U.S. Nuclear Planning After the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review Presentation by Hans M. Kristensen Consultant, Natural Resources Defense Council Phone: (202) 513-6249 / Fax: (202) 289-6868 Email: hkristensen@msn.com Website: http://www.nukestrat.com To the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM), University of Maryland, October 21, 2004
Overview Today s s U.S. nuclear posture The threats New planning capabilities Offensive-defense planning Conclusions
Today s s U.S. Nuclear Posture 2001 Nuclear Posture Review defined: Reduce operationally deployed strategic warheads to 1,700-2,200 by 2012. Maintain reserve of responsive force warheads Maintain Triad of offensive strategic nuclear forces Russia no longer an immediate enemy, but China and rogue states are enduring opponents Revitalize warhead production infrastructure Develop conventional strategic strike capabilities Increase role of missile defense (?)
Today s s U.S. Nuclear Posture SSBNs ICBMs Long-range bombers Fighter-bombers based in CONUS Tomahawk SLCMs
Today s s U.S. Nuclear Posture Trident SSBN 14 Ohio class SSBNs split between Atlantic and Pacific: - 7 at Bangor, WA - 7 at King s Bay, GA Life extended to 42 years 4 oldest SSBNs converted to SSGN (2002-2006) 2006) 4 SSBNs on Hard Alert
Today s s U.S. Nuclear Posture SSBN patrol rate remains at Cold War level US AND RUSSIAN SSBN PATROLS 1981-2003 120 Poseidon SSBNs retired Annual number of patrols 100 80 60 40 20 4 US SSBNs retired 0 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 Russia US
Today s s U.S. Nuclear Posture Trident SLBM force All D5 force C4 phase-out 2000-2005 2005 D5 conversion 2002-2007 2007 D5-Life Extension version Intermediate-range range ballistic missile with both nuclear and conventional warhead studied W88 deployed in Pacific from 2002
Today s s U.S. Nuclear Posture W88 in Pacific Most powerful ballistic missile warhead (455 kilotons) First hard-target kill warhead ever deployed in Pacific When SORT enters into effect in 2012, nearly 25% of U.S. SLBM warheads in Pacific will be hard- target kill 25 20 15 10 5 0 US Hard-Target Warhead Deployment in Pacific W88 Trendline 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Kristensen, 2004
Today s s U.S. Nuclear Posture Warhead Improvements Life-extension extension creates new Mod (W76-1) Ground-burst fuze: new mission Flight-tested tested October 2002 First W76-1/Mk 1/Mk-4A in Sep 2007 Three-axis flap control system: 3-year 3 program to develop GPS-accuracy for Trident II warhead Flight tested in April 2003 Maneuverable RV for high-priority targets such as HDBT
Today s s U.S. Nuclear Posture Implications of Trident Modernization D5/W88 Pacific deployment: first-ever hard-target kill capability in region (23 % of Pacific warheads by 2012) W76-1/Mk 1/Mk-4A ground-burst fuze strike option will increase radioactive fallout compared with current W76/Mk-4 4 air-burst option; development at the same time Defense Science Board argues for lower-yield warheads to reduce fallout 100 kt W76-1/Mk4A with GPS-accuracy would increase kill probability against hard and deeply buried targets; pave way for conventional warhead option on SLBMs
Today s s U.S. Nuclear Posture ICBMs MX/Peacekeeper retired (2002-2005); 16 left as of October 2004 W87 warheads moved to Minuteman III; mix with W78 New ICBM in 2018 500 Minuteman III at 3 bases MIRV retained; up to 800 warheads $6 billion modernization underway
Today s s U.S. Nuclear Posture Strategic Bombers B-52H ( nuclear( workhorse ) Barksdale AFB / Minot AFB ALCM / ACM (B83 / B61-7) B-2 2 (stealth bomber) All at Whiteman AFB B83 / B61-7/11 Carrier of RNEP
Today s s U.S. Nuclear Posture Fighter-bombers (DCA) Based in CONUS and Europe F-15Es of the 4 th Fighter Wing at Seymour Johnson AFB in North Carolina F-16C/Ds of the 27 th Fighter Wing at Cannon AFB in New Mexico Europe: Lakenheath, Aviano, Incirlik, Ramstein B61-3/4/10 gravity bombs; of 1,016 weapons 580 are active (480 in Europe)
Today s s U.S. Nuclear Posture Korea Contingency: Weapons withdrawn from South Korea in December 1991 1998: 4 th FW F-15E F squadron simulated nuclear strike against North Korea In support of OPLAN 5027 Defense of South Korea against North Korean attack (including chemical weapons) Long-range mission with refueling and defense (KC-135, AWACS, F-16, F-15) F
Today s s U.S. Nuclear Posture European Contingency: 480 U.S. B61-3/4/10 bombs remain in Europe Eight bases in six countries 180 for use by non-nuclear nuclear host countries US Nuclear Weapons In Europe, 1954-2004 8000 7000 6000 5000 4000 3000 2000 1000 0 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Today s s U.S. Nuclear Posture Tomahawk TLAM/N All weapons stored on land (SWFPAC, Bangor, WA SWFLANT, King s s Bay, GA) Of 304 W80-0 0 warheads, 100 are active and 204 inactive Periodic certification of about a dozen SSNs, but followed by de- certification Redeployment would take some 30 days DOD decided in 2003 to retain TLAM/N
Today s s U.S. Nuclear Posture Stockpile Outlook 2004-2012 2012 2004 2012 Reduction Strategic 8655 5104 3551 Non-strategic 1703 845 858 Total 10358 5949 4409
Today s s U.S. Nuclear Posture Stockpile Outlook 2004-2012 2012 Source: Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, What s Behind Bush s Nuclear Cuts, Arms Control Today,, October 2004, p. 7.
The Threats Defined by 2001 Nuclear Posture Review: Russia will remain the largest nuclear power with a capability to destroy the U.S. China modernization of nuclear forces North Korea / Iran / Syria proliferators and rogue Issues: India-Pakistan / extended deterrence
The Threats Russia is not considered an immediate threat, but: "Russia s s nuclear forces and programs, nevertheless, remain a concern. Russia faces many strategic problems around its periphery and its future course cannot be charted with certainty. U.S. planning must take this into account. In the event that U.S. relations with Russia significantly worsen in the future, the U.S. may need to revise its nuclear force levels and posture." (NPR Report, p. 17)
The Threats China is considered an immediate or potential threat: "Due to the combination of China's still developing strategic objectives and its ongoing modernization of its nuclear and non nuclear forces, China is a country that could be involved in an immediate or potential contingency." (NPR Report, pp. 16-17) 17) Taiwan crisis potential immediate contingency Koran peninsula potential contingency
The Threats China scenarios identified in 1994 by STRATCOM: Korean peninsula Not full-scale attack against China; adaptive planning mission against North Korea Direct US-China Major attack response plan needed against China Taiwan scenario (?)
The Threats China Returned to SIOP 1994 NPR: STRATCOM and Joint Staff tried but failed to return China to SIOP 1997: Presidential Decision Directive 60 (PDD-60) broadened targeting against China 2000: STRATCOM returned China to SIOP; CHISOP (Chinese Integrated Strategic Operations Plan) created
The Threats Proliferators: North Korea, Iran, Syria North Korea: immediate contingency, attack on South Korea, missile strike against allies or U.S. May have some form of nuclear weapons Iran: potential contingency, missile attack against Israel. May pursue nuclear weapons Syria: potential contingency, chemical/biological attack against Israel (Iraq and Libya issues gone since 2001 NPR)
The Threats Proliferators: North Korea 1994-1995 1995 Crisis U.S. issued nuclear threat: Congress: What role have nuclear weapons played in preventing WMD from being used by Rogue states? In my view, sir, it plays a very large role. Not only was that message passed in 1990 by the President [to Iraq], that same message was passed to the North Koreans back in 1995,, when the North Koreans were not coming off their reactor approach they were taking [sic]. Gen Eugene Habiger, CINCSTRAT, 1997
The Threats Proliferators: North Korea The illusion of containing fall-out: B61-11 11 is 400 kt RNEP similar yield Source: Christopher Paine, et al., Countering Proliferation or Compounding it?, NRDC, May 2003.
The Threats Proliferators: North Korea Fallout from use of a single B61-11 11 against North Korea Assumes depth of 30 feet (10 meters) and yield of 300 kt (actual B61-11 11 yield is 400 kt) Source: Christopher Paine, et al., Countering Proliferation or Compounding it?, NRDC, May 2003.
The Threats Issues other than threats: India-Pakistan: nuclear crisis or war, Pakistani command and control, India-China Extended deterrence: Japan, South Korea, European countries
New Planning Capabilities NPR States New Capabilities Are Needed: The current nuclear planning system, including target identification, weapons systems assignment, and the nuclear command and control systems requirements, is optimized to support large, deliberately planned nuclear strikes. In the future, as the nation moves beyond the concept of a large, Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) and moves toward more flexibility, adaptive planning will play a much larger role. NPR Report 2001, p. 29.
New Planning Capabilities actually, nuclear planning and particularly adaptive planning has already undergone extensive modernization over the last decade: 1993 Strategic War Planning System (SWPS) study SWPS Modernization completed 2003 Created Living SIOP Reduced complete overhaul from 18 to 6 months Major plan production in 4 months Limited options in 24 hours
New Planning Capabilities Definitions: Deliberate Planned Missions executable war plans, prepared in advance, for anticipated contingencies. Provides foundation for adaptive planning by identifying individual weapon/target combinations that could be executed in crises Examples: SIOP/OPLAN 8044, large attack plans Adaptive Planned Missions war plans generated quickly in time-critical situations Examples: Theater Nuclear Options, WMD strikes, preemption
New Planning Capabilities Pre-Planned Planned Mission Planning: Note: Since this chart was made, DOD has formally stopped using the name SIOP. The strategic war plan is now called OPLAN 8044. The last plan to be called SIOP S (SIOP-03) entered into effect March 2003.
New Planning Capabilities Some Adaptive Planning capability already existed 10 years ago Within the context of a regional single or few warhead detonation, classical deterrence already allows for adaptively planned missions to counter any use of WMD. USSTRATCOM, answer to 1994 Nuclear Posture Review Working Group Five. but Adaptive Planning is underpinning everything today and will proliferate the number and character of strike options
New Planning Capabilities Adaptive Planning is capability as well as doctrine: Adaptive planning challenges the headquarters to formulate plans very quickly in response to spontaneous threats which are more likely to emerge in a new international environment unconstrained by the Super Power stand-off... We can accomplish this task by using generic targets, rather than identifying specific scenarios and specific enemies, and then crafting a variety of response options to address these threats. To ensure their completeness, these options consider the employment of both nuclear and conventional weapons. Thus, by its very nature, adaptive planning offers unique solutions, tailored to generic regional dangers involving weapons of mass destruction. General Lee Butler, May 1993 Adaptive Planning is basis for preemption doctrine
New Planning Capabilities the Pentagon will continue pre-planning planning for the largest missions: We will continue to do pre-planning planning for our immediate and potential contingencies, but one of the important things that came out of the QDR is it's necessary to develop new tools for adaptively -- in a timely way adaptively creating plans for situations that may arise very quickly in an unexpected way. J. D. Crouch, the assistant secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, January 9, 2002
New Planning Capabilities Example of Adaptive Planning: B-2 B 2 modernization October 1, 1997: B-2 B 2 replaces B-1 B in SIOP (SIOP-98) Planning and processing of a single SIOP sortie took well over 24 hours to complete November 1998: STRATCOM orders new timelines incorporated into B-2 B 2 planning documents Deliberate planned missions: no more than 24 hours Adaptive planned missions: no more than 8 hours
New Planning Capabilities Example of Adaptive Planning: SSBN modernization October 2003: Navy completes deployment of submarine-launched ballistic missile retargeting system (SRS) on strategic submarines: enables SSBNs to quickly, accurately, and reliably retarget missiles to targets and allow timely and reliable processing of an increased number of targets will reduce overall SIOP processing time and support adaptive planning
New Planning Capabilities Example of Adaptive Planning: targeting Support of Regional CINCs and NATO: Theater Nuclear Support mission SILVER Books (1993-1995) 1995) NATO Nuclear Planning System (NNPS) ISPAN (2003-)
New Planning Capabilities Example of Adaptive Planning: STRATCOM Theater Nuclear Support System: Assist regional CINCs with designing and maintaining theater nuclear strike plans Mission assigned to STRATCOM in June 1994: Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan nuclear Annex C (JSCP CY 93-95) 95) JSCP CY 93-95 95 included also guidance for CINCs requesting preplanned targeting outside their own AOR
New Planning Capabilities Example of Adaptive Planning: STRATCOM SILVER Books (1993-1995): 1995): SILVER = Strategic Installation List of Vulnerability Effects and Results the planning associated with a series of silver bullet missions aimed at counterproliferation Targets: nuclear, chemical, biological and command, control and communications (C3) installations SILVER Book developed for EUCOM and PACOM
New Planning Capabilities Example of Adaptive Planning: NATO NATO Nuclear Planning System (NNPS): Is designed to automate NATO s s coordinated adaptive nuclear planning process Enables dispersed users to access the NNPS server at SHAPE Headquarters via remote fixed and mobile PC workstations Develop Major Contingency Options and Selective Contingency Option plans (target development, DGZ construction, force application, aircraft route planning, timing and deconfliction, and consequences of execution) Prepare planning products and messages for external commands and agencies
New Planning Capabilities Example of Adaptive Planning: STRATCOM ISPAN (Integrated Strategic Planning and Analysis Network) Contract awarded in 2003 to Lockheed Martin for 10-year modernization (continues SWPS modernization from 1993-2003) Nuclear/conventional strike and missile defense planning the system will assess a given situation and present DOD decision- makers with potential courses of action. For each option, the war planning system will determine the probability of success, potential tial collateral damage, timing and other details. Military officials can then execute one of the options, or change the planning parameters to see a new set of options based on different requirements. Lockheed Martin, May 2003
Conclusions Significant numerical warhead reductions, but Cold War posture maintained (Triad) Improved weapons capability and accuracy Vastly more flexible and adaptive nuclear war planning system (responsiveness is core) Capability-based based (vs. threat-based) planning Option-hungry doctrine drives strike planning Arms control disconnected from vision