Challenges in Vertical Collaboration Among Warfighters for Missile Defense C2

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2004 Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium The Power of Information Age Concepts and Technologies Challenges in Vertical Collaboration Among Warfighters for Missile Defense C2 Laura A.T. Lee, Ray C. Prouty, David J. Sepucha SPARTA, Inc. 13400 Sabre Springs Parkway, Suite 220 San Diego, California 92128 (858) 668-3570

Challenge: Evolving Missile Defense Plans for Net-Centric Operations In 2004, USSTRATCOM will Oversee the Deployment of the Initial Defensive Operation (IDO) for Missile Defense Architecture Has Been in Development for Over Twenty Years Comprised of Land, Air, Sea and Space Elements Developed by the Army, Navy, Air Force and the Marines NCW Concepts Such As Networked Sensors Will Be Employed, Although Not Originally Envisioned The Corresponding Integrated Missile Defense Plan Must Consider the Complex, Distributed Sensors and Weapons From Around the Globe The Plan Includes Tens of Systems Frequently Engaged in Multiple Missions for Different Commanders Against Multiple Threat Types Individual System Planners Already Exist or Are in Development Question is What the Role These Individual Planners Should Have in Integrated Plan for an NCW Architecture

Missile Defense 101 Enemy Missiles Have the Range to Be Launched in One Theater Area of Responsibility (AOR), Fly Over Another AOR and Impact in Yet Another AOR. With These Ranges, Missile Defense Has Become a Global Issue in Theater Conflicts. Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI) Enemy Ballistic Missiles Air-Borne Laser (ABL) AEGIS Ship Ground-Based Radar PATRIOT Sensors are Networked. The AEGIS Ship may be supporting engagements in Korea, Japan and the U.S. simultaneously.

Steps in Developing A Missile Defense Plan Guidance 1. Gather Mission Guidance (current situation and plan objectives) 2. Analyze Defense Capability Feasible Enemy Trajectories Feasible Friendly Detections and Intercepts 3. Evaluate Enemy/ and Friendly Courses of Action Most Likely Events Includes Timing and Raid Size Pn = Probability of Negation Ballistic Missile Threat Launch Point Example Enemy Course of Action (ECOA) Plan Objectives: Defend These Radar Points (e.g., Airports) Fan

Analyzing Complex Defense Capability Increasing Complexity Single System, Single Threat (shown here) Single System, Multiple Threat Types, Single Mission (BMD) Single System, Single Threat, Multiple Chains of Command (AORs( AORs) Single System, Multiple Missions Multiple Systems, Interacting Systems, Single Threat Multiple Systems, Interacting Systems, Multiple Threats Multiple Systems, Multiple Threats, Multiple Chains of Command 0.0 Ballistic Missile Launch Area Probability of Negation 0.3 0.5 0.7 Radar Fan 0.9 0.95

Strategic Plan Development (Pre-Network Centric Warfare (NCW)) Planning Focus Monitor Situational Awareness of Air Defense Plan Products Theater Objectives & CINC s Intent / OPLAN COCOM Operational Tactical Top Level Operational Planner Develop A Prioritized Defended Asset List (Guidance) Develop Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) Evaluate Tactical Plans and Merge into An Operational Plan Detailed Tactical Planners Develop Plan Based on System Capabilities, Constraints for Optimal Locations Joint Force CDR Theater Campaign Plan Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) Air Campaign Plan Joint Air Operations Plan (MAAP, ACP) Tasking/Coordinating (TACOPDAT, ATO, ACO) Situation Monitoring and Re-planning Missions (Plan, Execute & Assess) JFC JFACC /AADC Comp./ RADCs Service Tactical Cmdrs Tactical Plans ABL AEGIS BMD PATRIOT THAAD GMD

Building the Pre-NCW Operational Plan Guidance Threats, Assets to Protect Air Force ABL Integrated Missile Defense Plan Army PATRIOT Navy AEGIS Army GMD Not Really Integrated, But with Autonomous Systems, It Would Be Close Plans

More Steps in Developing A Missile Defense Plan (Complexity) A Tough Problem Multiple Systems With Intereactions (AEGIS SPY RADAR, AEGIS SM-3, PATRIOT RADAR, PATRIOT PAC- 2/GEM/PAC-3, GBI, UEWR, COBRA DANE ), Multiple Threats (SCUD-B, SCUD-C, C, NO- DONG ), Multiple Chains of Command (USFK, USFJ, NORTHCOM) Multiple Missions (BMD, AAW ) Environment (Terrain, Water, Supportability, Electro-Magnetic Effects)

Planning Levels for Net-Centric Operations in Missile Defense AOR 1 (e.g., PACOM) AOR 2 (e.g., NORTHCOM) Strategic Monitor Situational Awareness of Air Defense Plan COCOM COCOM Operational Operational Planner Develop Plan With Sufficient Detail to Recommend Options for Sensors/ Weapons Includes C2 Such As Net- Centric Operations Evaluate Performance of Options to Illustrate Capabilities and Limitations to Decision Makers Transmit to Lower Echelon Units for Refinement/Validation JFC JFACC /AADC Comp./ RADCs ABL Interceptor Networked Architecture Radar JFC JFACC /AADC Comp./ RADCs Tactical Tactical Planners Evaluate Tasking Based on Given Threat, Asset and Architecture Balance with Multi-Mission, Supportability, and Environmental Impacts Service Tactical Cmdrs AEGIS BMD Service Tactical Cmdrs

NCW: Now What? 1. SINGLE PLANNER. Build a Detailed Mission Planner (i.e., One-Sim Sim ) for both Operational and Tactical Planning Levels Options for Evolving Mission Planning for Net-Centric Operations 2. FEDERATED PLANNERS. Develop Medium Level Fidelity Planner for Operational Level and Collaborate with Detailed Tactical Planners COCOM JFC ABL Networked Architecture COCOM JFC 3. NET-CENTRIC PLANNER. Develop a Detailed Mission Planning Framework Comprised of Planning Services Performing Synchronized Development and Mission Validation JFACC /AADC Comp./ RADCs Service Tactical Cmdrs Radar Interceptor AEGIS BMD PAC-3 JFACC /AADC Comp./ RADCs Service Tactical Cmdrs

Option 1. Single Planner Depth and Breadth Contains All Threats, Sensors, Weapon and C2BMC Models Current Tactical Models Include Detailed Physics Algorithms (e.g., Detection, Clutter, Multi-path, Atmospheric Drag, Lethality, Weather) Considers Multi-Mission Mission Aspects Littoral Warfare Air Defense (Aircraft, Cruise Missiles) Addresses Supportability, Reliability and Environmental Impacts Road Networks, Water Depth & Channels, Terrain, Local Weather/Seas Possible: Likely: yes No Why Not? Magnitude of the Problem (Breadth and Depth is Staggering), Engineering Details Are Evolving on all the Systems Simultaneously, Effort Crosses Service Boundaries with Acquisition Implications.

One-Sim Planner Example Operational Threat Model Satellites Platform C2BMC Radar Model Laser Tactical A/C Interceptor Terrain IR Launchers Anti-Air Warfare EMI Littoral Warfare Supportability

Option 2. Federated Planners Essentially, the Current Situation Top Level Operational Planner Evaluates Threats, Assets and System Elements for Defense Capability Creates Tasking (threat + asset + defense triplets) Evaluates Architecture Performance Requests Refinement by Tactical Level Planners Tactical Planner Submits Task Validation, Suggests New Location/Orientation and Additional Assets for Protection Submits Final Plan Registered XML Schema for Threat Input and Missile Defense Design (Plan) Assists In Collaboration Refinement by Tactical or Service Planners Can Be Difficult, Unless Each Planner Can Model the Other Sensors or Weapons They Interact With (e.g., Navy AEGIS Models Army Ground-Based Interceptor)

Federated Planner Example Operational Threat Model Satellites Platform C2BMC Radar Model Laser A/C Interceptor Terrain IR Tactical AEGIS (Sensor) Defense Design GMD (Interceptor) Radar Model GBI Radar GBI Model Littoral Mission Electro- Magnetic Interference Nuclear Effects Countermeasures

extensible Markup Language (XML( XML) Missile Defense Agency (MDA) Developed an XML Schema for the Missile Defense Planning Data Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Developed an XML Schema for Ballistic Missile Threat Data MDA s Operational Level Planner Employed the Java Messaging Services (JMS) to Exchange Plans MDA and the Army Are Developing A Web Service Interface To Validate Tasks Among Their Planners Technology Advances Supporting the Collaboration Among Planners XML Schema Developed to Encompass All Missile Defense Data Used XSL XQL XML Schema XML RDF XLINK DOM

Web Service Standards Used To Support Net-Centric Planning extensible Markup Language (XML)/ XML Schema Definition (XSD) Syntax for Messages and Data Types Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP)/( Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP)( Transport and Syntax for Synchronous/ Asynchronous Messaging Web Services Description Language (WSDL)( XML Format for Describing Network Services Universal Description, Discovery and Integration (UDDI)( Registry model supporting publish, find, bind, execute Web Services: WS-Security, Security, WS-Transaction, WS- Coordination Syntax for reliable messaging, encrypted payloads

Option 3. Net-Centric Planner Operational Level Architecture Planner Evaluates Threats, Assets and System Elements for Defense Capability Creates Tasking (threat, asset, defense triplets) Evaluates Architecture Performance Using Web Services for Element Capability Publishes Initial Plan Each System Element (sensor or weapon) Subscribes to Missile Defense Plans Evaluates Tasking Identifies Any Issues with their Element Locations Multi-Mission Mission Impacts, Water Depth, Terrain, Electro-Magnetic Interference Calculates Element Performance for Each Threat-Asset Pair Sensor Elements Produce Detection/Track History or Signal-to to-noise Ration (SNR) plots Weapon Elements Produce Probability of Negation Contours for Their Weapon using the Sensor Network Validates Tasking for Original Location/Orientation or Suggests Revised Location/Orientation Showing Original and Revised Validation Matrices for Approval (which starts cycle of iteration) What Happens When One Element Suggests a Revised Location/Orientation.The Plan Development Must Be Iterative.

Net-Centric Planner Example Operational Threat Model Satellites Platform C2BMC Radar Model Laser A/C Interceptor Terrain IR Tactical AEGIS (Sensor) GMD (Interceptor) Web Services Radar Model Littoral Mission Electro- Magnetic Interference Nuclear Effects Interceptor Countermeasures

Web Services Context Diagram Registry 1. All planners publish a list of hosted Services Provider UDDI Service Descriptions Consumer 2. Consumer queries Registry and finds a service that fulfills a requirement 3. Provider and Consumer bind together on a service. Consumer executes Providers' hosted service

Net-Centric Planner Example AEGIS (Sensor) GMD (Interceptor) Planner #1 Radar Model Web Services Planner #2 Interceptor Planner #1 Service Registry Planner #2 Planner #3 Planner #4 AEGIS Radar GBI Int Service Descriptions UEWR Radar AEGIS Int Integrated Plan

The Plan Glue : A Results Cube Operational Planner Constructs a Threat Asset-Defense (Tasking) Results Cube Task (Cube) Can Contain Original Performance, Validation Attribute and Validated Performance Tactical Planners Can Validate Each Task (Initial Plan with Improving Confidence) Results Can Be Translated into Probability of Negation Contours Color Coded for Intuitive Reading

Tasking Triplets Missile Defense Task = Threat (location, type) + Asset (point/area to defend) + Defense Tasked to Defend Asset Against Threat Threat Asset Pairs (Within Threat Range) Threat-Asset Asset-Defense (Tasking Triplet)

Tasking Details for One Defense Element Each Element Calculates its Sensor or Weapon Performance for Each Threat- Asset Pair Uses Web Services for Other Element s Performance (e.g., Threat Provide Sensor Track History 1 Threat 2 Threat 3 To Be Used in Interceptor Asset Flyout) 1 Asset 1 Asset 1 No No Yes Considers Other System and Environment Constraints Threat Provides 1 Threat Results 2 for Threat 3 Operational Planner Asset 2 Asset 2 Asset 2 (overrides initial plan Yes Yes Yes estimate) Threat 1 Asset 3 Threat 2 Asset 3 Threat 3 Asset 3 No Yes Yes Assets for Protection Threat 1 Threat 2 Threat 3 Threat 1 Threat 2 Threat 3 Airport 1 Airport 1 Airport 1 City 1 City 1 City 1 City 2 City 2 City 2 Threats Threat 1 Threat 2 Threat 3 Defense 1 Defense 2 Defense 3 Defense 1 Defense 2 Defense 3 Defense 1 Defense 2 Defense 3 Defenses

Example Results for Sensors and Weapons Sensor: Ave. Earliest Detection Time Weapon: Probability of Negation Threat 1 Threat 2 Threat 1 Threat 2 Threat 3 Threat 3

Next Steps for Net-Centric Planning Develop Web Services Approach Across Missile Defense Planners Determine What Physics-Based Questions Can Be Provided? Evaluate Modeling Approaches Across Planners (e.g., common terrain, terminology, measures of performance) Determine CONOPS for Information Flow Is Network Ubiquitous or Should Operational Level Planner Retain Duplicate Models to Gracefully Degrade? Finalize Missile Defense Planning and Intelligence XML Schemas to Accommodate Net-Centric Planner Needs Evaluate Current XML Schemas Against Required Breadth and Depth

Summary Missile Defense Planning Incorporating NCW Concepts Is Complex Several Options Exist to Develop and Validate the Plan Single One-Sim Sim Planner Federated Planner Net-Centric Planner Choosing a Net-Centric Planner Solution Provides the Best Path To Evolving the Current Missile Defense Planning Process