Josh Leach Daniel Morgan: Mastermind of Cowpens James Madison University

Josh Leach Daniel Morgan: Mastermind of Cowpens James Madison University

Lexington and Concord, Saratoga, Bunker Hill, Yorktown; everyone knows that these are battles from the American Revolution, but how many know the Battle of Cowpens? To the general public this battle means little to nothing, yet it was one of the most successful victories for the Americans over the British. The dominance showed here by the American fighters can be attributed to the leadership showed by their commanding officer, Brigadier General Daniel Morgan. Morgan, who lived in Winchester, Virginia in the Shenandoah Valley, was no newcomer to battle as he had seen combat in the French and Indian War and been a part of some of the Northern campaign during the Revolution. After his action at the Battle of Saratoga and service in the middle colonies, Morgan retired from the military only to be called back by George Washington. He then reentered the service and joined Nathaniel Greene in the southern campaign. Through his entire military career Morgan never received any formal military strategic training. So how did this backwoods colonial soldier defeat Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton of the British army on January 17, 1781 at the Battle of Cowpens with such ease? In his book A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens, Lawrence Babits makes the argument that British fatigue was one of the major contributing factors in the American win. While Babits is correct that fatigue was a main factor, he fails to acknowledge that Morgan marched in such a fashion before the battle to increase tough travels on the British. The overall defeat of the British by Daniel Morgan can be attributed to his pre-battle maneuvering, leadership when it came to addressing the militia, and tactics used during battle. Without the leadership shown by General Morgan the victory at Cowpens would not have been so easily achieved. 1 1. Any study of the military history of the American Revolution begins with Mark Boatner, Landmarks of the American Revolution, Library of Military History, 2 nd ed. (Farmington Mills: Thomson Gale, 2006). For overall involvement of Virginia looking at the Valley start with Freeman H. Hart, The Valley of Virginia in the American Revolution, 1763-1789 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1942). For the study of Daniel Morgan

To understand Morgan s great success at Cowpens one must look into his pre-war life and experiences. Not much is known about Morgan s early-life except for the fact that he likely grew up in the Delaware River Valley in parts of either New Jersey or Pennsylvania. 2 Even Morgan s official birth year remains uncertain, but it is likely to have been in the year 1735. 3 Following the trend, there is not much known about what family he had while living in this area. Morgan emerges from this clouded past around the age of eighteen, when he left home due to an argument with his father. Morgan moved westward during the winter of 1752-53 through Pennsylvania stopping along places while waiting for the snow to melt. Upon better traveling conditions Morgan entered the Great Wagon Road, a road crossing from Philadelphia to the Yadkin River in North Carolina. During the stretch of this road he encountered a town called Winchester, Virginia in the Shenandoah Valley and decided to seek work there. 4 His search for work landed him in nearby Frederick County where he began wagon driving for a wealthy farmer in the area. Saving his money, Morgan, was soon able to buy a wagon and team for the foremost research is presented by Don Higginbotham, Daniel Morgan: Revolutionary Rifleman (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1961), which offers a complete biography of Morgan with focus on his military involvement arguing that he is overlooked as a general and should be studied more. With regards to Morgan s rise through the ranks of the military, Robert McDonald, Sons of the Father: George Washington and his Protégés (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2013), arguing that Morgan did not have the glorious climb that many Generals have, but instead took a backseat to many figures before receiving recognition. Paul Nelson, Lee, Gates, Stephen and Morgan: Revolutionary War Generals of the Lower Shenandoah Valley West Virginia History 37, no. 3 (1976): 185-200, shows Morgan in comparison to some of the other leaders from the Valley. For an in depth look into the Battle of Cowpens, Lawrence Babits, A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), offers an in depth look into the battle in all aspects and offers the argument that the victory is due to British fatigue and Morgan s in battle tactics. William Singleton, Cowpens: The Patriots Best-Fought Battle Daughters of the American Revolution Magazine 111, no. 5 (1977):472-481. Richard Morgan, General Daniel Morgan: Reconsidered Hero. (Morganton: Burke County Historical Society, 2001), Richard Morgan looks at the events of Daniel Morgan s life and how he has come to be a forgotten hero. One of the best original documents presenting the acts of the battle is Banastre Tarleton, A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781: In the Southern Provinces of North America (Colles, Exshaw, White, H. Whitestone, Burton, Byrne, Moore, Jones, and Dornin, 1787.), which offers the battle from British perspective. With regards to some of Morgan s own letters and correspondents see James Graham, The Life of General Daniel Morgan (New York, Derby and Jackson, 1859), which offers many words from the General. 2. McDonald, 32. Places him somewhere in the Delaware River Valley unknown were exactly. Higginbotham, 2. Places him more likely in parts of New Jersey. 3. Higginbotham, 2. 4. Ibid., 3.

himself and started his own hauling business. Just after starting this hauling business Morgan saw his first look into the military arena. The first battle experience Morgan had was not as a soldier, but as a wagon driver during the French and Indian war. During the catastrophe known as Braddock s Defeat Morgan had taken his wagon to the lines in order to supply provisions for the British soldiers. The line of British soldiers advanced far beyond that of the wagons so Morgan did not actually see any of the fighting, but after the British sustained an almost complete defeat Morgan was there to see the aftermath. With soldiers trickling back wounded and even dead Morgan was there to make room in his wagon in order to transport them away. 5 Following Braddock s Defeat, Morgan joined a group of fellow Virginians called Ashby s Ranger Company who were responsible for defending the frontier from the ever encroaching Indian forces. 6 During his time with the rangers Morgan encountered a fight with Indians close up. He and another ranger companion were making their way from Fort Edward to Fort Ashby when a group of seven Indians ambushed them; killing his companion and shooting Morgan through the cheek before he got away. 7 Not long after this incident the Ashby s Ranger Company was disbanded due to the poor leadership shown and lack of effectiveness of the unit. Out of all the poor leadership, there was still one standout from this ranger company; Daniel Morgan. Morgan had many encounters with Indians during his time with the rangers and he became known for his ability to fight them off. 8 5. Higginbotham, 6. Morgan had to destroy the contents of his wagon, such as ammunition, powder, and flour, in order to make room for these men. 6. Lead by John Ashby who was the farmer that Morgan first worked for in Frederick County. 7. Higginbotham, 7. 8. Including the narrow escape from the Indians Morgan lead several counterattacks that gained him credibility as a soldier and leader.

After his involvement with the rangers Morgan returned to Winchester where he took up an informal union with a woman named Abigail Curry and then began farming. 9 Morgan s frontier lifestyle came to an end with the start of the American Revolution. With the news of fighting starting up north in New England Congress voted to raise ten rifleman companies from the states of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia; with only two coming from Virginia. The Frederick County Committee of Safety in charge of putting together one unit unanimously voted Morgan captain of the unit because of his time with the Ashby Ranger Company. Morgan went on to raise ninety-six recruits which was well above the sixty-eight required by Congress. These recruits were all frontiersmen equipped with their rifles, tomahawk, and scalping knife, while dressed in long hunting shirt and moccasins. While they looked ragtag and unconventional these men were some of the best marksmen in the area. They showed great aim and marksmanship while hunting on the frontier that would transfer to battle. 10 Morgan terrorized the British by picking off sentries and stragglers; the long range rifle had not been used in the very beginning of the war so the British were often lackadaisical when it came to staying behind protection. While this harassment was effective the long range weaponry was not so ideal when it came to siege operations. George Washington decided to detach three companies, including Morgan s riflemen, to Colonel Benedict Arnold in assistance to the invasion of Canada. Knowing Morgan s reputation, as an accomplished Indian fighter and frontiersman, Arnold appointed him in charge of the three riflemen companies. Due to Morgan s frontier background he was suited more to move through the difficult areas offered by the march to Canada. During the trek through Maine toward Canada Morgan s riflemen, consisting of frontiersmen, were more suited to the difficult terrain in which Maine produced. Many natural 9. Higginbotham, 11. 10. Higginbotham, 22-23; McDonald, 38.

obstacles stood in the way of the soldiers, but Morgan and his men showed great capability in navigating them. 11 The attempt to take Quebec by the Americans was poor at best. Benedict Arnold was the ranking officer at the time of the battle, but after he was wounded Morgan took command in the fight. 12 The Americans suffered one-hundred killed or wounded and four-hundred captured, including Morgan. 13 During his captivity the British became impressed with Morgan s valiant effort and offered him the rank of colonel if he were to join them in the fight, but Morgan denied making it clear that his loyalty to the American Revolution was unwavering. 14 Morgan was imprisoned from the end of the battle which took place on December 30, 1775 until August of the next year. All of the prisoners taken from the siege on Quebec were released to the Americans once the Americans released some of the British prisoners they had in their possession. Upon his arrival back from Canada Morgan was met with promotion. Due to Morgan s conduct as an officer and his intrepid behavior in the assault, Washington promoted Morgan to Colonel and be appointed the head of the rifle regiment. 15 The next major battle that Morgan and his regiment saw was in the north during the Saratoga Campaign. The initial reason for their deployment to the north was due to the increased attacks suffered by fellow soldiers at the hands of local Indians. The northern soldiers were afraid of the overall ferocity of the Indians and did not want to take the chance of fighting them. Morgan, known for his experience in dealing with Indians, took his rifle company up north to 11. Higginbotham, 30-42. 12. Richard Ketchum, Saratoga: Turning Point of America s Revolutionary War. (New York; Henry Holt and Company, 1997) 346. 13. Morgan pinned by the British only surrendered after giving a priest his sword stating, Not a scoundrel of those cowards shall take it from my hands. 14. McDonald, 38. 15. Ibid., 39. Washington spoke highly of Morgan skilled performance as a soldier in battle, but he also commended Morgan s leadership in that he understood men would rally behind Morgan s style of fighting.

join commanding officer General Horatio Gates. Arriving up north Morgan and his men were encamped at Bemi Heights, which was a high plateau deeply covered in trees and many ravines in which creeks turned and twisted; this was the perfect place for Morgan s frontier riflemen. From here Morgan could direct his corps so they could gain intelligence on General John Burgoyne s movement and harass the Indians under his control. 16 They proved quite effective in disheartening the Indians; because of this terrorization Burgoyne his Indians not a man of them was to be brought within the sound of a rifle shot. 17 When the battle of Saratoga commenced, Morgan and his troops confronted the head of Burgoyne s troops at a nearby farm where they were accompanied by Benedict Arnold. Morgan aligned his troops in two lines, the front one commanded by Major Jacob Morris and the second in the rear commanded by Morgan. The two lines were pushing through underbrush when the first moved too quickly and got separated from the second line. The first line then landed head on with the main force of Burgoyne; in an attempt to escape the superior force the men of this first line fanned out in all directions. Morgan heard the gunfire and rushed ahead to see what had happened. Though there was fire exchanged by the British there were not many of Morgan s men hit. 18 Morgan then regrouped with his men and proceeded to the nearby farm right along the edge of the foliage before a clearing. They opened fire on the British who were advancing through the clearing causing them to retreat giving Arnold s continentals room to move forward only to be pushed back by British fire. Several volleys were shared between the two forces before action was held later in the day. Throughout this battle it became clear that Morgan could effectively lead troops and it proved that his rifle company could take on the British troops in battle. 16. Burgoyne was the commanding officer for the British in this theatre of battle. 17. Higginbotham, 65. 18. Ibid., 67. Morgan used his sharp whistle in order to regroup the men that had scattered on the front line.

Another battle ensued quickly after that of Freeman s Farm. Since neither force was completely incapable of fighting more another confrontation was in the making. Weeks later the close proximity of the two forces came to fruition at the Battle of Bemis Heights. Since it is not imperative that the details be shared it can be said that the forces of Morgan and Arnold drove Burgoyne back along the Hudson away from General Gates position. This allowed Gates to send forces to pursue and surround Burgoyne at the village of Saratoga causing his surrender. 19 Following the Saratoga Campaign Morgan and his troops began fighting more Indianstyle battles, something they had become known for by this time in the war. Washington expressed his wishes that Morgan travel southward to join him in the middle colonies. Morgan joined Washington s headquarters in Pennsylvania as the winter of 1777 set in and when Washington stationed his troops at Valley Forge, Morgan took his troops to the west side of the Schuylkill River. Here is where Morgan and his troops fought their Indian-style battles mainly around the city of Philadelphia. 20 His time in the middle colonies brought controversy during the summer of 1779. Morgan felt that his achievements had earned him a promotion, and that the new forming of a special brigade of light infantry fit the mold. Unfortunately, the leadership position was given to a Brigadier General named Anthony Wayne of Pennsylvania. 21 Once informed of the denial of his promotional request Morgan retired from the military to his home in Winchester. 22 Morgan still kept in touch with some of his affiliates in the military such as Horatio Gates. In 1780 Gates was appointed to command the army of the south and he wrote Morgan 19. Ketchum, 360-368; Higginbotham, 65-70. 20. Morgan, 16. 21. Being a Virginian, Morgan was at a disadvantage because Congress had voiced its opinion that Virginia had produced more than enough generals at the time. 22. Morgan, 17-18.

urging him to join in his ranks. Only after Gates defeat at the Battle of Camden did Morgan finally oblige his request and set off for North Carolina to join the southern army. Shortly after arriving in the south, Congress realizing its previous mistake, promoted Morgan to Brigadier General giving him more command. Not long after Morgan received promotion was there another change in leadership, Washington sent Nathaniel Greene down to take control of the southern army. Just two weeks after taking command, Greene split his army into two sending Morgan southwest towards the Catawba River to disrupt British operations in the backcountry. The British commander in the southern arena, Lord Cornwallis, saw this move and countered by sending his Colonel Banastre Tarleton to block Morgan s movements. 23 The threat of battle began to increase as Tarleton and Morgan both moved strategically in an effort to gain the best advantage with the final product coming at the Battle of Cowpens. 24 The movements of both forces are described in relations to the rivers of the surrounding areas; Morgan s maneuvering before the battle gave him extreme advantages over the British. South Carolina offered two large rivers, the Catawba River and Broad River, these rivers offered relatively low struggle when it came to marching for the British. It was here that Cornwallis wanted to make his march up through South Carolina in order to get to North Carolina where Greene had his head quarters stationed, but because of the harassment of his troops by Morgan was unable to do so. Tarleton was given orders to flank the enemy in the western part of South Carolina, thus putting a natural border between Tarleton and the complete army of Cornwallis. 25 As Tarleton marched on the west side of the Broad River he found it more difficult because of 23. Banastre Tarleton was a 26 year old Colonel, but renowned for his ruthless style of warfare. Tarleton was particularly hated for his actions at the Waxhaws, where he cut down remnants of the Continental Army trying to flee. His methodology of offering no quarter led to the contemptuous term Tarleton s Quarter. 24. Morgan, 21-22; Nelson. 25. Tarleton, 225-227; Thomas Bowen, A Map of the Province of South Carolina (ca. 1773), C-7210, JCB Map Collection, London. Accessed at http://jcb.lunaimaging.com/luna/servlet/detail/jcbmaps~1~1~2888~ 101345:A-map-of-the-province-of-South-Caro.

the increased amount of small rivers and creeks. In his pursuit of Morgan, Tarleton had to cross smaller rivers such as the Enoree and Tyger which the British were not so well equipped to do. Tarleton described the march as difficult; on account of the number of creeks and rivers; and circuitous. 26 The Americans were not immune to the consequences of such an environment either, although they were better adapted at traveling such territory. At the time of the British movement, over the Enoree and Tyger Rivers, Morgan had been encamped along the Pacolet River. Hearing of the British advancement he informed General Greene that his forces needed to be moved and asked for him and his troops to be recalled from their current position. In a letter to Nathaniel Greene, General Morgan elaborated on the situation he and his men were in, and he argued that resorting to battle might be the only option for the General. 27 One of the first points he made is the lack of forage and provisions that are needed to sustain he and his men. He sent out units to look for provisions to the east between the Broad and Catawba River, but they were unsuccessful in their efforts. His forces included a large number of horses which took a lot to feed and Morgan stated the most plentiful country must soon be exhausted, if it had to feed such numbers. 28 Greene responded to Morgan on the accounts expressed in Morgan s previous letters to him. 29 Here Greene tells Morgan that it is of the utmost importance that the Continental Army has some sort of force in Morgan s area and that a retreat is very disagreeable. Although Greene is concerned with the safety of Morgan and his troops he is not willing to release control 26. Tarleton, 227. 27. Daniel Morgan to Nathaniel Greene, January 15, 1780, in The Sketches of the Life and Correspondence of Nathaniel Greene. Complied by William Johnson (Charleston: A.E. Miller, 1822) 387-388. Accessed at https://archive.org/stream/sketcheslifeand00johngoog#page/n386/mode/1up. The date in the letter is wrong but can be confirmed that in fact should be 1781, Morgan was not in this position in the year 1780. Many scholars attribute Morgan with very poor penmanship and this may serve as an example. 28. Ibid., 387. 29. General Greene to General Morgan, January 9, 1781, in The Sketches of the Life and Correspondence of Nathaniel Greene. Complied by William Johnson (Charleston: A.E. Miller, 1822) 391-392. Accessed at https://archive.org/stream/sketcheslifeand00johngoog#page/n386/mode/1up.

of the grounds in which they are holding. Greene is aware of the movements being made by Cornwallis and Tarleton and for this advises Morgan to take defensive measures within reason to ensure safety and reduce chances of confrontation. Morgan did not like the area he and his troops were in causing him to take action and move on his own instincts. Morgan was concerned with his position because of the scarcity of provisions available; the Americans had already used up what resources were in the area. But since Greene commanded him to stay in that region he was unable to leave making his men vulnerable to the approaching forces of Tarleton. In defiance to Greene s word Morgan decided to march his men north of their encampment at Pacolet River towards Broad River at Burr s Mill just a short march away. 30 By retreating Morgan left Tarleton a depleted area to march through. The British were already unaccustomed to marching through such conditions that were offered by the South Carolina backcountry and with all of the resources taken by the Americans previous encampment there was no substance left for the British. Morgan left so little to gather that British were forced to march through these areas without interruption, since camps weren t often made around areas that offered no provisions. Another advantage of moving his men north was that this drew Tarleton s forces further and further away from the full army of Cornwallis. Being so far away from Cornwallis, Tarleton could not receive supplies or reinforcements without waiting a considerable amount of time. Also, moving north decreased the distance between Morgan and the main army of Greene ensuring that reinforcements could be sent if needed. This benefitted Morgan in battle because the size of his force was smaller compared to the size of Tarleton s. 31 Morgan did not stop marching once he reached Burr s Mill; once camped there the British made 30. General Greene to General Morgan, January 9, 1781, 391-392. Greene acknowledges Morgan s position is undesirable but orders him to stay in that area. 31. Babits, 50-53.

an overnight march which landed them 6 miles from the current position of Morgan. 32 Upon hearing this Morgan immediately marched his troops northwest towards Cowpens where he had scouts previously travel to look at the area. Tarleton then marched into the area at Burr s Mill previously held by Morgan offering him the first large amount of provisions since his four day march. 33 Marching north again drew Tarleton even further from Cornwallis position and reinforcements. Morgan s decision to march north after Greene advised him to stay did go against his commanding officer s order, but it allowed Morgan to pick where he wanted to confront the British when that time came. General Greene ordered Morgan to stay in that area, while Morgan gave up a lot more ground to the British he ultimately made it so that he controlled the circumstances of which the battle occurred. Morgan had decided to choose the grounds of Cowpens which was 7 miles off the Broad River coming from his left and extending around behind him; most would disagree with this area for battle because it practically eliminated the route that which Morgan would retreat from if necessary, but rather than marching further possibly tiring the soldiers out they made camp there and waited for Tarleton to advance. Morgan described this decision as My situation at the Cowpens enabled me to improve any advantages I might gain, and to provide better for my own security should I be unfortunate. These reasons induced me to take this post, at the risk of the face of a retreat. 34 32. Daniel Morgan to Nathaniel Greene, January 19, 1781, in The Life of General Daniel Morgan, ed. James Graham (New York: Derby & Jackson, 1859.) 467. Accessed at https://archive.org/stream/ lifeofgeneraldan00grah#page/467/mode/1up 33. Ibid., 467-470; To George Washington from Nathanael Greene, 24 January 1781, The Papers of George Washington. Accessed at Founders Online, National Archives (http://founders.archives.gov/documents/washington/99-01-02-04635). Both of these sources contain the letter sent from Morgan to Greene after the battle; the first is an excerpt and the second contains the entire letter. 34. William Johnson, 392; Daniel Morgan to Nathaniel Greene, January 19, 1781, 467.

Morgan chose a location so close to the Broad River because of the large amounts of militia he had at his disposal. He knew from past experience that militia men were prone to scattering when panicked in a fight and retreating. By placing his men with their backs towards the river, Morgan forced them to fight and not break ranks. It can be said that the General was worried about the militia under his control trying to flee when it came time to fight. This is evident in his words when he says Had I crossed the river, one half of the militia would immediately have abandoned me. So by camping just miles from crossing the river Morgan cut out this option completely. With the British approaching from the southwest and the river to their backs on the northeast, Morgan had inherently boxed his troops in. Most observed this decision as being a terrible choice especially since the Cowpens was relatively flat and they fought in an open area which was advantageous to the British. For as Morgan, who had his doubts with the militia, it was his only option. 35 To understand the Morgan s style of leadership when it came to the militia, one must understand the structure of his force. In a letter from Nathaniel Greene to Daniel Morgan a month before the battle Greene lays out the men Morgan would receive for command. He states that Morgan was to receive a corps of light-infantry of 320 men detached from the Maryland line, a detachment of Virginia militia of 200 men, and Colonel Washington s regiment of lighthorse, amounting to from sixty to an hundred men. 36 Greene informed Morgan that more men would be joining him at the Catawba River, where you will be joined by a body of volunteer militia under command of General Davidson of this state, and by the Militia lately under General 35. Tarleton, 227. 36. Nathaniel Greene to Daniel Morgan, December 16 th, 1780, in The Sketches of the Life and Correspondence of Nathaniel Greene. Complied by William Johnson (Charleston: A.E. Miller, 1822) 363. Accessed at https://archive.org/stream/sketcheslifeand00johngoog#page/n386/mode/1up. Colonel Washington refers to Lieutenant Colonel William Washington, second cousin to George Washington. Colonel Washington commanded a unit called a dragoon which is a name for mounted infantry.

Sumpter. This force and such others as may join you from Georgia. 37 Morgan s forces can be summarized as 300 continental infantry, 150 state infantry, up to 1,280 militia infantry, eightytwo Continental light dragoons, fifty-five state dragoons, and forty-five militia dragoons; Morgan s troop total can be reasoned at 1,912. 38 Looking at General Morgan s force it can be reasoned that his mindset was focused around the fact that more than half of his men were that of militia. While the Continental troops were no strangers to battle, many of the militia were wary when it came to fighting. Therefore Morgan needed to provide encouragement to the army before the battle. Militiaman Thomas Young describes Morgan encouraging the men before the day of battle: It was upon this occasion I was more perfectly convinced of Gen. Morgan s qualifications to command militia, than I had ever before been. He went among the volunteers, helped them fix their swords, joked with them about their sweet-hearts, told them to keep in good spirits, and the day would be ours. And long after I laid down, he was going about among the soldiers encouraging them, and telling them that the old wagoner would crack his whip over Ben. [Tarleton] in the morning, as sure as they lived. Just hold up your heads, boys, three fires, he would say, and you are free, and then when you return to your homes, how the old folks will bless you, and the girls kiss you, for your gallant conduct! I don t believe he slept a wink that night! 39 It is obvious that Morgan appealed to the men s bravery with his words described by Young. Leading up to the battle Morgan had sent many small detachments to harass or spy on the troops of Tarleton and Cornwallis; these small missions were a success in that no losses were sustained. But now the full attention of Tarleton was on Morgan and this was a daunting event. By seeming so confident and relaxed Morgan was able to instill a backbone in that of his army. He did not waver in his convictions and would stand by the Continental cause. 37. Ibid. 38. Babits, 27-29; 33-36; 40-42; 73; 77; 104; 175; 187. Due to lack of resources Babits info was used to accurately detail Morgan s troops. 39. Thomas Young, Memoir of Major Thomas Young, Orion 3 (1843): 88, quoted in Lawrence Babits, A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998) 55.

Even though Morgan had encouraged the militia prior to battle, the way he structured his defense made it so that they were not burdened down by the fighting taking place. When Young heard Morgan say, Just hold up your heads, boys, three fires, he actually heard a tactic that Morgan was used. Morgan asked his militiamen to provide three fires or shots before withdrawing from the front lines. After three fires the men were able to follow routes that led them away from the front and back behind that of the Continental troops. 40 With such a simple plan as this even the most inexperienced fighter could understand the objective without confusion. This also provides the militiamen with the promise of a degree of safety; they would not have to stand on the front line the entire battle. His use of militia served as an example to his greater battle plan of having multiple lines in the front with the ability to retreat backwards in the cover of another line. Morgan structured his army in a series of lines; the first line consisted of four units split right to left. The men furthest to the right, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Cunningham, were Georgia volunteers. To Colonel Cunningham s left stood Major McDowal, who was leading a unit of North Carolina volunteers. A small road separated this section of the front line and the next section of the front line; Major Hammond was immediately to the left of the road with his unit of South Carolina state troops. 41 The final section of the front line, located to the left of Major Hammond, was a unit of Georgia refugees under the command of Captain 40. James Bartholomees, Fight or Flee: The Combat Performance of the North Carolina Militia in the Cowpens- Guilford Courthouse Campaign, January to March 1781 (PhD. diss,. University of North Carolina, 1978), 130-133. 41. This unit was formerly under the command of Colonel McCall who was now commanding a unit of light dragoons. Due to the size of his unit not every man was able to be outfitted in such fashion.

Donoly. 42 It can be gathered that most of these men were rifleman, mainly of militia, and were stationed in the front in order to volley the first shot at the oncoming British. Morgan stationed the bulk of his troops behind the first line. Directly behind the middle of the front line were Maryland troops commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Howard. The flanks of this second line were where the battle plan began to split into greater detail. Right of Colonel Howard was Major Triplett commanding a unit of Virginia Militia; the bulk of this unit was stationed behind the second line, but two smaller units were located directly in line with Colonel Howard. These two smaller units were staggered to the left in formation facing inwards toward the battle field. 43 To the right of Colonel Howard were units of North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia militia under Colonel Pickens set up in a way that followed Major Triplett, but his front lines were not staggered inwards. Lastly, the main guard, made up of Continental soldiers, remained at its position from the night before. This main guard contained Colonel Washington s cavalry and a reserved unit of South Carolina light dragoon troops commanded by Colonel McCall. 44 A representation of the initial battlefield set-up can be provided by the map drawn by Hammond who used it to orient his men on the front line. (See Appendix A) 45 Morgan had effectively separated his units by the ways in which he was going to use them. The front line was situated on the side of a small hill that the battlefield had provided creating a type of ridge that the British would come upon first. The front line was to act as a skirmish line which when the British came into sight would engage them with their long rifle 42. Daniel Morgan to Nathaniel Greene, January 19, 1781, 467; Babits, 67-69; Samuel Hammonds Notes in Joseph Johnson, Traditions and Reminiscences: Chiefly of the American Revolution in the American South (Charleston: Walker and James, 1851) 528, Accessed at http://books.google.com/books?id=isxcaaaaiaa J&pg=PA529&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=4#v=onepage&q&f=false. 43. Of these two small units, one was made up of South Carolina militia commanded by Captain Beaty. 44. Daniel Morgan to Nathaniel Greene, January 19, 1781, 467; Babits, 67-69; ; Samuel Hammonds Notes, 528. McCall s dragoons were located behind Pickens unit and not actually apart of the main guard. 45. Samuel Hammonds Notes, 529.

shots. As they shot most of their ammunition they could fall back into the second line which can be identified as a militia line since it was comprised mostly of militia units. This line being comprised of militia, long-shots and riflemen, could also engage the British at a distance which would benefit that of Morgan. 46 Since the British were not known for the ability to shoot longdistance accurately they were at a disadvantage from the beginning of the battle; Morgan thus made Tarleton rush his first charge. By splitting his men into different lines Morgan created a strategic problem for Tarleton; how would he get close enough for his soldiers to use their bayonets which they had been accustomed to doing so? Unfortunately, for Tarleton, the only option was to rush the field without the full support behind his army. The beginning of the battle played into the hands of Morgan and his strategic plan. The British entered the battlefield in a seemingly simple formation of two lines, one encompassed the infantry and two artillery pieces and the second being made up of cavalry. When they emerged out of the brush onto the battle field Tarleton rushed ahead with his 71 st Regiment leaving behind the rest of his 7 th Regiment still emerging out of the forage. Tarleton passed through the skirmish line, after the smaller Continental forces had retreated back through the militia line, and here he met the broad force of Morgan s militiamen. The militia knew they d get a shot out before their counterparts, and when it came to facing the British in close range they held their ground due to the confidence they had in their leader and the plan in strategy which he had executed. Morgan provided the militia with support throughout the entire battle riding up and down the lines of soldiers providing words of encouragement. When the British moved forward on the militia with some of their dragoons it cause disorder within the militia lines, such attacks like the one of Lieutenant Joseph Hughes unit. Hughes began to try to reign in the chaos but the militia were 46. Daniel Morgan to Nathaniel Greene, January 19, 1781, 468.

not rallied until Gen. Morgan did it in person Morgan galloped up and spoke words of encouragement to them, according to a soldier in Hughes unit. 47 Morgan was out on his horse bellowing words of order and courage to his men further exemplifying the leadership he provided to the militia and instilling confidence that would help them fight more efficiently. The British eventually pushed through the militia line and met the final line of Continental soldiers. Major Hammond produced another map, similar to the previous one used, that depicts the positions of the opposing armies at the time of the final fighting (See Appendix B). 48 The militia had retreated to the flanks of Howard s Continental troops once the British had used significant force. Colonel Washington took his cavalry to confront that of Tarleton s on the left flank in front of the militia that had previously retreated allowing them to regroup. From here the British forces could not withstand the fire coming from the Continental muskets. 49 As fighting came to an end Tarleton escaped with his cavalry and small group of infantry, Morgan ordered a force to follow them but lost them twenty-four miles from the battlefield due to a wrong trail used. 50 Morgan had effectively defeated the British and began to gain information about the final numbers of killed, wounded, and captured. Morgan personally estimated that the British numbers were as follows; 10 commissioned officers killed, upwards of one-hundred rifleman killed, 200 wounded, twenty-nine commissioned officers along with 500 privates prisoner, and multiple items take including the two artillery pieces. Counter the British numbers to those of the 47. Robert Long, Statement of Robert Long, A History of the Upper Country of South Carolina (1859),, quoted in Lawrence Babits, A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998) 99. 48. Samuel Hammonds Notes, 530. 49. The Continentals used muskets as opposed to most of the militia who had rifles. The main difference is that a rifle has spiral grooves on the inside of the barrel making the ball spin as it is shot out, this enhances accuracy. 50. Daniel Morgan to Nathaniel Greene, January 19, 1781, 469.

Americans which are according to Morgan twelve killed and sixty wounded; Babits puts American casualties closer to 148 men which is almost double Morgan s but still significantly lower than the British. 51 Morgan is correct for the most part with these numbers although he underestimates the size of his army to 800 men. 52 This battle cemented Morgan into military history due to the excellent manner in which he led his men against the British. Following the war Tarleton described the defeat as ascribed either to the bravery or good conduct to the Americas; or to some unforeseen event, which may throw terror into the most disciplined soldiers, or counteract the best-concerted designs. 53 Tarleton s view on the loss can only be attributed to the manner in which Daniel Morgan led his men during the period of time they were pursued by General Tarleton. His trek through the South Carolina backwoods fatigued the British causing them to lack the effectiveness needed to win a battle. Morgan was an exceptional leader of ordinary men and rallied those of non-military background to stay and fight courageously. The formation of his troops in battle led the British into constant fire even though the Americans had multiple points of retreat. When looking at these factors there can be no doubt that on the day of January 17 th, 1781 the British received a devil of a whipping at the hands of Daniel Morgan. 51. Babits, 152. 52. To George Washington from Nathanael Greene, 24 January 1781, The Papers of George Washington. Accessed at Founders Online, National Archives (http://founders.archives.gov/documents/washington/99-01-02-04635) 53. Tarleton, 228.

Appendix A Skirmish Line- H, I, J, K represent the militia. Here is where the first militia skirmishes would ve taken place right at the bottom of the hill by the ravine. Militia Line- D, E, F, G, M represent the smaller units of militia that would receive the British once they passed the skirmish line. B and L are the larger forces of militia that allow those smaller units to retreat into them as the British advance. Main Line- A and C represent the Continental force and Main Guard of Morgan s troops. When the British moved through the Militia line they would ve fallen back into this section with the Continental troops.

Appendix B Here it is easy to see how the first two lines retreated into the main line of the Continentals. The number 1 represents the Continental troops and to the flanks are the lines of militia that progressively fell back into line with them.