Hawaii Area Contingency Plan Section 9000 Section 9000 - Table of Contents 9000 - Table of Contents...9000-1 9100 - Hawaii Area Committee...9100-1 Committee Chairman...9100-1 State of Hawaii Representative...9100-2 Trustees...9100-2 Stakeholders...9100-2 Committee Decisions...9100-3 Area Committee Meetings...9100-3 Area Committee Organization...9100-3 9200 - Plan Review and Exercise Process...9200-1 Subcommittee Objectives...9200-1 Revision and Review...9200-1 Exercises and Drills...9200-1 Area Exercises and Drills...9200-1 Tri-Annual Area Drills and Exercises...9200-2 Facility and Vessel Drills and Exercises...9200-2 9300 - untitled...empty Section 9000 Table of Contents 9000-1
Section 9000 Hawaii Area Contingency Plan 9400 - Oil Spill History...9400-1 Major/Worst Case Discharges...9400-1 Historical Spill Consideration...9400-1 Hazard Assessment...9400-1 Medium/Maximum Most Probable Discharges...9400-1 Historical Spill Considerations...9400-1 9000-2 Section 9000 Table of Contents Chevron Pipeline ('87)...9400-2 T/B Hana ('87)...9400-2 M/V Exxon Houston ('89)...9400-3 T/V Star Connecticut ('90)...9400-4 Chevron Pipeline Oil Spill into Waiau Stream and Pearl Harbor ('96)...9400-5 Hazard Assessment...9400-6 Minor/Average Most Probable Discharges...9400-6 Historical Spill Considerations...9400-6 Hazard Assessment...9400-6 Future Considerations...9400-7 9500 - Oil Spill Scenarios...empty 9510 - Oil Spill Worst Case Scenario...9510-1 Scenario Development...9510-1 Historical Spill Considerations...9510-1 Hazard Assessment...9510-1
Hawaii Area Contingency Plan Section 9000 Vulnerability Analysis...9510-1 Risk Assessment...9510-1 Seasonal Considerations...9510-2 Event General Description...9510-2 Trajectories...9510-3 Figure 9510-1 Worst Case Discharge (Oahu view) - plus 06 hours, day 1...9510-3 Figure 9510-2 Worst Case Discharge (Oahu view) - plus 12 hours, day 1...9510-3 Figure 9510-3 Worst Case Discharge (Oahu view) - plus 18 hours, day 1...9510-4 Figure 9510-4 Worst Case Discharge (Oahu view) - plus 24 hours, day 1...9510-4 Figure 9510-5 Worst Case Discharge (Oahu view) - plus 30 hours, day 2...9510-5 Figure 9510-6 Worst Case Discharge (Oahu view) - plus 36 hours, day 2...9510-5 Figure 9510-7 Worst Case Discharge (Oahu view) - plus 48 hours, day 2...9510-6 Figure 9510-8 Worst Case Discharge (Oahu view) - plus 60 hours, day 3...9510-6 Figure 9510-9 Worst Case Discharge (wide view) - plus 48 hours, day 2...9510-7 Section 9000 Table of Contents 9000-3
Section 9000 Hawaii Area Contingency Plan Figure 9510-10 Worst Case Discharge (wide view) - plus 60 hours, day 3...9510-7 Figure 9510-11 Worst Case Discharge (wide view) - plus 72 hours, day 3...9510-8 Figure 9510-12 Worst Case Discharge (wide view) - plus 84 hours, day 4...9510-8 Figure 9510-13 Worst Case Discharge (wide view) - plus 96 hours, day 4...9510-9 Figure 9510-14 Worst Case Discharge (wide view) - plus 108 hours, day 4...9510-9 Figure 9510-15 Worst Case Discharge (wide view) - plus 120 hours, day 4...9510-10 Hazards...9510-10 Figure 9510-16 Worst Case Discharge Benzene Plume (Oahu view) - plus 1 hour, day 1...9510-10 Initial Actions...9510-11 Response Goals...9510-12 General Response Strategies...9510-12 Location of Response Equipment...9510-13 Pre-designated Collection/Containment Sites...9510-13 Disposal Options...9510-14 Public Health and Safety...9510-14 Site 1 - Barbers Point Moorings...9510-15 9000-4 Section 9000 Table of Contents
Hawaii Area Contingency Plan Section 9000 Response Plan...9510-15 Equipment...9510-15 Site 2 - Hickam Harbor/Reef Runway Pond...9510-16 Response Plan...9510-16 Equipment...9510-17 Related Contacts...9510-17 Site 3 - Keehi Lagoon...9510-18 Response Plan...9510-18 Equipment...9510-18 Site 4 - Ala Moana Beach Park...9510-19 Response Plan...9510-19 Equipment...9510-19 Related Contacts...9510-20 Site 5 - Kahanamoku Beach/FT DeRussy Beach Park...9510-21 Response Plan...9510-21 Equipment...9510-22 Related Contacts...9510-22 Resource Requirements...9510-23 Skimmers...9510-23 Boom...9510-23 Dispersants...9510-23 Section 9000 Table of Contents 9000-5
Section 9000 Hawaii Area Contingency Plan Fire Boom...9510-23 Contracted Personnel...9510-24 Work Boat/Vessel of Opportunity (VO)...9510-24 Barges...9510-24 USCG Personnel...9510-24 Berthing and Messing...9510-24 Workforce...9510-24 Available Resources and Sources of Procurement...9510-25 Shortfalls...9510-25 Time Frame...9510-25 Disposal...9510-26 9520 - Oil Spill Maximum Most Probable Scenario...9520-1 Scenario Development...9520-1 Historical Spill Considerations...9520-1 Hazard Assessment...9520-1 Vulnerability Analysis...9520-1 Risk Assessment...9520-1 Seasonal Considerations...9520-2 Event Description...9520-2 Areas at Risk...9520-2 Weather...9520-2 9000-6 Section 9000 Table of Contents
Hawaii Area Contingency Plan Section 9000 Initial Actions...9520-2 Notifications...9520-2 Activation of Response...9520-2 Initial On-Scene Investigation, Evaluation and Recommendation...9520-2 Initial Response Actions, Strategies...9520-2 Spill Response Organization...9520-3 Strategies...9520-3 Resource Requirements...9520-3 Equipment...9520-3 Personnel...9520-3 Available Resources and Sources of Procurement...9520-3 Shortfalls...9520-3 Timeframe...9520-3 Disposal...9520-3 9530 - Oil Spill Average Most Probable Scenario...9530-1 Scenario Development...9530-1 Historical Spill Considerations...9530-1 Hazard Assessment...9530-1 Vulnerability Analysis...9530-2 Risk Assessment...9530-2 Event Description...9530-2 Section 9000 Table of Contents 9000-7
Section 9000 Hawaii Area Contingency Plan Areas at Risk...9530-2 Seasonal Considerations...9530-2 Weather...9530-2 Initial Actions...9530-3 Notifications...9530-3 Activation of Response...9530-3 Initial On-Scene Investigation, Evaluation and Recommendation...9530-3 Initial Response Actions, Strategies...9530-3 Spill Response Organization...9530-3 Strategies...9530-3 Resource Requirements...9530-3 Equipment...9530-3 Personnel...9530-4 Available Resources and Sources of Procurement...9530-4 Shortfalls...9530-4 Cleanup Timeframe...9530-4 Disposal Options...9530-4 9600 - Hazardous Substance Release History...9600-1 Major/Worst Case Releases...9600-1 Historical Consideration...9600-1 Hazard Assessment...9600-1 9000-8 Section 9000 Table of Contents
Hawaii Area Contingency Plan Section 9000 Caustic Soda...9600-1 Ammonia...9600-2 Other Hazardous Materials...9600-2 Medium/Maximum Most Probable Releases...9600-3 Historical Considerations...9600-3 Hazard Assessment...9600-3 Minor/Average Most Probable Releases...9600-4 Historical Considerations...9600-4 Hazard Assessment...9600-4 9700 - Hazardous Substance Release Scenarios...empty 9800 - untitled...empty 9900 - untitled...empty Section 9000 Table of Contents 9000-9
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Hawaii Area Contingency Plan Section 9000 Section 9100 - Hawaii Area Committee The National Contingency Plan defines the Area Committee as the "entity appointed by the President consisting of members from qualified personnel of federal, state, and local agencies with responsibilities that include preparing an area contingency plan for an area." Useful References Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act) 33 USC 1251 et seq. National Contingency Plan (NCP) Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 300 Committee Chairman The National Contingency Plan designates the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) for the inland zone and the U.S. Coast Guard for the coastal zone (40 CFR 300.120). In addition, the National Contingency Plan states that the FOSC is responsible for directing the actions of the Area Committee and preparing the Area Contingency Plan (40 CFR 300.205(c). The Chair of the Hawaii Area Committee is: Commander U.S. Coast Guard Sector Honolulu 400 Sand Island Parkway Honolulu, HI 96819 voc: 808-842-2640 (working hours) 808-842-2601 (after hours) fax: 808-842-2649 The Contingency Planning and Force Readiness Staff of U.S. Coast Guard Sector Honolulu coordinates the activities of the Area Committee. Hawaii Area Committee 9100-1
Section 9000 Hawaii Area Contingency Plan State of Hawaii Representative Trustees For the State of Hawaii the Director of the Department of Health (DOH) is the representative to the Hawaii Area Committee. The department is represented on the Area Committee by the Hazard Evaluation and Emergency Response (HEER) Office. The HEER office also serves as the State's On-Scene Coordinators (SOSCs). Hawaii Department of Health Hazard Evaluation and Emergency Response Office 919 Ala Moana Blvd., Room 206 Honolulu, HI 96814 voc: 808-586-4249 (working hours) 808-247-2191 (after hours) fax: 808-586-7537 The Director of the Department of Health is also the Chair of the State Emergency Response Commission (SERC) and represents the needs and issues of the Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) to the Hawaii Area Committee. The HEER office coordinates the SERC for the Director. Both the Federal and State Trustees are members of the Hawaii Area Committee. A list of Trustees can be found in Section 4156 - Hawaii Trustees. Stakeholders While not specifically allowed for by the National Contingency Plan, a Stakeholder is a group or organization that has a vested interest in a specific area that may be effected by the actions of the actions and decisions of the Hawaii Area Committee. These organizations make significant contributions to the Hawaii Area Committee and include, but not limited to: TESORO Hawaii 431 Kuwili St, 2nd Floor Honolulu, HI 96814 MSRC 179 Sand Island Road Honolulu, HI 96819 Clean Island Council 179 Sand Island Road Honolulu, HI 96819 PENCO 65 Nimitz HWY Pier 14 Honolulu, HI 96817 Any organization or individual with an interest is welcome to be involved with the Hawaii Area Committee. 9100-2 Hawaii Area Committee
Hawaii Area Contingency Plan Section 9000 Committee Decisions Decisions made by the Hawaii Area Committee are made in the same manner as decisions are made in the Unified Command. It is preferred that all decisions be reached by consensus, however if a decision can not be reached, the Chair will make the final decision. Area Committee Meetings The Area Committee meets approximately three times a year. The meetings are open to all members of the Hawaii Response Community and the public. Meeting announcements are made four to six weeks in advance of the meeting date. Contact the Chair to be added to the notification list. Area Committee Organization The organization of the Hawaii Area Committee is established by the committee. When an issue or problem has to be resolved, the Chair will charter a subcommittee. The subcommittee will be provided with a definition of the problem or issue and a list of objectives that they are to work on. The subcommittee is responsible for working on the problem independently, returning to the Chair or Area Committee when additional guidance is required or when the problem or issue has been resolved. Since its inception the Hawaii Area Committee has utilized many subcommittees. They include: Air Operations Communications Disposal Hazardous Materials Health and Safety Incident/Unified Command System Logistics Public Affairs Response Strategies Risk Assessment and Scenario Development Sensitive Areas Shoreline Wildlife Hawaii Area Committee 9100-3
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Hawaii Area Contingency Plan Section 9000 Section 9200 - Plan Review and Exercise Program The Area Contingency Plan is required by the National Contingency Plan. Useful References: National Contingency Plan (NCP) Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 300 National Preparedness for Response Exercise Program (PREP) Guidelines - dated August 1994 Coast Guard Regulations Title 33 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Sections 154.1055 and 155.1060 The Area Contingency Plan is developed in consultation with the appropriate Regional Response Team (RRT), Coast Guard District Response Advisory Team (DRAT), the National Strike Force Coordination Center (NSFCC), Scientific Support Coordinator (SSC), Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPC), the State Emergency Response Commission (SERC) and local industry members. Subcommittee Objectives Annually, the Chair of the Area Committee will establish objectives to be worked on by the subcommittee. These objectives are established based on national or local issues that need to be addressed by the Area Committee. Revision and Review The Area Contingency Plan is a "living document". As such, it is never done. Holding all the changes so they can be published as a single update to the plan is very inefficient. As an individual subcommittee completes work on an objective, an update of the appropriate Area Contingency Plan Section will be written and submitted to the Chair of the Area Committee for review. Once the Chair of the Area Committee approves the section, it will be published. Exercises and Drills To validate the Area Contingency Plan, exercises and drills are conducted monthly, quarterly and annually. Area Exercises and Drills The National Pollution Response Exercise Program calls for Area wide Notification, Spill Management Team Tabletop and Equipment Deployment Exercises to be conducted. Plan Review and Exercise Program 9200-1
Section 9000 Hawaii Area Contingency Plan Annually, local industry, in cooperation with the Area Committee, conducts several major spill drills. These drills are jointly designed by the sponsoring company, Coast Guard and the members of the Area Committee. These drills are designed to meet the objectives of the company, the Area Committee and, PREP. The Hawaii response community is small. Any company responding to a spill that is larger than the "maximum most probable" involves contracted OSROs, co-op groups, mutual aid agreements, and many members of the Area Committee for an adequate response. As long as these drills continue to be conducted no additional drills will be conducted. Tri-Annual Area Drills and Exercises Every three years the Coast Guard sponsors a major Area Exercise. The National Strike Force Coordination Center (NSFCC) is responsible for this program. This exercise is held in compliance with the National Pollution Response Exercise Program. Facility and Vessel Drills and Exercises Each facility and vessel that is required to maintain a Response Plan is required to conduct Qualified Individual Notification, Spill Management Team Tabletop and Equipment Deployment Drills. In addition, they are subject to Government Initiated Unannounced Spill Drills. These drills are conducted on a random basis by the local Coast Guard Sector Honolulu and will not occur more than once every three years. 9200-2 Plan Review and Exercise Program
Hawaii Area Contingency Plan Section 9000 Section 9400 - Oil Spill History Oil Spills are classified by the amount of oil discharged. Major/Worst Case Discharges A major discharge is defined as a spill greater-than 100,000 gallons of oil in the coastal zone or, a spill greater-than 10,000 gallons in the inland zone. Historical Spill Consideration The last major discharge occurred in May 1987 when Jet A fuel leaked from a pipeline into Pearl Harbor. Prior to that, there have been no historical catastrophic discharges in the COTP Hawaii Zone since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor December 7th, 1941. Hazard Assessment Although a pipeline failure is possible, the "Worst case potential discharge" will probably be from a vessel. A survey of the two refineries on Oahu, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. and Tesoro Hawaii Corporation, (formerly BHP), shows that the largest vessel that could be received at either offshore moorings is a 1,000 foot, 150,000 DWT tanker, with a cargo carrying capacity of approximately 1,000,000 barrels (or 42,000,000 gallons). Medium/Maximum Most Probable Discharges A medium discharge is defined as a spill greater-than 10,000 but less-than 100,000 gallons of oil in the coastal zone or, a spill greater-then 1,000 but less than 10,000 gallons in the inland zone. Historical Spill Considerations There have been 13 discharges of larger than 10,000 gallons over the past 25 years (1984-2009). These include the T/B Hana Discharge ('87), Exxon Houston Grounding ('89), T/V Star Connecticut Grounding ('90), T/V Yupex ('91), Chevron Pipeline Spill ('96), and the AGI Pipeline Spill ('97). All the discharges have varying circumstances, causes, and results. The general causes can be linked to mechanical failures (most human error or weather related) which resulted in the discharge of a large quantity of refined product. The following are narratives describing four of the largest or most complex responses undertaken in this Captain of the Port zone. Oil Spill History 9400-1
Section 9000 Hawaii Area Contingency Plan 9400-2 Oil Spill History Chevron Pipeline ('87) On the 13th of May 1987, approximately 104,496 gallons of JET-A was discharged from a seven-inch crack in an eight-inch pipeline. The product was discharged into a small stream that empties into Middle Loch of Pearl Harbor. The discharge also affected a nearby wildlife refuge resulting in the death of one Hawaiian Stilt, one Hawaiian Duck (both endangered species) and approximately 1,000 Mosquito Fish. An additional Hawaiian Duck was affected but did survive after being rescued by cleanup personnel then turned over to a ranger. The oil entered the refuge through a surface-skimming intake that provided water to the refuge. The responsible party (Chevron) contracted with Clean Islands Council (CIC) to perform the necessary cleanup. CIC also utilized Pacific Environmental Company (PENCO) and equipment from the U.S. Navy. The response efforts were first concentrated in the wild life refuge and the creek area. CIC, Pacific Environmental Company (PENCO) and the U.S. Navy deployed containment equipment and performed recovery using sorbents and vacuum truck skimmers. Several days into the response, the heaviest concentration of JET-A was located along the west bank of the Middle Loch. Here wash pumps were also used to hold the product against the shore where it was accessible to the recovery effort. Later into the response CIC brought in two OIL MOP machines that performed exceptionally well. The recovered product was first placed into pits and then transferred to the Chevron Refinery where it was recycled or disposed of. Once all the JET-A was recovered from the water and pits, CIC requested to terminate cleanup operations, to which the OSC approved. One of the problems that hampered the response was that, due to the concentration of the JET- A, it did not emit a sheen, which made it difficult to find the major concentration from the air. A major cause of the successful mitigation, was the quick response of the U.S. Navy in providing and deploying equipment to the scene. T/B Hana ('87) On 20 January 1987 the HANA was loaded with 1,344,000 gallons of Bunker C and accidentally discharged an estimated 42,000 gallons while being towed overnight to Kahalui, Maui. The cause of the discharge was the failure of the #4 port and starboard ullage openings. Openings were damaged when wooden timbers carried on the barge's deck broke free during transit and struck dogging wheels on the ullage covers. Opened covers allowed sea water to enter the tanks and displace the cargo of Bunker C. Additional cargo was discharged as the barge surged through heavy seas, frequently immersing itself. The discharge resulted in an oil slick consisting of heavy rainbow sheen approximately 12-25 miles long and 100-200 yards wide. The responsible party, Sausse Bros., immediately assumed responsibility for the spill. As a member of the
Hawaii Area Contingency Plan Section 9000 local oil spill cooperative, Clean Islands Council (CIC), they had immediate access to oil containment and cleanup equipment. Sausse Bros. contracted Pacific Environmental Company (PENCO) to provide supervisors and laborers to use CIC equipment and clean up the spill. Personnel from MSO Honolulu provided on-site monitoring of cleanup activities and were augmented by Pacific Strike Team personnel. Clean up efforts involved an average of 50 laborers daily (90 laborers at peak) and took 5 weeks to complete. During this period a number of problems were encountered. Tracking the movement of the spill was difficult because portions of the oil had a specific gravity (1.07) denser than that of normal seawater around Oahu (1.024). Consequently, much of the oil sank below the surface of the water and could not be seen by aircraft since it blended in with benthic algae and dark lava rock on the ocean floor. Prevailing winds from the northeast at 20-35 m.p.h. and computer trajectories provided by the NOAA Scientific Support Coordinator indicated that the oil should drift southwest and out to sea with no beach impact. Contrary to these predictions, very strong northerly currents pushed the slick, particularly the subsurface oil, towards Oahu and impacted every beach from Hanauma Bay to Waimea Beach on the north shore of Oahu, including Bellows AFB, Kailua and Kaneohe Beaches. As a result of tracking difficulties, oil impact locations could only be determined by personnel walking the beaches. Cleanup operations were tedious and labor intensive using shovels, rakes and sorbents. For example, globules of oil found underneath the sand on Makapuu Beach had to be removed by sifting sand through window screens. Lava rock shorelines in these areas had to be hand cleaned with sorbent "snares" due to their porous nature. Approximately 100 tons of oil-coated debris was transported to Kapaa Landfill near Kailua for disposal. Offshore containment and removal of surface oil using booms was not feasible due to high seas and winds. Dispersants were considered, but never used because much of the oil was migrating beneath the surface of the water, and aircraft capable of applying dispersant were not available. VHF-FM radio communications were poor on the windward side of Oahu due to "shielding" by the mountainous terrain. Portable cellular telephones were distributed to On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) forces to correct this problem and greatly improved the communications and coordination between responsible federal, state and local agency representatives. Although the impact of the oil on wildlife was small (15 birds oiled, 4 birds and a small number of crustaceans and fish dead), media interest was understandably high. M/V Exxon Houston ('89) On 2 March 1989 the M/V EXXON HOUSTON ran aground off Barbers Point, Oahu. The vessel was off-loading 490,000 barrels of Alaskan crude oil to Hawaiian Independent Refinery through an offshore single point Oil Spill History 9400-3
Section 9000 Hawaii Area Contingency Plan 9400-4 Oil Spill History mooring (SPM) when the ship broke free in heavy weather. Most of the transfer had been completed leaving 80,000 barrels of crude oil still on board. The vessel ran aground as it tried to maneuver to deeper water, breaching its double bottom bunker tank located below the engine room, and its port bunker tank. Approximately 16,800 gallons of crude oil was lost from the damaged SPM hose and 8,400 gallons lost from the port bunker tank. An eight day response effort followed in which local RRT and LRT members were activated. The Pacific Area Strike Team (PST) was requested to provide personnel to assist, along with an Air Deliverable Anti-Pollution Transfer System (ADAPTS) and one Open Water Oil Containment and Recovery System (OWOCRS). DOD resources were heavily depended upon during this response. Submersible pump systems were requested from and provided by the Navy Supervisor of Salvage; U.S. Marine Corps heavy lift helicopters from Kaneohe Marine Corps Air Station were used to transport the pumps to the EXXON HOUSTON; and U.S. Navy salvage vessels assisted in successfully re-floating the vessel. Approval for the use of dispersants was quickly requested and obtained in the event that the vessel should founder and discharge its remaining cargo. EXXON Corporation contracted for two dispersant applying planes and had them delivered from the mainland to Oahu where they remained on standby in the event of a vessel breakup. An effective media relations room was established at MSO Honolulu to handle a high volume of press inquiries. Further assistance was received from public affairs offices from the Coast Guard's Fourteenth District, MLC Pacific Area and Headquarters' Public Information Assist Team (PIAT). Coast Guard reservists who joined the effort voluntarily provided additional manpower. Oil impact was primarily limited to Germaines Luau Beach and Campbell Industrial Park. EXXON Corp. contracted Pacific Environmental Corp. for beach cleanup of these areas. Impact on wildlife was negligible and no bird or fish kills were reported. As a result of lessons learned, a 600 ft Strike Team OWOCRS boom is now pre-staged at CG Base Sand Island to provide for a limited offshore oil-skimming recovery capability. This incident underscored the lack of an open water response capability on the islands, either by mechanical means or by the application of the limited amounts of dispersants stockpiled on the islands. T/V Star Connecticut ('90) On November 6th, 1990, the T/V STAR CONNECTICUT grounded approximately 1 NM from Barbers Point Light. The vessel was loaded with, 250,604 barrels of various refined products. Initial radio communications indicated that the vessel was taking on water in its aft pump and engine rooms. Clean Islands Council (CIC) and Pacific Environmental Company (PENCO) were notified and immediately began
Hawaii Area Contingency Plan Section 9000 mobilizing equipment. The Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) made a request, (via the DOD representative to the RRT) to Commander In Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT), Pearl Harbor Naval Base and Combat Support Squadron Five (COMSUPPRON), for tug and salvage assistance. A request was also made to the Coast Guard Pacific Strike Team, NSF, for an Air Deliverable Anti-Pollution Transfer System, and the necessary support personnel for the Open Water Oil Recovery and Containment System. The USS SAFEGUARD and the M/V CLEAN ISLANDS arrived on-scene where they joined several commercial tugs and Coast Guard vessels. De-watering pumps from the U.S. Navy were placed on board the T/V STAR CONNECTICUT by US Marine Corp and Army heavy lift helicopters. The vessel was de-watered and floated free with the assistance of two commercial tugs approximately eighteen hours after she had grounded. No oil had been discharged from any of the vessels' tanks. A major problem during the response was VHF Communications. The area near Barbers Point is a "dead area" for VHF communications with the MSO. The major reason for success was the assistance of the DOD. Chevron Pipeline Oil Spill into Waiau Stream and Pearl Harbor ('96) On May 14, 1996, a Chevron Products Company pipeline ruptured and discharged No. 6 Bunker fuel oil adjacent to the Hawaiian Electric Company Waiau Power Plant in Pearl City, Oahu, Hawaii. The released oil entered the nearby Waiau Stream and submerged, floating to the surface upon entering the denser salt water of Pearl Harbor. An estimated total of 982 barrels (41,244 gallons) of No. 6 fuel oil was released covering approximately 2,290 acres of open water during the first six days of the spill event. Immediate impacts of the discharged oil included; closure of Pearl Harbor to navigation and vessel traffic, interruption of USN construction projects around Pearl Harbor, suspension of ferry service to Ford Island, closure of USS Arizona Memorial, closure of bicycle and jogging paths around the perimeter of East Lock and closure of Pearl Harbor to commercial fishing and boating. The USCG, Clean Islands Council and their vessel the HAWAII RESPONDER, and US Navy assets began a long and intensive clean up. The response efforts were widespread throughout Pearl Harbor over the next two months. Critical, sensitive and significant areas were boomed off for protection, including the HECO Power Plant intakes, the USS ARIZONA and the USS UTAH, Aiea Bay, Halawa Stream, Waimalu Stream. Teams utilizing skiffs and vac trucks cleaned shoreline areas, including Halawa stream, Maiau Stream, the ARIZONA memorial, Ford Island, oiled piers throughout Pearl Harbor, and Waipio Peninsula. The HAWAII RESPONDER, several Coast Guard Cutters and Navy skimmers worked to clean waterborne oil and oily water throughout the harbor. The Unified Command stood down on 20 May 1996, though direct clean up efforts Oil Spill History 9400-5
Section 9000 Hawaii Area Contingency Plan Hazard Assessment continued for a further two months in some locations. The eventual decision was made, after the FOSC determined that cleaning the remaining oil would cause more harm than letting it be, to boom off the area around Waiau Power Plant and leave the product for bioremediation. And on 18 Nov 1996, The U.S. Coast Guard and other stakeholders including Hawaii State Department of Health, U.S. Navy, NOAA, National Marine Fisheries, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and Chevron all concluded residual oil was stable and did not represent a significant risk of mobilizing. Oil droplets continue to surface creating very small sheens. To which HECO conducts daily notification to the NRC, 13 years after the incident. Assessments of daily risks for the Honolulu port area resulted in the development of the maximum most probable scenario. The scenario would involve offshore bunkering operations in which mechanical failure of transfer equipment causes a discharge of a quantity of product under pressure. In addition, the aging pipeline infrastructure in Hawaii has the potential of causing a medium discharge. Because pipeline spills are not readily noticeable and often occur in remote areas or in areas that cannot be readily monitored (under piers, underground) the amount of oil released is much greater per incident. While also a major threat, the volume of discharge would not exceed the medium discharge thresholds. Minor/Average Most Probable Discharges A minor discharge is defined as a spill less-than 10,000 gallons of oil in the coastal zone or, a spill less-than 1,000 gallons in the inland zone. Historical Spill Considerations 9400-6 Oil Spill History A statistical analysis was done using Coast Guard Business Intelligence System data, which showed that the average spill was approximately 40 gallons. Such spills are handled routinely by Sector Honolulu personnel and do not require outside involvement; however, State and Federal response agencies do assist due to a strong partnership and robust working relationship. Hazard Assessment The majority of discharges in the COTP Honolulu zone occur in the Honolulu Harbor, marinas, and anchorage areas. They are caused mostly by bilge pumping and tank overflows. The products most commonly discharged are waste oil and diesel. The discharges occur in industrial areas and pose a low threat to sensitive
Hawaii Area Contingency Plan Section 9000 areas. The bilge pumpings are generally very small amounts and occur mostly during the rainy season. The tanks over flows are the larger, and occur during all times of the year. There are many areas in which bunkering operations could possibly lead to a discharge. Due to the large number of transfer operations taking place, the greatest probability of a discharge could potentially occur in Honolulu Harbor, Kewalo Basin, and in the Ala Wai Yacht Harbor. Future Considerations Sector Honolulu incorporates an aggressive inspections program to prevent oil spills from occurring. Facilities and vessels are inspected on a regular schedule to identify problems. Follow-ups are conducted to ensure compliance. The Hawaiian Area Committee meets on a regular basis to discuss oil contingency planning and to update the Hawaii Area Contingency Plan. Oil Spill History 9400-7
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Hawaii Area Contingency Plan Section 9000 Section 9510 - Oil Spill Worst Case Scenario For a copy of the Oil Spill Worst Case Scenario please contact U.S. Coast Guard Sector Honolulu at (808)842-2696. Oil Spill Worst Case Scenario 9510-1
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Hawaii Area Contingency Plan Section 9000 Section 9520 - Oil Spill Maximum Most Probable Scenario The definition of Maximum Most Probable Discharge is different for vessels and marine transportation related facilities. Each are defined in the Code of Federal Regulations. Useful References: Coast Guard Regulations Title 33 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Sections 154.1020 and 155.1020 For the Area Contingency Plan the Worst Case Discharge is defined as a spill of 50 barrels of oil. Scenario Development The following information was used in developing the scenario: Historical spill considerations There have been 12 discharges of larger than 10,000 gallons over the past 10 years (1982-1992) these include the T/B Hana, Exxon Houston Grounding, Chevron Pipeline failure, and the T/V Yupex. All the discharges have varying circumstances, causes, and results. The general causes can be linked to mechanical failures(most human error or weather related) which resulted in the discharge of a large quantity of refined product. Hazard assessment Assessments of daily risks for the Honolulu port area resulted in the development of the maximum most probable scenario. The scenario would involve offshore bunkering operations in which mechanical failure of transfer equipment causes a discharge of a quantity of product under pressure. Vulnerability analysis Refer to the Geographic Annex for identification of sensitive areas. The areas most at risk are in the high traffic areas in the vicinity of the main commercial harbors. Risk assessment Vessels passing through the zone to fuel and receive stores (gas 'n' go) frequent the offshore bunkering area. There is a reasonable probability that a vessel receiving bunkers from a barge could spill up to 50 barrels before either party was able to secure the transfer. The average gas 'n' go traffic is four vessels per week. Oil Spill Maximum Most Probable Scenario 9520-1
Section 9000 Hawaii Area Contingency Plan Seasonal Considerations No seasonal considerations apply to the maximum most probable as bunkering happens on a regular basis. Event Description Areas at risk Weather Initial actions Notification Situation... Mechanical failure during transfer operation Location... Anchorage southeast of Sand Island Product... Bunker Amount - 50 bbls. Source... Pollution source secured. Shoreline areas from Barbers Pt. to Diamond Head, shoreline impacts will be heaviest in the Pearl Harbor, Honolulu Harbor and Ala Wai basin areas. Clear, 80_ (day), Light rain/overcast 70_ (night). Initial notification is as stated in the Most Probable discharge scenario. Activation of response Activation is as stated in the Most Probable scenario. Initial on-scene investigation, evaluation and recommendations This aspect of the response will be executed in the same manner as the Most Probable scenario. Initial response actions, strategies The initial response will consist of open ocean or harbor boom (depending on sea conditions), with sorbent boom outside to pick up any entrained oil. Within the boomed area, skimmers will be employed. As a precaution, protection booming techniques may be employed for sensitive areas (refer to Section 3200 - Recovery and Protection). 9520-2 Oil Spill Maximum Most Probable Scenario
Hawaii Area Contingency Plan Section 9000 Spill Response Organization Strategies The response organization is as outlined in the Most Probable scenario. A description of the harbor areas and possible response strategies for specific sensitive areas are contained in the Geographic Annex of this plan. Resource Requirements Equipment Personnel The initial response will consist of the large spill response platform, Clean Islands, as well as Munson boom boats, all fully equipped with skimmers and boom. Sector Honolulu has platforms for monitoring of the clean up. Sector Honolulu will also request air support from C.G. Airstation Barbers Point (overflight of the spill). The Oil Spill Response Organization will provide boat operators and spill response personnel. The Coast Guard will employ Sector response personnel, and will request public affairs support from D14 (de). Available Resources and Sources of Procurement Shortfalls Timeframe Disposal Primary response resources will be provided by the Oil Spill Response Organization on behalf of the Responsible Party. Additional resources could be supplied by military commands in the area through the DOD representative to the RRT. All resources needed for a 50bbl spill will be on scene within 2-3 hours. It is not anticipated that there will be any shortfalls for a spill response of this size and product. A spill response of this size will take approximately 2-3 weeks to complete. (NOTE: THESE TIMES ARE FOR PLANNING PURPOSES ONLY AND DO NOT REFLECT PERFORMANCE STANDARDS) Disposal options are as outlined Section 3240 - Disposal, of this plan. The options include the refinery for processing of collected oil, and the Waipahu incinerator and/or H- Power Plant for oiled debris. Oil Spill Maximum Most Probable Scenario 9520-3
Section 9000 Hawaii Area Contingency Plan This Page Intentionally Blank 9520-4 Oil Spill Maximum Most Probable Scenario
Hawaii Area Contingency Plan Section 9000 Section 9530 - Oil Spill Average Most Probable Scenario The definition of Average Most Probable Discharge is different for vessels and marine transportation related facilities. Each are defined in the Code of Federal Regulations. Useful References: Coast Guard Regulations Title 33 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Sections 154.1020 and 155.1020 For the Area Contingency Plan the definition of Average Most Probable Discharge was derived by the the review and analysis of the average spills responded to by Sector Honolulu. Scenario Development The following information was used in developing the scenario: Historical spill considerations A statistical analysis was done using Coast Guard Business Intelligence System data, which showed that the average spill was approximately 40 gallons. Such spills are handled routinely by Sector Honolulu personnel and do not require outside involvement, though through strong partnerships and working relationships, State and Federal response agencies do assist. Hazard assessment The majority of discharges in the COTP Honolulu zone occur in the Honolulu Harbor, marinas, and anchorage areas. They are caused mostly by bilge pumping and tank overflows. The products most commonly discharged are waste oil and diesel. The discharges occur in industrial areas and pose no threat to sensitive areas. The bilge pumpings are generally very small amounts and occur mostly during the rainy season. The tank over flows are the larger, and occur during all times of the year. There are many areas in which bunkering operations could possibly lead to a discharge. Due to the large number of transfer operations taking place, the greatest probability of a discharge occurs in the following locations; Honolulu Harbor Kewalo Basin Ala Wai Yacht Harbor Oil Spill Average Most Probable Scenario 9530-1
Section 9000 Hawaii Area Contingency Plan Vulnerability analysis Refer to the Geographic Annex for identification of sensitive areas, and descriptions of harbor and port facilities. Risk assessment The average discharge occurs during bunkering operations between a facility and a foreign fishing vessel (FF/V). These operations occur dock side within Honolulu Harbor. Discharges of between 25 to 100 gallons of diesel occur due to failure of the FF/V's crew to properly gauge the vessels' fuel tanks. The error allows the tanks to over flow through the fill tube and tank vents. The product overflows the containment and travels across deck to a scupper. The product continues to overflow due to communication problems between the foreign crew and the facility operator - Once the facility operator is aware of the discharge, the operator secures the operation hence securing the discharge. Since the discharges occur in Honolulu Harbor, no sensitive areas are threatened. The only hazard presented by the discharge is a slight chance of fire. These types of discharge occur during all times of the year, and during all Hawaii weather conditions. Event Description Situation... Bilge pumping or tank overflow Location... Harbor/industrial waterfront facilities. Product... Bilge oil or diesel Amount... 25 to 100 gallons. Source... Pollution source secured. Areas at Risk Shoreline areas within the harbors/marinas are at risk. Areas at the greatest risk on Oahu include Pearl Harbor, Honolulu Harbor, Ala Wai and Kewalo basins. Seasonal Considerations Weather No seasonal considerations apply. Clear, 80_ (day), Light rain/overcast 70_ (night). 9530-2 Oil Spill Average Most Probable Scenario
Hawaii Area Contingency Plan Section 9000 Initial actions Notification The facility operator or the vessel's agent notifies the USCG Sector Honolulu, who then notifies state and local agencies. The person taking the report will advise the reporting party to begin cleanup operations if cleanup hasn't already been initiated. Sector Honolulu will dispatch a pollution investigation team. Initial notification is typically completed in fifteen (15) Minutes An initial Notification list can be found in Section 3030 - Initial Notifications, of this plan. Activation of response The USCG Sector Honolulu pollution response team is recalled for all scenarios. Standard recall time is 30 minutes. Mitigation and investigation will commence upon recall. Initial on-scene investigation, evaluation and recommendations Once on-scene, the team will ensure that the discharge has been secured and that the responsible party is conducting a proper response. If the responsible party's response is inadequate, the team will advise the responsible party how the cleanup can be improved. The team will then investigate and collect evidence leading to the cause of the discharge, while monitoring the response. Initial response actions and strategies The initial response generally consists of sorbent booms and pads. Spill Response Organization Strategies The responsible party generally hires an Oil Spill Response Organization (OSRO) to conduct the cleanup, with assistance from the vessels' crew. A description of the harbor areas, and possible response strategies for specific sensitive areas are contained in the Geographic Annex of this plan. Resource Requirements Equipment The initial response generally consists of sorbent booms and pads provided by the OSRO and/or the facility. Oil Spill Average Most Probable Scenario 9530-3
Section 9000 Hawaii Area Contingency Plan Personnel An average response will consist of a 2-3 man C.G. pollution response team, and three to five cleanup technicians supplied by the responsible party or the response organization. Available Resources and Sources of Procurement Shortfalls The initial response generally consists of sorbent booms and pads provided by the OSRO and/or the facility. Initial "band-aid" equipment may be provided by the Sector Honolulu pollution response team to mitigate further damage/impact until contract response organization commences response. Due to the simplicity of the response there are generally no shortfalls to be overcome. Cleanup Timeframe These discharges are generally cleaned up in under 5 hours. (NOTE: THESE TIMES ARE FOR PLANNING PURPOSES ONLY AND DO NOT REFLECT PERFORMANCE STANDARDS) Disposal Options These discharges do not produce significant amounts of debris. The debris generated by daily spills such as described above are routinely disposed of at the Waipahu incinerator and/or the H-Power plant. 9530-4 Oil Spill Average Most Probable Scenario
Hawaii Area Contingency Plan Section 9000 Section 9600 - Hazardous Substance Release History Hazardous Substance Releases are classified by the amount of chemical released and the area effected by the release. Useful References: Published Reportable Quantities Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 117.3 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) Title 42 United States Code (USC) Section 9601 et seq National Contingency Plan (NCP) Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 300 Major/Worst Case Releases A major/worst case release is defined as an incident involving hazardous materials that occurs when the entire vessel or facility is "lost". Historical Consideration There has not been a major/worst case release in Hawaiian Waters. Hazard Assessment The Hawaiian ports do not receive large tank/bulk vessels carrying hazardous substances. All hazardous substances arrive either in an inter-modal tank or within a container. The likelihood of a complete vessel failure pier-side is slight. If it were to occur, it would probably occur while the vessel is in transit to or from a Hawaiian Port and while in open water. The containers would probably sink. A survey of the port and facilities in Hawaii found the following. Caustic Soda The largest quantity of Hazardous Substances that arrive in Hawaii is bulk caustic soda. Two or three times a year a barge arrives and transfers caustic soda to Brewer Environmental in Honolulu Harbor. The vessel moors on the pier adjacent to their facility and pumps the chemical to their facility on Nimitz Highway. Hazardous Substance Release History 9600-1
Section 9000 Hawaii Area Contingency Plan Ammonia In addition to transfer operation in Honolulu, barge loads of caustic soda are transported to Kahalui, Maui several time a year. There has not been a release of caustic soda while transferring from the barge. As long as operational safety is maintained at current or higher levels this operations poses a minimal threat to the port. The Hawaiian Islands are in the center of very lucrative fishing areas. In addition to the local fishing fleet, several foreign fishing fleets use Hawaiian harbors for supply and maintenance. These vessels use ammonia as a refrigerant to freeze their catch at sea. To service the fishing vessels, and fish plants, ammonia is imported in inter-modal containers and tanks. There have been instances where cylinders have arrived damaged or with exploded pressure relief valves. Typically, the cylinders were damaged because they were not secured in the container properly. Releases have occurred when the pressure relief valve has released. Typically, the cylinder was over-filled and the expansion of the heated -- by the mid-pacific sun -- ammonia was not taken into consideration. The fire department's hazardous material teams lead the response to these releases. Other Hazardous Materials All other hazardous substances arrive either in an inter-modal tank or within a container. Occasionally a container arrives leaking. The fire department's hazardous materials team working with the container yard's response contractor and the State of Hawaii's Hazard Evaluation and Emergency Response (HEER) Office respond. The likelihood of a complete vessel failure pier-side is slight. If it were to occur, it would probably occur while the vessel is in transit to or from Hawaii while in open water. The containers would probably sink. 9600-2 Hazardous Substance Release History
Hawaii Area Contingency Plan Section 9000 Medium/Maximum Most Probable Releases A medium/maximum most probable release is not specifically defined by regulation. However, an incident of this size would involve a hazardous substance released in excess of its published Reportable Quantity but, not as severe as the complete failure of the vessel or facility. The release may effect an adjourning neighborhood. Historical Considerations Existing case history suggests that "less than a 10%" of all hazardous substance releases exceed the published reportable quantities. These cases include leaking containers, leaking transport vehicles and incidents occurring within the facility. Hazard Assessment After a review of existing incident reports and discussion with local authorities the following hazardous substances threats exist in Hawaii: Ammonia Release Chlorine Release Containers Pesticides Transport Vehicles used as refrigerant in fishing vessels used to treat the water supply and community swimming pools both on container vessels and in the container yards stored and stocked on local farms used to distribute the product The Ammonia and Chlorine used on the island are stored in cylinders and if a release were to occur it would involve a single cylinder. The threat posed by the release would be short in duration. The local Hazardous Material Response Teams are trained to respond to ammonia and chlorine releases. The greatest threat is presented when these cylinders are threatened during another category of incident -- fire, collision, etc. The container yards pose the widest scope of threat. Literally any product used in Hawaii could be in the yard. As long as proper segregation is maintained aboard the vessel and in the container yards, the potential for a release reacting with another product is minimized. The threat posed by pesticides is compounded by the lack of regulations on their storage on land and transportation. Like chlorine and ammonia, the greatest threat posed by pesticides is presented when they are involved in another category of incident. Every product arriving in the Hawaiian Islands arrives by vessel and shipped by truck from the ports. The volume of product being moved presents a large threat. The police and fire departments respond to incidents involving vehicles. Hazardous Substance Release History 9600-3