OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR 01. l E~D!NG IN TEL LI GE N CE J NTE G RATION

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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR 01 l ED!NG IN TEL LI GE N CE J NTE G RATION

Executive Summary... 2 Methodology... 3 Security Clearance Volume for the entire Federal Government..... 3 The number of individuals who held and who were approved to hold a security clearance as of October 1, 2013, to be calculated and categorized by personnel type government employees or contractors and by security clearance level.... 3 Security Clearance Performance for Each Element of the IC... 5 i. The time in days to process the shortest and longest security clearance determination made among 80% of security clearance determinations. and the time in days for the shortest and longest security clearance determination made among 90% of determinations... 5 ii. The number of pending security clearance investigations for such level as of October 1, 2013 that have remained pending for: 4 months or less; between 4 months and 8 months; between 8 months and one year; and for more than one year... 6 iii. The percentage of reviews during the preceding fiscal year that resulted in a denial or revocation of a security clearance... 6 iv. The percentage of investigations during the preceding fiscal year that resulted in incomplete information...... 7 v. The percentage of investigations during the preceding fiscal year that did not result in enough information to make a decision on potentially adverse information... 7 vi. The number of completed or pending security clearance determinations for government employees and contractors during the preceding fiscal year that have taken longer than one year to complete; the agencies that investigated and adjudicated such determinations; and the cause of significant delays in such determinations... 7 Conclusion... 9 1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (FY 2010 IAA), Public Law 111259, Section 367, requires the President to submit an annual report to Congress on the total number of security clearances across government and indepth metrics on the timeliness of security clearance determinations in the Intelligence Community (IC). In response to this requirement, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) prepared this 2013 Report on Security Clearance Determinations, which provides the number of security clearance determinations in the categories outlined below. Security Clearance Data Required by the FY 2010 IAA Security Clearance Volume for the Entire Federal Government Security Clearance Performance for the Seven IC Agencies The number of individuals, categorized by i. The time in days to process the shortest and government employees and contractors who held longest security clearance determination made and who were approved for a security clearance as among 80% of security clearance of 1 October 2013; sorted by security clearance determinations, and the time in days for the level. shortest and longest security clearance determination made among 90% of determinations. ii. iii. The number of security clearance investigations as of October 1 of the preceding fiscal year open for: 0 4 months or less; 0 48 months; 0 8 12 months; and 0 more than 1 year. Percentage of reviews during the preceding fiscal year that resulted in a denial or revocation of a security clearance. iv. Percentage of investigations during the preceding fiscal year that resulted in incomplete information. v. Percentage of investigations during the preceding fiscal year that did not result in enough information to make a decision on potentially adverse information. vi. The number of completed or pending security clearance determinations for government employees and contractors during the preceding fiscal year that have taken longer than one year to complete; the agencies that investigated and adjudicated such determinations; and the cause of significant delays in such determinations. 2

This 2013 annual security clearance determinations report improved its assessment reporting to provide a more detailed representation of the status of security clearances 1 held across the government. In Table 1, the total volume reported is broken down by 1) the number of individuals who have actual access to classified information and 2) the number who have been approved for access, but who either have not yet had a need to work with classified information, or who no longer require access in the performance of their job duties but continue to occupy sensitive national security positions. Although the total number of individuals deemed "eligible" for access to classified information increased by 232,628, there was a decline of 27,064 in the number of individuals actually briefed and put "in access." M ETHODOLOGY The Special Security Directorate (SSD) of the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive compiled and processed data from the three primary security clearance record repositories: CONI's Scattered Castles (SC); the Department of Defense (DoD) Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS); and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Central Verification System (CVS). In addition, SSO conducted a special data call to the seven IC agencies with delegated authority to conduct investigations or adjudications to fulfill specific reporting.requirements of the FY 2010 IAA. To ensure accuracy, SSD designed the methodology to minimize doublecounting of duplicate records in the three security clearance record repositories. While the number of potential duplicate entries is minimal, adjudicative facilities are increasingly recording their determinations in multiple repositories for reciprocity purposes. Therefore, duplicate records may be created when different agencies grant eligibility for access to the same individual. Queries between the two largest repositories. SC and JPAS. which account for approximately 95 percent of all clearance entries, were structured to eliminate duplication. The Defense Manpower Data Center scrutinized the fiscal year 2013 JPAS data, the largest percentage of clearance information, to ensure the most accurate information was included in this report. SC and CVS data owners also refined their queries to collect the most accurate data. While a single security clearance record repository housing all national security determinations would be ideal, a single database is not a viable option at this time as some agencies require house their security clearance databases on classified networks to which other agencies do not have or require access. CONI continues to collaborate closely with DoD and OPM to improve information sharing across the three data repositories. SECURITY CLEARANCE VOLUME FOR THE ENTIRE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT The FY 2010 IAA requires the number of individuals who held, and who were approved to hold, a security clearance as of October 1, 2013, to be calculated and categorized by personnel type government employees, contractors, or other2 and by security clearance level. Prior annual ODNI Security Clearance Determination reports provided the total number of individuals eligible to hold a security clearance as a single number. The number of eligible 1 Throughout this document. Department of Energy's Q and L access authorizations are included wherever discussion or data is presented concerning Top Secret and Secret/Confidential security clearances, respectively. 2 The "govemmenr category includes all government employees and military personnel. Contractors indude all industry employees, independent contractors and consultants. The "other" category includes the number of cleared government and contractor personnel recorded in CVS, which does not have an employee type field, and the number of individuals in JPAS and Scattered Castles for which the employee type category field was not completed. 3

individuals reflected those who were investigated and adjudicated at either the Confidential, Secret, or Top Secret level and had access to classified information, as well as those who were favorably adjudicated but did not have access to classified information. Individuals, such as those supporting the military, may be determined eligible due to the sensitivity of their positions and the potential need for immediate access to classified information, but may not have actual access to classified until the need arises. The report prepared for fiscal year 2013 not only reports the total population eligible for access to classified information, as in past years, but also has been enhanced to delineate between the total population in access (Table 1.1) and those not in access but eligible for access to classified information (Table 1.2) as of October 1, 2013. Table 1.1, Eligibility (In access), includes the number of individuals in this category for both fiscal years 2012 and 2013. As of October 1, 2013, there were 27,064 fewer individuals in access than on October 1, 2012. Table 1.2, Eligibility (Not in access), reflects 259,692 more eligible Table 1 Number of Security Clearances Employee T 1 t;ont/secret 1 283 287 Table 1.1 Eligibility (In access} I As of 10/1/13 T Secret Conf/Secret 625 727 497634 444928 131.302 1.201 957 3,1 19,041 TopSecret 1,204,416 646 527 467,909 452102 144 512 176,511 1,816,83.. '5140....;...;..;o... 3,091,977 Emp Govcr'l'11e;;t'l [ 1.474 046 Contrartor J Ot 31... 62 SubTotal. 1 soj 698 Total: lr1, 798,710. 2,058,402 45581 3674,J:A 648 I Table 1.3 Total Eligibilit) As of Government 1 2,757,333 791,200 Contractor 582,524 483263 Other 167,925 135 506 SubTotal: 3,507,782 1,409,969 Total: I 4,917,751 A 2,886,106 851,920 558,626 497 683 175,859 180,185 3,620,591 1,529,788 5,150,379 4

individuals not in access than on October 1, 2012. Table 1.3, Total Eligibility, shows a 4.7 percent increase in the overall number of individuals found eligible to hold a clearance, to include those in access. since October 2012. Table 2, Number of Security Clearance Approvals, presents the number of individuals approved for a security clearance by clearance level. Variations in data collection fields in the repositories limit the ability to collect precise data. For instance, a query of the security clearance determination approvals recorded in some repositories cannot distinguish between initial and periodic reinvestigation approvals. Therefore, the number of approvals does not represent the number of new clearances granted, but rather a combination of approvals for initial clearances and for reinvestigations of existing clearances. Employee Table 2 Number of Security Clearan ce Approvals l I Government 364,498 140 016 369245 152490 Contractor 108 933 133 493 82,875 131 209 Other 38,045 13,633 28,564 12,785 SubTotal: 511 476 287 142 480684 296484 Total: I 798,618 m,168 SECURITY CLEARANCE PERFORMANCE FOR EACH ELEMENT OF THE IC To collect information responsive to the FY 2010 faa, the ODNI conducted a special data call with seven IC agencies or elements with delegated authority to conduct investigations or adjudications: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 3, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), National Geospatiallntelligence Agency (NGA), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and National Security Agency (NSA). With the exception of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Department of State which provided for their entire department, data from other agencies that have IC elements 4 are not included, because these agencies are unable to extract data on clearance actions for individuals assigned to IC positions without a manual review of the files. The plan for the 2014 report is to reflect only data that pertains to the IC elements. This report, as in previous years, reflects the exact data provided by participants. The results are as follows: i. The time in days to process the shortest and longest security clearance determination made among 80% of security clearance determinations, and the time in days for the shortest and longest security clearance determination made among 90% of determinations Table 3, Processing Timeliness, provides the total number of days required to process the shortest and the longest security clearance cases from initiation to adjudicative decision for the fastest 80 percent of cases and for the fastest 90 percent of cases. 3 CIA also processes security clearances for OONI employees and contractors 4 OHS, DOE, OEA, and Departments of the Treasury, Army, Navy (which includes the Marine Corps as a separate component), Coast Guard, and Air Force. 5

Table 3 P rocess1ng Tmeliness 1 80th Pe!CenliiE Agency I TS SecreUConfidential TS 90th ntrle SecreUConfidential J st Shortest j c,hortest Longest Shortest Longest Shortest C IA 265 1 272 1 I 419 1 448 1 DIA 146 1 DNP DNP I 198 1 DNP DNP FBI 162 1 167 4 212 1 204 4 NGA 125 26 DNP DNP 159 26 DNP DNP NRO 158 2?. 159 29 222 22 167 29 NSA 182 13 DNP DNP 240 13 DNP DNP State 115 10 98 5 155 10 136 5 DNP = Does Not Perform ii. The number of pending security clearance Investigations for s uch level as of October 1, 2013 that have remained pending for: 4 months or less; between 4 months and 8 months; between 8 months and one year; and for more than one year Table 4, Age Pending, provides the number of pending security clearance investigations categorized by length of pending time for each agency. Table 4 Age Pending,,,,,,, Agency 4 to 8 r 8 to 12 Over 12.s vt>nfrls MJnthc Vonths CIA 214 7 1 0 DIA 3 0 0 0 FBI 299 204 42 15 NGA 11 0 0 0 NRC 127 0 0 0 NSA 561 505 286 232 State 2,639 533 65 6 iii. The percentage of reviews during the preceding fiscal year that resulted in a denial or revocation of a security clearance Table 5, Denials and Revocations, reflects the percentage of denials and revocations in fiscal year 2013 resulting from reviews of initial and periodic reinvestigations, and does not account for revocations based solely on validated adverse reports obtained outside of a background investigation. 6

Table 5 Denials and Revocations A.j ':r D' II lr ro CIA 6.7% 0.6% DIA 0.0% 0.4% FBI 0.1% 0.1 % NGA 7.8% 1.6% NRO 8.4% 5.4% NSA 7.2% 0.0%* State 0.9% 0.3% Note: NSA revoked the security clearances of 30 individuals in fiscal year 2013, but none were a direct result of a periodic reinvestigation. lv. The percentage of investigations during the preceding fiscal year that resulted in incomplete information All agencies confirmed that their final reports of investigation contained complete information. v. The percentage of investigations during the preceding fiscal year that did not result in enough information to make a decision on potentially adverse information The seven IC agencies listed on Table 5 reported that they had no cases to report against this category. Agencies worked to ensure that sufficient information was available to make a decision on any potentially adverse information. vi. The number of completed or pending security clearance dei:enninations for government employees and contractors during the preceding fiscal year that have taken longer than one year to complete; the agencies that investigated and adjudicated such determinations; and the cause of significant delays in such determinations Table 6, Delays over 1 Year, shows the number of security clearance determinations for government employees that required more than one year to complete. Table 7, Delays over 1 Year, shows the number of security clearance determinations for contractors that required more than one year to complete. The CIA, DIA, FBI, NGA, NRO, NSA, and Department of State investigated and adjudicated such determinations. 7

Table6 Table 7 Dela 1ys over 1 Y, ear Delays over 1 Year,_;r.ve: mwn! c,: ses 1.::1cu, _,,;.,es Agency Over 1 Year Agency Over 1 Year c j Pendmg Completed CIA 50 74 CIA 419 1 024 DIA 0 0 DIA 0 0 FBI 4 11 FBI 11 15 NGA 18 22 NGA 0 0 NRO 0 6 NRO 0 172 NSA 123 50 NSA 75 61 State 0 2 State 0 0 Table 8, Causes of Significant Delays, contains detailed information for yearold cases in the IC agencies with delegated investigative authority. "Multiple issues" were cited as the cause for significant delay in 382 cases (67 percent of the total number of delayed cases). Among the issues cited, foreign issues were reported as the most common single reason for delay. Agency ASP & ISP Table 8 C auses o f s i!qn m can to ays Volume. G') (")..., 0 0 f[ G') a + 0 (I) c If (J S gn flcant AdJ d cabve Events f s: 3 '\ m 0 en 0 :1: fij.., 3 ii) en,, en "0 I 0 (I) :;, :;, en l m c en i g. c m < co c.o' 9!. g 5' (I) it i m Q?. < "0 0... 0 I :::j 0 0 CD i en 0 f 3: < '< c c en en i5' 5. l f 3 (tl CD "" )i1. 3 (I) g en CIA 12 ; 1567 Unable to provide at this time DIA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 FBI 15 26 41 0 7 17 1 6 2 0 0 3 1 0 4 0 0 0 0 NGA 40 0 40 35 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 NRO 6 172 178 85 0 0 1 26 0 1 11 29 2 4 9 1 4 1 4 NSA 173 136 309 260 1 0 0 31 0 0 1 11 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 State 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 *Other. Includes delays involving high risk cases, derogatory information, protected information, and polygraph or medical issues. 8

CONCLUSION In fiscal year 2013, while the total number of individuals eligible for a security clearance increased (Table 1.3), the number of individuals with actual access to classified information declined by 27,064. Therefore, the data gathered for this report suggests that agencies are reviewing their cleared population and debriefing individuals who no longer require access pursuant to Executive Order 12968, which directs agencies to keep the number of employees with eligibility for access to classified information to the minimum. The IC continues to face timeliness challenges in clearing individuals with unique or critical kills such as those with highly desirable language abilities who often have significant foreign associations that may take additional time to investigate and adjudicate. Further, compartmentalization and variations in information technology platforms within the IC are impediments to the implementation of automated systems that have the potential to improve the timeliness of electronic business processes. The ODNI, in partnership with OMB, OPM, and DOD, continues to drive improvements in the timeliness, accuracy and consistency of investigative and adjudicative clearance processes governmentwide. 9