Acquisition Path Analysis as a Collaborative Activity

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Acquisition Path Analysis as a Collaborative Activity A.El Gebaly, R.Grundule, K.Gushchyn, R.Higgy, W.Mandl, A.Nakao, I.Tsvetkov, International Atomic Energy Agency

Acquisition Path Analysis (APA) Processes supporting Safeguards implementation Ongoing Collaborative analysis 2

APA Working Methodology For a State, it took 11 State Evaluation Group (SEG) meetings in total over a two-month period to complete acquisition path analysis (APA). The analysis process and discussions were followed in accordance with the APA guide: Step1. Consolidating information Step2. Identify & visually present technically plausible acquisition paths Step3. Assessing steps of identified acquisition paths Step4. Assessing the time needed to accomplish the paths At each SEG meeting, a Power Point presentation would normally be prepared to visualize the process, to stimulate the discussion and to document the findings. All identified actions were monitored and their completion was recorded. The SEG meetings were often attended by Section management and by subject matter experts in Department of Safeguards. 3

- Step 1 - Consolidating Information about the State s past, present and planned NFC-related capabilities & infrastructure: NFC locations Declared facilities & NFC processes Other declared elements of NFC and R&D Declared Annex I and II capabilities Declared NM inventory Open source analysis of NFC related R&D and industrial capabilities 4

- Step 2 - Identify and visually presenting technically plausible acquisition paths for a State Identified Possible Acquisition Path Groups (PAPG) were as follows: No.1 Plutonium (Pu) path starting from Spent Fuel No.2 Pu path starting from Natural Uranium Ore Concentrate (NU UOC) No.3 Pu path starting from Depleted Uranium (DU) No.4 High Enriched Uranium (HEU) path starting from Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) Fresh Fuel (FF) through UF 6 Enrichment No.5 HEU path starting from NU UOC through UF 6 Enrichment No.6 HEU path starting from LEU FF through Uranium (U) metal Enrichment No.7 HEU path starting from NU UOC through U metal Enrichment No.8 233 U path starting from Thorium ore concentrate In this example, the State has no declared separated Pu or HEU materials. 5

PAPG No.1 in the State - Pu path starting from SF - 3 x 2 x 2 = 12 Acquisition Paths in total. 6

PAPG No.2 in the State - Pu path starting from NU UOC - Pu path starting from NU UOC 144 Acquisition Paths in total. 7

Identified Acquisition Path Steps for the State Step No. Description for Step Duration PAPG I1 Unreported import of NM 1-6 months 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 P1 Known indigenous production of UOC 2 weeks 2 5 7 P2 Unknown indigenous production of UOC 2 weeks 2 5 7 D1 Diversion of Alloy (DU) 1 day 3 D2 Diversion of FF (LEU) 1 day 4 6 D3 Diversion of SF from Reactor 1 day 1 D4 Diversion of SF from Storage 1 day 1 M-1 Misuse of exempted & terminated NM 1 day 3 M0 Misuse of declared Conversion I 1 year 2 4 5 6 7 8 M1 Misuse of declared Fuel Fabrication Plant 1 week 2 3 8 M3 Misuse of declared Reactor 1 month 2 3 8 8

Identified Acquisition Path Steps for the State (Cont.) Step No. Description for Step Duration PAPG M4.1 Misuse of declared Conversion II (Pu path) 1.5 years 1 2 3 M4.2 Misuse of declared Conversion II (HEU path) 1 year 4 5 M4.3 Misuse of declared Conversion II ( 233 U path) 1 year 8 M5 Misuse of declared Reprocessing plant 1 month 1 2 3 8 F1 Undeclared Conversion I 1 year 2 4 5 6 7 8 F2 Undeclared Manufacture of target 1 week 2 3 8 F4.1 Undeclared Irradiation 3 years 2 3 8 F4.2 Unknown Irradiation 10 years 2 3 8 F5 Undeclared Reprocessing 7 months 1 2 3 8 F6.1 Undeclared Conversion II (Pu path) 1.5 years 1 2 3 F6.2 Undeclared Conversion II (HEU path) 1 year 4 5 F6.3 Undeclared Conversion II ( 233 U path) 1 year 8 F7.1 Undeclared Enrichment (UF 6 ) 5 years 4 5 F7.2 Undeclared Enrichment (U metal) 10 years 6 7 9

- Step 3 - Assessing acquisition path steps along the identified acquisition paths 10

Assessments of Acquisition Path Steps - I1 Unreported import of NM for All PAPG No.1-8 - Technical Capability Any unreported import of NM (DU, LEU, NU, HEU, Pu and Th) can occur at any time. State s actions to accomplish the step (proliferation scenarios) Separated Pu and HEU: Unreported import is technically plausible. SF: Unreported import technically plausible; the State also has large inventory. DU, LEU, NU and Th: Unreported import is technically plausible. Detectable indicators Falsification of accountancy records; Inconsistencies in transit matching analysis. Time needed to accomplish the step for 1 Significant quantity (SQ) of NM Is NM available domestically to perform the step? LEU is available in FF form in the State. DU, NU and Th might be required and import might be needed. Is Technical capability available to perform the step? It will require clandestine network to avoid detection. How long does it take to complete the step for 1 SQ of NM? DU: min.1 month, NU, LEU: min. 2 months, Th: min. 6 months. Added by SEG 11

Assessments of Acquisition Path Steps - D3 Diversion of SF from Reactor for PAPG No.1 - Technical Capability Quantity of nuclear material available for diversion Each spent fuel assembly (SFA) contains max. 100 kg of LEU, 1 kg of U 235 and 1.5 kg of Pu. 2500 assemblies are stored in spent fuel ponds, which amounts to 500 SQs of Pu and 33 SQs of LEU. State s actions to accomplish the step (proliferation scenarios) Diversion of spent fuel assemblies (replacement by dummies). Due to the high level of radiation dose, a cask would be required for any movement of SFA outside the pond. The size of a nominal cask for SF transfer can contain 90 SFAs. 6 SFAs are to be diverted to accumulate 1 SQ of Pu. Detectable indications SFA in the pond are replaced by dummies (gross defect); Unreported movement of casks. Time needed to accomplish the step for 1 SQ of NM Is NM available domestically to perform the step? Yes, there is plenty. More than 500 SQs of Pu are available in the State. Is Technical capability available to perform the step? Yes, the operators are regularly performing SF transfer to co-located dry storage. Transportation cask is available on site. How long does it take to complete the step for 1 SQ of NM? 1 day to divert 6 SFAs. Added by SEG 12

- Step 4 - Assessing the time needed to accomplish each of the acquisition paths Less than 1 month More than 1 month and Less than 3 months More than 3 months and Less than 1 year More than 1 year and Less than 3 years More than 3 years and less than 5 years 13

PAPG No.1 in the State - Pu path starting from SF - Step I1 is assessed as lower priority. 2x2x2 = 8 plausible acquisition paths. Shortest time needed to accomplish = 1.5 years by all 8 paths. Conversion II will be dramatically shortened from 1.5 years to 1 month if facilities/capabilities become available in the State. 14

PAPG No.2 in the State - Pu path starting from NU UOC - 144 acquisition paths in total. Shortest time needed to accomplish = 1.5 years by 48 paths. 15

Summary - Time needed to accomplish the path - PAPG Sum < 1 yr 1-3 yrs 3-5 yrs 5 yrs > No.1 Pu path starting from SF 1.5 8 0 8 0 0 No.2 Pu path starting from NU UOC 1.5 144 0 48 48 48 No.3 Pu path starting from DU 1.5 72 0 24 24 24 No.8 233 U path starting from Th ore concentrate 1.3 48 0 16 16 16 No.4 HEU path starting from LEU FF - UF 6 Enr. 5 8 0 0 0 8 No.5 HEU path starting from NU UOC - UF 6 Enr. 5 12 0 0 0 12 No.6 HEU path starting from LEU FF - Umetal Enr. 10 4 0 0 0 4 No.7 HEU path starting from NU UOC - Umetal Enr. 10 6 0 0 0 6 Total number of paths in all groups Shortest Time (year) Distribution of number of the path by the time needed to accomplish total path 302 0 96 88 118 Total number of plausible acquisition paths 184 16

SEG Achievements Visual presentation of a group of pathways that allow for simple calculation of total number of paths in a group was established. Acquisition path steps were identified in order to be assessed in logical and structured way. In this way, the APA process follows well defined methodology and can be computerized. New assessment criteria with 3 practical questions were added to step assessment form intending that assessment results in duration of the step to acquire 1 SQ of NM. The SEG feedbacks were incorporated into the Agency APA Guide. Collaborative environment was maintained during the SEG meetings and for number of cases, subject matter experts in the department were invited to participate. 17