D I S A R M A M E N T A N D I N T E R N A T I O N A L S E C U R I T Y Study Guide SMUN 2016 1
1. Director s Note 2. The Executive Board 3. Participating Delegations 4. Topic Summary (Nuclear Weapon Free Zone) a. Basic Elements of an NWFZ b. Effects of creation of an NWFZ 5. Introduction to DISEC 6. Some Basic Terms 7. Threats arising out of Presence of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East 8. Key Issues 9. Distribution of Nuclear Weapons in: a. the Middle East b. around the Globe 10. Contact
DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AGENDA- CREATION OF A NUCLEAR FREE ZONE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Hello Delegates! DIRECTOR S NOTE It gives me immense joy and honour in being the director for the Disarmament and International Security committee in SMUN 2016. I hope that each one of you is as excited and enthusiastic as I am, if not more! Something about me, I m a science student currently studying in the 12th standard. I really love public speaking, but I found out this passion only in the 11th standard, after I started to attend MUNs across Mumbai. Madhulika Pathak, also a grade 12 Science student, is the Assistant Director for DISEC. She is well read and well versed with the current global scenario and being extremely approachable makes her a favourite among her peers. This year, Saachi Sethi, a student of Commerce, will moderate DISEC. Like Madhulika, she is approachable and she likes to remain updated with all the global happenings.
DISEC is one of the two new committees introduced in this year s SMUN and it is really interesting and exciting. I urge all the delegates to not label the agenda as a region-specific topic, as I m sure that in the course of your research work, you will understand how this has an impact on other parts of the world! The three of us expect every delegate to be well versed with the agenda, and their country s foreign policy and we hope that each one of you is participative in the proceedings. As this is a crisis committee, all delegates would be required to think fast and come up with almost impromptu (if I may say it in that manner) speeches in committee. So put your best foot forward! This is sure to be a phenomenal experience for all of you and a great learning opportunity. See you in committee! Agam Chavan, Director- DISEC Agam Chavan- Director Saachi Sethi- Moderator THE EXECUTIVE BOARD Madhulika Pathak- Assistant Director 1. Afghanistan 2. Algeria 3. Australia 4. Bangladesh 5. Belgium PARTICIPATING DELEGATIONS
6. Brazil 7. Canada 8. China 9. Cuba 10. Denmark 11. Egypt 12. France 13. Germany 14. Hungary 15. India 16. Iran 17. Iraq 18. Israel 19. Italy 20. Japan 21. Jordan 22. Kuwait 23. Lebanon 24. Libya 25. Mexico 26. Morocco 27. Netherlands 28. North Korea 29. Norway 30. Pakistan 31. Portugal 32. Russia 33. South Africa 34. South Korea 35. Switzerland 36. Syria 37. Turkey 38. United Kingdom 39. United States of America 40. Yemen
NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONE A nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) is a specified region in which countries commit themselves not to manufacture, acquire, test, or possess nuclear weapons. Five such zones exist today, with four of them spanning the entire Southern Hemisphere. The regions currently covered under NWFZ agreements include: Latin America (the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific (the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga), Southeast Asia (the 1995 Treaty of Bangkok) Africa (the 1996 Treaty of Pelindaba) and Central Asia (the 2006 Treaty of Semipalatinsk). Article VII of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered into force in 1970, affirms the right of countries to establish specified zones free of nuclear weapons. The UN General Assembly reaffirmed that right in 1975 and outlined the criteria for such zones. Within these nuclear-weapon-free zones, countries may use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Each treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone includes a protocol for the five nuclear-weapon states recognised under the NPT-China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States-to sign and ratify. These protocols, which are legally binding, call upon the nuclear-weapon states to respect the status of the zones and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against treaty states-parties. Such declarations of non-use of nuclear weapons are referred to as negative security assurances. However, the five nuclear-armed countries have at times signed and ratified a NWFZ protocol and declared conditions
reserving the right to use nuclear weapons in certain scenarios against parties to a nuclear-weapon-free zone. For instance, the United States signed the protocol for the African nuclear-weapon-free zone in April 1996 with a declaration that it would reserve the right to respond with all options, implying possible use of nuclear weapons, to a chemical or biological weapons attack by a member of the zone. None of the nuclear-weapon states have signed the relevant protocol for the treaty creating a zone in Southeast Asia because of concerns that it conflicts with the right of their ships and aircraft to have freedom of movement in international waters and airspace. The other three zones do not explicitly rule out the transit of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon states through the zones, and the general practice of nuclear-weapon states is not to declare whether nuclear weapons are aboard their vessels. BASIC ELEMENTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONE TREATIES- Duration: The treaties are to remain in force indefinitely. Yet, each treaty includes a withdrawal option for states-parties. With the exception of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which simply requires three months' advance notice before a withdrawal can take effect, all the NWFZ treaties require 12 months' advance notice for a state-party to end its treaty obligations. Conditions: None of the treaties can be subjected to conditions by its non-nuclear-weapon states-parties. Verification: Each state-party adopts comprehensive safeguards administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which verifies that states-parties are not pursuing nuclear weapons illicitly. The Central Asian NWFZ goes a step further in requiring that states in the region
adopt the IAEA's Additional Protocol, which provides for expanded monitoring. Territory Covered: Each zone applies to the entire territories of all of its states-parties. Territory is understood to include all land holdings, internal waters, territorial seas, and archipelagic waters. The Latin American treaty also extends hundreds of kilometers from the states-parties' territories into the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, but the nuclear-weapon states, citing their freedom at sea, assert that this does not apply to their ships and aircraft that might be carrying nuclear weapons. A dispute also exists over the inclusion of the Chagos Archipelago, which includes the U.S. military base at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, as part of the proposed African nuclear-weapon-free zone. Neither the United States nor the United Kingdom recognises Diego Garcia as being subject to the Pelindaba Treaty. EFFECTS OF CREATION OF A NWFZ- As mentioned earlier, a NWFZ is something, which the Mid East has long wanted. This zone will not only ensure peaceful times in the Middle East which is currently plagued by terrorism and civil unrest, but will also help in establishing good relationships between nations as a NWFZ will clear any fog regarding a country s nuclear capabilities. But, if a NWFZ is to be created, countries like Israel which prefer not to disclose completely their nuclear capacity, will have to reach a consensus with other countries regarding their participation in an NWFZ while not compromising greatly on their national policies and interests. Every willing country must think for the common good, and world peace must be of paramount importance for them. Apart from developing good diplomatic relations and contributing to world peace, the creation of such a zone
would help nations to divert funds to areas of greater importance like developing a social system, better healthcare and educational facilities etc. The financial implications of the creation of a NWFZ are plenty and remain highly debatable. Moreover, terrorists or other countries in the event of a war to cause widespread destruction can easily target great security measures need to be taken for a nuclear plant as such structures. INTRODUTION TO DISEC The Disarmament and International Security is the first committee out of the six committees of the General Assembly. As the name suggests, The First Committee deals with disarmament, global challenges and threats to peace that affect the international community and seeks out solutions to the challenges in the international security regime. It considers all disarmament and international security matters within the scope of the Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any other organ of the United Nations; the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, as well as principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments; promotion of cooperative arrangements and measures aimed at strengthening stability through lower levels of armaments. The Committee works in close co-operation with the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament. It is the only Main Committee
of the General Assembly entitled to verbatim records coverage. The First Committee sessions are structured into three distinctive stages: 1) General Debate 2) Thematic Discussion 3) Action on drafts It should be understood that though this is the procedure for the actual functioning of DISEC, we will follow standard HMUN procedure, and not the actual one. DISEC meets every year in October for a 4-5 week session, and all 193 member states of the United Nations can attend it. The landmark resolutions passed by DISEC include; Resolution 1 (I): The very first General Assembly resolution, entitled Establishment of a Commission to Deal with the Problems Raised by the Discovery of Atomic Energy, was adopted on recommendation by the First Committee on 24 January 1946, in London. Resolution 1378 (XIV): The very first General Assembly resolution that was co-sponsored by all Member States at that time. SOME BASIC TERMS Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone It is any zone, recognised as such by the General Assembly of the United Nations, which any group of States, in the free
exercise of their sovereignty, has established by virtue of a treaty or convention whereby the statute of total absence of nuclear weapons, including the procedure for delimiting the zone is defined. In addition, a zone where an international system of verification and control is established to guarantee compliance with the obligations derived from that statute. Nuclear Weapon It is any device which is capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and which has a group of characteristics that are appropriate for use for warlike purposes. An instrument that may be used for the transport or propulsion of the device is not included in this definition if it separable from the device and not an indivisible part thereof. Nuclear Proliferation A term used to describe the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons-applicable nuclear technology and information, to nations which are not recognised as "Nuclear Weapon States" by the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, also known as the NPT. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) A landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. Nuclear Deterrence The military doctrine that an enemy will be deterred from using nuclear weapons as long as he can be destroyed as a
consequence. Nuclear Umbrella A term that refers to the guarantee of military protection that nuclear weapons armed states are seen to extend, if need be with nuclear weapons, to their non-nuclear weapons armed allies. Nuclear umbrellas are usually, but not always, explicitly declared. Amimut The official Israeli stance regarding its own nuclear weapons; it is a Hebrew word that literally means opacity or ambiguity and represents the opposite of transparency. Under this stance, Israel neither confirms nor denies the possession of nuclear weapons. Confidence-Building Measures (CBM) They are broadly defined as measures that address, prevent, or resolve uncertainties among states. Designed to prevent wanted and especially unwanted escalations of hostilities and build mutual trust, CBMs can be formal or informal, unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral, military or political, and can be state- to-state or non-governmental. THREATS ARISING OUT OF PRESENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST Iran-Israel nuclear conflict Although the Iran-Israel severed relations since 1979 are mainly attributed to the ideological conflict of Islamism vs. Zionism, the involvement of both nations nuclear program
has worsened the situation. In 2010, a series of assassinations of top Iranian nuclear scientists was rumoured to have been the work of Israel s secret service, Mossad. These were supposedly meant to halt the Iranian nuclear program or to ensure inability to recover after attacks on Iranian facilities. Moreover in June 2010, Israel allegedly launched a cyber attack on Iran s Natanz uranium enrichment plant through the Stuxnet computer worm. The virus was thought to be of Israeli origin and had destroyed about 1000 centrifuges at the facility. The Mossad had also been suspected of causing the 2011 explosion at the sensitive Isfahan facility. Indeed this proxy conflict has been amplified by Israel s efforts to stop the Iranian nuclear program. Syrian and Libyan violation of the NPT Both Syria and Libya have violated the NPT once and while these may have not been serious transgressions, they did stir the international community into thinking about the possible ramifications of such nations acquiring nuclear weapons. Libya was believed to have undertaken a covert weapons program, using material and technology supplied by Pakistani nuclear scientist, A.Q. Khan s illicit proliferation network. However in 2003, Libya agreed to eliminate all its WMD programs and even invited US, UK and IAEA inspectors to verify this process. The Syrian contravention was discovered by an Israeli airstrike in 2007 that bombed a suspected plutonium production reactor at the Al-Kibar site. The subsequent IAEA investigation from 2008 to 2011 concluded that it was likely that the bombed building was a reactor that should have been declared. Syria had failed to cooperate with the IAEA and in June 2011, the IAEA resolved to report Syria to the UN Security Council on the grounds of violation of the Safeguards Agreement.
Airstrikes on nuclear facilities As a result of the mistrust among Middle Eastern nations, airstrikes on suspected nuclear facilities have been common, especially during times of war. The first such instance was Operation Scorch Sword on September 30, 1980 when Iranian airstrikes damaged Iraq s Osirak reactor that was being constructed, aiming to forestall nuclear weapon development. The reactor was completely destroyed on June 7, 1981 by Israel s Operation Opera that carried out similar airstrikes. In retaliation, Iraqi aerial strikes damaged Iran s Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant during the Iran-Iraq War in 1984. It is also worthy to note that Operation Orchard, Israel s preventive strike on the Syrian reactor helped expose a clandestine nuclear project. KEY ISSUES Ability to freely arrive upon a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone A nuclear-weapon-free zone needs to be arrived upon by member states through the free exercise of their sovereignty and this has been reiterated by many nations, party to the issue, including Israel. However, given the strained relations between nations in the Middle East, it may be difficult to be able to initiate a nuclear-weapon-free zone in its correct spirit if one or more member states dissent. This has been marked in the various demands, sometimes unreasonable such as Israel s desire for a comprehensive peace settlement, of several key players and its resulting impediment to the creation of said zone. It will be essential to formulate a strong consensus among regional states with regard to a determined effort to ban nuclear weapons on Middle Eastern
soil. Definition of the Middle East as a region The Middle East has not been demarcated as an official macro-geographical region by the United Nations Statistics Division s geo-scheme. For a nuclear-weapon-free zone to be implemented, its scope needs to be defined in terms of the nations included under its ambit. There is a need to deal with this issue from a geopolitical rather than a geographic point of view that further complicates the question of the jurisdiction of such a zone. An equitable decision that addresses potential nuclear threats from certain Middle East states continues to be a challenge. Accession of Israel to relevant treaties including the NPT The 2010 NPT Review Conference resolution singled out Israel as the only regional state that is non- signatory to the NPT. Moreover, Israel has signed but not ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). If Israel were to be included in a nuclear-weapon-free zone of the Middle East, this would require its immediate accession to the NPT and subsequent placement of all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. Although it seems like an unlikely prospect, it will be imperative to have Israel sign and ratify treaties aimed towards nuclear disarmament or testing if such a zone is to be realised. Furthermore, Israeli-IAEA cooperation would also need to be established for effective applications of safeguards to nuclear sites and gradual decommissioning of its alleged 100 200 warhead stockpile. Regulation mechanism to verify compliance after
ratification Probably the most important aspect of a nuclear-weaponfree zone, a verification mechanism is a prerequisite to building such a zone. It is needed to enforce the obligations resulting from the treaty that mandates the regional nuclearweapon-free zone. More importantly, the system is used to keep a check on compliance of member states with the said treaty after they ratify it, while investigating cases of violation of the obligations of the zone. Bilateral or multilateral inspection regimes would further bolster the thoroughness of the verification process. However, the longstanding mistrust and skepticism among member nations is likely to hinder the work of the regulatory body and thus such a regime needs to be initiated that is acceptable to all parties and that can function fairly with a large jurisdiction. Role of the P5 nations and their regional interests A nuclear-weapon-free zone requires recognisance by the P5 nations (United States, China, Russia, United Kingdom and France), who happen to be the only legitimate Nuclear Weapon States, in order to secure the ratifying countries from a nuclear attack or a threat of a nuclear attack by any of the aforementioned nations. The P5 nations are obliged to provide security assurances, which may be negative (promising to never use nuclear weapons against the nation except in retaliation) or positive (promising to aid the protected nation if it is a victim of a nuclear attack). Given some of the powers compulsion to act in favour of their close allies in the region, it is crucial to have the P5 nations unanimous consent on a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone. However, what truly complicates the establishment of such a zone is the strategic interests of some of the external powers characterised by the desire for regional clout and the lucrative presence of oil. This makes it unclear whether the P5 nations will always act in the best interests of the Middle
East states or in a deliberately passive manner to maintain status quo and further wield their already existing political influence. DISTRIBUTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 1. Israel Israel is the Middle East s principal nuclear power, though it has never officially acknowledged possession of nuclear weapons. According to a 2013 report by US experts, Israel s nuclear arsenal includes 80 nuclear warheads, with enough fissile material potentially to double that number. Israel is not a member of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and parts of its nuclear research program are off limits to the inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency. Proponents of regional nuclear disarmament point to a contradiction between Israel s nuclear capacity and insistence by its leaders that Washington stops Iran s nuclear program with force, if necessary. But Israel s advocates say nuclear weapons are a key deterrent against demographically stronger Arab neighbours and Iran. This deterrent capacity would of course be compromised if Iran managed to enrich uranium to the level where it too could produce nuclear warheads. 2. Syria In September 2007, Israel conducted an airstrike on what U.S. officials have alleged was the construction site of a nuclear research reactor similar to North Korea s Yongbyon reactor. Intelligence officials briefed members of congress on the airstrike eight months later in April 2008, discussing the
evidence leading to their judgment that the site was an undeclared nuclear reactor. While the extent of Syrian-North Korean nuclear cooperation is unclear, it is believed to have begun in 1997. Subsequent IAEA investigations into the U.S. claims uncovered traces of undeclared man-made uranium particles at both the site of the destroyed facility and Syria s declared research reactor. Syria has failed to provide adequate cooperation to the IAEA in order to clarify the nature of the destroyed facility and procurement efforts that could be related to a nuclear program. 3. Pakistan We often count Pakistan as part of the wider Middle East, but the country s foreign policy is better understood in the South Asian geopolitical context and the hostile relationship between Pakistan and India. Pakistan successfully tested nuclear weapons in 1998, narrowing the strategic gap with India, which conducted its first test in the 1970s. Western observers have often voiced concerns over the safety of Pakistan s nuclear arsenal, particularly regarding the influence of radical Islamism in the Pakistani intelligence apparatus, and the reported sales of enrichment technology to North Korea and Libya. While Pakistan never played an active role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, its relationship with Saudi Arabia could yet place Pakistani nuclear weapons at the center of Middle Eastern power struggles. Saudi Arabia has provided Pakistan with generous financial largesse as part of efforts to contain Iran s regional influence, and some of that money could have been ended up bolstering Pakistan s nuclear program. 3. Iran s Nuclear Program Just how close Iran is to reaching weapons capacity has been the subject of endless speculation. Iran s official
position is that its nuclear research is aimed for peaceful purposes only, and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei Iran s most powerful official has even issued religious decrees slamming possession of nuclear weapons as contrary to the principles of Islamic faith. Israeli leaders believe that the regime in Tehran has both intent and ability, unless the international community takes tougher action. The middle view would be that Iran uses the implicit threat of uranium enrichment as a diplomatic card in the hope of extracting concessions from the West on other fronts. That is, Iran might be willing to scale down its nuclear program if given certain security guarantees by the US, and if international sanctions were eased. That said, Iran s complex power structures consist of numerous ideological factions and business lobbies, and some hardliners would no doubt be willing to push for weapons capacity even for the price of unprecedented tension with the West and Gulf Arab states. If Iran does decide to produce a bomb, the outside world probably doesn t have too many options. Layers upon layers of US and European sanctions have battered but failed to bring down Iran s economy, and the course of military action would be extremely risky. 4. Egypt Egypt recently announced plans to build a number of nuclear power stations to generate electricity. It says energy security is important to its development. The US has offered to provide assistance, saying there is no comparison between the peaceful use of nuclear technology by Egypt and Iran's controversial nuclear programme. Cairo's original plans to pursue nuclear weapons were abandoned in the 1980s when the country ratified the NPT. It
has since led calls for a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction. 5. Gulf States Saudi Arabia has the world's largest oil reserves and an abundance of natural gas but is now also developing a civilian nuclear power supply. There is speculation this is in response to Iran developing a nuclear capacity. The kingdom is wary of its Gulf neighbour's intentions, but does not support a US strike on its nuclear sites. Saudi Arabia and the other states of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) - Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates - have declared an interest in pursuing a joint civilian nuclear programme. In January, France signed a deal to help the United Arab Emirates build a nuclear reactor. 6. Jordan Last year, King Abdullah of Jordan told Israel's Haaretz newspaper that the rules had changed on the nuclear issue in the Middle East. He went on to announce that his country planned to develop its first nuclear power plant by 2015 for electricity and desalination. He said it was following Egypt and the GCC. DISTRIBUTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE
AFRICA DISEC WORLD Guided by the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, in which they solemnly declared their readiness to undertake, through an international agreement to be concluded under United Nations auspices, not to manufacture or acquire control of nuclear weapons They believed that the African nuclear-weapon-free zone will constitute an important step towards strengthening the nonproliferation regime, and will promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, will promote general and complete disarmament and enhance regional and international peace and security The African nuclear-weapon-free zone will protect African States against possible nuclear attacks on their territories According to the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty Each Party undertakes: (a) Not to conduct research on, develop, manufacture, stockpile or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over any nuclear explosive device by any means anywhere; (b) Not to seek or receive any assistance in the research on, development, manufacture, stockpiling or acquisition, or possession of any nuclear explosive device; (c) Not to take any action to assist or encourage the research on, development, manufacture, stockpiling or acquisition, or possession of any nuclear explosive device.
It prohibits testing of nuclear devices It prohibits Declaration, Dismantling, Destruction, Conversion of nuclear weapons PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES 1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as to prevent the use of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes.2. As part of their efforts to strengthen their security, stability and development, the Parties undertake to promote individually and collectively the use of nuclear science and technology for economic and social development. To this end they undertake to establish and strengthen mechanisms for cooperation at the bilateral, sub regional and regional levels.3. Parties are encouraged to make use of the programme of assistance available in IAEA and, in this connection, to strengthen cooperation under the African Regional Cooperation Agreement for Research, Training and Development Related to Nuclear Science and Technology EUROPE Nuclear bombs are stored on air-force bases in Italy, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands and planes from each of those countries are capable of delivering them. Among the five undeclared nuclear states, Germany remains the most heavily nuclearized country with three nuclear bases (two of which are fully operational) and may store as many as 150 [B61 bunker buster] bombs (Ibid). In accordance with NATO strike plans these tactical nuclear weapons are also targeted at the Middle East. While Germany is not categorized officially as a nuclear power, it
produces nuclear warheads for the French Navy. It stockpiles nuclear warheads (made in America) and it has the capabilities of delivering nuclear weapons. Germany imports and deploys nuclear weapons from the US. It also produces nuclear warheads which are exported to France. Yet it is classified as a non-nuclear state. Nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO provide an essential political and military link between the European and the North American members of the Alliance. The Alliance will therefore maintain adequate nuclear forces in Europe. Nuclear bombs are stored on air-force bases in Italy, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands and planes from each of those countries are capable of delivering them. ASIA The Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ) or the Bangkok Treaty of 1995, is a nuclear weapons moratorium treaty between 10 Southeast Asian member-states under the auspices of the ASEAN: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam. It was opened for signature at the treaty conference in Bangkok, Thailand, on 15 December 1995 and it entered into force on March 28, 1997 and obliges its members not to develop, manufacture or otherwise acquire,
possess or have control over nuclear weapons. The treaty includes a protocol under which the five nuclearweapon states recognized by the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), namely China, the United States, France, Russia and the United Kingdom (who are also the five permanent members of the United) undertake to respect the Treaty and do not contribute to a violation of it by State parties. None of the nuclear-weapon states have signed this protocol. Nuclear weapons in Asia are on the rise. China, North Korea, India, and Pakistan are all increasing their nuclear arsenals and modernizing their delivery systems. The report says that China is "gradually increasing its nuclear forces as it modernizes its arsenal." China has an estimated 260 nuclear weapons, but it has so far refrained from producing the nuclear fuel to create more. China in the past has built gigantic, city-busting megaton nukes to make up for inaccurate missiles, but as accuracy improves they may dismantle existing weapons to create more, smaller warheads. Beijing is also preparing to send its latest nuclear missile submarines to sea and is placing multiple warheads on long-range land-based nuclear missiles. North Korea continues to grow its nuclear arsenal. The totalitarian country is estimated to have 10 to 16 nuclear weapons and appears to have restarted its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, which will give it the capability to produce fuel for up to two more weapons per year. India and Pakistan are locked in a regional arms race. India has between 100 and 120 nuclear weapons, while Pakistan has slightly more, between 110 and 130. Both countries are also looking to build their own versions of a nuclear "triad",
with nukes split between air, land and sea delivery forces to prevent a surprise attack from eliminating their nuclear arsenals. AMERICA The United States of America is said to be the first country to manufacture nuclear weapons and used them in combat fighting against Japan in Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II. The Nuclear Armaments of United States of America are being produced by the Nuclear Weapon Complex (NWC), which is being administered by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The comprehensive tests are done on the weapons so that they can remain up to date. Some 27 foreign countries also house the nuclear weapons of America, which include Okinawa in Japan, Taiwan, Greenland, Morocco, and Germany. The nuclear warheads of United States of America are stored in some 21 locations, which include 13 U.S. states and 5 European countries. There are said to be some 5,113 atomic weapons, which are scattered all around U.S., and some are on board U.S. submarines. There are some "zombie" nuclear warheads as well, and they are kept in reserve, and as many as 3,000 of these are still awaiting their dismantlement. It also extends its nuclear umbrella to such other countries as South Korea, Japan, and Australia. AUSTRALIA
Most Australians are unaware that for more than three decades Australian politicians and military, scientific and cabinet officials conducted a campaign to persuade the government of the day to acquire or develop nuclear weapons. the emphasis had shifted from purchasing nuclear weapons from abroad, to manufacturing them in Australia. W. C. Wentworth, Liberal parliamentarian and former Chairman of the AAEC, advocated a home-grown weapon because the United States could not be trusted to come to our defense. He wanted a nuclear reactor to be built in the Snowy Mountains to generate plutonium. Baxter spoke glowingly to Australian public servants in Canberra about different types of nuclear reactors, and the best one for Australia. Australia is widely considered to be a world leader in efforts to halt and reverse the spread of nuclear weapons.1 The Australian government created the Canberra Commission, which called for the progressive abolition of nuclear weapons. It led the fight at the U.N. General Assembly to save the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the year before, played a major role in efforts to extend the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) indefinitely. In short, Australia is a country whose nonproliferation credentials are impeccable. But there is another side to this story. Newly declassified documents describe repeated attempts by elements within the Australian government to acquire nuclear weapons. In 1958, for example, Australian officials approached the British government regarding the purchase of tactical nuclear weapons. In 1961, Australia proposed a secret agreement for the transfer of British nuclear weapons, and, throughout the 1960s,
Australia does not possess weapons of mass destruction, although it has participated in extensive research into nuclear, biological and chemical weapons in the past.
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