Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive

Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive Speeches Michelle Van Cleave National Counterintelligence Executive Remarks for Department Of Defense Conference on Counterintelligence San Diego, California April 28, 2004 It s a pleasure to be with you here in my beautiful home state, which, as our Governor says, is called California and to share some of my thoughts about our Nation s strategic counterintelligence mission. Since it s the last week in April, 2004, let me begin by noting that the last week in April has traditionally been a bad one for spies: The last week in April, ten years ago, Rick and Rosario Ames pleaded guilty. Rosario got a lighter sentence as an inducement for her husband s cooperation; Aldrich Ames was sentenced to life. Ames, a former CIA CI officer, was arrested in 1994; he spied for the Russians for nearly a decade, during which period some 30 operations against the Soviets were compromised, and at least 10 Russians and East Europeans were executed as a result of his espionage. Indeed, as the Senate Intelligence Committee reported, Ames was responsible for the loss of virtually all of CIA s intelligence assets targeted at the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War. At the time, it was believed that Ames was the most damaging spy in US history. In fact, FBI Agent Robert Hanssen was waiting in the wings, serving the same master; as was the lesser-known (but potentially no less damaging) DIA analyst Ana Montes, working for the Cubans. Their betrayal of their country s trust through their continuing espionage over 21 and 17 years, respectively, opened the contest for the title a little. Then there is Christopher Boyce, a former TRW employee here in California, who in the last week in April 1977, was convicted of espionage and sentenced to 40 years in prison. You may remember Boyce from the movie "The Falcon and the Snowman." Boyce s espionage revealed U.S. technical capabilities in the satellite http://www.ncix.gov/publications/reports_speeches/speeches/ncixsandiegospeechapril2004.html (1 of 9)11/28/2005 1:57:41 AM

field, requirements for communicating with agents covertly, and other operational details. By the way, Boyce successfully petitioned for early release, and got out of jail last year; although he will probably remain on parole for the rest of his life. The last week in April 1865, John Wilkes Booth was shot and killed. His name appears among the roll call of spies, of course, because he served as a courier for the Confederate Secret Service. He was able to cross the Union- Confederate lines under cover of his engagements as an actor; which brought him to Ford s Theater, where he assassinated President Lincoln. Justice caught up with Booth in a barn near Port Royal, Virginia, where he was shot dead by federal cavalrymen after they set the barn on fire. He didn t get parole. As it happens, the last week in April was a bad one for Mae West too. No, she wasn t a spy; but she was an actress, of course, and one of the betterknown graduates of my alma mater, USC. (National football champions this year, I might add.) Mae West was arrested the last week in April, 1926 for "corrupting the morals of youth" for her play "Sex." Allegedly, she "gyrated her navel seductively" during a belly dance performance. She was fined $500 and sentenced to 10 days in jail. She paid the fine, and served her time well nearly; in fact, she was released after only eight days incarceration. In her words, "This is the only time that I ever got anything for good behavior!" While Mae West was being hauled in front of the judge, across the world Corporal Hitler was celebrating his 37th birthday by consolidating his leadership of the Nazi Party. And soon the world would know the full meaning of that evil. Now we are building a monument on the Mall in Washington DC, in honor of those who served in the world war that followed, to be dedicating, fittingly, on Memorial Day. As I heard my first boss in Washington, Jack Kemp, say many times, the history of the great American experiment has been that freedom must be won anew by every generation. Perhaps with proclamations about the End of History, we thought the post-vietnam generation had escaped that burden. We were wrong. As my current boss George W. Bush has said, "For America, there will be no going back to the era before September the 11th, 2001 -- to false comfort in a dangerous world. We have learned that terrorist attacks are not caused by the use of http://www.ncix.gov/publications/reports_speeches/speeches/ncixsandiegospeechapril2004.html (2 of 9)11/28/2005 1:57:41 AM

strength; they are invited by the perception of weakness. And the surest way to avoid attacks on our own people is to engage the enemy where he lives and plans. We are fighting that enemy in Iraq and Afghanistan today so that we do not meet him again on our own streets, in our own cities." The President s message is clear. In the aftermath of September 11, the world has been divided into two: those who would stand with us against terrorism, and those who would stand with the terrorists. This war has brought about a profound moral accounting of the nations and peoples and creeds of the world. And we in the United States are reminded of what it means to be the Leader of the Free World. For those of us in the counterintelligence business, we are reminded of the solemn importance of our work. During the Cold War, with the possible exception of the Coast Guard, virtually every one of our national security institutions was penetrated by the Warsaw Pact, most more than once. These losses imposed grave damage in peacetime; they could have had catastrophic consequences had we found ourselves at war. Now we are at war, and the potential consequences of intelligence failure are far more immediate, putting in jeopardy deployed forces, ongoing operations, and the lives of troops abroad as well as Americans at home. So I am seized with the need to do our job as though it were the morning after. Indeed, each of the major challenges confronting the nation s security defeating global terrorism, countering weapons of mass destruction, ensuring the security of the homeland, transforming defense capabilities, fostering cooperation with other global powers, promoting global economic growth -- has an embedded counterintelligence imperative. Specifically, terrorists and tyrants, foreign adversaries and economic competitors, engage in a range of intelligence activities directed against us in order to advance their interests and defeat U.S. objectives. Too often, these foreign intelligence activities against the United States are successful. Collectively, they present strategic threats to the Nation s security and prosperity. The U.S. requires a national, systematic perspective and coherent policies to counter them, including a strategic counterintelligence response. U.S. Counterintelligence (CI) has four essential purposes: To identify, assess, neutralize and exploit the intelligence activities of foreign powers, terrorist groups, and other entities who seek to do us harm. I would put force protection in this category. http://www.ncix.gov/publications/reports_speeches/speeches/ncixsandiegospeechapril2004.html (3 of 9)11/28/2005 1:57:41 AM

To protect our intelligence collection and analytic capabilities from adversary denial, penetration, or manipulation. To help enable the successful execution of sensitive national security operations. To help safeguard our vital national security secrets, critical assets and technologies, and sensitive propriety data against theft, covert foreign diversion or exploitation. As this audience knows full well, CI is more than catching spies. It is more than force protection. It is more than support to operations. And it is much bigger in its reach than the purview of the several departments and agencies charged with CI responsibilities. Foreign intelligence services don t target an individual FBI field office, or a CIA station, or a military unit; they target the United States. Our Nation s security requires that we approach CI strategically, from two perspectives: First, CI must be driven strategically by coherent processes for collection, investigation, analysis, operations that support integration when it is needed and respect compartmentation when it is needed and enable the big picture to emerge and order our allocation of resources and creative effort. Secondly, we must look at our vulnerabilities strategically as well. Our adversaries are keenly interested in our closely guarded national security secrets. But they are also interested in the national critical assets that underpin our wealth, our daily life, and ultimately our security. In times past, the U.S. government did not take a strategic view of CI. The near sixty-year history of CI has been one of having no one in charge of the enterprise. Our community was not organized or structured to accomplish a national mission; rather, the various CI elements have grown out of individual department or agency needs. They are part of a loose confederation of independent organizations with narrower and varying responsibilities, jurisdictions and capabilities. Operations have tended to focus on individual cases and are conducted with little appreciation of the potential impact of a synergistic effort. Many previous CI deficiencies have been the result of this systemic failure in the architecture of the CI community. To begin to remedy this situation and help bring strategic coherence to U.S. CI, the Congress created the position of the National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX). The law directs that the NCIX shall serve as the head of counterintelligence for the US government, subject to the direction and control of the President. The law also creates the office of the NCIX (ONCIX), which is assigned a number of specific duties. Among others, these include the development of a national CI strategy for the President s approval, the production of an annual threat assessment, and government-wide CI budget reviews to evaluate on an http://www.ncix.gov/publications/reports_speeches/speeches/ncixsandiegospeechapril2004.html (4 of 9)11/28/2005 1:57:41 AM

ongoing basis the effectiveness of resource allocation and program execution against the priorities set forth in the national strategy. More broadly, the purposes behind the CI Enhancement Act, which codified the mission, authorities and responsibilities of my office, are set forth in the Act s preamble: To enable the CI community to fulfill better its mission of identifying, assessing, prioritizing and countering the intelligence threats to the US. To ensure that the CI community acts in an efficient and effective manner. To provide for the integration of all of the CI activities of the US government. It is easy to read this language to you. It is rather more difficult to reduce goals to actions. I am reminded of the words of another of my recent bosses, for whom most of you now work in one way or another, Don Rumsfeld. One of the Secretary s many notable innovations is the compilation of rules to govern conduct in government, business and life. As it happens, there are pages and pages of rules (and those of us who have had the opportunity to work for him know a raft of more rules, up close and personal, in addition to the ones that are written down). But here are three of my favorite, as they pertain to my current job: Learn to say I don't know. If used when appropriate, it will be often. (Unfortunately, we encounter this truth too often in CI. I d like to fix that.) Look for what's missing. Many advisers can tell a president how to improve what's proposed or what's gone amiss. Few are able to see what isn't there. (Not infrequently the key to insightful CI analysis.) Finally, if you think you have things under control, you're not going fast enough. (No danger of that.) As many of you know, this isn t the first time a national level CI organization has been constituted. Earlier efforts, under the DCI s direction, or under the FBI s leadership, or pursuant to PDD, have had important objectives and have left a record of mixed results. Why should we expect that the new NCIX will be any more effective or successful? First the imperatives for integration have never been stronger than they are now, in the aftermath of September 11. Second the head of the office is a Presidential appointee, conferring a needed stature to the mission that has been lacking in the past. Third, Congress has put my organization into law I may leave when the President s term ends but my office is here to stay. http://www.ncix.gov/publications/reports_speeches/speeches/ncixsandiegospeechapril2004.html (5 of 9)11/28/2005 1:57:41 AM

Fourth, the law confers policy independence on the NCIX that keeps it from being brought under the wing of one part of the CI community to the exclusion of others. It is truly a purple organization, headed by noncareer personnel, and populated by directly hired employees as well as detailees from the various departments and agencies with CI responsibilities. Finally, the Department of Defense has recognized the imperative of bringing strategic coherence to its many CI activities, to ensure unity of purpose and strategic design. This is reflected in the creation of CIFA and in your presence here today. While each of the Services properly must look to its own mission, DoD s role in support of national level CI needs transcends any one Service or any one combatant commander. I d like to discuss some of those national CI imperatives. To begin, we must extend the safeguards of CI to the global war on terrorism. I know this is a major focus of this conference. In many parts of the world, including here at home, Al Qaida and other terrorist organizations employ classic intelligence methods to gather information, recruit sources, and run assets. They are also capable of engaging in sophisticated deceptive practices, not unlike traditional foreign powers, to deceive US decision-makers. Terrorist groups draw strength from the support of state sponsors, which means that the intelligence services of those regimes are a key link in the global terrorist support network. Accordingly, we must ensure that the global war on terrorism is armor-plated with an effective CI strategy 1) to identify and exploit offensive opportunities against terrorist networks, 2) to support force protection and operations security in the field, 3) to counter the intelligence operations of state sponsors, and 4) to help filter truth from deception. The imperative for U.S. CI overall parallels the strategic imperative for the global war on terrorism: to go on the offense. US counterintelligence needs to shift emphasis from a posture of reacting to a proactive strategy of seizing advantage. Offensive CI activities can increase the range of options available to decision makers to defuse or shape an emerging threat. In wartime, we must be able to defeat the adversary s intelligence capabilities, including their ability to deceive or mislead us. Our experience with Iraq taught us once again that neutralizing the intelligence services of the adversary is a crucial element in winning the war; and that it is far better to plan well in advance than on a crash basis. Strategic CI planning can also increase the options available to decision makers for advancing national objectives while avoiding war. Similarly, within the U.S., the operational and analytic focus must transform from a case-driven rhythm and purpose to a strategic CI assessment and engagement of adversary presence, capabilities and intentions. In order to do this, we will need to have unity of effort among the several organizations with http://www.ncix.gov/publications/reports_speeches/speeches/ncixsandiegospeechapril2004.html (6 of 9)11/28/2005 1:57:41 AM

CI responsibilities. Additionally, we will need to draw on the full range of CI resources, both defensive and offensive; prioritize the allocation of CI community resources against risk and opportunity; and ensure that CI is coupled with effective security and countermeasures that support the missions they protect. These are some of the strategic imperatives behind U.S. CI. But there is a second meaning behind the need to approach counterintelligence strategically. We also need to bring a strategic perspective to the way in which we think about our Nation s vulnerabilities and critical resources. U.S. counterintelligence has a strategic mission to help protect the vital technology secrets that are the bedrock of our security. America s national defense rests on its continuity technological superiority. The United States cannot maintain its dynamic technological superiority without a corresponding intelligence and counterintelligence superiority. A national defense strategy based on transformation places a premium on the sensitive capabilities and technologies that give advantage. The single most effective strategy to defeat U.S. plans to ensure superiority through transformation is to capture those essential secrets, in order to incorporate them into adversary weapons systems and to develop countermeasures. Our adversaries understand this well. Espionage has long delivered the highest payoff for the lowest cost as a means of defeating U.S. capabilities. Weapons systems that cost billions of dollars can have their essential secrets exposed and therefore defeated by the work of a single successful spy. We also see a breadth of foreign activity to evade US export control laws, in order to acquire key technologies. In attacking our technology base, many foreign powers employ collection techniques outside of clandestine intelligence channels, including tasking visiting businessmen, scientists and engineers; exploiting trade shows and exhibits, and debriefing third country visitors. Given its pervasiveness, and the limits of our resources, it s a struggle simply to be able to characterize the scope of this collection activity. Another major responsibility of my office is to help ensure that the national security decision-making process is informed by counterintelligence insights. Specifically, we need to be able to present an array of strategic CI operational and information options in foreign and defense policy for the President and his national security leadership team. Such a process should also support the strategic direction and integration of CI operations with other national goals and instruments. Working together as a community, I believe that we have the opportunity to develop and institutionalize a strategic, national CI system, not taking on everything at once but methodically, one piece at a time. We need to: http://www.ncix.gov/publications/reports_speeches/speeches/ncixsandiegospeechapril2004.html (7 of 9)11/28/2005 1:57:41 AM

Build on the work that CIFA has begun by establishing a national-level CI assessment center to facilitate cross-agency and cross-disciplinary work to: Integrate threat data Detect anomalies in foreign conduct Provide basis for initiating CI and CM ops Transition CI from a HUMINT-centric activity to an all-source discipline Institutionalize damage assessments when they are performed, what they must include. We need to rationalize their relationships to other activities including IG investigations, and to ensure that actionable recommendations are derived from the lessons learned, and remedies implemented. Develop a CI doctrine for attacking foreign intelligence services systematically via strategic CI operations. Take lessons from our experience with Iraq to heart and develop the campaign plans that have been of such interest during your discussions this week. My office will be leading a study of the JIATF approach, not for the purpose of slowing things down (to be sure!) but to ensure the best use of resources as we build up. The combatant commanders must stand prepared to deal with any contingency in their area of responsibility. The development of war plans is a finally honed military art. It is also a necessary responsibility of the nation to whom much of the free world looks for its security. We need to bring the deliberate planning process into strategic planning for neutralizing the intelligence capabilities of an adversary (which goes beyond the existing tactical battlefield focus). As a standing requirement, we should consider building strategic CI annexes to war plans. As I mentioned earlier, such planning can increase options available to decision makers, to advance national objectives while avoiding war. Advance the professionalization of the CI cadre, from the senior-most leadership to the newest recruit, including the development of common standards, training and education. If we can do these things, then we will have laid the foundations not only to articulate, but also to execute an effective national CI strategy. You all know how important it is that we succeed. I first reported for duty at the Pentagon in mid-september 2001. You could still smell the smoke in the halls and the grim determination in the air. The dedication of the men and women of our armed forces, and the civilians, with whom I had the honor to serve, was extraordinary. It remains so today. I am so proud to have been a part of DoD at that time in our Nation s history, and a witness to what selfless service truly means. http://www.ncix.gov/publications/reports_speeches/speeches/ncixsandiegospeechapril2004.html (8 of 9)11/28/2005 1:57:41 AM

In the past eight months, I have come to a far deeper appreciation of the dedication of the professionals in the CI business, which I admire. And I have a much clearer understanding of the difficulties many of you face in carrying out your responsibilities. If there is one message I could leave with you today, it is this. As you ensure vital CI support to the warfighter, you are also part of a larger strategic CI mission that supports the Nation. I am honored to share that mission with you. Top of Page http://www.ncix.gov/publications/reports_speeches/speeches/ncixsandiegospeechapril2004.html (9 of 9)11/28/2005 1:57:41 AM