pages 1 PROSPECTIVE REASSIGNMENT OF FORCES TO CINCIBERLANT DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-0001-2Q06 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE ' ' ÏŸPE CATEGORY """A"' "B" (x). (a) (b) 1. CVS, ASW Aircraft Carrier 1 2 2, US 1 2 3. DD, Destroyer 2 11 i 4. FR 2 3 3 5. US - 8 16 6, DE, Ocean Escort 8 16 16 T. FR 3 6 6 8. PORT t1) 5 5 5 9. UK - 3 3 10, US - 2 2 11. MP, Maritime Patrol Aircraft (HTA)(^ 12. FR 8 8 8 13. PORT ^1) 18 18 18 14. US(2) - IS IS 15. ZP, Maritime Patrol Aircraft (LTA) (SQUAD) 16, US - _ 1 Exp;lanatory Notes: These forces are earmarked for SACLANT. They may, used for A/S protection in Portuguese home waters. (2) US allocations of MP A/C are by squadrons the number of A/C per squadron will vary, in line 11. 110" (c) eventually, be of 9-12 A/C totals are not. Since shown Category "A" forces available between D-Da.v and D nlus 2. Category "B" forces available between D r>lus!2 aod D plus 30. Category "C r forces available afte-r Déplus ^O * ÖGWM-33-59 - 1 - Appendix A to Enclosure 1

ENCLOSURE 2 Pages 1 TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR CINCIBERLANT DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-0001-2Q06 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE The Commander-in-Chief of the Iberian.Atlantic Area Command will be responsible to the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic: a. In peace: (1) For preparing the necessary operational and logistical plans for the execution of his assigned wa.rtime missions; (2) For preparing earmarked forces to the extent ne cessary to insure their readiness for war; (3) For conducting exercises, testing war procedures and the wartime chain of command; (4) For planning the exercise of operational control over earmarked forces, b. In war: (1) To control, route and protect ships and aircraft in the IBERLANT area and provide safe transit and required support for friendly force s; (2) To conduct o ffensive operations against the enemy in IBERLANT as opportunity permits with particular attention to coordination of any operations against the enemy in the ACLANT approaches to the Straits o f Gibraltar; (3) To defend the mainland and island territories of the NATO nations within the IBERLANT area against a.ttack from the sea. with particular emphasis upon plans for defense against submarine guided missile attack; (4) To support the operations of adjacent NATO and national commande rs. -1- Enclosure 2 s g w m -33-59

i ENCLOSURE 3 Pages 1 CINCXBERL ANT SHOULD BE A FRENCH FLAG OFFICER 1, France's share in the distribution of NATO naval commands does not reflect, particularly in the Atlantic, national responsibilities tha.t she must assume in order to maintain her sea communications between metropolitan France, West Africa and Madagascar in wartime as well as in peacetime. 2, The current and future status of the French naval forces, almost all of which a,re to be used in wartime for the NATO common defense, enables France reasonably to claim a major responsibility within N ATO in that part of the A tlantic, 3. France considers tha.t, in wartime, flexibility should be fully enhanced in the employment of NATO naval forces. If, according to her request, France is vested with the NATO responsibility of the Western Mediterranean and of the North Atlantic, she will be able to make, either in the Mediterranean or in the Atlantic as appropriate, the best use of her naval forces which will be logistically supported by Mers-El-Kebir, Brest and Dakar na.val bases. 4. Finally, France considers that, in the event of CINCIBERLANT being a French flag officer, the United States interests in the Mediterranean a.s well as in Spain are respected since the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, to whom CINCIBERLANT is responsible, is a United States flag officer. -1- Enclosure 3

ENCLOSURE 4 Pages 1 CINCIBERLANT SHOULD BE D, S. FLAG OFFICER 1. A preponderance of forces earmarked to IBERLANT are U.S. naval forces. 2. The U.S. has a. major Interest in the sea lines of communications flowing through the IBERLANT area; and this includes. In particular, the support and reinforcement the U.S. will provide in wartime to the NATO nations and NATO forces in southern Europe a.nd the Mediterranean a.rea. 3. UiS. command of IBERLANT Is advantageous by reason of the favorable relationship of the U.S. with Spain; and the unique position enjoyed by the U.S. by reason of its bilateral treaty with Spain Involving the use of Spanish bases. 4. A French or U.K. CINCIBERLANT may possibly preclude the proper use of Spanish naval forces and utilization of her bases in time of war. The U.S. Is in a position to coordinate the potential contribution of Spanish naval forces. 5. The U.S. has allocated approximately 80$ of its Atlantic na.val forces to the defense of the eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean. Yet, not one U.S. flag officer has been assigned to an area command in the sea.s contiguous to Europe. 6. And finally, the U.S. views parallel those which were agreed by all the N ATO nations In MC 58 (Revised)(Final). - 1 - Enclosure 4

ENCLOSURE 5 Pages 1 U. K. VIEWS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF IBERLANT The U.K.'s present views on IBERLANT, which are subject to negotiation, are as follows: a. That the IBERLANT Command should be set up with Headquarters at Lisbon; Jo. That CINCIBERLANT should be a U.S. officer unless a. review o f the whole naval command problem in NATO indicates that he should be of other nationality; Q. That consideration should be given to including the Azores in IBERLANT; d_. That CINCIBERLANT should have a British Chief of Staff or Assistant Chief of Staff (Plans and Policy); e_. That the U.K. Commander of Gibraltar should be responsible only to CINCAFMED but suitable arrangements must be made for the conduct of anti-submarine operations in the Straits of Gibraltar and the Atlantic and Mediterranean approaches. The U.K. would be prepared to consider a functional command in this area, under a U.K. Commander. Sg w m -33-59 -i- Enclosur e 5

fft TO 20 January 1959 COPY NC.. NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE COMITE MILITAIRE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD Standing Group CORRIGENDUM NO, 1 Pages 1 to Groupe Permanent 1. Holders of (The Establishment of the Iberian Atlantic Area Command (IBERLANT)) are requested to replace page 4 of Enclosure 1 with the attached page 4. to pulp. 2. Removed page is to be destroyed by burning or reducing 3. This cover page is regraded UNCLASSIFIED ~ NATO -when the attached page has been removed. H. -V. FRASER Colonel, British Army Deputy Secretary HAVF:McC 1 ENCLOSURE (l page change) Page 4 of Enclosure 1 of SGWM -33-59 DISTRIBUTION: as for basic paper