ABOUT THE MILITARY COMMITTEE (MC)

ABOUT THE MILITARY COMMITTEE (MC) The Military Committee (MC) is the senior military authority in NATO and the oldest permanent body in NATO after the North Atlantic Council, both having been formed months after the Alliance came into being. It is the primary source of military advice to NATO s civilian decision-making bodies the North Atlantic Council and the Nuclear Planning Group.Its advice is sought prior to any authorization for military action and, consequently represents an essential link between the political decision-making process and the military structure of NATO. 1. Smart Defense 2. Evaluation of KFOR 3. Development of VJTF TOPIC A: SMART DEFENCE INITIATIVE The Smart Defence Initiative is a project developed by NATO after the 2008 economic crisis to address the decrease in military spending and in funding contributions of member states given the austerity adopted by governments. In time of recession, many leaders don t have the political will or public support to maintain defense spending at their previous levels. Given these reductions, NATO had to take proactive and adaptive measures to maintain its capabilities and the abilities to fulfill its mandate. This initiative is aimed directly at establishing a more equitable sharing of the defense burden and to reduce the overreliance of member states on the United States capabilities. It encourages member states to increase their cooperation in military procurement, where they are encouraged to work together to develop, acquire, operate and maintain military capabilities ( ) required to achieve the goals of NATO

Forces 2020 : modern, tightly connected forces that are properly equipped, trained, exercised and led. That means harmonizing requirements, pooling and sharing capabilities, setting priorities and coordinating efforts better. 1 Concretely, they are expected to develop specific capabilities in collaboration with other states in order to address specific needs of the alliance, such as air-to-air refueling capabilities, support ships or ISTAR capabilities. By doing so, there is a specialization of capabilities and all states don t need to maintain all of these capabilities as everyone is responsible for a distinct specialization. It is consequently more cost-effective and improves the resources available for NATO operations. The basis of this project is that states will specialize themselves in areas in which they are the most efficient and will prioritize their procurement resources towards this specific field. NATO is acting as an intermediary, coordinating among nations to assist them and to ensure that capabilities are maintained at an acceptable level to fulfill the roles of the alliance. This initiative also includes the facilitation of joint procurement between states to share the burden of equipment that is significantly costly to produce and maintain. At the Chicago Summit in 2012, it was agreed to adopt the Smart Defence Initiative, and numerous projects have since been developed in order to fulfill the mandate of this initiative. However, Smart Defence Initiative has been criticized as it is perceived by some as a threat to the sovereignty and defense autonomy of the state given the overdependence on the alliance for defense introduced by the development of specific capabilities, while neglecting others. Furthermore, given the limitations on force employment imposed by the engagement rules defined by national legislations in conflicts, some essential capabilities for NATO could not be used or could face restrictions within operations. As an example, some countries refuse to fly at night, while others might even refuse to participate at all in a specific operation given their domestic constraints. How can NATO develop effective mechanisms to generate cooperation and effective state specialization while addressing the concerns of defence autonomy and domestic constraints? In which further capabilities, does your country is ready to invest? Further Reading: Aronsson, L., O Donnell, M., 2012. Conference Report. In: Chicago Council on Global Affairs, Smart Defence and the Future of NATO: Can the Alliance Meet the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century? Chicago, Illinois 28-30 March 2012. Chicago: Chicago Council on Global Affairs. 1 NATO Website. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_84268.htm?

Huso, R., 2012. A Strategic Challenge: Building Capabilities in an Age of Austerity. Allied Command Transformation. Major, C., Mölling, C., Valasek., T., 2012. Smart but too Cautious: How NATO can Improve its Fight Against Austerity, Centre for European Reform. TOPIC B: EVALUATION OF KFOR Resolution 1244 of the United Nations Security Council created the NATO-led Kosovo Force on June 10, 1999, with the mandate to contribute to maintaining peace and security in Kosovo amidst conflict and civil and political breakdown. Its mandate is also derived from the Military-Technical Agreement between NATO and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia. As a Chapter VII intervention (of the UN Charter), KFOR is a peace enforcement operation. After the breakup of the Former Yugoslavia, Albanian leaders declared independence from Serbia, only to be met with violent and brutal repression by Serbian forces, led by Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, and were faced with little international recognition for the newly declared independent Republic of Kosovo. In 1992, Ibrahim Rugova was named president of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), an Albanian political organization, and Albanians elected their own parliament to strengthen their own independence. Although the LDK operated peacefully, with its political, economic and social institutions working alongside those of the Serbian government, dissatisfaction with the government by both Kosovar Albanians and Serbians led to violence, leading to a full scale war in 1996, as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) clashed with Serbian forces. Later in the ICTY Milosevic stood trial for war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity against the Kosovar Albanians (as well as against civilians in Bosnia and Croatia). KFOR deployed into Kosovo on June 12, 1999 to complete an air campaign, and with the primary goals of demilitarizing the KLA and expulsion of Serbian forces, who were committing humanitarian atrocities, from the region. While the latter was accomplished in 1999, and was followed by relative peace and stability, in 2004 renewed violence broke out between the Albanians and Serbs. The 2004 Istanbul Summit reaffirmed KFOR s, and NATO s necessity in Kosovo: to create a secure, stable, multi-ethnic Kosovo. In 2007, the Ahtisaari Proposal, created by a year of UN negotiations, was rejected by Serbia and accepted by Kosovo, leading to a further stalemate on peace talks between the two states. At the Bucharest Summit in 2008, NATO leaders agreed that KFOR would remain to work with Kosovar and Serbian authorities and would facilitate cooperation between the UN, EU and other relevant international actors necessary in creating and sustaining a peaceful situation.

The situation in Kosovo since this time has improved significantly (indicated by events such as elections and the protection of cultural and heritage sites), with KFOR s presence becoming more for deterrence. While peace is not yet stable, troops have been reduced from 50,000 at the start of KFOR s mission to the current number of 5,000. Some of the main tasks of KFOR have included: assistance with the return of displaced persons; reconstruction and de-mining; medical assistance; providing security and public order; ensuring border security; and supporting the establishment of public institutions and judicial systems. Its military tasks have included assisting the standing down of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) and creating the Kosovo Security Force (KSF). The 2014 Wales Summit Declaration commended KFOR s successes over the last 15 years. However, since 1999, significant improvements in Kosovo s security situation, including political, social and economic advancements, have called into question the necessity of maintaining a NATO military presence, even if it is for deterrence. In evaluating KFOR s mandate in the present, is there still a need for NATO military presence in the region? How has KFOR contributed to the peace situation in Kosovo, and is their continued presence necessary for its sustainability? In addition to dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, how can NATO ensure it is not providing a crutch, and thereby hindering, the region from creating its own sustainable peace solution? Further Reading: NATO s role in Kosovo (NATO): http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm History: KFOR Deployment (NATO): http://www.aco.nato.int/kfor/about-us/history.aspx NATO marks fifteen years of providing security in Kosovo (NATO): http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_111055.htm?selectedlocale=en Wales Summit Declaration (NATO): http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm UNSC Resolution 1244 (UN): http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n99/172/89/pdf/n9917289.pdf?openelement TOPIC C: DEVELOPMENT OF A VERY HIGH READINESS TASK FORCE (VJTF) The 2014 Wales Summit Declaration noted the need for NATO to be able to respond swiftly and firmly to new security challenges outlined in the NATO Readiness Action

Plan. The threats identified include responding to Russia s challenges and implications of action and emerging threats in the Middle East and North Africa; the plan includes measures such as strengthening crisis management capabilities and NATO s collective defence. The Declaration further noted that these changes would be possible by modernizing the NATO Response Force (NRF) and creating force packages with the ability to move rapidly and respond quickly to high-level threats and challenges. Currently, the NRF is comprised of a command and control element from the NATO Command Structure; the Immediate Response Force (joint force of approximately 13,000 high-readiness troops) and a Response Forces Pool to supplement forces when needed. The creation of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), conceptualized in the midst of the Russia-Ukraine crisis, is part of this plan. It is envisioned as a new Allied joint force that is able to deploy within days to respond to rapidly emerging security threats, particularly at the periphery of NATO s territory. Additionally, the VJTF should include land, maritime, air and special operations forces, with their capabilities testable through short-notice response exercise. NATO also hopes to create a command and control presence within eastern Allied members, with troop contributions being fulfilled on a rotational basis. To create a prepared and adaptable VJTF, NATO hopes to train troops, develop critical infrastructure, and procure supplies, bases, weapons and other equipment from Member States. Finally, the VJTF should be able to conduct a full range of NATO missions, from land to naval. It is important to note that the VJTF would be an enhancement of the NRF, which can only be used when an issue is referred to the North Atlantic Council and a consensus vote decides to deploy NRF forces. As well, while many individual parts of VJTF s composition have been discussed, particularly in the Wales Summit Declaration, much of its composition is still undecided. As well, sceptics of VJTF believe that the VJTF may be overly confrontational towards Eastern Europe and Russia in particular, especially as it was envisioned during the Ukraine crisis. Additionally, as of September, the UK was the only country to commit personnel to the VJTF, even though NATO leaders promised to commit to spending 2% of their GDP on defence something that has long been ignored. While there has been significant praise for VJTF, details still need to be worked out, and the commitments of Member States must be solidified to ensure the Task Force is sustainable and actionable in terms of funding, troops and political support. The Military Committee is being tasked with articulating the development plans for the VJTF. How can the mandate of VJTF be harmonized with that of NRF to ensure there is no overlap of command? How will the VJTF prioritize competing and simultaneous security threats? How will intelligence be shared with the VJTF?

What are the minimum contributions for Member States? What will the command and control structure look like? Where will strategic bases for VJTF be placed? How will VJTF interact with national and other military forces in conflicts? Further Reading: Wales Summit Declaration (NATO): http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm NATO Response Force (NATO): http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49755.htm# An Evaluation of the Wales Summit: NATO builds coalitions for conflict on multiple fronts (Ian Davis and Nigel Chamerlain): http://www.natowatch.org/sites/default/files/briefing_paper_no.54_- _the_wales_summit_final.pdf