United Sttes Mrine Corps Commnd nd Stff College Mrine Corps Universtty 2076 South Street Mrine Corps Comb! Develop~ent Commnd Quntico, VirgInI 22134-5068 \ MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES AY: 1993-94 -~~- Title: XM-26 TOW: BIRTH OF THE HELICOPTER AS A TANK BUSTER Submitted in Prtil Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Mster of Militry Studies Author: MAJ JG BURNS USA Dte: 2 MAY 1994 Approved:
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL DOCUMENT OF THE MARINE CORPS commant> AND STAFF COLLEGE QUOTATION FROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, OR REPRODUCTION OF ALL OR ANY PART OF TIllS DOCUMENT IS 'PERMITTED' PROVIDED PROPER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS MADE THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN' ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENf THE VIEW OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR rher GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE -THE FOREGOING STATEMENT THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE QUANTICO, VIRGINIA
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: XM-26 TOW: BIRTH OF THE HELICOPTER AS A TANK BUSTER Author: Mjor John C Burns, United Sttes Army Thesis: The successful development nd employment of the XM-26 TOW in Vietnm estblished the ttck helicopter s credible nti-tnk wepons system on the modern bttlefield Bckground: The present dy nti-tnk missions nd wepons of the United Sttes Army evolved from the, introduction of the rmored tnk during World Wr The I unprlleled firepower, mobility nd endurnce of the tnk led to rdicl chnges in defensive strtegy, tctics nd equipment In the erly 1960s, the Army determined tht mneuver forces operting beyond the rnge of their orgnic ground-bsed firepower require ccompnying firepower in order to ccomplish their ssigned missions Army studies of the rmed helicopter concept concluded tht helicopters equipped with nti-tnk missiles provided highly effective rmor-defeting cpbility tht is not restricted by surfce obstcles The XM-26 TOW rmment subsystem clerly demonstrted the key to the successful employment of the ttck helicopter in the nti-tnk role ws the development of n ccurte nti-tnk guided missile system cpble of providing high first-round hit probbility t rnges in excess of 2,000 meters With the development of the XM-26 TOW, the Army developed stbilized sight system tht corrected the mjor problem involved in firing missiles from helicopters The 1972 North Vietnmese Army's ll-out, tnk supported invsion of South Vietnm provided the Army unique opportunity to test the irborne TOW in combt The success of the irborne TOW in South proved the vlue of the Vietnm's Militry Region II helicopter s n nti-tnk killer Conclusion: The Army used the publicity from the success of the XM-26 TOW in Vietnm to sell Congress on the Advnced Attck Helicopter Progrm nd ccelerte the development of the TOW/COBRA to counter the Soviet tnk thret in Europe
PREFACE The present-dy nti-tnk missions nd wepons of the United Sttes Army evolved from the introduction of the rmored tnk during World Wr I; The unprlleled firepower, mobili ty, nd endurnce of these cterpillr- tred monsters in offensive wrfre led to rdicl chnges in defensive strtegy, tctics nd equipment The development of the ttck helicopter s n nti-tnk wepons pltform hs revolutionized modern ground wrfre in the mid to high- intensity environment nd llowed wrfighters to exploit the lower spectrum of irspce to blnce tcticl mobility with firepower nd logistics It ws only through the vision nd determintion of Generl Hmilton Howze nd other members of the Howze Bord tht this cpbility cme to life These Army vition pioneers relized tht the key to successful employment of the ttck helicopter in the nti-tnk role ws the development of n ccurte nti-tnk guided missile system cpble of providing rnges in excess of 2,000 met~rs high first-round hit probbility t This monogrph trces the history of the development of the helicopter TOW (Tube-lunched Qpticlly-trcked Nire- guided) system from the 1962 Howze Bord Report through 1
employment of the system in combt in vietnm in 1972-73 first chpter exmines the successful XM-26/UH-1B helicopter The development tests tht were hlted short of service tests when the Army mde the decision to redirect the effort to the TOW/CHEYENNE rmment subsystem The second chpter discusses how the XM-26 subsystem ws removed from storge nd rushed to South Vietnm in the spring of 1972, when the North Vietnmese Army (NVA) swept cross the Demilitrized Zone in n ll-out, tnk supported invsion The third chpter looks t the re of opertions s well s the enemy buildup nd friendly sitution in South Vietnm's Militry Region II (MR-II) prior to the commitment of the helicopter TOW system Chpter four highlights the initil NVA ctions in the Centrl Highlnds during the 1972 Ester Offensive Chpter five nlyzes the US Militry Assistnce Commnd Vietnm (MACV) decision to employ the 1st Combt Aeril TOW Tem in MR-II during the bttle for Kontum The sixth chpter highlights the ctions of the Second Combt Aeril TOW Tem until the cesefire in Jnury 1973 The finl chpter discusses the findings nd conclusions relted to the employment of the Aeril TOW Tems in combt nd future developments of the dvnced ttck helicopter nd TOW rmment subsystem 2
firepower CHAPTER ONE DEVELOPMENT OF THE XM-26/UH-1B HELICOPTER ARMAMENT SUBSYSTEM In 1956 the Army initited development of irmobile concepts nd tctics using heliborne mneuver nd firepower elements The funded ircrft rmment progrm ws strted in 1957 From 1958 through 1963, the rmed helicopter concept in CONUS ws extensively tested nd Europe 1 The Army determined tht mneuver forces operting beyond the rnge of their orgnic ground-bsed firepower require ccompnying in order to ccomplish their ssigned missions Armed helicopters orgnic to the mneuver force provided suppressive fires s escort,during the movement, nd close-in fire support s required during the lnding nd tke-off in the obj ecti ve re The Howze Bord studies of the rmed helicopter concept concluded tht helicopters equipped with nti-tnk missiles provided highly effective rmor-defeting cpbil-ity tht is not restricted to surfce speeds or impeded by surfce obstcles2 One of the mjor problems involved in firing missiles from helicopters ws stbilizing the line of sight from the helicopter to point trgets on the ground The Army Missile Commnd (MICOM) selected Hughes Aircrft Compny, s the TOW (Tube-lunched Qpticlly-trcked Wire-guided) missile system 3
prime contrctor, nd the Aeronutronic Division of Philco Ford Corportion, the SHILLELAGH prime contrctor, to work on solution to the problem In December 1963, MICOM wrded contrcts of $138 million ech to Hughes nd Aeronutronic to design, fbricte, nd instll on the UH-1B helicopter, stbilized sight/sensor tht would be comptible with ech compny's nti-tnk guided missile The contrcts lso clled for preliminry design of the complete tcticl wepon subsystem, designted s the XM-26, which ws to replce the M22 (SS-11/UH-1B) subsystem by Jnury 19693 Hughes nd Aeronutronic delivered their stbilized sights 2 nd preliminry design pckges on September 19644 The Frnkford Arsenl tested the competing sights under the direction of MICOM At the sme time, MICOM evluted both contrctor designs for the tcticl subsystem As result of the evlution completed in Februry 1965, MICOM concluded tht both systems were superior to the M22, nd tht the Hughes stbilized sight/sensor ws superior in performnce to the Aeronutronic device The Aircrf~ Weponiztion Project Mnger then uthorized MICOM to develop the XM-26 irborne subsystem using the Hughes stbilized sight nd the TOW missile5 On 8 October 1965, Hughes Aircrft received Cost-Plus- Incentive-Fee (CPIF) contrct for $42 million which covered the first 6 months of the Reserch nd Development (R&D) effort Negotitions for the remining 21 months of the 4
development progrm begn on 18 April 1966, nd were essentilly completed by 17 June 1966 An increse in the contrctor's cost estimte from $123 million to $186 million resulted in n bsolute minimum revised scope of work written to reduce costs to This revision, together with the finl negotition efforts, helped to estblish the finl negotited trget price of $153 million for the" 21-month period totl estimted R&D cost of the XM-26 progrm, including in- house support, ws $28 million Advnced Production Engineering (APE) ws expected to cost $36 million, nd production of 165 units bout $257 million, totl estimted progrm cost to $573 million~ The bringing the Upon completion of the contrct negotitions in mid-june 1966, MICOM recommended to the -Aircrft Wepons Project Mnger tht the XM-26 progrm be terminted The resons were twofold: excessive costs nd the projected vilbility of the dvnced TOW/CHEYENNE system within 1 yer fter fielding of the TOW/UH-1B (XM-26) With the rejection of the MICOM's recommendtion, n R&D contrct for $154 million ws wrded to Hughes on 30 June 1966, retroctive to 8 problems April7 During FY 1967, the R&D progrm ws hindered by funding The development contrct originlly specified n interim design relese in August 1967, nd ws incrementlly funded It required renegotition in December 1966, becuse the Aircrft Weponiztion proj ect Mnger ws unble to obtin funding in the negotited mount The renegotited 5
4 contrct which ws to continue through months of the Engineering Test/Service Test (ET/ST) progrm, specified n interim relese dte of 1 Mrch 19688 MICOM in-house funds pid for n overrun of $650,000 to cover effort during June 1967 An dditionl $506,000 from MICOM in-house funds ws then included in the contrct to cover effort through 17 July 1967, nd $36 million more ws needed to complete the development progrm MICOM received $16 million to initite reduced APE progrm, but could not issue contrct becuse the Aircrft Weponiztion Project Mnger hd plced hold on the wrd until 31 October 19679 The overll design configurtion of the XM-26 subsystem ws pproved during the Design Chrcteristics Review held t MICOM erly in October 1966 As result of Tnk, Antitnk, Assult Wepons Requirements Study completed in Februry 1967, the Combt Developments Commnd recommended cncelltion of the XM-26 progrm nd trnsfer of the effort to the TOW/CHEYENNE (TOW/AH-56A) progrm The Deputy Commnding Generl, Lnd Combt Systems, in n unexplined reversl of the previous MICOM position, lter notified the Aircrft Weponiztion Project Mnger tht he did not gree with this recommendtion 10 The XM-26 rmment subsystem (See Figure 1 nd Figure 2) consisted primrily of two tringulr three-missile pods, ech mounted on n outbord pylon; gyro-stbilized sight system designed to isolte the sight nd sensor from the helicopter 6
- "-LAUNCHER t TOP SIGHT-SENSOR AIRCRAFT PYLON ASSEMBLY AIRCRAFT PYL:ON SIDE L 6;-T---~ ;1INIMUM CLEARANCE SiGHT-SENSOR pod - ASSEMBLY - three-view Drwing of >>1-26 Helicopter Armment Subsystem FIGURE 1 7
- ',tl ; 1 "!if i I, i - "" II UH-IB cockpit modifiction for TOW include: (1) sight unit stbili~ed telescope (2) Sight unit hnd control (3) Arm rest unit hnd control (4) Control rmment TOW FIGURE 2 8
motion nd vibrtion; nd three electronic units for stbiliztion, genertion of missile signls, nd regultion of electric power For sfety resons, the TOW missile ws redesigned for the XM-26 to include flight motor dely feture which llowed the missile to move wy from the helicopter before ignition of the missile flight motor 11 When used in the XM-26, however, the missile ws lunched from its seled cse in the three-missile pod Both pods were ttched to M-4A bomb rcks contining electricl nd mechnicl jettison equipment Both the pilot nd gunner could jettison individul pods electriclly, or both pods could be jettisoned t once by mechnicl mens pods could be ttched to the pylons by two men in 5 The missile minutes, nd they could be reloded without the use of specil tools 12 The XM-26 Development Test Progrm begn with series of 20 unguided ( " slug" ) missile firings (10 ground nd 10 irborne) from the experimentl luncher in Mrch, April nd My 1966, to verify luncher design nd determine missile helicopter rections The experimentl subsystem ws then modified to fire guided missiles, nd design of the first Advnced Development Model (ADM) subsystem ws initited13 Guided flight tests from the helicopter-mounted experimentl subsystem commenced t Redstone Arsenl on 29 July 1966 nd continued through 13 July 1967, with totl of 32 firings including 12 wire integrity tests The ltter 9
resulted in seven trget hits, three missile filures unrelted to the XM-26 system, one wire brek becuse of sngging in the trees, nd one trget miss s gunner error result of The problem with the TOW missile wire sngging in the trees ws unique to the moving lunch pltform of the helicopter, nd did not occur when it ws sttionry ground luncher14 fired from the The other 20 firings yielded 12 trget hits nd 8 filures, 6 of which were ttributed to the missile, 1 to the subsystem, nd 1 to instrumenttionls The first ADM subsystem ws fbricted nd instlled on the UH-1B helicopter during June 1967 Test firings were delyed until erly October 1967 due to missile shortges nd engineering chnges The 30-round engineering design test progrm begn on 5 October 1967 nd continued through 28 Februry 1968 During the tests, the TOW missile successfully hit both sttionry nd moving trgets with high degree of ccurcy while the helicopter ws hovering, trveling t high speed, or flying zig-zg coursel6 Specificlly, 22 of 30 missiles fired scored trget hits Six of eight filures were the result of design deficiencies lter corrected; one ws ttributed to missile filure, nd the other to n instrumenttion problem Excluding the round mrred by instrumenttion filure, which ws scored s no test, 17 of the lst 20 missiles fired hit their trgets for 20-round moving verge of 85 percent17 During the third qurter of 1968 nd the first hlf of 10
1971, totl of 62 demonstrtion firings of the XM-26 irborne TOW were conducted in the Federl Republic of Germny Fifty-seven of the missiles scored direct hits for 92 percent ccurcy Two of the misses were ttributed to gunner errors nd three to equipment filures18 In ddition to firings from the first ADM subsystem, Hughes Aircrft conducted qulifiction tests using the ADM Subsystem No 2, MICOM performed relibility tests using Subsystem No3, nd combined Government qulifiction nd relibility tests were conducted on ADM subsystem No4 fifth XM-26 subsystem ws constructed for service tests which were to begin in April 1968 i however, these tests were cncelled when the Army decided to redirect the XM-26 effort to the TOW/CHEYENNE progrm 19 Subsequent efforts were directed towrd verifiction of the contrctor-developed XM-26 documenttion pckge nd completion of Advnce Production Engineering on XM-26/CHEYENNE common items The The updted XM-26 pckge ws retined t MICOM ginst future requirements for TOW cpbility from the UH-1B or other rotry wing ircrft2o 1 Tlking Pper, Deputy Chief of Stff for Opertions nd Plns, Army Stff, Subject: Armed Helicopters, 4 Mrch 1963 2 US Army Tcticl Mobility Requirements Bord Report, 20 August 1962 This report is commonly referred to s the Howze Bord Report 11
Cgle, 3 Mry Cgle, Historv of the TOW Missile System, (Redstone Arsenl, Albm: US Army Missile Commnd, 1977), p 76 4 Ibid 5 Ibid, p 77 6 (1) Historicl Report, Lnd Combt Commodity Mnger, FY 66 (2) Historicl Report, Smll Rockets nd Aircrft Armments Brnch, Directorte for Reserch nd Development, MICOM, FY 66 7 (~) Annul Historicl Summry, Aircrft Weponiztion - Project Mnger, Army Mteriel Commnd, Aug 64 Aug 65, p25 (2) Historicl Report, Smll Rockets nd Aircrft Armments Brnch, Directorte for Reserch nd Development, MICOM, (3)-Historicl Report,- Lnd Combt Commodity Mnger, FY 66 FY 66 8 p 77 9 (~) SS AMSMI-I-~30-66, Directorte for Procurement nd Production, 27 Oct 66, subj: Request for Approvl of Determintion nd Finding XM-26, TOW/Helicopter (2) Historicl Report, XM26 (TOW/Hel), Development Division, Directorte for Reserch nd Development, MICOM, FY 67, pl (3) Historicl Report, Lnd Combt Commodity Office, FY 67,;- pp 1-2 ~O (1) (2) AMCTCM Ibid, pp~-2 Item 6535,18 Dee 68, subj: Armment Subsystem, Hel, GM Lchr: XM26 (TOW/Hel) Approvl of Design Chrcteristics IPR, proj DA~X164202D134 Tsk OS Redstone Scientific Informtion Center ~~ Interview, uthor with Mr Robert Whitley, -former Deputy Project Mnger, TOW Progrm, 20 Apr 94 ~2 AMC TIR 1821~5, Jn 67, subj: GM Luncher Helicopter Armment Subsystem, XM26 Redstone Scientific Informtion Center 13 (~) -Historicl Report, Lnd Combt Commodity Office, FY 66 (2) Historicl Report, Smll Rockets nd Aircrft Armments Brnch, Directorte for Reserch nd Development, FY 66 14 Interview, Mr Robert Whitley 15 Cgle, p 81 12
16 Ibid 17 (1) Historicl Reports, Lnd Combt Commodity Office, FY 1967-68 (2) Historicl Reports, XM26 (TOW/Hel), Development Division, Directorte for Reserch nd Development, FY 1967-68 (3) TOW Firing Dt Furnished by Edwin E Bker, TOW Project Office, MICOM lb Airborne TOW Fct Book, TOW Project Office, MICOM, Redstone Arsenl, Albm XM26 (TOW/Hel), Development 19 Historicl Report, Division, Directorte for Reserch nd Development, FY 68 20 Historicl Report, Aircrft Wepons Commodity Office, FY 69 13
CHAPTER TWO DEPLOYMENT OF THE 1ST COMBAT AERIAL TOW TEAM TO VIETNAM The 1st Combt Aeril TOW Tem, Vietnm ws designted nd deployed to the Republic of Vietnm on 22 April 1~72 originl tem ws engged in combt until 20 June 1972 nme wrded the tem by the 1st Avition Brigde denoted its ssocition with tht unit s being the first time in the h~story of the United Sttes Army tht ws employed in combt ginst n rmored enemy1 The The heliborne TOW system The tem ws originlly orgnized to trin nd prticipte in United Sttes Army Combt Developments Experimenttion Commnd (USACDEC) Experiment 436 (Attck Helicopter, Dylight Defense) Phse 1112 The XM-26 Visul Acquisition Sight System ws one of three systems to be evluted Three Aircrft Commnders nd two crew chiefs were selected from the 155th Avition Compny USACDgC Fort Ord, Cliforni Additionlly, three pilots/gunners were ssigned from the 7th Squdron, 1st Cvlry Regiment (Blck Hwks), Fort Knox, Kentucky USACDEC ssigned the Tem OIC from within the commnd Trining begn during the fll of 1971 nd continued through Februry 1972 t Hunter Liggett Militry Reservtion, Cliforni Identified s 436 Side Experiment VASE (Visul Acquisition System Experiment: comprison of three heliborne sighting systems in trget cquisition nd 14
simulted TOW firings), totl of 108 record trils were completed during this period 3 In Februry 1972, fter n 8- initil nlysis of results, USACDEC recommended repet of the VASE experiment, utilizing only the XM-26 TOW Sight System s integrted into the UH-1B helicopter, t nother loction Sites selected for the follow-on test included: Fort Riley, Knss: Fort Lewis, Wshington; nd Fort Knox, Kentucky As result of commitments t Fort Riley, USACDEC mde the decision to conduct the initil experiment t Fort Lewis with subsequent trils scheduled for Fort Knox Over 85 explortory nd record trils were conducted t Fort Lewis during the period of 6 Mrch to 16 April 19724 On 14 April 1972, the USACDEC 436 contingent t Fort Lewis received JCS wrning Order directing preprtion for deployment of the entire system to the Republic of Vietnm on 21 April 1972 to include the two test UH -lb ircrfts Clssified s n extension of Experiment 436 under combt conditions, the rmment subsystem, to include TOW simultor triner (XM-70), lunching pods, missiles, XM-26 Sight, nd ll ssocited test equipment, were prepred for ir movement to Vietnm Designted to ccompny the equipment nd the TOW tem personnel were technicl representtives from Hughes Aircrft Compny, Bell Helicopter, nd US Army Missile Commnd (MICOM)6 A lst minute replcement pilot/gunner ws obtined from the Advnced Attck Helicopter Progrm t US Army Avition Systems Commnd, St Louis, Missouri7 15
The order to hve the experimentl irborne TOW system on the wy to Vietnm, redy to fight, in 7 dys sprked one of the most unique deployments ever ccomplished by the Armys It ws indeed monumentl tsk done in record time through well-coordinted tem effort heded by COL Robert W Huntzinger, the TOW Project Mnger Only prt of the XM-26 equipment ws instlled on the UH-1B helicopters prticipting in the 436 experiment t Fort Lewis, the reminder hving been plced in storge t the Hughes Aircrft plnt in Culver City, Cliforni The TOW-peculir hrdwre ws removed from the helicopters nd flown to Culver City, where the complete XM-26 subsystems were ssembled, checked out, nd pcked for pickup t El Segundo, Cliforni Mintennce ws begun on the two helicopters t Fort Lewis s they were redied for irlift TOW missiles were tken from production lots t Hughes' plnt in Tuscn nd ssembled for pickup by C-141 ircrft t Dvis Monthm Air Bse 9 The equipment nd personnel were consolidted t McChord Air Force Bse, Wshington nd loded on two C-141 ircrft The tem deprted for the Republic of Vietnm on 22 April 1972 nd rrived t Tn Son Nhut AFB, Sigon, Vietnm on 24 April 197210 At Ton Son Nhut, ressembly of the two ircrft nd the complete instlltion of TOW systems were expedited The dvncing enemy rmored thrusts were overwhelming the ARVN defenses in South Vietnm nd the need for this new precision, 16
yet unproven in combt, nti-tnk firepower ws needed to ssist in the onslught On 26 April, the TOW tem moved to Long Binh nd ws plced under the opertionl control of the 1st Avition Brigde The seriousness of the enemy rmored thret in severl crucil res of the country ws such tht COMUSMACV considered immedite commitment of the tem once the ircrft were opertionlly redy n However, in this mid- intensity environment, trining ws recognized s the key to survivbility The period of 26-29 April ws utilized to conduct dditionl gunner trcking trining, continue system checkouts, nd instll the rmored set modifiction entire tem ws considered combt redy on 29 April, The nd with UH-1H escorts, were flown to Pleiku for live fire trining nd opertionl employment with the 17th Avition Group From 30 April to 2 My, the 1st Combt Aeril TOW Tem conducted their initil live-fire trining in the Pleiku re never fired The tem hd live TOW missile prior to their deployment to Vietnm 12 In order to gin true pprecition for the opertionl successes of the 1st Combt Aeril TOW Tem, it is importnt to exmine the re of opertions, enemy nd friendly sitution in Militry Region II, nd the focus of the 17th Avition Group prior to the April 1972 North Vietnmese Ester Offensive 17
COMUSMACV - Vietnm, 1 Mry Cgle, Historv of the TOW Missile System, (Redstone Army Arsenl, Albm, US Army Missile Commnd, 1977), p 165 2 specil Report 1st Combt Aeril TOW Tem, US Army Combt Developments Experimenttion Commnd (USACDEC), Fort Ord, Clf, 14 Dec 1972, p 1-1 3 Ibid 4 Ibid 5 (1) Ibid, p 1-2 (2) Cgle, p 163 6 Interview, uthor with Mr Hugh McGinnis, MICOM representtive with 1st Combt Aeril TOW Tem, 10 Mr 94 7 Interview, uthor with CW3(Ret} Lester M Whiteis Jr, Senior Avitor with 1st Combt Aeril TOW Tem, 14 Apr 94 B (1) Cgle, p 165 (2) Interview, uthor with COL(Ret} Robert W Huntzinger, former TOW Project Mnger, 20 Apr 94 9 Interview, COL(Ret} Huntzinger 10 Interview, uthor with CW4(Ret) Dougls R Hixson, former Avitor with 1st Combt Aeril TOW Tem, 10 April 1994-11 Messge, to DCG USARV, Wepons Systems 12 Interview, CW4(Ret} Hixson 27 Apr 72, Subj: AT 18
CHAPTER THREE THE NVA BUILDUP Joining the southern boundry of Militry Region I (MR- I) ly the vst territory of Militry Region II (MR-II) MR-II ws n re of sprwling high plteus, rolling hills, nd dense jungle commonly referred to s the Centrl Highlnds, which sloped down towrd costl lnd to the est (See Figure 3) long~ nrrow, nd curving strip of Along the nrrow cost where most Vietnmese Ii ved, Ntionl Route QL-l connected costl cities such s Quî Nhon, Tuy Ho, Nh Trng, Cm Rhn, Phn Rng, nd Phn Thiet From the cost, two mj or highwys extended towrd the highlnds in the west: Routes QL-19 nd QL-21 Route QL-19 connected the port city' of Qui Nhon with An Khe, Pleiku, nd Kontum, the ltter twò cities in Kontum Province Frther south, Route QL-21- connected Nh Trng with Bn Me Thuot, the only mjor city on the Drlc Plteu Both highwys were importnt LOCs for MR- II Running the entire length of the highlnds from north to south ws Route QL-14 which originted ner Hoi An in MR-I nd connected Kontum with Pleiku nd Bn Me Thuot As result of frequent enemy interdictions, rod communiction between Pleiku nd Bn Me Thuot ws no~ lwys possible South of the Drlc Plteu ly the Di Linh Plteu with its fmous resort city of Dlt which connected with Bien Ho nd Sigon in Militry Region III (MR-III) by QL-20 19 This sprsely
8 f, ;:< "\-/ \ i ) '~"' LAOS ~ BEN t-4u -',-' \ J III TAN CANt4'OAK TO " r '" r I Ii" r\' / J' / It", (IIIOCK~T' 111100 (3 ~, -J' /~ ( C~BOOIA I ) I ~"'\ -' " ( \, 1--\"'''''' _J J" ( FIGURE 3 20
populted Montgnrd re of South Vietnm rrely ttrcted the interest of Vietnmese lowlnders MR-II, the lrgest of the four militry tcticl zones in the Republic of Vietnm, contined 47 percent of the country's totl lnd re However, people, bout one-fifth of them Montgnrds it contined only three million For this reson, in the rolling, sprsely populted Centrl Highlnds, neither side tried very hrd to win1 Both North Vietnmese Army/Viet Cong (NVA/VC) forces nd Army of Vietnm (ARVN) troops were used in economy of force roles The wether throughout MR-II, under the reversible influence of opposing monsoon sesons, proved to be importnt firly fctor tht regulted the pttern of militry ctivities on both sides The period from Februry to April ws chrcterized by fir nd dry wether ffected little by either monsoon cycle Ech yer during the dry seson, the Annmite Mountins in Kontum Province -becme n re of incresing ctivity nd 1972 ws no exception2 By erly 1972, ll US combt units hd deprted the Centrl Highlnds, but there still remined some logistic units nd security forces t Qui Nhon nd Cm Rnh Bses on the cost Two South Koren divisions were still deployed in MR-II, one in the An Khe-Qui Nhon re nd the other in the Tuy Ho-Ninh Ho re However, they were in drwdown sttus in preprtion for redeployment bck to Kore most tht could be expected from South Koren forces ws The 21
3 continution of security from An Khe to Qui Nhon drwdown of US mneuver bttlions nd the relegtion of the remining 60,000 US militry personnel in Vietnm to dvisory roles resulted in Vietnmese responsibility for the wr in the region Filure of the Americn Vietnmiztion progrm would be disstrous blow to US foreign policy nd provide the enemy decided dvntge t the negotiting tþle4 The The ARVN II Corps performed serch nd rescue missions resources nd the ssistnce of US- lrgely with its own dvisors nd US Army vition, plus whtever dditionl US combt support/combt service support could still be mde vilble It consisted of two infntry divisions nd one mobilernger group The 22nd Infntry Division with its four regiments, the 40th, 41st, 42nd nd 47th, ws usully responsible for the northern sector of MR-II The 22nd Infntry Division ws under the commnd of Colonel Le Duc Dt, n rmor officer nd former province chief Its efforts were concentrted on the two provinces of Kontum in the highlnds nd Binh Dinh in the lowlnds The 23~d Infntry Division ws hedqurtered t Bn Me Thuot nd under the commnd of Colonel Ly Tong B The 23rd Division's three infntry regiments, the 44th, 45th nd 53rd, were widely deployed over the division's lrge re of opertions For defense of the long western flnk within MR-II, eleven rnger bttlions were deployed in cmps nd bses long the border The II Corps hedqurters, under the commnd of LTG Ngo Dzu, ws locted t Pleiku In 22
ddition to its orgnic forces, II Corps occsionlly received reinforcements from the RVNAF generl reserve, usully irborne nd rnger units, when necessry to cope with incresed enemy ctivitiess As erly s the middle of December 1971, llied forces in the Centrl Highlnds of MR-II begn to receive reports of preprtions for mjor offensive to commence in the dry seson of 1972 ARVN intelligence reports nd interrogtion of prisoners nd defectors reveled lrge enemy troop movements from bse res in cmbodi nd Los into northern Kontum Province The enemy cmpign ws reported to be multi-phse effort nd the first phse ws to begin in lte Jnury or erly Februry, the period of the trditionl TET Lunr new yer celebrtion Prisoner nd detinee sources further disclosed tht the high point of the offensive ws to be chrcterized by ttcks on Tn Cnh/Dk To II, the fire support bses on Rock~t Ridge, nd the libertion of the min popultion centers of Kontum City nd Pleiku City 6 In ddition, VC locl force ctivity in the southern portion of MR-II nd the costl provinces would increse in n ttempt to widely sctter the ARVN forces nd thus mke the highlnds vulnerble to multi-divisionl ttck in Kontum Province With the supporting ttcks of VC units in trditionlly VC- dominted Binh Dinh Province, success on the Kontum bttlefield would enble the NVA to cut the Republic of Vietnm in two nd thus discredit the Vietnmiztion progrm7 23
Intelligence sources identified the controlling hedqurters for the impending NVA offensive in the Centrl Highlnds s the B-3 Front Its mjor combt units were the 320th NVA Division, the 2nd NVA Division, nd the orgnic combt units of the B-3 Front which equlled nother division These NVA units were supplemented by VC min force nd locl force units nd the 203rd Armor Regiment from Hnoi High Commnd 8 This would, in fct, be the first instnce of the enemy's employment of rtillery nd rmor in the Centrl Highlnds As result of incresing indictions of n impending offensive, the US dvisors in Second Regionl Assistnce Group (SRAG) in MR-II worked closely with their counterprts to utilize the remining US ssets in Vietnm; the ir cvlry, tcticl These ssets were ir support (TACAIR), nd B-52 strikes The 7-17th Air Cvlry Squdron ws used to reconnoiter known enemy bse re long the tri-border region of Los, cmbodi, nd Vietnm nd lso to the northwest of Kontum City in the Plei Trp Vlley The ir cvlry nd the USAF forwrd ir controllers were ble to detect enemy trining res contining mock-up tnks, mortr positions, nd lrge bunker complexes9 During the lst week of Jnury 1972, the first sightings were mde of enemy rmor ctivity est of Bse Are 609 Figure (See 4) 10 On 25 Jnury two AH-1 Cobr gunships from the 361st Aeril Wepons Compny (Pink Pnthers) reported engging 24
two tnks in the Plei Trp Vlley just west of Rocket Ridge The ircrews lso sw four other tnks under trees in the re In this sme re nother Cobr tem reported sighting six sets of trcks mde by rmored vehicles Subsequent visul reconnissnce did not locte the tnks, but the trcks indicted tht the enemy hd t lest one rmor compny in the re Further tnk sightings by gunships occurred on 30 Jnury nd spordiclly there~ter11 Becuse these reports could not be substntited by ground reconnissnce, little credence ws given to them by Mr John Pul Vnn, the only civilin ever selected to hed the dvisory effort in one of South Vietnm's militry regions This problem would continue to plque the SRAG stff during the period of NVA buildup in MR-II12 As tensions begn to build during the first week of Februry, the Vietnmese Air Force nd 7-17th Air Cvlry Squdron continued to report sightings of enemy rmor, tensions begn to build Documents cptured during the week s of 4 to 10 Februry confirmed the presence of the 320th NVA Division in the B-3 Front re One document lso stted tht the 320th ws composed of the 48th, 52nd, nd 64th Infntry Regiments nd the 54th Artillery Regiment The totl strength of the division nd its specil bttlions ws listed t 10, 400 men An ccompnying document reveled tht both 122mm nd 130mm Soviet field guns with rnges up to 17 miles were þeing infiltrted to the tri-border re13 25
Pul Upon evlution of ll vilble intelligence, the ARVN II Corps stff, led by LTG Dzu, plnned the defense of the Centrl Highlnds while the US dvisors were kept informed of ll developments, the Vietnmese themselves formulted the defense pln The key us figure in this pln ws Mr John Vnn, who hd spent over 11 yers in Vietnm s n rmy officer nd then s civilin, nd Vnn ws highly respected mong the Vietnmese people 14 LTG Dzu ordered Colonel Le Duc Dt, the new commnder of the ARVN 22nd Division, to move the division forwrd CP, 47th Regiment, nd logisticl support to Tn Cnh/Dk To II re, which ws lredy occupied by the division's 42nd Regiment In ddition, elements of the 19th Cvlry Regiment were ordered to the Tn Cnh re to reinforce the division's orgnic 14th Cvlry Regiment Dt plced this new rmor support t Ben Het becuse he felt tht ny NVA rmor ssult must come from tht direction LTC Tuong, the II Corps senior rmor officer, rgued ginst this deployment since it tied-rmor to sttic positions COL He felt tht these units should be kept free for mobile defense1s The 2nd Airborne Brigde from the Government of Vietnm's strtegic reserve ws lso committed to the fire bses on Rocket Ridge LTG Dzu then defined his commnd structure COL Dt ws plced in commnd of the Dk To re to include the border rnger cmps t Ben Het, Dk Mot, Dk Pek, Dk Seng, nd Fire Bses 5 nd COL 6 Long, Kontum Province Chief, ws responsible for Kontum City nd COL Tuong, the 26
Corps Deputy for Opertions, ws given commnd in Pleiku16 The Tet New Yer pssed nd there ws no offensive, but I I I nevertheless, the evidence of enemy bttlefield preprtion continued to increse In n effort to disrupt the enemy's timetble, the USAF flew more thn 80 B-S2 missions in the Tn Cnh re during the first three weeks of Februry 17 President Nixon's visit to Communist Chin led mny to believe the enemy would ttempt widespred ctivity to discredit this meeting between the two powers Once gin the enemy cted contrry to intelligence estimtes The enemy continued to void direct enggements but incresed his interdicting ttcks on lines of communiction nd minor instlltions The number of prisoners nd defectors reduced to trickle In previous yers, this hd signled n impending ttck Surveillnce continued to detect n estwrd movement of enemy supplies into Kontum Province in greter mounts thn ever before In retrospect, it ppers tht the offensive ws delyed becuse the NVA/VC units hd difficulty in moving their supplies into ttck positions due to hevy US B-S2 nd TACAIR strikes on the bse res in response to 7-17th Air Cvlry Squdron surveillnce nd ARVN intelligence reports To further bolster the defense of the Centrl Highlnds, the Airborne Division Hedqurters nd nother brigde moved to Kontum during the first week of Mrch nd ws ssigned responsibility for the defense of Kontum Province After the middle of Mrch, contcts with lrger enemy forces begn to 27
- ' increse significntly The contcts with NVA bttlion size forces mrked the end of the period of enemy reluctnce to engge in mjor combt One mjor incident ner Rocket Ridge resulted in the cpture of severl prisoners nd one defector They reported tht the 320th NVA Division would support the B- 3 Front in n offensive during the period April to September The sources lso reported seeing mny tnks in the bse res through which they hd moved nd hering tht NVA rmor units would ccompny B-3 Front ground forces during the coming offensive18 There were three other significnt enemy contcts One of these occurred 30 kilometers north of Kontum City where the 23rd Rnger Bttlion ws surrounded while ssessing B-52 strike 19 Hevy tcticl irstrikes, rtillery, nd - supporting B-52 strikes were required to ssist the rngers' brekout A smller enggement occurred between the 95th Rnger Border Bttlion nd the J4Jst Regiment, 2nd NVA Division, north of Ben Het The third contct occurred towrd the end of Mrch when elements of the 47th Regimen~ nd the 2nd Airborne Brigde mde hevy contct long Rocket Ridge The ARVN forces took hevy toll on the ttcking NVA forces with the support of B-52s long with us nd VNAF tcticl ir support These successful ARVN offensive ctions nd the enemy's filure to lunch his nnounced offensive on schedule led the II Corps stff to believe tht the enemy lcked the cpbility 28
to ttck his intended objectives They felt tht the continued pressure on the enemy through incresed ptrolling, the ggressiveness of the 2nd Airborne Brigde, nd the relentless use of vilble ir resources hd hrssed the enemy sufficiently to dely his preprtion of the bttlefield II Corps believed tht ggressive ARVN ground ction nd mssive ir support would deny the NVA the inititive nd reduce the size, durtion, nd effectiveness of the plnned offensive 20 During the first week of April, this enemy estimte of the sitution ppered to be ccurte s the 320th NVA Division's 48th nd 52nd Regiments sustined hevy losses in ssults on the fire bses on Rocket Ridge (See Figure 4 for 8- disposition of forces on 1 Apr 72) B-52s nd TACAIR pounded the mssed enemy forces in the Rocket Ridge re until t lest five enemy bttlions were rendered combt ineffective A prisoner tken in one of the ttcks reported tht reinforcements were infiltrting dily from the north nd tht units were regining their originl strength At the sme time, the 42nd nd 47th ARVN Regiments were in hevy contct north nd est of Dk To with elements of the 2nd NVA Division nd the 66th Regiment of the enemy B-3 Front Prisoners cptured in these contcts reveled tht the mission of the 2nd NVA Division ws to cpture the irfield t Dk To II, the 47th Regiment's hedqurters t Tn Cnh, nd destroy friendly rtillery units long Route 512 Additionlly, the prisoners 29
indicted tht the 66th Regiment hd reconnoitered the Tn Cnh compound nd were in the finl plnning stges for mjor ttck21 The exct time of the NVA ttck ws not known, but it ws undoubtbly imminent Hering these reports, the II Corps Commnder felt tht he hd insufficient forces in the Dk To re to counter multi-divisionl ttck LTG Dzu wnted to strengthen the Dk To defense with nine ARVN bttlions from the Binh Dinh Province This would hve left tht province with no regulr ARVN forces nd defended only by territoril forces Mr Vnn strongly dvised ginst this move nd convinced LTG Dzu to extend the 23rd Division's re of opertions north to give it some responsibility in Kontum, which would eliminte the need to move the bttlions from the Binh Dinh province With this move, the II Corps order of bttle showed the 22nd Division with totl of 13 bttlions consisting of three border rnger bttlions, eight ARVN infntry bttlions nd scout compnies, cvlry, sector forces nd 50 tubes of 10Smm nd lssmm rtillery The Airborne Division hd six irborne btttions, one border rnger bttlion, nd 16 tubes of 10Smm rtillery The Kontum sector consisted of rnger group of two bttlions nd territoril forces Fifty M-41 tnks belonging to the 14th nd 19th Cvlry Regiments were spred between Pleiku nd Ben Het This relignment plced tremendous strin on the logisticl support of ARVN forces north of Vo Dinh due to the limited cpbility of the single 30
Highlnds ly poised for the expected enemy ssult which ws rod into the re 22 The northern sector of the Centrl nticipted to follow the NVA ttcks in Qung Tri-Hue (MR-I) nd An Loc (MR-III) While the North Vietnmese prepred for mjor cmpign in the Centrl Highlnds, the 17th Avition Group's objective ws to prepre to close four vition bses nd inctivte four of the remining five vition bttlions s prt of the US withdrwl from South Vietnm From 1 December 1971 to 31 Mrch 1972, the number of vition compnies in 17th Avition Group ws reduced from twenty-seven to nine This ws very significnt event since one of the most difficult cpbilities the South Vietnmese hd to develop s prt of the Vietnmiztion progrm ws the helicopter support provided by the US Army 23 During the course of the wr, MACV hd developed system of dedicted support in which designted ARVN units were temed up with specified US Army vition units The mission of 17th Avition Group ws to commnd nd control ll nondivisionl rmy vition ssets in the II Corps Tcticl Zone (MR-II) While it ws under the commnd of 1st Avition Brigde, the Group ws under the opertionl control of the Second Regionl Advisory Group (SRAG) nd provided direct support to ARVN nd South Koren forces in MR-II24 By the beginning of April, it becme very pprent tht 17th Avition Group clerly lcked' sufficient ttck helicopter ircrft with nti-tnk wepons systems to counter 31
LTG the growing enemy rmor thret in MR-II The 361st Aeril Wepons Compny ws the only remining Cobr gunship compny nd it ws slted for stnddown on 7 April 1972 The 361st hd lost mny vitors nd mintennce personnel in the 30 dys prior to their inctivtion 2S By the end of Mrch, property nd tool boxes hd been inventoried nd ll ircrft were prepred for retrogrde With the imminent thret of n NVA rmor ttck nd the plnned dectivtion of the only ttck helicopter compny in MR-II,Mr John Pul Vnn set out to convince MACV to dely the inctivtion of the 361st Aeril Wepons Compny nd request dditionl nti-tnk wepons systems26 1 Intelligence Report, Province Senior Adviser, Province, 18 Jnury 1972 2 Ibid Kontum 3 (Ret) Ngo Qung Truong, Indochin Monoqrchs The Ester Offensive of 1972, (Wsh D C: US Army Center for Militry History, 1980), p117 4 Bruce Plmer, Jr, The 25-Yer Wr, (Lexington: Univer~ity Press of Kentucky, 1984); p 117 The 5 Truong, p 118 6 Report, CPT John Schndl, G-3 SRAG, 15 Feb 72, Subj: Bttle for Kontum (SRAG refers to the Second Regionl Assistnce Group which ws under Mr John Pul Vnn On 10 Jun 72 when BG Michel Hely succeeded Mr Vnn who hd been killed in helicopter crsh, SRAG ws redesignted SRAC: the Second Regionl Assistnce Commnd) 7 Report, G-2, SRAG, Intelligence Enemy Updte 8 Ibid 32 13 Jn 72, Subj: SRAG Weekly
30 - Lessons 9 Interview of CPT Jck Heslin, $-3 17th Avition Group, by 1LT Gry R Swingle, G-3, SRAG, Pleiku, RVN, 22 Jun 72 10 Journl, G-2/G-3, SRAG, 24 Jn 72-11 (1) Opertionl Report Lessons Lerned, 17th Avition 1 - Group, Nov 71 Apr 72 (2) Dily Opertions Journl, 17th Avition Group, 25 Jn 72 nd 30 Jn 72 12 Interview, uthor with COL(Ret) Joseph Pizzi, former Chief of Stff in SRAG, 19 Mr 94 13 Report, G-2, SRAG, 10 Feb 72, Intelligence Enemy Updte, 4-10 Feb 72 Subj: SRAG Weekly A 14 Neil Sheehn, Briqht Shininq Lie: John Pul Vnn nd Americ in Vietnm, (New York: Rndom House, 1988) 15 Report, LTC Rlph C Wr, Senior Advisor, Armored Brigde, 5 Jun 72, Subj: Lessons Lerned 2nd Arvn 16 Report, CPT John Schndl, G-3, SRAG, 15 Feb 72, Subj: Bttle for Kontum 17 (1) Interview, MAJ Stnley Kwecik, G-3 Air SRAC, by llt Gry R Swingle, G-3 SRAC, Pleiku, RVN, 21 Jun 72 (2) Report, G-2 SRAG, 17 Feb 72, Subj:' SRAGWeekly Intelligence Enemy Updte, 11-17 Feb 72 18 Report, CORDS, Overview, Mrch 1972 19 Journl, G-2/G-3, SRAG, 28 Mr 72 MR-2, Subj: SRAG Militry Region 6 20 Report, G-2 SRAG, Apr 72, Subj: 6 Apr 72 Intelligence Enemy Updte, 31 Mr - 21 Messge, Senior Advisor, SRAG to COMUSMACV, Subj: Dily Commnder's Evlution SRAG Weekly 9 Apr 72, 22 MACV After Action Report, Oct 72, pg K-5 23 Plmer, p 119 24 Interview, uthor with LTG (Ret) Jmes H Merrymn, former Commnder 17th Avition Group, Springfield, Virgini, 3 Mr 94 25 (1) Opertionl Report Lerned, 361st Aeril wepons Compny, for the period 1 Nov 71-31 Mr 72 (2) Interview, uthor with LTC (Ret) Richrd N Peterson, former Commnder 361st Aeril Wepons Compny, 7 Mr 94 (3) 33
Interview, uthor with COL Willim Reeder, former Pltoon Leder, 361st Aeril Wepons Compny, 7 Apr 94 26 Interview, COL(Ret) Pizzi 34
CHAPTER FOUR ALL OUT NVA OFFENSIVE IN MR- II By the end of the second week of April, contcts with mjor NVA units in the re of Tn Cnh-Dkto hd incresed considerbly On 14 April, Fire Bse Chrlie (See Figure 4) on the northern end of Rocket Ridge received over three hundred mixed 10Smm howitzer nd 7Smm recoilless rifle rounds, followed by ground ttck from the 48th NVA Regiment1 Although US Cobr ttck helicopters from the 361st Aeril Wepons Compny nd USAF tcticl ircrft were ble to slow the initil dvnce, the ARVN 11th Airborne Bttlion ws forced to withdrw Mj John Duffy, the Senior US Advisor to the 11th Airborne Bttlion, noted in his debriefing tht five of the nine enemy ntiircrft guns tht encircled the fire bse hd been destroyed nd tht s mny s 1,000 enemy bodies were lying on the perimeter wire2 The 42nd nd 47th ARVN Regiments continued their ttempts to control the ridgelines round Tn Cnh nd Dk To II, but were slowly forced to fll bck to the min compounds COL Dt, the 22nd ARVN Division Commnder, clerly filed to show effective ledership nd determintion to hold the ridgelines ln the north nd est of the compound which mde the division's defense very vulnerble3 On 19 April, the 1st Bttlion, 42nd Regiment ws isolted by n estimted two 35
KONTUM q DISPOSITIONS 1 APR 7'2 LAOS I- QUANe TIN /1 \i / ) DAK},,/ ( PEK \' \ { \ \ QUANG NGAI 8- ^-' J rj POLE I KLENG r-/-'- _ -;~E ( \ -- f"" ( ~ (""\ / / j \ ),- -_ BI HH DINH I KU I FIRE SUPPORT BASE 6 r t FIRE SUPPORT BASE 5 ( 0 5 10 IS MILES 3" FIRE SUPPORT BASE c: I 4 FIRE SUPPORT BASE 0 I5FSB NOVEMBER FIGURE 4 8 36
enemy bttlions, mking resupply impossible COL Dt mde only two feeble ttempts to relieve this force On the 21st, fter running out of mmunition, 63 of the 360 men in the bttlion filtered bck to the regimentl compound4 On 20 April, the Vietnmese Joint Generl Stff ordered the relese of one irborne brigde consisting of three bttlions nd the irborne division light commnd post from Militry Region II to defend Hue in MR-I In n ttempt to fill the gp, the 6th Rnger Group ws brought in from Hue, nd the 23rd Division ssumed the irborne division's re' of opertions with the 53rd Regiment After severl dys of intense rtillery brrges, the ARVN forces t Fire Bse Delt on Rocket Ridge were overrun on -the 21st The defenders, composed of one irborne compny nd one compny from the 2nd Rnger Group, held until n NVA ttck supported by three tnks forced them to withdrws On 22 April LTG Dzu quickly moved some of his rtillery to Dien Binh in the Dk To district to offset the setbcks on Rocket Ridge nd give much - needed depth to the bttlefield Mr Vnn hd urged this move since the end of Mrch but hd not been ble to convince the II Corps Commnder of the tcticl vlue of this shift in rtillery ssets6 By 23 April the 22nd Division's defenses in the Tn Cnh re ppered dequte with the 42nd Regiment nd one bttlion of the 41st Regiment ner the compound The 37
grrison defense ws comprised of 1200 troops, of which 900 were support troops nd not orgnized into the defensive pln for the compound For nti-tnk defense, the compound hd two 106mm recoilless rifles, over 100 M-72 light nti-tnk wepons (LAW), nd compny of M-41 tnks The 47th ARVN Regiment t Dk To II hd compny of tnks nd one irborne bttlion in support They lso hd two recoilless rifles nd numerous M- 72 LAWs The irborne brigde nd rngers t the remining fire support bses on Rocket Ridge were well supplied; however, they were locted too fr south nd were more useful for the defense of Kontum City thn to Tn Cnh-Dk To The 22nd Division hd more thn 50 tubes of 105mm nd 155mm rtillery in direct support ARVN II Corps nd SRAG believed tht the re ws well prepred for the multi-division ttck which thretened' THE ATTACK ON TAN CANH During the morning of 23 April, the long-wited NVA ttck begn with strong enemy force consisting of elements of the NVA 2nd Division combined with B-3 Front uni ts, sppers, nd tnks Their trget ws Tn Cnh During the initil ttck, the enemy mde extensive use of the wireguided AT-3 "Sgger" missile which quickly disbled M-41 tnks nd destroyed the 22nd Division commnd bunker with dedly ccurcy 8 The US dvisors were completely surprised by the 38
introduction of this sophisticted nti-tnk wepon nd greed tht it signled the beginning of the NVA offensive in MR-II The 22nd Division's morle nd confidence were delt devstting blow nd the tcticl sitution rpidly deteriorted 9 By noon, US dvisors estblished new division commnd post in the 42nd Regiment TOe using US signl equipment The division slowly regined prt of its composure, but eol Dt, the division commnder, ws visibly distressed He declined to join the us dvisors t the new Toe nd remined t his destroyed commnd post with his deputy, his ide nd severl stff officers 10 During the fternoon, ARVN rtillery units opened counterbttery fire on suspected enemy without success From the new division commnd post, dvisers directed us tcticl irstrikes onto enemy trgets bsed on reports from regimentl dvisers; however, bd wether nd hevy enemy nti-ircrft fire precluded ccurcy nd effect With the exception of incresed rtillery fire nd smll ground probes, the reminder of the fternoon nd erly evening of the 23rd pssed without significnt incidents When drkness closed in, enemy sppers, ided by B-40 nd B-41 rocket lunchers, destroyed n mmunition dump ner the Tn Cnh irstripll A few hours before midnight, the us District Adviser of Dk To District reported to the 22nd Division tht tnks were pproching from the west At 2300 hours n AC-130 Spectre gunship rrived over the re nd locted column of 18 tnks 39
moving towrd the Dk To District Hedqurters Spectre's 10Smm cnnon hd little success in destroying the enemy tnks Since the tnks were T-S4s, the only vulnerble points to ttck from high ltitude with high explosive mmunition were the rer fuel tnks nd rer engine A comprtment hit nywhere else cused csulties mong the crew but did not usully disble the tnk 12 About midnight the enemy rmor column turned south towrd Tn Cnh nd the 22nd Division eol Kpln, the US Senior Adviser to the 22nd, forewrned the ARVN rtillery commnder to fire on the tnks before they were overrun13 His ples were nswered with four gun volley which Spectre observed to hit one POL vehicle nd lnd within five feet of one of the dvncing T-54s An intense NVA counterbttery fire sent the ARVN rtillerymen scurrying for their bunkers nd ended the- ttempt to engge the oncoming enemy with indirect fire14 To rech the 22nd Division compound, the enemy column hd to cross two bridges on QL-14 Both bridges were defended by pltoon of territoril forces These forces hd no nti- tnk cpbility nd quickly evcuted their bridge positions when fced with the dvncing rmor This incident demonstrted cler lck of coordintion between regulr nd territoril forces Both bridges were long likely venues of pproch nd spnned unfordble strems The 22nd Division Hedqurters believed tht the sector forces hd prepred the bridges for destruction; however, this ws not relized until 40