The Battle of Ba Gia Periods 2 and

The Battle of Ba Gia Periods 2 and 3 -- 1-6-1965 Colonel Ton That Soan In early 1965, Task Force A composing of the 1st and 2nd Battalion, was reinforcement to the 22nd Infantry Division and participated in operations in An Lao valley, Binh De gorge, Duong Lieu, Hill 10 and Tra O Muddy lake. The NVA 3rd Infantry Division Gold Star tasted Marines' punches. In the Battle of Phung Du (1-4-1965) a regiment of that NVA Division suffered heavy losses when it had attacked the 2nd Marine Battalion's position at night and at the next morning, it was blocked by the 1st Marine Battalion when their survivors had been running for escape. Later a blitz operation to lessen the enemy pressure at Hoai An district, Binh Dinh province caused local residents and regional forces to trust the ARVN, of which the 1st Marine Battalion was a representing unit. After this battle, the 1st Battalion returned to Thu Duc for a rest. The battle situation in MRI continued to boil up. Ba Gia outpost was occupied at the end of 5-1965. The 1st Battalion received orders from the Marine Brigade to reinforce MRI urgently. Task force B was formed, composing of the 1st Battalion and the 3rd Battalion. The latter had been in the area of operation. Major Ton That Soan was commander of the 1st Battalion and at the same time, commander of the Task Force B. Task force B headquarters and the 1st Battalion were airlifted from Tan Son Nhat airport. From above, Quang Ngai city appeared familiarly with Thien An mountain in the east and Tra Khuc river in the north. Vaguely seen in the west was Nui Tron Mountain and next to it was Ba gia outpost which had previously been occupied by a Regional Frces Company. The VC had attacked this outpost. The RF Company was outnumbered. It had to withdraw after having destroyed ammunitions and the two 105mm Howitzers. Billows of flames and smoke still arose from the Ba Gia outpost, covering a corner of the sky, north west of the city. Smokes were interlaced with US jet fighters performing airstrikes along the Truong Son range and also with fires of Artillery supporting units in operation. Leaving aircrafts, everybody felt a war atmosphere. Quang Ngai city was desolate. Daily activities stopped. Civilians were anxious about the close fighting. From the end of the runway, I walked directly to the tent that had been used as the field forward headquarters of the 2nd Infantry Division. I met Brigadier General Hoang Xuan Lam who had been conversing with Major Vo Cong Hieu - the 2nd Infantry Division G3 chief in front of the tent. Brigadier General Lam invited me to go in to see Major General Nguyen Chanh Thi - the I corps commander. Because the severity of the situation, General Thi flew from Da Nang to Quang Ngai to directly oversee operations. In that command tent, the atmosphere seemed quietly suffocating. Major General Thi was standing in front of operation maps fixed on a stand. His face was tense and of a bad mood but when he saw me, he became a little bit relieved. After a hand shake and greeting, he said: "You arrived here at the right time. I Corps would transfer the 3rd Marine Battalion back to Task force B. From today, task force B was to command both Battalion 1 and 3 to lessen the enemy pressure and to support Regional Forces to

reoccupy the Ba Gia outpost. He paused for a while, then using his hand, he swept over an area on the map and continued: "Enemy forces are still in the area. Brigadier General Lam and his staff will brief the task force on situations." Major Hieu was waiting for me in the briefing room: The fighting situations in these recent days had been excessively boiling. The NVA had sent a regiment to surround and overrun the Ba Gia outpost. Its defending force had to withdraw after having destroyed ammunitions and two 105mm Howitzers. The 2nd Infantry Division ordered the independent Infantry Regiment 51, the 39th Ranger Battalion and the 3rd Marine Battalion to perform operations to reoccupy it. All units have had encounters day and night. US fighters conscientiously supported with airstrikes. The NVA Infantry Division 3 "Gold star" suffered heavy losses. We also had remarkable human losses, especially the 39th Ranger Battalion. The latter dealt a heavy blow to the NVA, capturing a hundred weapons of all kinds. However, at night, the NVA counterattacked and overran that Battalion which had to withdraw. Major Luong - the Battalion commander, lost all contacts with his unit and was captured by the NVA who led him away. However, thanks to our pursuing violent airstrikes and artillery, the NVA ran in chaos and Major Luong escaped back to Quang Ngai. A. Period II On 1-6-1965, Task Force B started period 2 of the operation. Participating forces were: the Independent Regiment 51 of Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Tho Lap, 1st Marine Battalion of Major Ton That Soan and 3rd Marine Battalion of Major Nguyen The Luong. The latter had been in the area of operation. The 1st Battalion was airlifted to replace the 39th Ranger Battalion on a hill. The 2nd Infantry Division ordered: "Independent Regiment 51 advanced in the south. "Task Force B advanced in north. Both prongs moved in parallel to search the NVA and lessen pressure in order to reoccupy the Ba Gia outpost. Learned by experiences gained by blood in Period I, this time all units used maximal supporting airstrikes and artillery before advancing to occupy targets. They were also continuously alert, moved in a thin dispersing formation and thoroughly searched and coordinated very well with each other. The result was on that day, the units successfully removed NVA pressure and reoccupied the Ba Gia outpost. The NVA had at several occasions stopped fighting and ran when the ARVN advanced to occupy targets. They had to withdraw in the North West direction after having been beaten by the heavy airstrikes and artillery and by our strong attack. Many weapons and ammunitions and their wounded comrades were left behind. The ARVN had slight human losses and had weapons conserved. The next day, all units expanded their search and supported the Regional Force company to return and repair and reinforce their defending positions. An US Skycrane helicopter carried two 105mm Howitzers to the Ba Gia outpost as replacements and a 155mm Howitzer into Nui Tron, preparing for Period 3 of the operation. B. Period III Intelligence sources - collected from an officer of NVA Third Division "Gold Star"

by G2 of the 2nd Infantry Division, revealed that although the NVA had severe losses in the last few days, they had to continue the plan of the Summer Campaign of 1965 aiming to occupy Quang Ngai city. This NVA officer was allowed by G2 officers to board a C & C helicopter to pin-point suspected locations of the NVA Division 3 Gold Star units at west and North West of Ba Gia outpost and Nui Tron. Those suspected areas were divided in squares for the US artillery to shell a hundred rounds of all kinds at night. This NVA officer also said that the NVA headquarters of this campaign might have been positioned inside the Phu Son barrack - a long time deserted place, near the Quang Ngai shooting training field. According to G2 of I corps, Nguyen Don - the NVA lieutenant general had drawn the plan to attack and occupy Quang Ngai. The commander off all battles in Ba Gia area had been NVA Major General Nguyen Phu Thu, the Commander of Division 3 "Gold Star". Based on these relatively accurate sources, I corps quickly organised the following "Pursue and destroy" operation. Participating forces were composed of: "1st Marine Battalion and 5th Airborne Battalion (as a reinforcement), constituted the main attacking force. "3rd Marine Battalion was to be a reserve. Major Ton That Soan - Commander of Task Force B directly commanded. Task Force B and the 1st Marine Battalion which had positioned overnight at Ba Gia were helilifted to LZ1 to occupy targets A and B. The 5th Airborne Battalion was helilifted from Quang Ngai airfield and landed in LZ2 to occupy targets C and D. These helilifts were directly supported by gunships and fighters of the US Marine corps VNFA-531 Air Division. At 7.00, 2-6-1965, the C & C helicopter of Task Force B commander was flying above the area and selected the LZs. This helicopter was escorted by two gunships. This time, deciding to perform a blitzkrieg, Task force B did not use aircrafts and artillery to clear landing zones, but just allowed companies to land quickly and to storm the targets. Company 2 of 1st lieutenant Phan Cong Ton landed first. He ordered his boys to follow rice fields' edges and aim towards the edge of a village of Target A. The VC fired with all kinds of weapons from bamboos rows and killed two and wounded four Marines. Under gunship supports, Company 2 dashed to occupy the village edge and then moved deeper inside the village. Meanwhile, Company 4 of 1st lieutenant Tran Van Hien landed north of LZ1, advanced towards target A and joined Company 2 for the search. Facing our storming advances, the NVA left their positions and ran in the north west direction. A number of them ran uphill and were killed by our artillery. Group B of the 1st Battalion - commanded by the executive officer Phan Van Thang, was composed of Company 1 of 1st Lieutenant Tran Van Bi, and Company 3 of Captain Nguyen Van Da. They landed south of LZ1 and advanced to target B. The Communists resisted. However, Group B managed to overrun the target. The NVA ran towards target C in the south - Numerous NVAs were killed and four captured. A number of personal firearms and collective weapons and documents were seized. In the south, two prongs of the 5th Airborne Battalion of Major Nguyen Khoa Nam landed in LZ2 and quickly occupied Targets C and D. Facing Airborne and Marine, the NVA did not dare to combat. They ran to the west and north west and then became preys for pursuing airstrikes and artillery.

After half of a day of blitzkrieg, 1st Marine Battalion and 5th Airborne Battalion mastered the battlefield situation. Sounds of guns ceased at 12.00noon. The two units searched thoroughly through the targets. Task Force B had in total ten killed, twenty-two wounded and weapons conserved. The NVA had about a hundred killed. Their bodies scattered on the battlefields. Eighty-five personal firearms, four collective weapons and four NVA soldiers were captured. The next day, Task force B units moved in parallel to search villages close to Ba Gia and then returned to a gathering area in Quang Ngai. A ceremony for the Ba Gia victory was organised in Quang Ngai city stadium with participation of representatives of local government, local army and civilians. There were also delegates from Saigon, led by Lieutenant General Ton That Dinh. Participating units in the operation, namely Infantry independent regiment 51, the 39th Ranger Battalion, the 5th Airborne Battalion, the 1st and 3rd Marine Battalions, Regional and Local Forces were praised and suitably decorated. These included 1st lieutenant Phan Cong Ton, Tran Van Hien, Tran Van Bi and Airborne 1st lieutenant Nguyen Van Dinh who were promoted to Captain, "on the battlefield." Major Soan, Task force B was proposed to be promoted to lieutenant colonel. The next day, the 5th Airborne Battalion left Task force B. The 3rd Marine Battalion was airlifted to its Rear Base to rest. The 1st Marine Battalion continued to perform operations to support the Regional Force Company of Captain Dinh Ngo - originated from Ba Na. This captain was also chief of Son Ha district which was reoccupied since then. C. Summary 1. When planning to attack Ba Gia, the NVA had set four goals as described in the documents which were seized by us. They motivated a large number of units composing of: - A regular Regiment of NVA 5th military region, with three battalions 40, 60 and 90. - An independent supporting battalion 45 - A provincial regular Battalion 83. - Two local companies. However, the main force of the campaign was NVA Division 3 "Gold Star" which threw themselves in the battle at decisive moments. They could not occupy the area and had to run and hide in the Truong Son range. They needed a long time to recover. 2. The US Marines did not send units to directly participate in the operation as the NVA had expected. However, they actively supported friendly forces with artillery and airstrikes. Thanks to that excessively powerful fires, the NVA suffered heavy losses. General Thi had nevertheless requested the participation of a US Marine Battalion but that was not granted. 3. The NVA had used a reinforced Battalion to attack an outpost of the ARVN Regional Forces. They also used outnumbered forces and "Rotating wheel tactics" to attack the Marine Ranger and Infantry units, but that still could not defeat us. The Ba Gia battle, period III was violent, with heavy losses. The lost outpost was reoccupied in the shortest period of time. Not a single ARVN unit participating in the battle had its name erased. 4. The NVA tactics of "Attack outpost, beat reinforcements" and "solidly position to

kill opposing forces at landing zones" were not able to stop our storming advance. In period III, NVA stopped fighting and ran. 5. Although at that time, there was some political turmoil, it had still not influenced much on the fighting morale of ARVN. US officials were so pessimistic when looking at our damages and did not see exactly the NVA's exceedingly heavy losses. That is why they had unjust comments and pessimistic views. Colonel Ton That Soan