Response of the Open University of Japan (OUJ) to the Great East Japan Earthquake and Establishment of a Risk Management System Yumiko NARA and Tamae ONISHI The Open University of Japan Abstract: The Great East Japan Earthquake caused damage in a wide region extending from Kanto to Tohoku. In addition to Chiba, where our headquarters is located, each prefecture of Aomori, Iwate, Miyagi, Fukushima, Niigata, Ibaraki, Tochigi, and Nagano (having its own learning center) was designated as an area eligible for coverage under the disaster relief acts, and some of our students were subjected to personal suffering. When the disaster occurred, our university had to cope with a number of unfavorable factors including the following; the damaged headquarters, physical distances between damaged learning centers and the headquarters, widely-spread distribution of stakeholders inclusive of students. Consequently, the extent of higher uncertainty, higher emergency and lower autonomy that an organization usually has to deal with in a time of crisis was amplified in our case. The staff members in charge at the headquarters and learning centers did their best under the circumstances. Furthermore, efforts are being made to establish a school-wide risk management system with the view to immediately utilize the lessons learned from the Great East Japan Earthquake. Concrete deliverables include Risk Management Regulations of the Foundation for the Open University of Japan, Basic Guidelines for Risk Management of the Foundation for the Open University of Japan, and Basic Risk Management Manual of the Foundation for the Open University of Japan. These documents will be continually reviewed for their effective implementation following the PDCA cycle. 1. Introduction: Identified problems The purpose of this report is to shed light on the following four points: (1) damages to OUJ caused by the Great East Japan Earthquake, (2) the response of OUJ from immediately after the earthquake up to the point of restoration, (3) earthquake response based on the peculiarities of OUJ as an educational institution, and (4) practicality and potential of the construction of a crisis-management system that was undertaken immediately after the earthquake. On March 11, 2011, an unprecedented catastrophe occurred. The damage was vast not only as a consequence of the earthquake and tsunami but also the accident at Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. And the power shortage resulted in efforts to save power. Since the Great East Japan 1
Earthquake various organizations in Japan have reviewed and strengthened their crisis management. Companies have endeavored to assure the safety of their employees and health of their business by strengthening the link between BCP (BCM) and crisis management. Problem areas for companies that surfaced as a result of the Great East Japan Earthquake include the extent of damage to buildings and facilities, power shortages, power conservation, supply chain disruptions, IT network protection, confirmation of personnel safety, internal and external communications, return of displaced persons to their homes, and radioactivity and rumors of radioactivity. To prepare for future disasters, companies have upped their assumptions of the risk of these events and their management and strengthened countermeasures of employee education and training (Uchida 2012). Moves to review and strengthen crisis management since the Great East Japan Earthquake have also been seen at universities. Universities in the disaster-stricken Tohoku region (Ishinomaki Senshu University 2012, etc.) have recorded in detail the conditions of their damage, their responses beginning immediately after the earthquake (e.g., decision making, safety confirmation, student response), contributions to local communities (e.g., taking in refugees, setting up volunteer centers), and the response and actions of each department and committee, beginning immediately after the earthquake casting a light on future problems. Universities outside the disaster-stricken Tohoku region have also taken the initiative to revamp their crisis management manuals (Kobe University 2012, Niigata University 2012, Chiba Institute of Technology 2012, etc.). These initiatives, which aim to ensure the safety of students, faculty, and staff and guarantee the continuity of educational services, are likely to continue going forward. The aforementioned universities are so-called commuter universities. In other words, students, faculty, and staff commute to the university campus to, respectively, attend classes and work (i.e., no one lives on campus) and the provision of educational services is also confined to the campus. As such, the sphere of crisis management in physical terms can be narrowed down considerably. OUJ, on the other hand, is a distance learning university. In other words, the university's 90,000 students are scattered throughout Japan, from Hokkaido to Okinawa. The headquarters is in Makuhari, Chiba Prefecture, but the university has 50 study centers and seven satellite locations nationwide, and faculty and staff are also scattered throughout the country. Furthermore, educational services are not limited to face-to-face instruction (so-called schooling). Lessons are also broadcast via TV and radio nationwide. OUJ also functions as a lifetime learning institution. In other words, it is also expected to contribute to society by broadly raising the 2
knowledge of the citizens of Japan as a whole. Thus, what should the disaster management be for a distant learning university that has characteristics different from the usual commuter university? In this report we would like to examine the damage sustained by OUJ, Japan's largest distant learning university, by the Great East Japan Earthquake and how the university responded, and what the issues are of that response. Inferences were made with the help of the following documents: Response of the Open University of Japan to the Great East Japan Earthquake (Great East Japan Earthquake task force of the Open University of Japan, April 25, 2012), Risk Management Regulations of the Foundation for the Open University of Japan (March 22, 2012), Basic Guidelines for Risk Management of the Foundation for the Open University of Japan (March 22, 2012), Basic Risk Management Manual of the Foundation for the Open University of Japan (Risk Management Committee of the Open University of Japan, April 25, 2012), University-wide Risk Management Manual According to Event (April 25, 2012), and Faculty and Staff Risk Management Handbook of the Open University of Japan (July 2012). 2. Damage sustained by the university as a result of the Great East Japan Earthquake The Great East Japan Earthquake caused damage in a wide region extending from Kanto to Tohoku. In addition to Chiba, where the university headquarters is located, each prefecture of Aomori, Iwate, Miyagi, Fukushima, Niigata, Ibaraki, Tochigi, and Nagano (having its own study center) was designated as an area eligible for coverage under the disaster relief acts. Damage sustained by the university is as follows. (1) Headquarters (Makuhari area) There was little personal suffering. As for property damage, cracks developed in the front joint of the foyer of the administrative building, ground subsidence caused surface voids in the area around the Chiba study center, the phenomenon of ground liquefaction gave rise to mud piles, some bookcases in the library were overturned and books from mainly two-story open-shelf bookstands were scattered about, and bookcases and experimental equipment in the teacher research labs were overturned. As a 3
result, the Chiba study center was closed until March 14 and the library until March 21, 2011. (2) Study centers There was little personal suffering among faculty and staff. However, there was damage to the residence of some staff (one staffer's house was washed away, one staffer's house was partially destroyed, six staffers' homes were partially damaged, and two staffers temporarily sought refuge outside the prefecture). As for property damage, buildings were largely unaffected but there was damage at study centers and satellite places (hereafter referred to as study centers, etc.) in the Tohoku region (Hachinohe, Iwate, Miyagi, Akita, Yamagata, Fukushima, and Iwaki) and Kanto region (Ibaraki, Tochigi Tokyo Bunkyo, Tokyo Adachi, and Tokyo Tama) in the form of overturned bookcases, scattered books, some falling of masonry from walls, and power outages. As a result, study centers, etc. that suffered damage were closed for one to two weeks in general, with some closed for three weeks or longer. (3) Students (confirming their safety) Of the 7,272 students enrolled in the first term of the FY2011 school year, 6,370 were confirmed of their safety (one was confirmed dead and one missing) (as of September 30, 2011). For students in the FY2010 school year, of the 10,497 students enrolled in the second term of the FY2010 school year and those planning to enroll in the first term of the FY2011 school year, 3,080 were confirmed alive (as of April 18, 2011). 3. Response of OUJ from immediately after the earthquake up to the point of restoration (1) Setting up organizations for emergency response The Tohoku Region Pacific Ocean Offshore Earthquake task force of OUJ (later renamed the Great East Japan Earthquake task force of OUJ) was established on March 14, 2011, to take prompt and appropriate measures to respond to the earthquake. 4
The Working Group of the Electricity Supply-Demand Measures in Summer Time was established on April 20, 2011, to respond to spillover risks caused by power shortages. This working group, which was based upon the government's Framework of the Electricity Supply-Demand Measures in Summer Time, was tasked to consider a plan to cut electricity usage and consider how to respond in the event of an unforeseen large-scale power outage. (2) Main specific responses 1) Assure safety and confirm whereabouts of students, staff, and faculty * The most important response immediately after the earthquake was to assure the safety of students, staff, and faculty. In the Makuhari area, faculty and staff evacuated buildings on a directive from the accounting department (out of concern about the dangers of remaining indoors because of the liquefaction phenomenon). Depending on the situation, all study centers adopted the same response. * In the Makuhari area, a safety confirmation was done for staff on the day of the earthquake (accounting department directive) and for faculty from the following day (carried out by the comprehensive strategy and planning department). Because many faculty work outside university facilities, the safety confirmation for faculty was completed on March 15. Safety confirmation of students was done at headquarters and study centers. 2) Assessing damage sustained by headquarters and study centers * At headquarters, each department did a damage assessment. In particular, the technology and operational division made an effort to check for damage to broadcasting facilities. * At study centers, staff of the study center support department telephoned from within the office individual study centers to assess damages. 3) Responding to people having difficulty commuting to work and returning home * For several days after the earthquake, a number of people working in the Makuhari area encountered difficulty commuting to work and returning home because of paralyzed transportation systems and gasoline shortages (125 people spent the night inside school facilities on the day of the earthquake). Use of Seminar House and food stocks were provided to people having difficulty returning home. For people having difficulty commuting to work, a furlough measure was adopted. 4) School support for students subjected to personal suffering 5
* A decision was made on March 16 to set up a free-dial disaster area hotline and from March 28 through June 10 various consultations were provided. * Course materials (printed) were distributed free of charge to students who had lost them in the earthquake and tuition payment deadlines were extended (from March 31 to April 28, 2011) (both decisions were made on March 15 and announced by HP) for students in the Tohoku and Kanto regions that had trouble in making payments. * The full-time board of directors approved on May 9 the waiver of tuition and other expenses of students affected by the disaster and a notification was sent out on May 26 to students who had paid their tuition (231 applications as of September 30, 2011). * The first tranche of tuition waivers for students affected by the disaster (126) was approved by the full-time board of directors on June 27, the second tranche (36) on July 25, the third tranche (21) on August 4, and the fourth tranche (16) on August 18. * The full-time board of directors approved on June 7 additional tuition and expense waivers (summer intensive course) for students affected by the disaster and a notification was posted on the university s homepage and was also sent out to students concerned (18 applications as of September 30, 2011). 5) Visits to the disaster-stricken area * The chairperson and president of the university made an on-site inspection of study centers in the disaster area, encouraging students and staff and hearing first-hand from study center directors events at the time of the earthquake (Iwate study center on July 14, Miyagi study center on July 14 and August 3, Fukushima study center on July 15 and August 3). 6) Receiving donations and disaster sufferers * A decision was announced on March 24 to solicit donations for the disaster-stricken area. Donations were accepted from April 1 through April 15 and the president of the university delivered the donations to the Japan Red Cross' Chiba branch on April 25. * The solicitation of donations for university-affiliated persons (commonly known as the Great East Japan Earthquake Mana-P Fund) began on April 20 and was scheduled to end on August 31. There was a plan to distribute the donations to students, staff, and faculty affected by the disaster as grants or consolation payments. * The university registered Seminar House with the government as a potential shelter for people affected by the disaster (until July 31). 6
7) Response to planned power outages and electricity supply-demand measures in summer time * Immediately after the earthquake a basic policy decision was made to carry on broadcasting even during planned power outages (as it turned out, the area in which OUJ is located was unaffected). * In response to the formulation of summer time electricity supply-demand measures by the government's Electricity Supply-Demand Emergency Response Headquarters, a plan to curb electricity usage (by 15% from the previous year) at university facilities in the Makuhari area (headquarters and Chiba study center) was adopted on June 13 (a drill was carried out based on the plan on June 22). * Efforts to reduce power consumption at headquarters and the Chiba study center were posted to the university's homepage on June 30, 2011. * A plan on how to respond in the event of an unforeseen large-scale power outage was adopted. 8) Restoration of facilities * Restoration work on damaged facilities was scheduled to be completed at study centers on September 5 and at the Makuhari headquarters (including Chiba study center) by October 21 (some work was extended because of partial design changes). 9) Broadcast of disaster-related programs * Beginning with "Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake," a number of disaster-related programs in the public relations series "Window on the University" were broadcast. In addition, it was proposed to actively address classes on the disaster in special lectures. 10) Preparing a crisis-response system at OUJ (details to be supplied later) 4. Uniqueness of OUJ as an educational institution and its response to earthquakes Organizations experience changes in the nature of their work as they respond to disasters. Social conditions are now different from what they were before and continue to undergo rapid, minute-by-minute changes that in turn produce rapid changes in working environments and increase the demands placed on the organization and its sub-groups (increase in uncertainty). The issues that present themselves during disaster have a high degree of urgency and require quick responses, which increases workloads 7
and also changes decision-making structures because ordinary decision-making processes are unable to respond fast enough (increase in urgency). In addition, disaster reduces the absolute amount of resources available to society as a whole for response, which forces individual organizations to rely more on resources that are available for use by all (increase in interdependency) (Quarantelli & Dynes 1977). There were a number of unique factors at work in OUJ during the earthquake: the damage to the headquarters itself, the physical distance between damaged study centers and the headquarters, the broad distribution of students and other stakeholders, the responsibility to provide educational services without shutting down broadcasting while there was a possibility of power outages, and the fact that the large size of the organization necessitates clear divisions of responsibilities even during ordinary times. These factors served to amplify the increases in uncertainty, increases in urgency, and declines in autonomy that ordinarily confront organizations during crisis. The increase in uncertainty was particularly serious. After disaster happens it is crucial to understand the kinds of issues that may present themselves during the response. The first step in this is to measure the extent of the damage, and then to gauge the amount and the location of resources that can be allocated. In OUJ 's case, however, it was a difficult task even to make these starting-line measurements because study centers and students are dispersed around the country. One specific issue was the inability of the headquarters and study centers to communicate with each other. It is normal for telephone lines to be congested after a disaster, particularly in the disaster area itself. That was the case after the Great East Japan Earthquake. To gauge the damage to study centers, the staff of the Study Center Support Office attempted to phone study centers located within the Tohoku disaster area from their offices, but had difficulties getting through. Likewise, study centers had difficulties making connections to the headquarters in Makuhari. With power out, e-mail communications were also impossible. It was not until the evening of the 11th that the headquarters was able to contact study centers in the Tohoku disaster area, and even this was only possible by making use of public telephones, which are better at achieving connections during disasters, and by going through study centers located in the Chugoku region. Another issue was the difficulty of confirming student safety. To confirm safety, the organization collected and organized the following kinds of information. At the headquarters: confirmations of student safety by research advisors and faculty advisors; confirmations from tuition and fee deposit information; confirmations from ordinary mail; confirmations from contacts made by the student himself; confirmations from mailings of notices of tuition and fee waivers sent to parties responsible for expenses; 8
confirmations with return postcards sent to students not remitting tuition (students on leave, unregistered students); confirmations through delivery of diplomas to graduating students and students completing post-graduate work; confirmations via testing centers and partner schools; confirmations from submissions of coursework; confirmations from follow-up calls regarding coursework submissions; confirmations from second-semester course registrations and credit testing; and confirmations with telephone calls from the Student Support Center. At the study centers: confirmations through attendance at face-to-face classes and confirmations from contacts made by the student himself (to the study center etc.). Yet another issue was the need to continue to broadcast classes despite the potential for power outages and broadcasting system failures. The master control room urgently recruited replacement staff so that it could maintain broadcasts while simultaneously inspecting facilities and equipment. During disasters there is a rapid change and diversification of students' academic support requirements, and it is difficult to secure the resources required for response. Nonetheless, the staff of the headquarters and study centers did everything possible to satisfy those needs. 5. Initiative to build risk management system launched immediately after earthquake (1) Enhancement of risk management structures Disaster response is unique in that it involves qualitatively and quantitatively different work from ordinary times, which must be performed with different structures and in situations in which infrastructure is damaged. Natural disasters are not frequent occurrences and each tends to be very different from all of the others in terms of timing, type of disaster and geographical location. This makes it difficult to extract general lessons about disaster response, and it is even more difficult for an organization to accumulate experience when there are regular rotations of staff charged with disaster response. At many organizations, therefore, information processing and response can be chaotic and confused. Overcoming these obstacles requires organizations to learn disaster-response lessons not only from their own experiences but from those of other organizations, to incorporate those lessons into plans and manuals, and to confirm their effectiveness in day-to-day training and planning. OUJ launched a project to immediately embody the lessons of the Great East Japan Earthquake in a university-wide risk management system. The aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake confirmed the need to build a risk management structure for the entire university, and caused the 9
Foundation for OUJ to establish an OUJ Risk Management System Study Committee on September 14, 2011. The study committee was tasked with drafting the "Risk Management Regulations of the Foundation for OUJ" and "Basic Guidelines for Risk Management of the Foundation for OUJ" that lay out a framework for the university's risk management structure (adopted by the board of directors on March 22, 2012). This provided a basis from which the Foundation for OUJ Risk Management Committee formulated the "Basic Risk Management Manual of the Foundation for OUJ" and "University-Wide Manual for the Management of Specific Risk Categories" to prepare the university for disasters and other emergencies (April 25, 2012). The study committee also examined and made decisions on emergency contact systems and disaster-response stockpiles. Chapter 1 of the Basic Guidelines for Risk Management of the Foundation for OUJ defines their objectives, stating, "The Basic Guidelines for Risk Management of the Foundation for OUJ articulate basic guidelines and frameworks for risk management for the purposes of preventing risks that have the potential to harm the staff, faculty and students of the university, minimizing any damage experienced, and maintaining the university's educational and research activities, stable broadcasts of broadcast classes, and the execution of university operations." The document goes on to explicitly state that "these guidelines will be reviewed as necessary in light of changing social circumstances and developments in science and technology, and every effort will be made to establish a functioning 'P (plan) D (do) C (check) A (action)' cycle." The intention, therefore, is to create an effectively operating risk management structure that is subject to ongoing PDCA cycle-based reviews. Chapter 2 and subsequent chapters discuss preparations, responses during disaster, and responses after disaster in an effort to described crisis response over a medium and long-term time span, including risk management during ordinary times, rather than just response during disaster itself. One of the key lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake was the crucial nature of information management. It is particularly important to facilitate the collection and analysis of information, create materials that enable top administrators to arrive at appropriate decisions, strengthen general administrative functions, and have execution systems in place across the organization. This structure only functions smoothly during crisis, however, if it is in place during ordinary times. The Basic Guidelines for Risk Management of the Foundation for OUJ also discuss enhancements to information collection and communication systems. (2) Specific risk management programs 10
Below are some of the specific programs adopted by the university in response to the Guidelines. 1) Clear articulation of crisis response organizations and structures When crisis strikes, it is imperative that the emergency response system be suited to the situation. Crises go through different phases, and to enable quick organizational response as these phases shift, the university has a Risk Management Committee as a permanent organization, which becomes a Crisis Response Headquarters during emergencies, and then returns to a Risk Management Committee after the situation is resolved. 2) Improvement of faculty and staff awareness of and ability to respond to crisis The university created an "OUJ Staff Risk Management Handbook" for distribution to faculty and staff in an effort to improve their crisis-response literacy. In November 2011, faculty and staff from the headquarters and Chiba Study Center participated in a disaster drill. 3) Installation of information system hardware and software for use during crisis The university strengthened its ability to communicate with the outside and gather information during disasters by installing emergency telephone lines, enhancing its ordinary telephone lines and information circuits, and ensuring redundancy. This hardware was accompanied by software enhancements in the form of overhauls of the emergency contact network and safety confirmation system at both the Makuhari headquarters and the study centers. 4) Countermeasures for flooding of broadcast facilities and information systems The university constructed protective works (new installation of hydraulic waterstops and improvements in water tightness) to minimize the potential for flooding of electrical rooms and other facilities during tsunami, and also improved the management and stability of electric power supplies. It performed additional protective works (improvements in the water tightness of exterior doors) for server rooms and permanent storage centers. 5) Other measures include enhancements to disaster stockpiles and works to prevent bookshelves and similar items from falling over during earthquake. 11
6. Conclusion: Organized, ongoing crisis response Preparing for crisis -- in other words, risk management-- is essentially a redundant activity. One's awareness of a disaster that may or may not ever happen necessarily fades over time. Nonetheless, rigorous risk management and efforts to minimize damage are crucial for the survival of the organization and are responsibilities that organizations have to society at large. Crisis response will differ according to the damage envisioned by the organization and the specific characteristics of the surrounding community. OUJ has study centers and students around Japan and a mission to broadcast educational services throughout the country. These unique characteristics require it to design and implement its own, unique responses, and continue to advance and improve them. The authors would like to acknowledge and thank Shigeo Habuki, Manager of the General Affairs Dept., General Affairs Div., Shinya Horiuchi, Assistant Manager of the General Affairs Dept., General Affairs Div., and Yuzuru Shimojo, General Affairs Section Chief, General Affairs Dept., General Affairs Div. for preparing detailed materials and providing insightful discussions. We would also like to express our gratitude to all of the departments and staff of OUJ for the dedication and self-sacrifice that they have continued to display since the earthquake. Bibliography OUJ, Response of the Open University of Japan to the Great East Japan Earthquake (Report), (2012.4.25) OUJ, Basic Guidelines for Risk Management of the Foundation for the Open University of Japan, (2012.3.22) OUJ, Risk Management Regulations of the Foundation for the Open University of Japan, (2012.3.22) OUJ, Basic Risk Management Manual of the Foundation for the Open University of Japan, (2012.4.25) OUJ, University-wide Risk Management Manual According to Event, (2012.4.25) OUJ, Faculty and Staff Risk Management Handbook of the Open University of Japan, (2012.7) Uchida, Tomoo, Investigation of BCM Initiatives: The Great East Japan Earthquake and BCM, (Report from the Kanto Branch of the Japan Risk Management Society, 2012.6.23) 12
Ishinomaki Senshu University, Ishinomaki Senshu University Report on the Great East Japan Earthquake (2012.3.11) Chiba Institute of Technology, Chiba Institute of Technology Disaster Response Manual: Preparing for a Major Earthquake and Tsunami, (2012.4.1) Kobe University, Kobe University Crisis Management Manual, http://www.kobe-u.ac.jp/info/project/crisis-management/index.html (2012.8.1) Niigata University, Niigata University Crisis Management Office, http://www.niigata-u.ac.jp/profile3/40_kikikanri_010.html (2012.8.1) Quarantelli, E.L. & Dynes, R.R., Response to Social Crisis and Disaster, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol.3, pp.23-49 (1977) 13