PURPOSE This paper describes the synchronization efforts associated with planning and executing an effective antiterrorism (AT) program and the key elements that can enhance the overall ability to coordinate and synchronize efforts at the installation and standalone facility (SAF) level. INTRODUCTION Synchronization is defined as the arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time. 1 From an AT perspective, maximizing relative combat power equates to the application of available resources that, when taken together, aim to prevent a terrorist attack and effectively respond if necessary. An AT Plan is the physical outcome of this synchronization. Synchronization occurs across the AT community at all levels of command Antiterrorism Program The AT program is a collective, proactive effort focused on preventing and detecting terrorist attacks against DOD personnel, their families, facilities, installations, and infrastructure critical to mission accomplishment as well as on preparing to defend against and planning for the response to the consequences of terrorist incidents. Although not elements of AT, plans for terrorism consequence management preparedness and response measures as well as for continuing essential military operations are important adjuncts to an effective AT program. (tactical, operational, and strategic levels), at all locations, and across the full range of military operations. At the strategic and operational levels of command (Department of the Army Agencies, Army Commands [ACOMs], Army Service Component Commands [ASCCs], Direct Reporting Units [DRUs], and the Army National Guard Headquarters [ARNG]), synchronization links the Army Antiterrorism Strategic Plan (ATSP) to the Army Campaign Plan through assigned AT-specific goals, objectives, and tasks. This provides the guidance that links strategic, operational, and tactical levels while synchronizing AT with the Army Protection Program (APP) functional and enabling elements 2 as an interconnected web of protection. Tactical organizations employ resources designed to prevent or respond to terrorist attacks. They conduct 1 Joint Pub 2.0, Joint Intelligence, 22 October 2013. 2 AR 525-XX-A, The Army Protection Program, Draft Policy, lists the APP elements as Antiterrorism (AT), Computer Network Defense (CND), Continuity of Operations (COOP), Critical Infrastructure Risk Management (CIRM), Emergency Management (EM), Fire and Emergency Services (F&ES), Health Protection (HP), High Risk Personnel (HRP), Information Assurance (IA), Law Enforcement (LE), Operations Security (OPSEC) and Physical Security (PS). The enabling functions include Intelligence, Counterintelligence (CI) and Security Engineering. 1
a wide variety of activities whichh allow the local community to assess, detect, warn of, defend against, and recover from (AT doctrinal principles) terrorist actions. By clearly delineating roles and responsibilities, tactical synchronization greatly increases among AT-related activities at the installation, SAF, and operational unit levels. SYNCHRONIZING ANTITERRORISM WITHIN THE ARMY CAMPAIGN PLAN (ACP) The Department of the Army s ATSP articulates AT objectives and assigns responsibilities for subordinate commands AT planning. Figure 1 shows the AT objectives which directly support the ACP. Efforts at the department and subordinate command levels focus primarily on policy, program, and resource development and execution. Figure 1, Antiterrorism Objectives Supporting the Army Campaign Plan SYNCHRONIZING ANTITERRORISM AT THE OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVELS Antiterrorism synchronization at Army command levels and below involves numerous offices, units, processes, and forums. Key to any AT program is the certified AT officer (ATO), who serves as the commander s principal staff assistant for matters concerning potential terrorist 2
activities against the organizationn or unit. Usually assigned at largerr units and installations, Army AT policy (AR 525-13, Antiterrorism) specifies what organizations require a certified ATO. ATOs are often supplemented by Antiterrorism Coordinators (ATC). ATCs require less training and are most often found at smaller Army units, activities, and large staff sections that do not require an ATO. Typically a member of the operations section, the ATO serves as the overall central point and subject matter expert for coordinating planss and procedures governing AT, and increasingly is assuming the role of integrating AT with the APP functional and enabling elements (such as physical security, law enforcement, information assurance, OPSEC, intelligence, and protecting critical infrastructure). Fundamental to effective AT mission execution is the ability to integrate and synchronize efforts among the ATO and the various organizational staff and unit ATCs, including tenant units and activities on installations and SAFs. Critical forums which provide effective means to coordinate and synchronize AT efforts include the AT Working Group (ATWG), Threat Working Group (TWG), and AT Executive Committee (ATEC). Throughout the operations process, the ATO synchronizes the AT plan, protective measures, training and exercises, resource requirements and allocation, and terrorist incident response (TIR). Figure 2 shows how the eight AT framework tasks (AR 525-13) might align within the operations process with AT coordination and synchronization cutting across all phases of the operations process. Figure 2, Antiterrorism Synchronization across the Operations Process In addition to synchronizing efforts within the AT program, the ATO and ATCs will increasingly be charged with the responsibility to integrate and synchronize AT efforts with the APP s 3
functional elements and enabling functions. 3 Examples of areas which require increased focus and synchronization: Integrating AT risk assessment with the other APP elements and functions to ensure that the installation or SAF has an aggregate (combined) risk assessment which considers the mission criticality, threat, and vulnerability across an all-threats, all-hazards environment. Threat, vulnerability, and criticality each play a role in the overall risk assessment process and inform decisions involving the prioritization and application of resources across all APP functional and enabling elements. Developing priorities, coordinating requirements, and applying resources. The process for setting priorities for AT-related funds demands greater integration into the APP priorities. Assessments provide input for commanders to make decisions regarding priorities and resource allocation. By identifying shortfalls, organizations can improve processes and build necessary physical protection. As the DOD Mission Assurance framework evolves, DOD intends to develop policy for the horizontal integration of risk assessment and mitigation efforts at the installation level for the following programs: AT, COOP, DCIP, IA, IEM, PS, and CBRNE. As DoD makes this transition, the ATO may find themselves performing a broader role in supporting the AT integration into Mission Assurance. To ensure that AT continues to receive the level of visibility and resourcing warranted by the persistent terrorist threat, the AT community must understand and value the need for increased coordination and integration across a much wider set of security-related initiatives. AT COORDINATORS PROVIDE A COMBAT MULTIPLIER ATOs are not expected to do all the heavy lifting on their own. ATOs should establish a close-knit network of ATCs to maximize Key Points for ATCs Identify ATCs by name and position Assign ATCs roles & responsibilities Provide training & resources Leverage ATCs to fullest extent possible information sharing and to support full integration within the AT program and across the APP functional and enabling elements. In large organizational headquarters staffs (such as 3 Functional elements include Antiterrorism (AT), Computer Network Defense (CND), Continuity of Operations (COOP), Critical Infrastructure Risk Management (CIRM), Emergency Management (EM), Fire and Emergency Services (F&ES), Health Protection (HP), High Risk Personnel (HRP), Information Assurance (IA), Law Enforcement (LE), Operations Security (OPSEC), and Physical Security (PS); enabling functions include Intelligence, Counterintelligence (CI) and Security Engineering. 4
Department of the Army, ACOMs, ASCCs, DRUs, and the ARNG), in tenant units (such as an Army company or other small units detached from their primary battalion or above headquarters), and in SAFs (such as recruiting stations, ROTC departments, and Corps of Engineers projects), the designation of ATCs is an effective way to augment the role of the ATO, ensure AT coverage throughout the organization, and expand the capabilities of the organization when it comes to executing the AT mission. Doing so facilitates information sharing and gives external organizations a consistent POC for AT-related information flow and dissemination of time-sensitive threat information received from Federal, state, local, host nation, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command, and U.S. intelligence agencies. Developing an AT program represents the first step for any ATO or ATCs. Army policy (AR 525-13) and AT doctrine (FM 3-37.2) guide AT program development. The AT framework tasks and AT doctrinal principles (assess, detect, defend, warn, and recover) provide the vision and direction which must be understood by the ATO and ATCs in order for them to provide the appropriate level of support to the staff, tenant unit or activity, or operational unit. The eight tasks that apply to establishing an AT program also supply the framework and foundation for an AT focal point. Intelligence and information form the basis for decisions for the AT program. ATCs support commanders and leaders at all levels to monitor, report, and disseminate terrorist threat information. In the case where an installation, SAF, or tenant unit does not have a formal intelligence structure or support element, an ATC can be assigned the responsibility to gather this type of information for use and dissemination within the organization. Recommended Tasks for ATCs AT Framework Tasks Establish a program Collect, analyze, and disseminate threat information Assess and reduce critical vulnerabilities Increase AT awareness in every Soldier, civilian, and Family member Maintain defense in accordance with Force Protection Condition (FPCON) Establish civil-military partnership for terrorist incident crisis Plan terrorist threat and incident response Conduct exercises and evaluate and assess AT plans Single point of contact for AT matters within the staff, unit, or activity Support the organization s ATO in AT matters relevant to the ATCs staff, unit, or activity Monitor threat information sharing and disseminate information within their area of responsibility 5
Track the status of AT Level I awareness training and AOR-specific training within their staff, unit, or activity Conduct AT coordination with contracting and complete the ATO portion of AT in the Contracting Cover Sheet Assist the ATO with implementing random AT measures (RAM) Support the overall AT program evaluation Identify resource requirements to effectively support execution of AT tasks Support iwatch Army community awareness and suspicious activity reporting Antiterrorism awareness: fundamental knowledge of the terrorist threat and measures to reduce vulnerability to terrorism. Training for ATCs Army policy directs the requirement for formal ATO training (AT Level II). However, for ATCs the current training may be more than what is necessary (and not readily available due to limited resources) to prepare the ATCs to accomplish their assigned duties. The U.S. Army Military Police School is developing an online, web-based, distance learning course for the AT focal points. In the near term USAMPS will develop a training support package designed to complement efforts to train ATCs as soon as possible. The primary elements of the training are expected to include: Active shooter AT integration into the contract support process Information sharing and awareness Risk Management In the meantime, ATCs can quickly grasp an understanding of the key parts of an AT program and their role by working closely with the installation, SAF, or unit ATO. Other ways for ATCs to expand their AT knowledge include extensive resources on the Army Antiterrorism Enterprise Portal. 4 4 https://west.esps.disa.mil/army/sites/app/opmg/ops/antiterror/atep/default.aspx 6
Commanders and leaders designating an ATC should consider selecting someone with a background in planning and some experience in law enforcement and/or intelligence. Most other requirements can be taught by the higher headquarters or the local installation or unit ATO. Some commanders and leaders may have received some AT training through professional development courses. This training may have instructed them in concepts specifically oriented to building AT plans and AT doctrinal principles. Regardless of whether they have received formal AT training, leaders must seek guidance from their higher headquarters in managing their AT programs and pass the appropriate guidance on to their respective ATO or AT focal point. WORKING GROUPS Working groups are basic planning and execution forums used across the Army to integrate and synchronize a wide range of functions and tasks. Within the AT community the various types of working groups (such as ATWG, TWG, and ATEC) are integral to the success of an effective AT plan or program. Key to maximizing working groups is the identification of key members, establishment of the charter or purpose of the group, assignment of roles and responsibilities within the group, prioritization of actions or tasks the group will be involved with, and tracking progress and the way ahead. In addition to the primary working groups discussed below, sub working groups (such as an AT plan working group or resources working group) are established as needed to tackle specific tasks. AT focal points should participate in higher headquarters AT-related working groups and, subsequently, develop standard procedures to convey the information to their own organization. Discrete working groups may not be possible within the focal point s organization. However, focal points could integrate the necessary AT-related information in routine organizational meetings. Developing consistent procedures aimed at comprehensive AT information sharing is the critical point in the working group concept. Threat Working Group Key Points for Working Groups Identify membership, being sure to include representatives from across the entire staff, AT focal points, and tenant activities Establish WG charter and purpose Assign roles & responsibilities Maximize time, resources, and efforts Prioritize actions Support resource decisions Track progress & issue resolution Commanders of major Army subordinate commands (ACOM, ASCC, DRU, and ARNG) and installation and SAF commanders establish a TWG that meets quarterly or more frequently, depending upon the level of threat activity, to develop and refine terrorism threat assessments 7
and coordinate and disseminate threat warnings, reports, and summaries. Formal TWGs are not required to be established at operational unit, tenant unit, or tenant activity levels instead, installation ATOs are expected to coordinate with ATCs to integrate their staffs and organizations into AT planning and operations. Headquarters staff and tenant unit ATCs should participate in the TWG, which includes the following membership: Commander or designated leadership representative ATO Representatives from across the organization s principal staff Headquarters staff and tenant unit ATCs Appropriate representatives from direct-hire, contractor, local, state, Federal, and host nation law enforcement agencies and the Intelligence Community Sample Threat Working Group Agenda Provide an update on any new threat assessments received from higher headquarters or other sources Review recent AT- and force protection related incident reports Receive update on any reports added to eguardian for locations within command s geographical area of responsibility or areas of interest Review blue force activities (such as large gatherings, major training exercises, and forces in-transit) which may attract threats Review of progress on key tasks assigned during previous meetings Determine any requests for information to submit to higher headquarters Review of priorities for future meetings The TWG should integrate local iwatch Army reporting and routine updates from data contained within eguardian as key process inputs. By doing so, the TWG can serve as the commander s single source of threat information fusion for the installation or SAF. In the case where an organization has a larger geographical area of responsibility or multiple missions, it s likely the organization will have multiple TWGs operating at the same time. In this case, it is crucial that the TWGs share information to ensure that information gaps are addressed. Areas of special focus for TWGs should include tracking the evolution of threat tactics and groups within the respective area of responsibility. Tactics which TWGs may delve more deeply into could include insider threat, active shooter, and swarm tactics. 8
Antiterrorism Working Group Commanders of major Army subordinate commands (ACOM, ASCC, DRU, and ARNG) and installation commanders establish an ATWG that meets semiannually or more frequently, depending upon the level of threat activity, to oversee the implementation of the AT program, to develop and refine AT plans, and to address emergent or emergency AT program issues. Formal ATWGs are not required to be established at operational unit, tenant unit, or tenant activity levels instead, installation ATOs are expected to coordinate with ATCs to integrate their staffs and organizations into AT planning and operations. Headquarters staff and tenant unit ATCs participate in the host installation or garrison ATWG, which includes the following membership: Commander or designated leadership representative ATO Representatives from across the organization s principal staff CBRNE expertise Headquarters staff and tenant unit ATCs Other representatives as required supporting AT planning and program implementation Sample AT Working Group Agenda Update on threat assessment Review of progress on key tasks assigned during previous meetings AT training status Review of priorities and future events Changes to FPCON status or other protective measures in place, including RAM Plans for AT-related exercises, special events, larger gatherings Review higher headquarters guidance Tasks for future progress Review recent AT- and force protection related incident reports Discuss preparations for upcoming vulnerability assessments and progress on open actions from prior assessments Discuss upcoming physical security inspections, assessments, and surveys and open action Changes to key unit personnel (ATO, liaisons from law enforcement, security, medical, logistics, tenants, etc.) Reporting requirements established by higher headquarters 9
Special focus areas for the ATWG may include training and exercises which support the AT plan, self-assessments and plans to address identified shortfalls, and efforts to address AT measures in contracting which might examine how the installation or SAF is vetting contractor access to facilities. Antiterrorism Executive Committee Installation Commanders ( as well as ACOM, ASCC, DRU, and ARNG) establish an AT executive-level committee to develop and refine AT program guidance, policy, and standards; to act upon the recommendations of the ATWG and TWG; and to assist in determining resource allocation priorities to mitigate or eliminate terrorism-related vulnerabilities. Minimum membership should include the commander, his staff principals, and the ATO. Protection Threat Working Group The Protection Threat Working Group (PTWG) is responsible for addressing and assessing threats and hazards that could impact the command. It prepares recommendations for the PWGs and the PEC. The PTWG must appropriately consider classification of information when sharing with associated nongovernment personnel. Protection Working Groups The Protection Working Group (PWG) includes representatives from each protection supporting and enabling program that develops plans and exercises, conducts assessments, and makes recommendations to the Protection Executive Committee (PEC) on the means and methods to ensure execution of DOD and Army missions and the security of the force. When possible, installations consolidate working groups for efficiency while meeting the intent and requirements of individual protection-related regulations (for example, OPSEC Working Group, ATWG, EM Working Group, and Physical Security Council). The PWG develops the command s Integrated Protection Plan for the PEC and commander. Protection-related working groups should present issues through the PEC to ensure the synchronization of protection efforts. Protection Executive Committee The Protection Executive Committee (PEC) is the management structure at installation and SAF level that leverages APP principles and best practices to coordinate, integrate, synchronize, and prioritize resources with a unity of effort across the APP functional elements. The PEC reviews protection related initiatives and integrates and synchronizes efforts across the functional elements. The commander chairs the PEC and makes all final decisions, based on risk analysis, for the allocation of available resources to mitigate vulnerabilities and decisions to accept risk. 10
Information Flow across Functions The flow and synchronization of information between the APP functional elements is dynamic at all levels of command. At the installation level, where planning and implementation activities are often the most complex due to the geographical size of the area of responsibility and the direct link to organizational mission execution, information sharing is critical. Given the fact that information, whether it is threat or protective measures related, often involves more than a single function, it is important that established processes exist and are well understood across all of the personnel supporting the various APP programs. Generally, from an AT perspective, information is centered on the ATWG and TWG as a means to gather and analyze information prior to presentation to the ATEC. Where AT specific information is of importance to other APP functional elements, the ATO shares the information through an established network of contacts. The sharing of information may be more formally through other APP elements participation in the various AT working groups (or vice versa) or through informal daily interaction as routine staff actions. Where AT specific information is deemed critical to mission execution, information is shared with the PTWG, PWG, and PEC. Figure 3 shows the interaction among the other protection working groups and functions with the AT function in supporting of the overall APP. It s important to understand that the graphic is not intended to portray stringent control or flow of information, but rather to advocate that information flows back and forth across the various APP functions. Moreover, it s also important to recognize that information is gathered and analyzed within the AT function (AT focal points, TWG, ATWG, and ATEC), as it is within the Other Protection Working Groups, as well as shared and analyzed within the overall protection function (PTWG, PWG, PEC). Protection Executive Committee (PEC) Protection Working Group (PWG) ATEC ATWG Antiterrorism Forums TWG CND COOP CIRM EM F&ES AT HFP HRP IA LE OPSEC PS Army Protection Program Functional Elements Figure 3, Example of AT Synchronization with the other Army Protection Program functions 11
Risk Assessment AT is a risk-based protection program. At the heart of risk assessment are subordinate processes of threat, vulnerability, and criticality and their relationship to mission accomplishment. The Army s AT policy and doctrine establish risk assessment methodologies which are intended to support a common approach to risk management. Risk management concepts and execution cut across both AT and APP. As the Army continues to improve integration and synchronization across the APP functions, risk assessment methodologies from the installation to strategic levels are envisioned to apply a common framework. Importance of the Criticality Assessment An area within the risk assessment process which requires increased attention and information synchronization is the criticality assessment (CA). A CA identifies key assets and infrastructure that support DoD missions, units, or activities and are deemed mission-critical by military commanders and civilian-agency managers. It addresses the impact of temporary or permanent loss of key assets or infrastructures to the installation or a unit s ability to perform its mission. The following criteria assist in standardizing the process of determining asset criticality (see FM 3-37.2, Antiterrorism, Appendix E): Importance. Importance measures the value of the area or the value of the assets located in the area. Considerations include function, inherent nature, and monetary value. Effect. Effect measures the ramification of a terrorist incident in the area. Considerations include psychological, economic, sociological, and military impacts. Recoverability. Recoverability measures the time required for the function that is occurring at the area to be restored. Considerations include resources, parts, expertise, manpower, and redundancies. Even an injured, damaged, or destroyed DA asset may have future value in the accomplishment of other DA missions or be of symbolic value to the DOD, U.S. government, or American people. Considerations include resources that must be expended to recover or repair assets. Mission functionality. Mission functionality measures key positions, special facilities, and specialized equipment used to fulfill assigned missions. Substitutability. Are there substitutes available for personnel, facilities, or materiel? Can assigned missions be performed using substitutes? If the substitutes are less capable, can the mission still be accomplished successfully? Reparability. If a DA asset is injured or damaged, can it be repaired and rendered operable? How much time is required? How much will it cost? Can repairs be 12
accomplished in a timely manner? Will repairs degrade asset t performance? If so, can the mission be accomplished in the degraded condition? Detailed, cross APP functions, planning and integration focused on identifying and prioritizing critical mission essential functions, other operational requirements, and critical assets through mission analysis to focus APP priorities and resources. Given the establishment of the APP, the CA processs must address the Defense Critical Assets and Task Critical Assets through a mission analysis and Critical Asset Identification Process -- CAIP (seee DOD Manual (DODM) 3020.45, Volume 1). CAIP focuses solely on DoD strategic level, mission essential assets whichh are typically facilities directly supporting mission execution. From an AT perspective, the CA process must integrate CAIP with the AT CA (see Figure 4) which results in the establishmen nt of an installation Critical Asset List (CAL). The AT CA identifies both mission and non-mission essential assets. The CAL is updated annually, approved by the Commander, and represents a list of mission and non-mission essential assets deemed sufficiently important by the Commander to warrant additional protective measures. Every asset identified through the CAIP should be on the CAL list. Figure 4, Criticality Assessment Process 13
TENANT UNITS AND ACTIVITIES It is critically important that tenant units and activities at the installation and SAF levels be fully integrated into the AT plans and programs. Responsibility for integration resides both with the installation or SAF ATO and the commander or director of the tenant or activity to ensure that all tenant units and activities participate in the AT planning process and the ATWG and are included in AT plans, providing guidance and assistance as required. Tenants and activities should Key Points for Tenant Units Identify & track a full list of tenant units (operational units tend to come and go based on their primary mission) Identify tenant unit and activity POCs, roles & responsibilities Integrate tenant units and activities into the full AT program across the operations process Leverage tenant units for suspicious activity reporting ( Every Soldier a Sensor ) and support for AT protective measures Participate in the host installation or facility AT planning process and ATWG and TWG. During this planning process, any tenant unit or activity personnel support requirements will be identified that are required for implementing host installation FPCON levels. Comply with host installation or facility AT requirements. Provide the installation or facility ATO with a copy of the unit AT Plan and relevant implementation actions. Provide personnel support as specified in host installation or facility AT plans. Company-level units and below that are not located on the same installation as their parent units are not required to develop and maintain their own AT program. Commanders of such units will implement the policies and procedures specified in the AT plan and orders of their parent unit. Specific guidance covering these units will be documented in the AT plan and orders of the parent unit. Tenant activities that are populated by fewer than 10 DOD personnel daily are not required to develop and maintain their own AT program. Commanders or directors of such tenant activities will implement the policies and procedures specified in the AT plan and orders of their parent organization. Specific guidance covering these organizations will be documented in the AT plan and orders of the parent organization. These activities may include an ATC who can share information and link the organization s personnel with larger programs. 14
Commanders or directors of tenant activities will establish appropriate procedures to send and receive terrorist threat information and warnings to and from the host installation or facility, and they will request representation at the host installation or facility ATWG. Tenant units should ensure any suspicious activity reported through local law enforcement is also reported to the installation ATO. AT Program Coordination Installation and SAF commanders will coordinate AT matters with all subordinate, supporting, supported, and tenant units; host nation authorities; and local, state, and Federal authorities pursuant to existing law and Department of the Army policy to support AT planning and program implementation. Include all tenants and supported RC units and activities in the AT planning process and ensure they are included in AT plans, providing guidance and assistance, as required. Ensure their subordinate units which are tenants of other installations or facilities comply with host installation or facility AT requirements, participate in the host installation or facility AT planning process, and provide personnel support for implementing host installation or facility FPCON levels specified in the host installation or facility AT plans. Coordinate AT plans with local, state, and Federal authorities to ensure that a complete understanding of how and what military or civilian support will be rendered in the event of a terrorist incident. Random AT Measures and Force Protection Condition RAM will be conducted as an integral part of all AT programs. RAM are particularly important for our units, installations, facilities, activities, and civil work projects due to the static nature of our forces, and missions often result in the establishment of identifiable routines. Commanders will ensure that RAM are conducted as an integral part of all AT programs. Installation commanders will have a formally documented RAM Program, under the supervision of the ATO. The RAM program will include tenant activities and commands in planning and execution, and the ATCs for tenant units and activities are responsible for support in executing the RAM measures as specified for their organization. Installation and SAF commanders will develop a process based on threat information and/or guidance from higher headquarters to raise or lower FPCON measures. FPCON transition procedures and measures will be disseminated to and implemented by all subordinate units, staffs, and tenant units and activities. 15
Suspicious Activity Reporting and iwatch Army Terrorist threat awareness and suspicious activity reporting are important elements of our defense against terrorist activities. Tenant units and activities make up the bulk of Soldiers, civilians, and family members living and working on installations and SAFs. The ATO and ATCs must endeavor to maximize the availability of these resources at every opportunity. By training and educating all members of the community, we can extend the eyes and ears ( Every Soldier a Sensor ) of law enforcement and security forces. The iwatch Army program is a simple concept similar to a neighborhood watch program. It can be usefully employed across any installation, tenant unit or activity, SAF, or operational unit. Common tasks such as providing an iwatch Army focal point for phoned-in suspicious activity and coordinating with higher headquarters to pass along the information can help to ensure the program serves its purpose. To support the iwatch Army program, installations and SAFs must ensure that a procedure for reporting suspicious activity is developed not only with law enforcement organizations and higher headquarters, but laterally across the installation or SAF to ensure that all tenant units are informed. Immediate reporting procedures and follow-on guidance must be clearly understood and followed by all tenants and occupants. Suspicious activity reporting should be a critical step in AT planning and high on the list of immediate action drills and exercises which integrate all tenant units and activities. Not all tenant units have direct access to eguardian information. For this reason, it is critical to emphasize the importance of sharing law enforcement information (within the limitations of controlling Law Enforcement Sensitive information) across the installation and geographic region by integrating tenant unit ATCs into working groups. This will ensure that key decision makers are aware of all the threats and place safeguards on personal civil liberties. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS There is no substitute for effective reporting. By knowing the status of their AT programs, commanders can make necessary adjustments to stay ahead of potential terrorist intentions. Reporting is a key element to achieving full understanding and to supporting the synchronization of AT plans. While face-to-face assessments may provide the best interpretation of AT defenses, the resource-intensive nature of assessments limits their usefulness. An appropriate level of reporting can fill the information gaps and help commanders manage effective programs. All organizations should develop AT-related reporting procedures that give sufficient information for the commanders to make decisions to improve their AT programs. 16
The most effective AT defenses are those that are continuously refined and improved. To achieve that goal, commanders make decisions based on information received largely through reports. AT planners must analyze reports to identify shortfalls and in turn develop recommended actions to sustain and improve AT programs. Effective reports begin the process toward persistent defenses intended to prevent a terrorist attack. SUMMARY Key Points for Reporting Requirements Determine what is reportable Identify who is responsible for completing, approving, and submitting the report(s) Determine when & how reports are to be submitted Determine the content requirement for each report Determine inputs required to develop the report and task appropriate personnel Synchronization occurs across the AT community at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels and is increasingly more complex as the Army continues to integrate AT with the APP. The AT framework tasks and AT doctrinal principles provide the key elements to guide the synchronization efforts at the installation, SAF, and unit levels. Given the inherent increase in complexity, greater volume of programs to integrate, larger volume of stakeholders, and competition for resources in a fiscally constrained environment, it is imperative that the ATO leverage a network of ATCs, tenant units and activities, and operational forums, to maximize their ability to plan and execute an effective AT program. 17
REFERENCES AND RESOURCES AR 525-13, Antiterrorism, 11 September 2008 Burnishing the Steel (2013-2016), Antiterrorism Strategic Plan, 14 February 2013 Antiterrorism Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Standalone Facilities, January 2012 FM 3-37.2, Antiterrorism, February 2011 Risk Management Linking Tactical Execution to Strategic Outcomes, October 2013 Antiterrorism Enterprise Portal, which has moved to the Army Policing Portal, https://west.esps.disa.mil/army/sites/app/opmg/ops/antiterror/atep/default.aspx DOD Manual (DODM) 3020.45, Volume 1, Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP): DOD Mission Based Critical Asset Identification Process (CAIP) 18