Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Module 11: Terrorism Module 11: Terrorism 11-1

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text 11-2 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Module 11: Terrorism Module Description This module overviews the responder s role at a hazardous materials incident resulting from terrorist activities. Terrorist weapons are discussed, along with a Hazardous Materials Technician s role at such incidents. First Responder responsibilities are also briefly addressed. Prerequisites Students should have completed a hazardous materials operations level training program. Students should have completed a basic incident command training course. Students must know the fundamentals of chemistry. Students should be familiar with public buildings in their jurisdiction. Objectives Upon completion of this module, participants will be able to: Objectives Identify a wide range of resources outside the local jurisdiction. Identify the need for equipment staging. Explain why a well organized Incident Command System is necessary. Identify places of refuge within and outside their community. Explain why Critical Incident Stress Debriefing is important for responders. Identify the different types of terrorist attacks. Identify resources available for response to terrorist attacks. Describe communication needs at terrorist incidents. NFPA Standards NFPA 472-1997 (Technical Interim Amendment) OSHA Standards 1910.120 (q) (6) (iii) (B) (C) (D) (F) (G) ( H) for all Module 11: Terrorism 11-3

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text 11-4 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Introduction Questions 1. What are three of the five weapons of choice for terrorists? 2. How are biological agents usually dispersed by terrorists? 3. Name two buildings or areas in your community that could be a target for terrorist activities. 4. Do all terrorists have the same goals? 5. What are four indicators of a terrorist attack? 6. Can nerve agents be detected? 7. What special resources within the fire department should the First Responder alert? Terrorism is defined by the FBI as The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives. Terrorist acts have increased in the United States and Canada in recent years. Terrorism hinges on mass casualty and destruction. Many times terrorists strike with a silent, odorless, and colorless weapon that may not become evident until hours or days later. The goal is to produce a high volume of casualties to overwhelm the local response system. Targets for terrorist activities are chosen based on type of occupancy and volume of innocent and designated victims. Typical targets are public assemblies, public buildings, transit systems, telecommunications, historic or symbolic sites, or locations of high economic impact. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, local emergency services will be on their own for up to ten hours following an attack before specialists and federal assistance or other agencies respond. Module 11: Terrorism 11-5

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text Incidents As a hazardous materials responder, you may be inclined to assume that an unexplained or suspicious incident that involves explosives or biological agents is a terrorist act. Terrorist incidents are rare, but they do occur. Until you know, treat every incident as an unknown event and use appropriate precautions. The following is a list of some recent terrorist incidents. New York City, Feb. 1993 World Trade Center Bombing: Killed 6, injured 1000+ and resulted in $500-million damage. Tokyo, Japan, March 1995 Subway Bombing: Sarin nerve gas killed 12, injured 5500 +. The Tokyo Fire Department did not have any SOPs in effect to handle such incidents; this may be the cause for 135 fire fighter and command staff injuries. Oklahoma City, April 1996 Federal building bombing: Killed 168, injured 500+. Atlanta, Georgia, 1996 Olympic outdoor bombing: Killed 1, injured 50+, secondary device initiated. Michigan State University, July 1993 Fire: A member of the Animal Liberation Front set fire to a research facility. Activity 11-6 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician The Terrorist Typically, a terrorist is a person who believes he or she has a cause for which a statement must be made. Federal agencies have segregated terrorists by two types: foreign and domestic. Foreign terrorists can easily access this country through our bordering countries. Generally the U.S., Canada and Mexico do not share databases of known terrorist or extremist groups. A suspect in a New York city subway bombing attempt had committed crimes in Canada and was known there. Canadian authorities knew of two false names that he had used, but that information was not available to the U.S. Activity Domestic terrorism involves groups or individuals whose terrorist activities are directed at elements of our government or population without foreign direction. International terrorism involves groups or individuals whose terrorist activities are foreign-based and/or directed by countries or groups outside the United States, or whose activities cross national boundaries. Module 11: Terrorism 11-7

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text 11-8 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Types of Weapons and Their Hazards There are a number of ways to classify terrorist weapons of mass destruction (WMD). For example, the Department of Defense uses the initials NBC to categorize attacks as Nuclear, Biological, or Chemical (NBC). Other agents break the classifications down further, using the acronym B- NICE. B-NICE stands for: B-Biological N-Nuclear I-Incendiary C-Chemical E-Etiological Weapons of Mass Destruction Biological Agents Typical biological agents are bacteria, fungi, viruses, rickettsial agents, and toxins. Some of the most common are anthrax (bacillus anthracis), plague (Yersinia pestis), ricin, SEB (staphylococcal enterotoxin), and VEE (Venezuelan equine encephalitis). Biological agents are dispersed as solids, liquids, gases, aerosols, and vapors. Most biological agents are dispersed by aerosol method. Aerosol dispensers range from hand held industrial sprayers to airplanes. Different dispersion methods allow the agent to affect eyes and skin by direct exposure, and the respiratory system by aerosol type release. Agents dispersed in size of one to five micrometers can remain suspended in the atmosphere for hours. When inhaled, the agent will be absorbed though the entire respiratory system. Agents that are above five micrometers will be filtered out in the upper airway. The best time to deliver an agent is at night with wind speeds less than ten miles per hour. In higher wind speeds, the agent will disperse. It does not take a large quantity of an agent to affect a large population. For example, fifty kilograms of aerosol B, (anthracis spores), can affect as many as 500,000 people and travel over twelve miles if Module 11: Terrorism 11-9

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text conditions are right. Biological weapons can also be easy to obtain and easily made. For example, the nerve agent Ricin comes from castor beans sold at garden supply stores. The seed can be grown into plants and cooked with other products to form Ricin. Nuclear/Radiological Agents Although radiation is listed as a common terrorist weapon, nuclear radiation is not. This is because a nuclear weapon would be very difficult to obtain. A more likely scenario would be an explosive device detonated at a nuclear facility. Terrorist incidents with radiation will probably involve very small quantities of highly radioactive substances. This type of terrorism carries a low risk to the perpetrator, is cheap, and has a highly successful impact. Incendiary Devices Incendiary devices are flammable devices that are thrown or placed. When detonated, they create large amounts of fire that quickly spreads, injuring large numbers of victims. Often there will be more than one device, aimed at blocking exits. The secondary device will usually be targeted to first responders. Explosives Explosives are the number one terrorist weapon. Explosives range from pipe bombs to plastic explosives. They also range in size. In one incident, a terrorist used a typical musical Christmas card as a letter bomb. Bombs are becoming high tech with mini circuit boards, smaller batteries, and smaller detonators. However, dynamite and chemicals are still used in larger incidents, such as the 1995 explosion in Oklahoma City. Many of the materials used for explosive bombs are purchased in the local hardware store. This may be why explosives are the number one terrorist weapon. Bomb threats are the most difficult terrorist incidents to deal with, in part because of the technology available to build these devices. For example, complex timing devices 11-10 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician can be programmed to activate the bomb before the reported detonation time. You may be able to tell if a bomb is about to go off if you notice an odor of gunpowder or see a brownish-orange smoke. At this point, you should exit the area immediately; it will be too late to evacuate. While it is virtually impossible to predict when or where a terrorist explosion will occur, some places are obviously more vulnerable than others, such as government buildings and facilities that produce products that could be used for military purposes. Timing is a factor as well. Historically, more bombings occur in the summer months, and oddly enough, on Monday. Chemical Agents Chemical agents can exist as solids, liquids, or gases, depending on temperature and pressure. Hydrogen cyanide, chlorine, and phosgene are common chemical agents used by terrorists. It is not possible to become an expert on all chemicals; new ones are manufactured routinely. Unfortunately, terrorists do not label or placard their products. Even when they do, you cannot be sure that it is what it says. Consequently, research and monitoring becomes more important than ever before. Treat chemical agents as unknowns and be prepared for combinations of products. Chemical agents are broken down into various categories, which are discussed in the following section: Neurotoxins (nerve agents) Chemical asphyxiants (blood agents) Respiratory irritants (choking agents) Skin irritants (blister agents) Antipersonnel agents (riot control agents) Etiological Agents Etiological agents are also biological in nature. However, etiological agents are defined as substances that are capable of causing disease; not all biological agents result in disease. Examples of etiological agents are hepatitis viruses and HIV. Module 11: Terrorism 11-11

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text Combination Devices Combining weapons produces even larger numbers of victims and widespread destruction. For example, explosive devices have been used as dispersion devices, sometimes called dirty bombs. If a container of high level radiation had been strapped to the columns in the World Trade Center, the building and contents would have been contaminated for over fifty years. Furthermore, the blast from the explosion would have caused the radiation to become airborne and travel to other areas, buildings, victims, and emergency responders. Riot Control Agents Riot control agents are used to incapacitate; they are not intended to cause severe injury. These chemical sprays cause temporary but extreme discomfort. Three basic types of riot control agents are: Chloracetephenone (CN) Orthochlorobenzalmalonitrile (CS) Oleoresin capsicum (OC) CN and CS act within seconds and cause extreme eye and skin irritation. The effects last for 10 to 30 minutes. The particles in these sprays are very light and can result in secondary contamination between victims and emergency responders. OC is the safest and most popular riot control agent. It is prepared from an extract of cayenne peppers; thus the alternate name pepper spray. Contact with OC causes immediate nerve-ending stimulation, but no irritation. Effects last for 10 to 30 minutes. 11-12 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Types of Dangers Once an incident is suspected of being caused by terrorists, evaluate the site for potential harm to understand the dangers you might be exposed to. You can assess the incident by using the acronym TRACEM as a guide. TRACEM stands for six distinct types of dangers: T Thermal R Radiological A Asphyxiation C Chemical E Etiological M Mechanical Thermal dangers include hazards from both hot and cold substances. This would apply not only to fire but to the heat generated by a detonation. In addition, many chemical reactions also create heat. Radiological dangers include alpha and beta particles and gamma radiation. Many radiological substances are also chemical hazards. Asphyxiation includes both simple asphyxiation (lack of oxygen in the atmosphere from depletion or displacement) or chemical asphyxiation (the inability of the body to exchange air). Chemical dangers include primarily toxic or corrosive materials. Etiological dangers include bacteria, rickettsia, viruses and toxins. Etiological substances are particularly hazardous if a device is used to disperse them. Contact with blood and other bodily fluids can pose etiological hazards. Mechanical dangers include any type of mechanical or physical item or situation that causes trauma. Blast pressures, shockwaves, and fragmentation can cause mechanical harm. Bombs, the weapons most frequently used by terrorists, are sources of mechanical hazards. Activity Module 11: Terrorism 11-13

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text 11-14 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Hazardous Materials Technician Responsibilities Research Research is difficult, at best, at a terrorist incident. You may have no product because it may have destroyed itself in a blast. In most situations, you will have to consider the agent an unknown. One of the most important factors to consider when researching a product is persistence, the rate at which a product evaporates. A product that is persistent as a liquid is significantly more dangerous than a product at a terrorist incident as a vapor. As a liquid, the product remains on surfaces up to 24 hours longer. Anyone touching that area will be affected. Agents are 20 times more lethal inside than outside because they cannot disperse as readily. Monitoring At a terrorist incident, monitor for unknown hazards just as you would for any other hazardous materials event. Develop a strategy: monitor the lower explosive limit, determine oxygen levels, detect if toxicities are present and finally, determine if radiation is a hazard. At this time there is no monitoring equipment for biological agents. Draeger has developed a technology using a series of tubes, available only to emergency responders. There are monitors available for nerve agents. You may, however, have nothing to go on but the victims signs and symptoms and the samples collected from their clothing. You must usually contact state and federal agencies for help. Even though they may not be able to respond quickly, they can provide help over the phone. Module 11: Terrorism 11-15

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text Sampling is generally not the responsibility of fire departments and is usually performed by specially-trained, federal or state personnel. Activity 11-16 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Hazard Classes You may only be able to identify the class of hazardous material involved, rather than the substance itself. Most chemical and biological agents fall into DOT hazard classes 2.3, 6.1, or 6.2. If you identify a terrorist weapon as belonging to a certain class, it is likely to be one of the following. The guide number refers to the guide in the North American Emergency Response Guidebook. Nerve Agents UN 3278 Guide 151 Blood Agents UN 1051 Guide 117 Vesicants UN 2810 Guide 153 (Blister Agents) Choking Agents Look up chemical Guide 123 Irritants Look up chemical Guide 159 Biological agents Use Handbook on the medical aspects of NBC (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical) Department of Defensive Military Operations Field Manual DOT hazard class for common warfare agents: Nerve Agents Tabun (GA) DOT hazard class 6.1 Sarin (GB) DOT hazard class 6.1 Soman (GD) DOT hazard class 6.1 V agent (VX) DOT hazard class 6.1 Blood Agents Hydrogen cyanide (HC) DOT hazard class 6.1 Cyanogen chloride (CK) DOT hazard class 2.3 Vesicants (Blister Agents) Mustard (H) DOT hazard class 6.1 Distilled mustard (HD) DOT hazard class 6.1 Nitrogen mustard (NM) DOT hazard class 6.1 Lewisite (L) DOT hazard class 6.1 Module 11: Terrorism 11-17

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text Choking Agents Chlorine (CL) DOT hazard class 2.3 Phosgene (CG) DOT hazard class 2.3 Irritants CS a more potent DOT hazard class 6.1 form of Mace used by military and law enforcement CR Tear gas DOT hazard class 6.1 CN Mace DOT hazard class 6.1 OC Pepper spray DOT hazard class 2.2 (secondary hazard 6.1) Biological agents Anthrax DOT hazard class 6.2 Mycotoxin DOT hazard class 6.1 or 6.2 Tularemia DOT hazard class 6.2 Activity Health Aspects Agent Dispersion Health Effects In order to treat patients exposed to chemical and biological agents, you will need to know the rate at which victims will be affected. Use the following as a guide only. Nerve agents Liquid or vapor Small amounts irritation to eye, nose, throat Lethal amounts loss of consciousness and convulsions followed by apnea Blister agents Liquid Respiratory system irritation, burns and blisters to skin (within minutes) and eyes (4 to 8 hours) Blood agents Vapor Central nervous system and heart effects within 15 seconds; death within 6 to 8 minutes Choking agents Vapor Death within seconds to hours depending on exposure Irritant agents Vapor Affects skin, eyes, and mucous membranes; reacts within seconds but dissipates Biological agents Varies Slowly progressive flu-like symptoms Nuclear Varies Symptoms range from blistering or nausea to death, depending on the source 11-18 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Treatment Basic Treatment for Injuries from Explosives Basic treatment for injuries from explosives is primarily supportive. Administer oxygen Notify Advanced Life Support Position for shock MAST application is not recommended Basic Treatment for Chemical Agents Immediate decontamination Maintain open airway Administer oxygen Consider advanced treatment, if available, and prepare for transport Monitor patient Protect against secondary contamination Basic Treatment for Blister Agents There is no treatment for blister agents beyond decontamination. The blisters formed by these agents do not pose a threat of secondary contamination because the blisters are not contaminated. Basic Treatment for Riot Control Agents Less than 1% of the exposed victims have symptoms severe enough to need medical care. Furthermore, there is no known antidote for these irritants, so medical care should focus on relief of symptoms. Module 11: Terrorism 11-19

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text 11-20 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) PPE, in the event of a terrorist attack, poses several issues: What is the product? Where do we find enough PPE to outfit the responding personnel? SFPC (Structural Fire Fighter Protective Clothing) and SCBA Product identification is difficult, if not impossible. Also, a second source or second incident is always a concern. The second source could be an explosion or a second release of product. Remember the goal of the terrorist is to overwhelm all resources. When selecting PPE, you must consider using the highest level of PPE, fully encapsulated vapor protective gear (Level A) protection for the personnel working in the Hot Zone. Minimum level is full turnout gear which includes SFPC and SCBA. If you have identified a specific chemical, then you can research PPE compatibility. Module 11: Terrorism 11-21

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text 11-22 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Decontamination Initial decontamination at a terrorist incident may be limited to emergency gross decontamination because of the massive number of people involved. This type of decon may consist of a ladder pipe or large nozzle from a pumper for those who may have been exposed, and an actual decon setup for victims. Decontamination Solutions Decontamination solutions vary, and may be hard to acquire for a large number of victims. For a chemical and biological contamination with no available information, remove clothing and use a 0.5% hypochlorite solution with water. Use one part Clorox (0.5% solution) to ten parts water. Most of the time, contaminant levels are reduced by removing clothing and washing hair. If you are able to identify the product, use your standard SOPs for specific decon solutions. Security Security at the decontamination area for victim treatment is a must. Products like mustard gas can be passed and result in secondary contamination if they have not evaporated from the victims. Decontamination at the medical treatment site should focus on eliminating agent transfer, decontamination of victims, and maintaining an uncontaminated treatment area. Decontaminating Victims Decontamination of ambulatory victims will be very limited in the beginning. You should have victims remove contaminated clothing, walk through a shower from fog streams or other sources, and be quickly evaluated for injuries. Construct the decontamination setup so that victims of exposure are allowed a suitable degree of dignity and privacy. Tag or prioritize victims so you have a systematic manner to handle all patients. Module 11: Terrorism 11-23

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text The location of decon depends on weather, location of incident, and places of refuge for victims. This should be preplanned with the local Emergency Management System. 11-24 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Risk and Safety Victims Terrorism incidents are usually designed to target large populations. Consequently, you may have many more victims than you are accustomed to handling. Because of their large-scale effects, terrorist incidents are also chaotic. Emergency personnel and bystanders are often unaware of the hazards, and may become victims themselves. Remember that terrorist incidents are criminal activities, and that the risks may be multiplied. Entry Team Activity The risk to the entry teams can be tremendous depending on the type of destruction and there is always the possibility of a secondary device. The instability of a damaged building can also be very dangerous. Entry team members also run the risk of contamination from chemical or biological agents. It is critical that responders carefully weigh the risk of entry or rescue versus the benefit. If lives can be saved, and if appropriate equipment is available, entry may be worth the risk. However, if it is unlikely that victims are alive or if responders are not trained and equipped to safely effect a rescue, it may be best to limit activities to defensive methods until other resources are available. Key Safety Issues Safety at a terrorist attack is critical for first responders. If responders become victims, the incident just becomes worse. Follow these guidelines: Warn of secondary devices. Secondary devices are often released at terrorist attacks. They are designed to injure or kill first responders. Secondary devices increase death and destruction. In Atlanta, Module 11: Terrorism 11-25

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text in 1997, a secondary device exploded while fire fighters attended victims at a bombing. If a terrorist bombing occurs, every responder is at risk of a secondary explosion. However, you can reduce your chances of being injured by: Staging apparatus and personnel well away from the initial blast Staying clear of large shrubs, dumpsters, mailboxes, or other places that could conceal a secondary device. Searching all victims before transporting them Another way to reduce your risk of injury by a secondary device is by being very careful with your communications equipment. Radio signals can trigger an explosion, so avoid any communication in the area of a suspected device. This includes hand-held radios, cellular phones, and mobile data terminals. It is a good idea to establish a 1500 to 2000-foot minimum isolation distance for radio equipment. Work within a unified command. An incident command system is absolutely critical. Each agency will need to establish its own safety position because of the magnitude of the incident. Different agencies will have different concerns at an incident. Coordinate safety plans. Each agency should have a safety plan and tactical worksheets. Establish a Safety Officer for each operation that reports back to the overall safety officer (i.e. Hazardous Materials Team, EMS, Fire, etc.) Secure Hot, Warm, and Cold Zones must be established. The Zones will be established in cooperation with the other agencies. One agency may be concerned with security, another with product release, and another with building collapse. Good working relationships must be established. Mandate minimum PPE. The Safety Officer should establish minimum PPE for all agencies. 11-26 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Work in groups of two. No team should have less than two members. Teams working in the Hot Zone should have two backup members waiting in the Warm Zone. A Rescue Intervention Team is very important during this time. Establish a rehab area. This may be difficult in the early stages of response. Response personnel will not want to take breaks. However it is important to rotate responders and limit work time so they do not become victims. Setting up a rehab area will depend on the location of the incident, time of day, and season of the year. Maintain accountability. Accountability at a large incident is mandatory because of the different agencies and departments involved. This is a process that should be developed long before the incident occurs. Module 11: Terrorism 11-27

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text 11-28 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Incident Command System A good Incident Command System is mandatory at a terrorist attack. A good working unified command will help all agencies work together towards a common goal. A simple task such as staging, which everyone takes for granted, becomes a large problem at many large-scale incidents. Emergency vehicles should not have to be towed to allow EMS units access for victims. Activity The Incident Command System must be implemented at the beginning of an incident. The question of Who s in charge? should be resolved long before such an incident occurs. A terrorist attack becomes a disaster, a hazardous material incident, a fire, or a criminal investigation involving local, state, and federal agencies. Awareness and preplanning are the best solutions. Incident Commander The Incident Commander s general responsibilities at a terrorist event are not unlike those at a hazardous materials incident. However there may be more, or more unusual duties. For example, the Incident Commander may need to restrict air traffic over an incident. The majority of agents used in terrorist attacks are dispersed as vapor and are typically heavier than air. An aircraft or news helicopter flying over the area will cause the agent to spread and become airborne again. As with other potential problems, anticipate what may happen and work out solutions in advance. Module 11: Terrorism 11-29

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text Command Staff The Safety Officer plays a critical role at every hazardous materials incident. If the incident is large, as most terrorist emergencies are, the Safety Officer will most likely delegate some responsibilities to other trained personnel, such as the Hazardous Materials Safety Officer. All fire department Safety Officers must be capable of working with their counterparts from other agencies. The Liaison Officer is the point of contact for all other responding agencies. The Liaison Officer plays a critical role at terrorist incidents simply because of the number of organizations that will respond from local police departments to federal agents. The Liaison Officer must be capable of organizing and monitoring the locations and activities of all other responding agencies. The Public Information Officer assumes a high profile role at a terrorist incident because the media will demand as much news as possible, as quickly as possible. The PIO must coordinate with other agencies in order to provide a clear, accurate, and timely picture of the situation to the news media. Logistics The Logistics Function is particularly valuable at largescale terrorist incidents because of the number of outside organizations that can provide assistance. For instance, in a 1996 Valujet crash, manufacturers were more than happy to supply whatever equipment was needed to accomplish certain goals. Have relevant phone numbers of PPE manufacturers and other logistical researchers on hand. You do not have time to look up numbers for a supplier at a crisis situation. Currently, the best resources for medical and personal protective equipment in terrorist situations are the U.S. Army, Medical Management of Biological casualties, and Medical Management of Chemical Casualties. The Centers for Disease Control may also offer some guidance. With increased concern about terrorism in this country, new information on protective clothing may soon be developed. Contact your PPE supplier for assistance in purchasing proper equipment. 11-30 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Communications are often disastrous at large incidents. Not only are frequencies different, but communication equipment may be inoperable. Cellular phones and regular phones may or may not work. This equipment, like other tools at an incident, needs to have a backup. Depending on the area you are in, the local phone company may be able to install a hard wire, closed system at your command post. However, even if equipment fails, remember that there are other ways to communicate via the channels of unified command system. Use face-to-face contact or runners with written or verbal communications to stay in touch with the IC and personnel under your command. Planning The Planning Section is responsible for collecting, evaluating, and disseminating information about the hazard and available resources. Planning must collect information about the current situation, the probable outcome of specific events, and alternative strategies. Those assigned to the Planning function should have some experience with terrorist activities, drills, or working with other agencies in large-scale incidents. Operations The Operations Section is responsible for most of the tactical planning. However, unlike routine fire or hazardous materials incidents, Operations at a terrorist incident must work very closely with operations units from other public safety, state, and federal agencies. Action plans that address goals and objectives must be carefully coordinated with other agencies to ensure that conflicts are minimized and the response is well-organized. Module 11: Terrorism 11-31

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text First Responder Responsibilities Activity If you are a First Responder to a terrorist incident, your initial actions will include the following: 1. Secure the scene 2. Deny entry 3. Size up the situation 4. Conduct risk/benefit analysis 5. Rescue civilians if appropriate 6. Perform emergency decon, if required 7. Implement EMS as necessary 8. Call for additional resources 9. Make necessary notifications Like many other departments, you may not be fully prepared to handle a full-scale terrorist incident. To prepare, expand your existing response plans to include terrorism. Develop scenarios and train with outside agencies to correct any problems that might exist. All departments will be taxed in the event of a terrorist attack; it is how we overcome that problem that results in a favorable outcome or a complete disaster. The mental status of the responders to an incident with numerous deaths and injuries should also be considered. In short, preplanning and training is essential. You cannot stop terrorism but you can be prepared for it. Emergency Medical System The Emergency Medical System may be overwhelmed in case of a terrorist attack. The first arriving EMS personnel may become victims. How is the medical system set up to handle a terrorist attack in your area? How far away is the second resource for EMS assistance? These are questions you should know and answer now. EMS units should drill in large-scale incidents to practice: Patient triage Treatment of psychological as well as physical effects 11-32 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Staging Notifying and working with local hospitals, clinics, and other medical resources Communicating within the department and with other agencies Hospital associations are now studying terrorism in this country to help responders plan their response. Remember that terrorists do not hit only large communities. A target could be a munitions depot in a very small city. Resources Identify other community resources that can help you handle problems at terrorist incidents. You cannot possibly be prepared to deal with every aspect of a terrorist attack, so develop a good resource list that is established before an incident. If you wait until the incident happens, it may be too late. In addition to your local resources, other federal and state agencies will be available during a terrorist attack. A partial list follows : Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI Field Offices National Security Division Critical Incident Response Group Hazardous Materials Response Unit Evidence Response Teams Federal Emergency Management Agency FEMA Region/Area Offices FEMA Search and Rescue Teams MERS - Mobile Emergency Response System IRR - Immediate Response Resources Public Health Service Metropolitan Strike Team CDMAT (Chemical Disaster Medical Assistance Teams) Disaster Medical Assistance Teams Disaster Mortuary Teams Module 11: Terrorism 11-33

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Regional Offices-On-Scene Coordinators Environmental Response Teams National Enforcement Investigations Center USCG Strike Team U.S. Department of Energy Facilities Response Team Nuclear Incident Response Team ( including Nuclear Emergency Search Team - NEST) Nuclear Weapons Accident Response Team Radiological Response Support Team U.S. Department of Defense DOMS - Director of Military Support EOD - Explosive Ordinance Disposal Teams TEU - Technical Escort Unit CBIRF - Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force Naval Medical Research Institute Chemical /Biological Defense Command USAMRICD Army Medical Research Institute for Chemical Defense USAMRIID Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases You can find a more detailed description of federal resources in Appendix D. State Response Assets: Law Enforcement Emergency Management State Emergency Operations Plans National Guard Chem-Bio Response Units 11-34 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Emergency Response Coordination The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention s (CDC) emergency preparedness and response activities are coordinated by the Emergency Response Coordination Group (ERCG) of the National Center for Environmental Health. ERCG has two main functions: To help local, state, and federal agencies plan responses to emergency situations To respond to requests for emergency and recovery assistance after technological disasters such as radiation, chemical, or biological releases and after natural disasters such as hurricanes, wind storms, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, or floods When an Emergency Occurs When a disaster or emergency occurs, the Emergency Response Coordination Group responds to requests for assistance by: Helping to make a preliminary assessment of the situation either by telephone or by sending an emergency response coordinator to the site Helping local health agencies set up a program to deal with the recovery process Coordinating emergency response activities with those of the local, state, and other federal health personnel who also respond to the emergency Helping to determine when protection, treatment, and prevention objectives are achieved Establishing protocols for environmental and biological tests and by assisting in collecting appropriate environmental and biological specimens Module 11: Terrorism 11-35

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text Conducting laboratory tests to identify any chemical or biological contaminants that may have been released during the emergency and by assisting in identifying the sources of the contamination Obtaining information on exposure pathways in order to identify populations at risk for adverse health effects Establishing surveillance programs at health care delivery locations to find persons who were at risk during the emergency Establishing protocols for infectious and vector-borne disease control How Quickly Can ERCG Respond The ERCG is available to respond to emergencies 24 hours a day. Upon request, services are available to local, state, and federal agencies. Within 10 minutes of receiving a call for assistance, an emergency response coordinator will be in touch with the person making the request. The coordinator will get full details about the emergency situation and contact the staff at CDC who can best respond. The coordinator can draw upon all of CDC s resources. Within 20 minutes of receiving a call for assistance, a preliminary assessment team will be available. Depending on the situation, the team members may include toxicologists, chemists, physicians, environmental health scientists, or health physicists. The team can be expanded to include people with expertise in many other fields if the situation dictates. Within eight hours of receiving a call for assistance (if immediate on-scene response is required), an emergency response coordinator and other team members can be on-site with the appropriate equipment. 11-36 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Resources Available During Emergencies The ERCG is prepared to address a broad range of issues associated with public health emergencies. The Coordinator Group: Has access to CDC s scientific expertise, which includes expertise in the following fields: Disease Control Environmental Science Epidemiology Health Physics Industrial Hygiene Injury Control Laboratory Science Statistics Toxicology Can perform any necessary laboratory tests related to infectious diseases or environmental health Has a network of staff in many locations around the country, which often means that they can respond sooner than eight hours after receiving a request for help Has the most up-to-date communications equipment Practicing for Emergencies ERCG participates, along with other agencies, in a wide range of planning and emergency preparedness activities to ensure that responders are always ready to assist in emergencies. The ERCG can be contacted at: 24-Hour Emergency Telephone (770) 639-0615 For planning or consultations during normal business hours (8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. Eastern Time): Telephone: (770) 488-7100 Fax: (770) 488-7107 Module 11: Terrorism 11-37

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text 11-38 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Application Exercise Module 11: Terrorism 11-39

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text 11-40 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician You will need: Application Exercise Local maps of the area Diagrams of an incident scene within the local area (e.g., a government building) A written description of a possible terrorist incident, containing: Clues about the hazard Mass casualties A booby trap or secondary device Mutual aid resources Departmental SOPs for entry, decontamination, mutual aid, etc. Chalkboard or flip chart and markers Chemical/hazardous materials reference sources A copy of the Competency Checklist (following pages) for each student Preparation This exercise is intended to give students classroom experience in responding to a large-scale terrorist incident setting up decontamination equipment and conducting both full and emergency decontamination. Divide the class into small groups and distribute copies of the local maps, diagrams, and written descriptions of a terrorist incident. Instruct them to use the Incident Worksheet on the following page. Answer any questions the students may have, but do not provide any resources that are not readily available in the jurisdiction. Allow about one hour for the groups to complete the activity, then reconvene the class and have each group give a detailed debriefing on how they handled the incident. Complete the Competency Checklist for each group. Module 11: Terrorism 11-41

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text 11-42 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Incident Worksheet Use the following guidelines to plan your response. 1. Describe your initial actions and what you would do to secure the area. 2. Indicate on the incident diagram where you would a) set up zones; b) establish triage; c) stage the command post and other equipment; d) set up a contamination reduction corridor 3. Based on what you know about the hazard, how would you treat the victims? 4. What resources would you call for assistance and/or mutual aid? 5. What specific duties would be assigned to these agencies? 6. Briefly describe the command structure that should be established at this incident. 7. What type of monitoring devices would be used? 8. Is entry into the Hazard Zone safe, considering the resources you have on hand? If so, what level of personal protective equipment should be worn by the entry and decontamination teams? 9. What steps would you take to protect the crime scene? 10. How and when would command be transferred? 11. Identify possible problems you may have handling this incident, based on location, resources, or mutual aid agreements. Module 11: Terrorism 11-43

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text 11-44 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Competency Checklist Students in Group: Indicate group competency in the following areas. Did the group: Yes No Take appropriate initial actions? Set up zones, staging, and other areas appropriately? Specify appropriate medical treatment, based on the hazard? Call for appropriate assistance/resources/mutual aid? Demonstrate an understanding of the duties of responding agencies? Set up a workable command system? Select the appropriate monitoring devices? Accurately determine whether to enter the Hot Zone? Use appropriate equipment for entry (if entry was made)? Take sufficient steps to protect the crime scene? Know when and how to transfer command? Attempt to control runoff from decon procedures? Follow departmental SOPs? Remarks (including skills to be improved): Module 11: Terrorism 11-45

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text 11-46 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Action Statement Module 11: Terrorism 11-47

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text 11-48 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Action Statement You have just completed the eleventh module of the Hazardous Materials Technician course. The topics included: Types of terrorist activity Common types of terrorist weapons Responsibilities of the hazardous materials technician at a Terrorist incident A review of hazard classes as they relate to common warfare agents Use of personal protective equipment at a terrorist incident Mass casualty decontamination A review of risk and safety at a terrorist incident Incident command systems at large incidents First responder responsibilities at terrorist incidents Emergency response coordination Knowing how you respond to emergencies in your first due areas, would you change your actions or habits based on the information covered in this module? Listed below are some suggested actions. Some you may already do, and others may not fit your work environment. If there are actions you have not done in the past, do you think you will begin doing them as a result of this training? As a result of this training I will: 1. Conduct more practice drills with mutual aid organizations 2. Contact local, state, and federal agencies for additional information on terrorism 3. Research terrorist activities when they occur 4. Find out more about the hazards of weapons of mass destruction 5. (Create my own action statement) Module 11: Terrorism 11-49

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text 11-50 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Appendix A Activities Module 11: Terrorism 11-51

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text 11-52 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Tokyo Subway Activity 1 On March 20, 1995, five makeshift chemical devices containing Sarin (isopropyl methyl phosphonofluoridate) were placed on three Japanese subway lines scheduled to converge from the north and west on Kasumigaseki (the government district) between 8:09 a.m. and 8:13 a.m. Two bombs released the chemical, Sarin, at the government station; three others were discovered either before or after their trains had reached the target area. The poisonous vapors were intended for government employees who worked in the Kasumigaseki area. The release was scheduled to affect the peak point of rush hour, just before the start of the 8:30 a.m. workday. Fire fighters were the first emergency crews to arrive on the scene. The fire fighters were not only unauthorized to give antidotes, they were also completely unaware of what substance they were dealing with. While some attempts were made at triaging patients on the scene, those less severely affected hailed passing cars and taxis for transportation to hospitals. The extent of decontamination of the casualties varied from hospital to hospital, and even within a single hospital. Miosis was the most common sign of poisoning. Other signs/symptoms were headache, dyspnea, nausea, vomiting, muscular weakness, cough, rhinorrhea, chest oppression, and fascilations. Many casualties had psychological effects, mostly anxiety. Three reported cases had pulmonary edema and metabolic acisosis, both of which have been reported after insecticide but not nerve agent poisoning. Casualties were treated with atropine and pralidoxime. Initially, some hospital staffs used reversal of miosis as an index of atropine effects, but later changed to other measures. Pralidoxime was given in varied doses. In one hospital the staff initially felt that they were dealing with cyanide poisoning and gave several casualties sodium nitrite and sodium thiosulfate. In another hospital seizures were treated with barbiturates. Most hospitals used diazepam for seizures. Ventilation and airway support were supplied as needed. There was little consistency among the treatment of victims in the various hospitals in Tokyo, yet casualties remained low. As of noon March 21, 5,510 people had reported to medical facilities. Eight people died on the first day; four others died in the following month. Over 4,000 had no signs or symptoms of exposure. While casualties were low, triage time was increased because so many people reported for treatment. Only very small amounts of Sarin are needed to kill. A single milligram of Sarin in contact with the skin is sufficient to cause death. In a vapor form, it takes a concentration of 100 milligrams per cubic meter to be fatal. Sarin is now known as GB. It has several chemical names: 1-Methylethyl methylphosphonate, Isopropylhydrogen methylphosphonate, or Isopropyl methyphosphonate. There are four ingredients in Sarin: phosphorous trichloride, sodium fluoride, isopropyl alcohol Module 11: Terrorism 11-53

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text and acetonitrile. Sarin can only be manufactured in a laboratory, though very sophisticated equipment is not needed. It is extremely dangerous to manufacture and handle. Questions 1. Why do you think the casualty count was so low in this incident? 2. What steps would you recommend to prepare for a similar disaster? 3. Research the ingredients in Sarin using the MSDS on the following pages. What are the greatest hazards of each chemical? Adapted from an article by Alex Neifert for the Camber Corporation 4. Would structural fire fighting clothing have protected responders in this incident? 5. Conduct a a risk/benefit analysis based on available information about this incident. 11-54 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician LETHAL NERVE AGENT (GB) Material Safety Data Sheet SECTION I - GENERAL INFORMATION ------------------------------------------------------------------------ DATE: 14 September 1988 REVISED: 28 February 1996 MANUFACTURER'S ADDRESS: U.S. ARMY CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE COMMAND EDGEWOOD RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT, AND ENGINEERING CENTER (ERDEC) ATTN: SCBRD-ODR-S ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND, MD 20101-5423 Emergency telephone #' s: 0700-1630 EST: 410-671-4411/4414 After: 1630 EST: 410-278-5201, Ask for Staff Duty Officer CAS REGISTRY NUMBERS: 107-44-8, 50642-23-4 CHEMICAL NAME: Isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridate ALTERNATE CHEMICAL NAMES: O-Isopropyl Methylphosphonofluoridate Phosphonofluoridic acid, methyl-, isopropyl ester Phosphonofluoridic acid, methyl-, 1-methylethyl ester TRADE NAME AND SYNONYMS: Isopropyl ester of methylphosphonofluoridic acid Methylisopropoxfluorophosphine oxide Isopropyl Methylfluorophosphonate O-Isopropyl Methylisopropoxfluorophosphine oxide Methylfluorophosphonic acid, isopropyl ester Isopropoxymethylphosphonyl fluoride Isopropyl methylfluorophosphate Isopropoxymethylphosphoryl fluoride GB Sarin Zarin CHEMICAL FAMILY: Fluorinated organophosphorous compound FORMULA/CHEMICAL STRUCTURE: C4H10FO2P O CH 3 CH 3 P O CH F CH 3 Module 11: Terrorism 11-55

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text 4 1 1 0 NFPA 704 HAZARD SIGNAL: Health - 4 Flammability - 1 Reactivity - 1 Special - 0 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ SECTION II - HAZARDOUS INGREDIENTS ------------------------------------------------------------------------ INGREDIENTS NAME FORMULA PERCENTAGE AIRBORNE EXPOSURE LIMIT BY WEIGHT (AEL) GB C4H10FO2P 100 0.0001 mg/m3 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ SECTION III - PHYSICAL DATA ------------------------------------------------------------------------ BOILING POINT: 158 C (316 F) VAPOR PRESSURE (mm Hg): 2.9 @ 25 C VAPOR DENSITY (AIR=1): 4.86 SOLUBILITY: Miscible with water. Soluble in all organic solvents. SPECIFIC GRAVITY (H2O=1): 1.0887 @ 25 C FREEZING/MELTING POINT: -56 C LIQUID DENSITY (g/cc): 1.0887 @ 25 C 1.102 @ 20 C PERCENTAGE VOLATILE BY VOLUME: 22,000 m/m3 @ 25 C 16,090 m/m3 @ 20 C APPEARANCE AND ODOR: Colorless liquid. Odorless in pure form. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ SECTION IV - FIRE AND EXPLOSION DATA ------------------------------------------------------------------------ FLASH POINT (METHOD USED): Did not flash to 280 F FLAMMABLE LIMIT: Not applicable LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT: Not available UPPER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT: Not available EXTINGUISHING MEDIA: Water mist, fog, foam, CO2. Avoid using extinguishing methods that will cause splashing or spreading of the GB. 11-56 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician SPECIAL FIRE FIGHTING PROCEDURES: GB will react with steam or water to produce toxic and corrosive vapors. All persons not engaged in extinguishing the fire should be evacuated. Fires involving GB should be contained to prevent contamination to uncontrolled areas. When responding to a fire alarm in buildings or areas containing agents, firefighting personnel should wear full firefighting protective clothing (without TAP clothing) during chemical agent firefighting and fire rescue operations. Respiratory protection is required. Positive pressure, full face piece, NIOSH-approved self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) will be worn where there is danger of oxygen deficiency and when directed by the fire chief or chemical accident/incident (CAI) operations officer. In cases where firefighters are responding to a chemical accident/incident for rescue/reconnaissance purposes, they will wear appropriate levels of protective clothing (See Section VIII). Do not breathe fumes. Skin contact with nerve agents must be avoided at all times. Although the fire may destroy most of the agent, care must still be taken to assure the agent or contaminated liquids do not further contaminate other areas or sewers. Contact with the agent liquid or vapor can be fatal. UNUSUAL FIRE AND EXPLOSION HAZARDS: Hydrogen may be present. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ SECTION V - HEALTH HAZARD DATA ------------------------------------------------------------------------ AIRBORNE EXPOSURE LIMITS (AEL): The permissible airborne exposure concentration for GB for an 8- hour workday or a 40-hour work week is an 8-hour time weighted average (TWA) of 0.0001 mg/m3. This value is based on the TWA of GB which can be found in "AR 40-8, Occupational Health Guidelines for the Evaluation and Control of Occupational Exposure to Nerve Agents GA, GB, GD, and VX." To date, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has not promulgated a permissible exposure concentration for GB. GB is not listed by the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH), Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), or National Toxicology Program (NTP) as a carcinogen. EFFECTS OF OVEREXPOSURE: GB is a lethal cholinesterase inhibitor. Doses that are potentially life threatening may be only slightly larger than those producing least effects. GB Route Dosage Form Effect Type ocular vapor ECt50 <2 mg-min/m3 inhalation vapor ECt50 <2 mg-min/m3 inhalation (15 1/min) vapor ICt50 35 mg-min/m3 inhalation vapor LCt50 70 mg-min/m3 percutaneous liquid LD50 1700 mg/70 kg man Effective dosages for vapor are estimated for exposure durations of 2-10 minutes. Symptoms of overexposure may occur within minutes or hours, depending upon dose. They include: miosis (constriction of pupils) and visual effects, headaches and pressure sensation, runny nose and nasal congestion, salivation, tightness in the chest, nausea, vomiting, giddiness, anxiety, difficulty in thinking and sleeping, nightmares, muscle twitches, tremors, weakness, abdominal cramps, diarrhea, involuntary urination and defecation. With severe exposure symptoms progress to convulsions and respiratory failure. Module 11: Terrorism 11-57

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text EMERGENCY AND FIRST AID PROCEDURES: INHALATION: Hold breath until respiratory protective mask is donned. If severe signs of agent exposure appear (chest tightens, pupil constriction, incoordination, etc.), immediately administer, in rapid succession, all three Nerve Agent Antidote Kit(s), Mark I injectors (or atropine if directed by physician). Injections using the Mark I kit injectors may be repeated at 5 to 20 minute intervals if signs and symptoms are progressing until three series of injections have been administered. No more injections will be given unless directed by medical personnel. In addition, a record will be maintained of all injections given. If breathing has stopped, give artificial respiration. Mouth-to-mouth resuscitation should be used when approved mask-bag or oxygen delivery systems are not available. Do not use mouth-to-mouth resuscitation when facial contamination exists. If breathing is difficult, administer oxygen. Seek medical attention IMMEDIATELY. EYE CONTACT: Immediately flush eyes with water for at least 15 minutes, then don respiratory protective mask. Although miosis (pinpointing of the pupils) may be an early sign of agent exposure, an injection will not be administered when miosis is the only sign present. Instead, the individual will be taken IMMEDI- ATELY to a medical treatment facility for observation. SKIN CONTACT: Don respiratory protective mask and remove contaminated clothing. Immediately wash contaminated skin with copious amounts of soap and water, 10% sodium carbonate solution, or 5% liquid household bleach. Rinse well with water to remove decontaminant. Administer Nerve Agent Antidote Kit(s), MARK I injectors only if local sweating and muscular twitching symptoms are observed. Seek medical attention IMMEDIATELY. INGESTION: Do not induce vomiting. First symptoms are likely to be gastrointestinal. IMMEDIATELY administer Nerve Agent Antidote Kit(s),MARK I injector(s). Seek medical attention IMMEDIATELY. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ SECTION VI - REACTIVITY DATA ------------------------------------------------------------------------ STABILITY: Stable when pure. INCOMPATIBILITY: Attacks tin, magnesium, cadmium plated steel, and some aluminum. Slightly attacks copper, brass, and lead; practically no attack on 1020 steels, Inconel & K-monel. HAZARDOUS DECOMPOSITION: Hydrolyzes to form HF under acid conditions and isopropyl alcohol & polymers under basic conditions. HAZARDOUS POLYMERIZATION: Does not occur. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ SECTION VII - SPILL, LEAK, AND DISPOSAL PROCEDURES ------------------------------------------------------------------------ STEPS TO BE TAKEN IN CASE MATERIAL IS RELEASED OR SPILLED: If leaks or spills occur, only personnel in full protective clothing will remain in area (See Section VIII ). In case of personnel contamination see Section V for emergency and first aid instructions. RECOMMENDED FIELD PROCEDURES: Spills must be contained by covering with vermiculite, diatomaceous earth, clay, fine sand, sponges, and paper or cloth towels. Decontaminate with copious amounts of aqueous sodium hydroxide solution (a minimum 10 wt. %). Scoop up all material and clothing and place in a DOT approved container. Cover the contents with decontaminating solution as above. After sealing, the exterior of the container will be decontaminated and then labeled according to EPA and DOT regulations. All leaking containers will be over packed with vermiculite placed between the interior and exterior containers. Decontaminate and label according to EPA and DOT regulations. Dispose of the material according to waste disposal methods provided below. Dispose of decontaminate according to Federal, 11-58 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician state and local regulations. Conduct general area monitoring with an approved monitor to confirm that the atmospheric concentrations do not exceed the airborne exposure limits (See Sections II and VIII). If 10 wt.% aqueous sodium hydroxide solution is not available then the following decontaminants may be used instead and are listed in the order of preference: Decontaminating Agent, DS (DS2), Sodium Carbonate, and Supertropical Bleach Slurry (STB). RECOMMENDED LABORATORY PROCEDURES: A minimum of 56 grams of decon solution is required for each gram of GB. Decontaminant and agent solution is allowed to agitate for a minimum of one hour. Agitation is not necessary following the first hour. At the end of the hour, the resulting solution should be adjusted to a ph greater than 11.5. If the ph is below 11.5, NaOH should be added until a ph above 11.5 can be maintained for 60 minutes. An alternate solution for the decontamination of GB is 10 wt.% sodium carbonate in place of the 10% sodium hydroxide solution above. Continue with 56 grams of decon for each gram of agent. Agitate for one hour but allow three hours for the reaction. The final ph should be adjusted to above zero. It is also permitted to substitute 5.25% sodium hypochlorite or 25 wt. % Monoethylamine (MEA) for the 10% sodium hydroxide solution above. MEA must be completely dissolved in water before addition of the agent. Continue with 56 grams of decon for each gram of GB and provide agitation for one hour. Continue with same ratios and time stipulations. Scoop up all material and clothing and place in a DOT approved container. Cover the contents with decontaminating solution as above. After sealing, the exterior of the container will be decontaminated and then labeled according to EPA and DOT regulations. All leaking containers will be over packed with vermiculite placed between the interior and exterior containers. Decontaminate and label according to EPA and DOT regulations. Dispose of according to waste disposal methods provided below. Dispose of decontaminate according to Federal, state and local regulations. Conduct general area monitoring with an approved monitor to confirm that the atmospheric concentrations do not exceed the airborne exposure limits (See Sections II and VIII). WASTE DISPOSAL METHOD: Open pit burning or burying of GB or items containing or contaminated with GB in any quantity is prohibited. The detoxified GB (using procedures above) can be thermally destroyed by incineration in EPA approved incinerators according to appropriate provisions of Federal, state and local Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Regulations. NOTE: Some states define decontaminated surety material as an RCRA Hazardous waste. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ SECTION VIII - SPECIAL PROTECTION INFORMATION ------------------------------------------------------------------------ RESPIRATORY PROTECTION: CONCENTRATION RESPIRATORY PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT < 0.0001 mg/m3 A full facepiece, chemical canister, air purifying protective mask will be on hand for escape. (The M9-, M17-, or M40-series masks are acceptable for this purpose. Other masks certified as equivalent may be used) > 0.0001 or =0.2 mg/m3 A NIOSH/MSHA approved pressure demand full face piece SCBA or supplied air respirators with escape air cylinder may be used. Alternatively, a full face piece, chemical canister air-purifying protective mask is acceptable for this purpose (See DA PAM 385-61 for determination of appropriate level) Module 11: Terrorism 11-59

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text > 0.2 or unknown mg/m3 NIOSH/MSHA approved pressure demand full facepiece SCBA suitable for use in high agent concentrations with protective ensemble (See DA PAM 385-61 for examples) VENTILATION: Local Exhaust: Mandatory. Must be filtered or scrubbed to limit exit concentration to < 0.0001 mg/m3. Air emissions will meet local, state and federal regulations. Special: Chemical laboratory hoods will have an average inward face velocity of 100 linear feet per minute (lfpm) +/- 10% with the velocity at any point not deviating from the average face velocity by more than 20%. Existing laboratory hoods will have an inward face velocity of 150 lfpm +/- 20%. Laboratory hoods will be located such that cross drafts do not exceed 20% of the inward face velocity. A visual performance test using smoke producing devices will be performed in the assessment of the hoods ability to contain agent GB. Other: Recirculation of exhaust air from agent areas is prohibited. No connection is allowed between agent areas and other areas through the ventilation system. Emergency backup power is necessary. Hoods should be tested at least semiannually or after modification or maintenance operations. Operations should be performed 20 centimeters inside hood face. PROTECTIVE GLOVES: Butyl Rubber Glove M3 and M4 Norton, Chemical Protective Glove Set EYE PROTECTION: As a minimum chemical goggles will be worn. For splash hazards use goggles and face shield. OTHER PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT: For general lab work, gloves and lab coat will be worn with mask readily accessible. In addition, daily clean smocks, foot covers, and head covers will be required when handling contaminated lab animals. MONITORING: Available monitoring equipment for agent GB is the M8/M9 Detector paper, detector ticket, blue band tube, M256/M256A1 kits, bubbler, Depot Area Air Monitoring System (DAAMS), Automatic Continuous Air Monitoring System (ACAMS), real time monitoring (RTM), Demilitarization Chemical Agent Concentrator (DCAC), M8/M43, M8A1/M43A2, Hydrogen Flame Photometric Emission Detector (HYFED), CAM-M1, Miniature Chemical Agent Monitor (MINICAM) and the Real Time Analytical Platform (RTAP). Real-time, low-level monitors (with alarm) are required for GB operations. In their absence, an Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH) atmosphere must be presumed. Laboratory operations conducted in appropriately maintained and alarmed engineering controls require only periodic low-level monitoring. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ SECTION IX - SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS ------------------------------------------------------------------------ PRECAUTIONS TO BE TAKEN IN HANDLING AND STORING: When handling agents, the buddy system will be incorporated. No smoking, eating and drinking in areas containing agents are permitted. Containers should be periodically inspected for leaks either visually or by a detector kit). Stringent control over all personnel practices must be exercised Decontamination equipment will be conveniently located. Exits must be designed to permit rapid evacuation. Chemical showers, eyewash stations, and personal cleanliness facilities must be provided. Wash hands before meals and each worker 11-60 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician will shower thoroughly with special attention given to hair, face, neck, and hands, using plenty of soap and water before leaving at the end of the work day. OTHER PRECAUTIONS: GB must be double contained in liquid and vapor tight containers when in storage or outside a ventilation hood. For additional information see "AR 385-61, The Army Toxic Chemical Agent Safety Program," "DA PAM 385-61, Toxic Chemical Agent Safety Standards," and "AR 40-8, Occupational Health Guidelines for the Evaluation and Control of Occupational Exposure to Nerve Agents GA, GB, GD, and VX." ------------------------------------------------------------------------ SECTION X - TRANSPORTATION DATA ------------------------------------------------------------------------ PROPER SHIPPING NAME: Poisonous liquids, n.o.s. DOT HAZARD CLASSIFICATION: 6.1, Packing Group I, Hazard Zone A DOT LABEL: Poison DOT MARKING: Poisonous liquid, n.o.s. (Isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridate) UN2810, Inhalation Hazard DOT PLACARD: Poison EMERGENCY ACCIDENT PRECAUTIONS AND PROCEDURES: See Sections IV, VII and VIII. PRECAUTIONS TO BE TAKEN IN TRANSPORTATION: Motor vehicles will be placarded regardless of quantity. Drivers will be given full information regarding shipment and conditions in case of an emergency. AR 50-6 deals specifically with the shipment of chemical agents. Shipments of agent will be escorted in accordance with AR 740-32. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ While the Edgewood Research Development, and Engineering Center, Department of the Army believes that the data contained herein are factual and the opinions expressed are those of the experts regarding the results of the tests conducted, the data are not to be taken as a warranty or representation for which the Department of the Army or Edgewood Research Development, and Engineering Center assume legal responsibility. They are offered solely for your consideration, investigation, and verification. Any use of this data and information must be determined by the user to be in accordance with applicable Federal, State, and local laws and regulations. Module 11: Terrorism 11-61

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text 11-62 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Canada Case Study Activity 2 One of the men suspected in a plot to bomb the New York City subway system was known to Toronto police. False names used by Gazi Ibrahim Abu Mezer appear in connection with at least five incidents, two of which resulted in charges against him. Police in New York shot and wounded Abu Mezer and Lafi Khalil in a raid of their apartment last Thursday after receiving information they were assembling explosives for a suicide bombing of the city s public transit system. U.S. investigators are attempting to determine if the men, former residents of Palestinian towns in Israel s West Bank, have links to Middle East terrorist organizations. After Metro Toronto Police were contacted by authorities in New York, officers found Mezer using two aliases, with several arrests between February, 1994 and May, 1995. The most serious, for which Mezer was put on probation for one year, occurred in October of 1994 when he tried to sexually assault a stranger in an elevator, said Sergeant Marilyn McCann, a Metro Police spokeswoman. Mezer pleaded guilty to the charge of assault and was convicted in May, 1995. He was also charged with credit card fraud in May, 1994. He was not convicted. Federal officials in the United States believe Mezer may have been involved in smuggling immigrants over the border from Canada into Washington state. In the past year and a half, Mezer was arrested three times by U.S. border authorities after illegally crossing into Washington state from British Columbia. On January 27, he appeared before an immigration judge in Seattle who ordered him deported to Canada. But the Canadian government refused to take him because of his previous attempts to cross the border and his criminal record. The following day, the INS began proceedings to deport Mezer from the United States. On February 6, he had another immigration hearing and the judge reduced the bond to $5,000. The bond was paid by an unknown person and Mezer was released. At another immigration hearing on April 7, Mezer asked for political asylum, saying Israel wrongly considered him a member of Hamas, the Islamic militant organization. He was given a date for an asylum hearing for January, 1998. But at a hearing on June 23, Mezer withdrew his request for asylum and said he would accept deportation voluntarily. A judge gave him until Aug. 23 to leave the United States. Some time after these hearings, Mr Abu Mezer moved to New York City. Adapted from an article by Jill Mahoney for the Globe and Mail. Module 11: Terrorism 11-63

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text Question: Discuss how you find out about suspected terrorists in your area. Do you share information with the police? Do you have access to NCIC (National Crime Information Center)? 11-64 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Fairground Scenario Activity 3 Scenario You are called to public fairgrounds in response to a reported explosion with multiple casualties. The explosive detonated under a performance stage, injuring a number of people on the stage as well as in the audience. Questions 1. What warning signs would you look for when you arrive at the scene? 2. What is the primary type of hazard that has probably already occurred at this incident? 3. What are five possible secondary forms of danger that may be present? 4. What are some methods of self-protection you could use at this incident? Module 11: Terrorism 11-65

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text 11-66 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Phosgene Activity 4 Around noon on a hot day in July your station receives a call to investigate a bomb threat at a nearby chemical plant. This is the third such bomb threat from a survivalist organization that believes commercial industry is secretly plotting with the government to develop chemical weapons to use against U.S. citizens. None of the bomb threats to date has resulted in an explosion. From preplanning, you know that the plant produces a range of pharmaceutical products. Some of the raw materials are extremely hazardous. When you arrive, plant management is in the process of evacuating the plant. As you are talking with the manager and local police about the bomb threat, an explosion occurs. A metal storage building about 500 feet away erupts into flames. Two people run from the burning building. The manager runs the other way, yelling that the building on fire is used to store phosgene. Use the documents on the following pages to answer the questions below. Questions: 1. What are your top three priorities? 2. Is the release likely to be a gas or liquid? What is the most susceptible route of exposure? One of the workers in the vicinity of the building when it exploded seems to be fine, but the other is complaining of watery eyes. Questions: 3. What are the health effects of exposure to phosgene? What symptoms should you look for? 4. How would you decontaminate the victims? Module 11: Terrorism 11-67

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text The fire very quickly burns itself out. The hazardous materials team decides to enter the building to check for damaged containers of phosgene. Questions: 5. Why would such a fire burn itself out quickly? 6. What specific precautions should the entry team take? 7. What level of protective equipment should the entry team wear? 11-68 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Module 11: Terrorism 11-69

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text 11-70 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Module 11: Terrorism 11-71

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text 11-72 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Module 11: Terrorism 11-73

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text 11-74 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Module 11: Terrorism 11-75

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text 11-76 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Scenario Post Office Activity 5 Your department receives an emergency call from your city s U.S. Post Office reporting an explosion. Responders arrive on the scene and find several employees suffering from minor injuries. The employees report that a loud explosion occurred in the parcel package section and scattered small debris. During your initial investigation, the postal supervisor advises you that at least 15 workers were inside the building at the time of the explosion. You discover broken pieces of glass in the area where the blast occurred, as well as a label displaying the symbol shown below: Questions 1. What are your initial primary actions? 2. What are your secondary actions? 3. What actions should you take to protect a potential crime scene? Module 11: Terrorism 11-77

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text 11-78 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Criminal Incident Activity 6 At 0850 today, the local fire department is called out to a house fire at 1234 Beechnut Street. Enroute 9-1-1 dispatch advises EMS has been dispatched due to calls indicating neighbors are attempting to put out the fire with garden hoses and administering first aid to two children. The fire is quickly brought under control while EMS administers first aid to the children, presumably from the house fire. The first entry team performing searches of the house discovers a body in the unburned section of the house with apparent gun shot wounds and a gun near the victim. In another room, three bodies are found, bludgeoned and stabbed. Two more victims, pre-teenage children, are found with stab wounds but stable vital signs. Questions 1. Is this a crime scene? 2. What actions would you expect arriving law enforcement officers to take? 3. What are the operational priorities in this situation? 4. What actions should the Fire Service and EMS take? 5. Now, multiply the scene from a single house to a 20-story building that has just exploded. What is the difference between the two scenarios? What are the similarities? Module 11: Terrorism 11-79

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text 11-80 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Instructions Explosive Feature Activity 7 1. Listen to the scenario described by your instructor. 2. In your groups, view the transparency shown by your instructor to determine where to place various elements of the response, including the command post, triage area, and safe refuge location. Also identify where you would stage incoming units. 3. List three to five scene control considerations appropriate to this scenario. Indicate which of the control measures should be implemented at all incidents, and which are unique to possible terrorist incidents. 4. Record your decisions on a flip chart 5. Have one member of your group present your findings Module 11: Terrorism 11-81

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text 11-82 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Morning Terrorist Scenario Activity 8 The Kelly McBudro-Meister Way, a breakaway sect of the Aryan Nation, claims the right to be the self-appointed guardian of the ultraconservative way of life with extreme bias to Neo-Nazism and the new right world order. A member of this sect was taken into custody late last night by local law enforcement officials on a minor traffic charge. Murphree Lewonski, in Ontario, Ohio and Josef Niel, address unknown, were arrested after police officers noticed what appeared to be materials of a homemade bomb on the rear passenger floor of Lewonski s vehicle. The immediate area was temporarily evacuated while bomb squad technicians checked the vehicle. The materials were found to be inert. Police are seeking a court order to search Lewonski s residence after the two stated, repeatedly, to several witnesses that they were part of something big that is about to happen. Midday Telephone call to Sheriff/Chief of Police from local Police: We have a situation developing. We have found evidence indicating Murphree Lewonski and his partner are part of some splinter group of the Aryan Nation and have one hell of a weapons cache here in their basement. They ve got AR15s, machine guns, grenade launchers, detonation cord, wooden boxes filled with C4, 90mm recoilless rifles, grenades, large sections of black cast iron pipe, a stack of black powder bags, etc. This isn t half of the story. There is some real scary stuff in this house indicating they are experimenting in chemical and poisons. There is a makeshift laboratory and bags of castor beans. Plus, a poisoner s handbook is tabbed at the page for making and dispersing a chemical called Ricin. There are newspaper articles and photographs of various buildings of downtown Mansfield. I think they were planning on doing something in your city. We re not going to go in any further until we get some experts in here. Afternoon News Report: In breaking news, area police, fire and health officials are cooperating with Mansfield officials in what may be a local version of the Tokyo subway attack. Police are confiscating large numbers of weapons, ammunition, and laboratory chemicals from the residence of Murphree Lewonski. The area has been sealed off for some time and health officials are very concerned about what some of these containers may contain. Officials are not making any statements at this time. However, unofficial reports indicate that the chemicals are a derivative from a natural source, the castor bean. You may recall officials in Fairfield County, Ohio had a similar scare when Larry Wayne Harris illegally ordered laboratory samples of the bubonic plague. That case went to court and Mr. Harris was convicted of mail fraud because there was no federal law against having bubonic plague. He received a sentence of 18 months supervised probation and was fined $500.00. Module 11: Terrorism 11-83

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text Exercise Scenario There has been a massive explosion at the County Courthouse. Initial reports, while sketchy and incomplete, have provided the following information: Witnesses report seeing a van parked next to the courthouse. Two men, Caucasians, thin build, wearing dark lightweight jacket and jeans were seen running from the area immediately before the explosion. There are approximately 130 injured, 25 dead, and 10 missing. Several of the cars parked along the street are on fire. The damaged building is being evacuated. Many people are trying to get to their cars to leave the area. An anonymous phone call was made to 9-1-1 claiming responsibility. The caller also claimed that there were radioactive materials in the van, and said additional explosives have been placed throughout the city, and specifically in the water treatment facility. You will have approximately 20 minutes to determine your Operational Priorities. Good luck! 11-84 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Appendix B Agent Classification Table Draeger Tube Selection List Biological Agents and Toxins Module 11: Terrorism 11-85

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text 11-86 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Agent Classification Table Type of agent Classification Sample agent Body Hazard Symptom Effect on Rate of effect duration Symbol/Name in persons persons action Nerve Lethal (Small Non-persistent GA - Taburn Difficult Incapacitates; Very rapid if doses may only GB - Sarin breathing, kills if high inhaled, slow incapacitate) GD - Soman nausea, concentration through skin. vomiting, inhaled Persistent VX convulsions, Incapacitates; Delayed and dim kills if skin through skin, Thickened G vision. not decontam- more rapid inated in time through eyes. Blister Usually not Persistent HD - Mustard Mustard and Blisters skin; Blistering lethal, but may HN - Nitrogen nitrogen is destructive delayed hours be if large doses mustard mustard: to upper to days. Eye injected. L - Lewisite no early respiratory effects more HL - Mustard symptoms. tract; can rapid. lewisite Lewisite and cause Mustard, CX - Phosgene mustard temporary Lewisite and oxime Lewisite: blindness; phosgene PD - Phenyldi- searing of some stinging oxime act chloroarsine eyes and welts on skin. very rapidly stinging of skin. Phosgene oxime: irritation of eyes and nose. Blood Lethal Non-persistent AC - Hydrogen Convulsion Incapacitates; Rapid cyanide and coma kills if high CK - Cyanogen concentration chloride is inhaled SA - Arsine Choking Lethal Non-persistent CG - Phosgene Coughing, Damages and Immediate to DP - Diphosgene choking, floods lungs 3 hours nausea and headache Vomiting Non-lethal -- Non-persistent DA - Diphenyl- Coughing, Irritates and Rapid physical chloroarsine nausea, physically incapacitant DM - Adamsite vomiting, and incapacitiates. headache Tear Non-lethal -- Non-persistent CS (potent form Coughing and Irritates Instantaneous physical of Mace ) copious tears respiratory tract, incapacitant CN - Mace eyes and skin. Stinging Non-lethal -- Non-persistent CR - Tear gas Stinging of skin Irriates eyes, Immediate physical and searing of nose, and throat incapacitant eyes, nose, stings skin; and throat nausea in high does Psycho- Non-lethal -- Non-persistent BZ Unpredictable, Temporarily Delayed chemical mental irrational incapacitates incapacitant behavior mentally and physically. Module 11: Terrorism 11-87

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text 11-88 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician DRAEGER TUBE SELECTION LIST FOR KNOWN WARFARE AGENTS Chemical Warfare Chemical Draeger Agent Group Agent Tube Nerve Agent Sarin (GB) Phosphoric Acid Ester 0.05/a Tabun (GA) " Soman (GD) " DFP " VX " Dichlorvos (DDVP) " Metasystox " Blister Agents S-Mustard (H, HD) Thioether N-Mustard (HN) Organic Basic Nitrogen Compounds Lewisite (L) Organic Arsenic Compounds and Arsine Phenyldicholoroarsine (PD) " Phosgene oxime (CX) Cyanogen Chloride 0.25/a (but used as Yes/No only) Lung Agents Phosgene (CG) Phosgene 0.25/b Diphosgene (DP) None Chlorine Chlorine 0.2/a Chloropicrin (PS) Carbon Tetrachloride 1/a Blood Agents Hydrogen Cyanide (AC) Hydrocyanic Acid 2/a Cyanogen Chloride (CK) Cyanogen Chloride 0.25/a Hydrogen Arsenide Organic Arsenic Compounds and Arsine Arsine (SA) Arsine 0.05/a Nerve/Throat Clark I (DA,DX) Organic Arsenic Compounds and Arsine Irritating Agents Clark II (DC) " Adamiste (DM) " Tear Gases CS, CR None (Tear gases and psycho CN, CH None agents are aerosolized Bromobenzylcyanide (BBC) None mists, not gases, so Capsicum (pepper spray) None cannot be detected by using Draeger tubes) Psycho Agents LSD None Mescalin None BZ None Note: Draeger advises that most of these tubes are special orders and are only available to agencies that can prove the legitimate need for them. Module 11: Terrorism 11-89

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text 11-90 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Agent Anthrax Cholera Plague Tularemia Q Fever Smallpox VEE Ebola Botulinum toxin T-2 Myotoxins Ricin Staphylococcal enterotoxin B Hazard Class 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 Biological Agents and Toxins 1997 Patrick Medici Dissemination Transmissable person to person spores in aerosol ingestion and aerosol aerosol no (except cutaneous) rare high aerosol no ingestion and aerosol aerosol rare high aerosol and infected visors contact and aerosol low moderate ingestion and aerosol no ingestion and aerosol no ingestion and aerosol ingestion and aerosol no no Incubation Period 1-5 days 12 hours to 6 days 1-3 days 1-10 days 14-16 days 10-12 days 1-6 days 4-16 days hours to days 2-4 days hours to days hours Lethality high low with treatment high if untreated moderate if untreated very low low low high to moderate high moderate high <1% Module 11: Terrorism 11-91

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text 11-92 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician AGENT GA GB GD VX TWA 0.0001 0.0001 0.00003 0.00001 IDLH 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.02 V.P. 0.037 mm 2.9 mm 0.4 mm.0007 mm M8/M9 Qualit. Qualit. Qualit. Qualit. DRAEGER.05 ppm (3).05 ppm (3).05 ppm (3).05 ppm (3) ICAM 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.1 MINI CAD yes yes yes M256A1 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.02 M18A2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 FID 0.0001 0.0001 0.00003 0.00001 PID Lamp ev 10.6/11.7 10.6 10.6 10.6 OTHER detection military military military military H, HD HN L 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.072 mm 0.35 mm Qualit. Qualit. Qualit. Qualit. (1) Qualit. (7).1 ppm (2) 0.01 0.01 2 yes 1-3 14 0.1 0.5 10 0.003 0.003 10.6 10.6 10.6 military military military AC CK 5 0.6 50 no stand. 630 mm 1010 mm.25 ppm (4).25 ppm (4) 11 10 8 n/a n/a civilian civilian CG CL 0.4 1.5 12.1 10 1.6 atm 6.8 atm.04 ppm (5).2 ppm (6) 12 11.7 n/a civilian civilian All values are in mg-min/m3 unless otherwise noted. Agents: Nerve: GA = Tabun, GB = Sarin, GD = Soman, VX = V agent Blister: H = Mustard, HD = Distilled Mustard, HN = Nitrogen Mustard, L = Lewisite Blood: AC = Hydrogen Cyanide, CK = Cyanogen Chloride Choking: CG = Phosgene, CL = Chlorine Draeger tube key: (1) - Thioether tube; (2) - Organic arsenic tube; (3) - Phosphoric acid ester tube; (4) - Cyanide tube; (5) - Phosgene tube; (6) - Chlorine tube; (7) - Organic alkaline nitrogen tube References: U.S. Army CBDCOM, Emergency Response to Incidents Involving Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents NIOSH Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards Microsensor Systems, Inc. RAE Systems, Inc. 1997 Patrick Medici Module 11: Terrorism 11-93

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text 11-94 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Appendix C Weapons of Mass Destruction Module 11: Terrorism 11-95

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text 11-96 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Biological Agents General Characteristics: Biological weapons include microorganisms, viruses, infectious substances or toxins previously known to science as well as genetically engineered organisms previously unknown to man. These substances possess the common ability to cause death, disease or other biological malfunction in a human, animal, plant or other living organism or deterioration in material. In principle, biological weaponry possesses the capability to kill or incapacitate on a scale comparable to nuclear weapons. The impact of a biological agent attack depends on the characteristics of the specific agent or toxin used, including whether or not it is transmissible from human to human; the method and efficiency of dispersal; meteorology; population exposed; level of immunity in the population; availability of effective post-exposure and/or therapeutic regimens; and the potential for secondary transmission. A biological WMD attack includes the potential for massive initial undetected population exposure, overwhelming demands on the health care system, and perhaps even massive numbers of deaths before effective preventive public health measures can be implemented. In the worst case scenario, a wellexecuted attack with no warning, those exposed to biological agents may be widely dispersed before the outbreak is recognized. Infectious disease agents may be transmitted secondarily. The potential exists for single or multiple incidents in single or multiple municipalities. Typical Effects: Symptoms that develop after a BW attack may be delayed and nonspecific making the initial diagnosis difficult. Within one to five days most pathogens will produce a unique pattern or illness. While the signs and symptoms may be similar to the clinical symptoms of a natural infection, the onset may be much more rapid. Unless prior warning of an impending attack is obtained, attack recognition may come only after symptoms first appear in the exposed population. Delayed recognition can result in markedly increased morbidity and mortality. Bioterrorism incidents can pose public health threats related to food, water, air, the health care system, mental health, and waste management. Factors Contributing to Vulnerability: Biological agents and toxins may be covertly disseminated as aerosols, dry powers or liquid droplets. Depending on the delivery system and agent used, a biological agent attack could present a hazard to personnel in an area far larger than that directly targeted. Unlike chemical agents, most of which have an immediate effect, most biological agents have a delayed effect ranging from several hours to days, and in some cases weeks. Biological agents are difficult to detect. The detection will most likely occur after the fact, by recognition of the symptoms in the victims, by growing cultures and then identifying them, or by other testing means. Biological agents may be obtained from nature, are relatively cheap and relatively easy to manufacture or are readily available. The use of even small quantities can have a tremendous effect. They can be used covertly with little signature, and are not readily detectable. They can be spread over large areas by natural convection or air-currents. Their psychological impact will extend far beyond their actual effect. Their use can result in contamination of air, water supply, land and animal life. Areas may become uninhabitable for humans and animals. Module 11: Terrorism 11-97

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text Nuclear / Radiological Agents General Characteristics: Nuclear / Radiological WMD can be divided into fission/fusion weapons, enhanced radiation weapons, and radiological dispersal devices. An Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) contains nuclear material and is designed to create a nuclear yield upon detonation. A radiological dispersal Device (RDD) is any explosive device that is intended to spread radioactive material upon detonation. An IND can also be an RDD if the required explosion does cause a nuclear yield, but "fizzles," spreading radioactive materials. A simple radiological dispersal (SRD) is any act that is intended to spread radioactive material, but does not involve an explosive device. The detonation of a fission/fusion WNM causes significant blast and thermal effects as well as initial and residual (fallout) radiation. An enhanced radiation weapon (neutron bomb) is a small-yield fusion weapon modified to permit the escape of high-energy fusion neutrons at the time of detonation. Compared to a standard fission/fusion weapon, an enhanced radiation weapon produces proportionately more biologically damaging initial radiation but less material damage due to blast and thermal effects, and less radioactive fallout. The use of nuclear material creates an incident in which the device's initial effects are accompanied by continued exposure and harm to responders and others. The potential exists for single or multiple incidents in single or multiple municipalities. Typical Effects: The physiological effects of nuclear / radiological WMD may result from direct physical effects from the blast; the thermal radiation; the ionizing radiation (initial or residual); or a combination of these. A nuclear detonation will produce large numbers of blast, thermal, and projectile injuries. The degree of tissue damage from ionizing radiation is proportional to the total amount of radioactive particles absorbed and the biological makeup of the tissue. In general, the higher the dose, the more severe the early effects will be and the greater the possibility of delayed effects. Contamination itself is not an acute threat to life and its presence should not preclude the delivery of care. When body cells, tissues, and target organs such as the liver, thyroid, bone, or kidney take up radioactive material, the ill effects may be delayed for years. A nuclear explosion will result in great physical damage and catastrophic casualties, and the aftermath will impose significant delays on effective response. Factors Contributing To Vulnerability: Radiation is an invisible hazard. These materials can be employed covertly with little signature, and are not readily detectable. Unless the responding agency has radiological detection equipment, or the incident has an obvious signature (explosion) there is a strong chance that the initial identification of a radiological or nuclear hazard will go undetected. The psychological impact of a nuclear / radiological incident will be extensive. Their effects can be spread over large areas, and can result in contamination of air, water supply, land and plant and animal life. Areas may become uninhabitable for humans and animals. 11-98 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Conventional Improvised Incendiary / Explosive Devices General Characteristics: Improvised explosive devices are categorized as being explosive or incendiary, employing high or low filler explosive materials to explode and/or cause fires. Bombs and firebombs are cheap, easily constructed, involve low technology, and are the terrorist weapon most likely to be encountered. Large, powerful devices can be outfitted with timed or remotely triggered detonators and can be designed to be activated by light, pressure, movement, or radio transmission. The potential exists for single or multiple bombing incidents in single or multiple municipalities. Typical Effects: Improvised explosive devices can inflict substantial casualties, physical destruction, fires, and structural instability. Blast injuries can be categorized as direct or indirect. Direct blast injuries result from trauma caused by the immediate explosion. Indirect blast injuries include fragmentation impalement, displacement of the entire body, and burns. Factors Contributing To Vulnerability: Historically, less than 5% of actual or attempted bombings were preceded by a threat. Explosive materials can be employed covertly with little signature, and are not readily detectable. Secondary devices may be targeted against responders. The psychological impact of an improvised explosive device incident can be extensive. Module 11: Terrorism 11-99

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text Chemical Agents General Characteristics: Chemical agents are compounds that, through their chemical properties, produce lethal or damaging effects on humans. The onset of medical symptoms is measured in minutes to hours instead of days. Chemical agents can be nonpersistent or persistent. Persistency is an expression of the agent's duration of effectiveness. Chemical agents include nerve, choking, blood, blister, incapacitating, vomiting, or irritating agents, and may include toxic industrial chemicals. The effectiveness of chemical weapons relies on effective delivery and dissemination, the size of the target area, and the ability to control the environmental conditions. Chemical agents are generally liquid when containerized; some boil at low temperatures and become gases. They are normally disseminated as aerosols or gases, and thus will dissipate with time. Chemical agents are influenced by weather conditions (temperature, wind speed, wind direction, humidity and air stability). When there is a release, the agent cloud will vary in concentration. As a result, not all individuals within the cloud will be subject to the same concentration, and therefore will not be subject to the same dose, thus symptoms will vary. The potential exists for single or multiple incidents in single or multiple municipalities. Typical Effects: High toxicity chemical weapons will generally affect individuals still in the immediate area of exposure. Nerve agents (anticholinesterase) can cause sudden loss of consciousness, seizures, apnea, and death. Blister agents (vesicants) produce pain and injury to the eyes, reddening and blistering of the skin, and when inhaled, damage to the mucous membranes and respiratory tract. Some blister agents have a delayed action. Choking agents (lung-damaging agents) cause severe life-threatening lung injury after inhalation. These effects are generally delayed several hours after exposure. These agents produce injury to the lungs and irritation of the eyes and the respiratory tract. "Blood agents" (cyanogens) are transported by the blood to all body tissues where the agent blocks the oxidative processes, preventing tissue cells from utilizing oxygen. The central nervous system is especially affected and leads to cessation of respiration followed by cardiovascular collapse. The use of chemical WMD can result in the sudden onset of mass casualties in sufficient numbers to overwhelm medical systems. These incidents can also pose public health threats related to food, water, air, the health care system, mental health, and waste management. Factors Contributing to Vulnerability: A deliberate release can quickly inflict maximum casualties and damage. Many people may be killed or injured and require immediate medical treatment. Small quantities of chemical agents are relatively cheap, relatively easy to manufacture or are readily available. The use of even small quantities can have a tremendous effect. They can be used covertly with little signature, and are not readily detectable. They can be spread over large areas by natural convection or aircurrents. They require decontamination. Their psychological impact will extend far beyond their actual effect. Their use can result in contamination of air, water supply, land and animal life. Areas may become uninhabitable for humans and animals. 11-100 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Multiple /Combined Weapons of Mass Destruction WMD agents can be combined to achieve a synergistic effect greater in total effect than the sum of their individual effects. They may be combined to achieve both immediate and delayed consequences. Mixed infections or intoxications may occur, thereby complicating or delaying diagnosis. Casualties of multiple agents may exist; casualties may also suffer from multiple effects, such as trauma and burns from an explosion, which exacerbate the likelihood of agent contamination. Attacks may be planned and executed so as to take advantage of the reduced effectiveness of protective measures produced by employment of an initial WMD agent. Finally, the potential exists for multiple incidents in single or multiple municipalities. Characteristics Nuclear Chemical Biological Area affected Large Relatively small Can be very large Detectability Unmistakable Difficult Very difficult Time to detect Near real time Seconds Tens of minutes and identify Medical treatment Very limited Limited Can be very effective Module 11: Terrorism 11-101

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text 11-102 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Appendix D Federal Resources Module 11: Terrorism 11-103

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text 11-104 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Federal Resources and Capabilities for Weapons of Mass Destruction Incidents Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Department of Defense (DOD) Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Department of Energy (DOE) Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) Federal Bureau of Investigation The FBI is the lead federal agency for crisis management of a response to domestic terrorist incidents. The FBI assumes the central investigative and/or crisis management role, in association with local and state law enforcement authorities, to resolve the incident. Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG) - These teams are specially assembled to conduct tactical and crisis management efforts. Evidence Response Teams (ERT) - The ERT s main functions are crime scene documentation and evidence collection in support of criminal investigations. Hazardous Material Response Unit (HMRU) - The HMRU has specialized sampling, detection and identification capabilities of NBC agents. It is also equipped with a variety of personal protective (OSHA Level A - C) and rescue equipment. Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) - The HRT is a specialized tactical team of the FBI established to conduct successful rescue operations of U.S. persons and others that may be held illegally by a hostile force, either terrorist or criminal in nature. Although oriented principally towards a counterterrorism mission, the team has evolved into a flexible emergency response component of the FBI able to deploy to any location, including a contaminated environment, and perform other law enforcement activities as authorized by the FBI Director. Intelligence Collection and Analysis - The FBI has expertise that contributes to and coordinates detailed interagency threat assessment activities. Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) - In most major metropolitan areas, the FBI maintains a multi-agency task force that is comprised of local, state, and federal law enforcement representatives dedicated to investigating acts of terrorism. Module 11: Terrorism 11-105

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text Rapid Start Team (RST) - The RST provides on-site information management services in support of crisis situations, special events, and major case investigations to local, state and federal law enforcement for the law enforcement agencies. These services include lead and information tracking, full-text retrieval, and access to the public source databases. Federal Emergency Management Agency FEMA is the lead federal agency for the coordination of consequence management. FEMA directs and coordinates any federal consequence management response in accordance with its statutory authorities to ensure appropriate coordination of federal response activities in support of state and local authorities. State and local governments take the lead for consequence management, and FEMA's responsibilities involve supporting state and local governments in dealing with the consequences of a terrorism incident. Urban Search and Rescue Team (USRT) - The USRTs save lives and protect property from both natural and manmade catastrophic urban disasters. Rapid Response Information System (RRIS) - The RRIS is a data base containing information on federal NBC response capabilities, NBC agents and munitions characteristics, and safety precautions. Department of Health and Human Services DHHS is the primary agency under the Federal Response Plan for the provision of health, medical, and health-related social services. DHHS provides technical personnel and supporting equipment to the LFA during all aspects of a terrorist incident. HES assistance could support threat assessment, DEST deployment, epidemiological investigation, pharmaceutical support operations, LFA advisory requirements, technical advice and operational (public health) medical and mental health services support. Technical assistance and advice includes identification of contaminants, sample collection and analysis, on-site safety and protection activities, medical management plans, and the provision of health and medical care and mass fatality management. 11-106 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Agency for Toxic Substance and Disease Registry (ATSDR) - The ATSDR provides consultation and advice on issues relating to the release or threatened release of hazardous substances. ATSDR is directed by congressional mandate to perform specific functions concerning the effect on public health of hazardous substances in the environment. These functions include public health assessments of waste sites, health consultations concerning specific hazardous substances, health surveillance and registries, response to emergency releases of hazardous substances, applied research in support of public health assessments, information development and dissemination, and education and training concerning hazardous substances. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) - CDC capabilities include epidemiological surveillance, statistical and epidemiologic consultation, biological agent identification, and public health consultation and response. Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) - The MMRS is an integrated system of resources and expertise centered on augmenting the local response to a terrorist threat or incident. Metropolitan Medical Strike Teams (MMSTs), a component of the MMRS, are specialized response teams at the city level which respond to, provide support for, and provide assistance to local and regional jurisdictions to effectively address responder safety issues, incident management, and public health consequences of terrorist incidents. Through the MMRS, these teams provide specialized medical skills, pharmaceuticals, and equipment that can assist in identifying a WMD agent, and in conducting victim decontamination, medical triage, and appropriate therapy prior to transportation to emergency and definitive medical care facilities. National Institute of Health (NIH) - NIH capabilities and resources include expertise in the causes, diagnosis, prevention, and cure of human diseases and the biological effects of environmental contaminants. NIH laboratories are located on the NIH campus in Bethesda, MD and in several field units across the country and abroad. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SMHSA) - SMHSA, through the center for Mental Health Services, offers mental health support consultation to federal and state agencies and crisis counseling to victims of large-scale disasters. Environmental Protection Agency EPA provides technical personnel and supporting equipment to the LFA during all aspects of a WMD terrorist incident. EPA assistance could support threat assessment, DEST deployment, LFA advisory requirements, technical advice and operational support. EPA assistance and advice includes threat assessment, consultation, agent identification, hazard detection and reduction, environmental monitoring; sample and forensic evidence collection/analysis; assessment and cleanup; identification of contaminants; and on-site safety, protection, prevention, and decontamination activities. Module 11: Terrorism 11-107

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text Environmental Radiation Ambient Monitoring System (ERAMS) - In a radiological emergency, the ERAMS may be able to provide information on the spread of contamination. Environmental Response Team (ERT) - The ERT has portable chemical agent instrumentation capable of detection and identification in the low and subparts per million. The team can also measure alpha, beta, or gamma radiation. Radiation Environmental Laboratories - The EPA has two state-of-the-art radiological laboratories. By characterizing radiation sources, they can decide how best to protect public health. EPA Research Laboratories - The EPA's 12 research laboratories offer programs in field monitoring, analytical support, and technical support for quality assurance programs related to air, water, wastewater, and solid waste. Five of these laboratories are capable of deploying mobile units to a contaminated site for chemical and biological analysis. Radiological Emergency Response Team (RERT) - The RERT capabilities are radiation monitoring, radionuclide analysis, radiation health physics and risk assessment. Outside Contractor Support - Contractor support for toxic material cleanup and disposal. Department of Energy DOE provides scientific-technicai personnel and equipment in support of the LFA during all aspects of a nuclear/radiological WMD terrorist incident. DOE assistance can support both crisis and consequence management activities such as threat assessment, DEST deployment, LFA advisory requirements, technical advice, forecasted modeling predictions, and operational support to include direct support of tactical operations. Accident Response Group (ARG) - The ARG is the technical response group for U.S. nuclear weapons accidents. The team provides equipment and technical assistance for weapon damage, risk assessment, safe recovery, packaging, transportation, and disposal of damaged weapons. Aerial Measuring System (AMS) - The AMS provides helicopters and fixed wing aircraft to respond to radiological emergencies. Its capabilities include aerial radiation surveys and search (gamma spectroscopy), real-time radiological aerial sampling, aerial photography survey, and aerial multispectra scanning surveys. Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC) - The ARAC provides real-time computer predictions of atmospheric transport radioactivity from a nuclear accident or incident. 11-108 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) - The FRMAC coordinates federal off-site radiological monitoring and assessment activities for a nuclear accident or incident. Joint Technical Operations Team (JTOT) - The JTOT is a formal crisis response program within DOE (DP-23) that is separate and distinct from NEST and ARG. JTOT consists of three phases: Phase I - crisis operations in a tactical environment, Phase II - crisis operations in a nontactical environment, and Phase III - non-crisis operations. The team is a multiagency team with capabilities to perform diagnostics, render safe procedures, weapons analysis, and device modeling and effects prediction. Lincoln Gold Augmentation Team (LGAT) - The LGAT provides expert technical advice and home team support to deployed military explosive ordnance disposal operators. The LGAT also provides technical training and custom equipment in support of counterterrorism missions. Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) - The NEST provides technical response to resolve incidents involving improvised nuclear and radiological dispersal devices. The team is able to search, locate, and identify devices or material; move, render safe, or disable devices; and mitigate damage from device detonation or disablement action. The Search Response Team (SRT) and Search Augmentation Team (SAT) are smaller, more rapidly deployable elements of the larger NEST to provide a timelier search capability. Nuclear/Radiological Advisory Team (NRAT) - The NRAT provides technical advice, emergency response, and follow-on expertise to all radiological or nuclear emergencies. Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) - The RAP provides the initial DOE radiological emergency response. The RAP provides assistance in identifying the presence of radioactive contamination on personnel, equipment, and property at the accident or incident scene. RAP also provides advice on personnel monitoring, decontamination, and material recovery. Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS) - The REAC/TS provides deployable, 24-hour medical consultation on health problems associated with radiation accidents. It also provides training programs for and emergency response teams comprised of health professionals. Department of Defense DoD provides military assistance to the LFA and/or Federal Response Plan Emergency Support Function primary agencies during all aspects of a terrorist incident upon approval by the Secretary of Defense. DoD assistance could support threat assessment, DEST deployment, technical advice, operational support, tactical operations, support for civil disturbances, and custody, transportation and disposal of a WMD device. Module 11: Terrorism 11-109

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text Response Task Force (RTF) - A joint task force with the mission of providing overall DoD support to civil authorities conducting WMD crisis or consequence management operations. For chemical and biological incidents, the major elements of the RTF are the Chemical-Biological Rapid Response Team (C/B-RRT) and the U.S. Marine Corps Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF). U.S. Marine Corps Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) - The CBIRF is a standing consequence management force tailored to furnish a highly trained, short notice response to terrorist-initiated chemical and/or biological incidents. Its mission is two-fold: Strategic: Consequence Management and Force Protection; and Operational: Turn victims into patients. CBIRF is a self-sustaining unit comprised of about 375 marines and sailors. CBIRF is capable of identification/downwind hazard prediction; advanced life saving support/casualty reconnaissance; extraction, incident site management/security; triage/ decontamination; medical stabilization; and evacuation of patients. The unit is supported by a panel of scientific and medical consultants available on-site or via satellite teleconferencing. Chemical Biological Rapid Response Team (C/B-RRT) - The U.S. Army Chemical Biological Defense Command (CBDCOM) has overall responsibility for command and control of the C/B RRT, and provides its core elements. Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) - USAMRIID provides technical expertise in the biology pathogenesis, diagnosis, identification and decontamination of the full range of biological threat agents (bacteria, viruses and toxins). Medical doctors and scientists from USAMRED may deploy as part of a Medical Chemical/Biological Advisory Team (MCBAT), a 3-4 person team that also includes chemical experts from USAMRICD. USAMRHD capabilities include evaluation of biological threat agents, their delivery methods, aerosol routes of administration, and medical impacts; technical expertise in personnel protection, including vaccines for selected biological threats, and in personnel and facilities decontamination; definitive identification of biological agents in medical or environmental samples; on-site training and assistance to local responders and medical personnel in the medical management of biological casualties; and advising local healthcare personnel or TEU on collection of specimens for laboratory verification of biological agent exposure. Another capability of USAMRIID is to provide the Aeromedical Isolation Team (AIT), for transportation of a limited number of individuals infected by or exposed to highly contagious or dangerous diseases, to their containment care research and clinical laboratory facility at Fort Detrick, MD. The facility is one of only two in the U.S. with biosafety level 4 (maximum containment) capability. U.S. Army Technical Escort Unit (TEU) - The TEU's mission is to provide worldwide, nonotice capability to conduct field sampling, monitoring, recovery, decontamination, transportation, exploitation, verification, and mitigation of hazards associated with weaponized and nonweaponized chemical and biological materials, and conduct operations in compliance with federal, state, and local laws. TEU is available to respond from one of three locations (Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD; Dugway Proving Ground, UT; Pine Bluff Arsenal, AR). 11-110 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Edgewood Research, Development and Engineering Center (ERDEQ), Chemical Support Division (CSD) - The CSD provides low-level monitoring using the Real Time Analytical Platform (RTAP), a vehicle containing a fully functional chemical analysis system. In its current configuration, the RTAP can automatically sample ambient air to detect the presence of specific chemical warfare agents (nerve and mustard). Army Medical Research Institute for Chemical Defense (USAMRICD) - USAMRICD provides the C/B-RRT with medical and scientific expertise in chemical matters. Medical doctors and scientists from USAMRICD will deploy as part of a MCBAT, together with biological experts from USAMRHD. USAMRICD capabilities include consultation to the incident commander on the medical effects of chemical agents, and medical management of chemical casualties; on-site training of local responders and medical personnel in the management of chemical casualties; and collection of specimens for laboratory verification of chemical agent exposure. Army Material Command (AMC) Treaty Laboratory - The AMC Treaty Laboratory provides an on-site analytical laboratory capability. The lab is capable of analyzing chemical surety materials, foreign chemical warfare agents, and all precursors and degradation by-products. An on-site analytical laboratory capability is provided through the use of modular transportable lab equipment, manned by chemists and chemical samplers. Additionally, an analytical spectra database is maintained, which provides the capability for analyzing other hazardous industrial chemicals. U.S. Army Medical Command (MEDCOM) - The MEDCOM provides support to the C/B RRT in the form of Medical, Chemical, and Biological Advisory Teams (MCBAT). U.S. Army 52d Ordnance Group (EOD) - Available to provide technical expertise in dealing with the explosive component of a WMD device. As required, assets of the 52d may be requested to provide access, augment the organic EOD capabilities of TEU, or to assist in dealing with unknown or specialized devices. U.S. Naval Medical Research Institute (NMRI) - The NMRI is primarily a research facility. Its Biological Defense Research Program (BDRP) has developed the ability to transport a biological field laboratory, expressly used in the identification of biological warfare agents. NMRI provides a transportable biological field lab, capable of rapid identification of biological agents using various methods including hand held chromatographic assays, biosensor-i inked polymerase chain reaction, and enzyme-linked immunosorbent assays. Navy Environmental and Preventative Medicine Units (NEPMU) - The NEPMU provides Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Environmental Defense Response Teams (CBRED) to advise the C/B-RRT medical assets. The NEPMUs are capable of providing doctors, industrial hygienists, environmental health officers, microbiologists, entomologists, epidemiologists and preventive medical technicians. NEPMU's deployable teams are called Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Environmental Defense Response Teams (CBRED), and are task organized for each incident. CBRED teams are on alert for rapid response and available to advise the C/B- RRT and local public health authorities, and augment other C/B-RRT medical assets. Module 11: Terrorism 11-111

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text U.S. Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) - The NRL is capable of providing uniformed microbiologists specifically trained in the use of the NMRI laboratory equipment and tests, in order to augment the NMRI field lab as required. All NRL microbiologists are trained in chemical and biological threat agents. 11-112 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Appendix E NBC Indicator Matrix Module 11: Terrorism 11-113

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text 11-114 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Instructions for Using NBC Indicator Matrix The NBC Indicator Matrix process is an assessment of general indicators that may be present at a Nuclear, Biological, or Chemical Incident. Developed for use as part of the Defense Protective Service (DPS) NBC Response Plan, the use of this matrix should not be considered as an authoritative determination of the type of NBC Incident that is occurring, but is rather a general guide for First Responding personnel (police, fire, or medical) until a more technical assessment can be made. The matrix itself is a combination of symptoms, observations, and other indicators (listed in the order that such indicators are most likely to be noticed) that may be present for each of the agents/materials listed at the top. Primarily designed for use in Communications Centers (911, dispatch centers, etc.) or Emergency Operations Centers (fixed or mobile) to record indications in which the indicator would be noticed by first responding personnel to the scene of a potential NBC emergency. However, should these operations centers also be affected by the emergency it is possible for field units to use the matrix as well. The intended result is to give some indication of what type of NBC materials may be involved in the emergency to the initial responding units until such time as an expert determination can be made. How To Use (The following steps assume responding units are reporting information to their Dispatchers) 1. Units arrive at scene where even at a distance it is apparent that multiple persons are affected. 2. Units should STOP, LOOK, and LISTEN and relay observations to their dispatchers (See note on Radio Transmit Code). 3. Dispatcher personnel will record each of the relayed observations on the matrix by placing a check mark in the Indicator Present column for each indicator so observed. 4. For every row in which the Indicator Present column is checked, the dispatcher will place another check mark in all unshaded boxes ( including those with words inside the box) on that row. (Note: Boxes with words are designed to help classify the indicator; for example, vomiting is listed for all NBC materials, but bloody vomiting is a sign of blister agent use.) 5. At the bottom of each page the total number of check marks for each column should be added and recorded as page totals transferred to Page 3 of the matrix. Total up all the page totals listed on Page 3, and the column with the highest number of indicators should be considered that agent/material most likely present. Module 11: Terrorism 11-115

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text RADIO TRANSMIT CODE NOTE: For those agencies requiring a means to transmit information over a radio or by unsecured phone line using a code, a column marked Radio Transmit Code lists a numeric code for each indicator(i.e. 1-1 for Prostration) listed on the matrix. In addition, each of the types of NBC materials has an alphabetic letter designation. The use of these matrix codes would require that both the sending unit and the receiving station have the NBC Indicator Matrix available. Examples of possible uses are as follows: 1. NBC Matrix 1-1 and 2-2 would indicate that prostration and painless blisters were observed. 2. NBC Matrix 1-9 and 5-7 Bravo would indicate vomiting and bloody diarrhea indicators were observed. 3. NBC Matrix Total Indicators Present is 12 with A (Alpha)=6, B(Bravo)=4, and (George)= 3 would indicate that a total of 12 indicators were listed on page 3 with 6 indicators for nerve agents, 4 indicators for blister agent, and 3 indicators for biological agents. This example could be used to transmit indicator totals to another agency using the matrix (such as the USPHS). The rules for using transmit codes or to transmit in the clear is left up to the agency using the matrix. Special Thanks to the Marietta Fire and Emergency Services and the Georgia Mutual Aid Group (GMAG) for the suggested format change that resulted in a 3 page matrix from earlier editions of 10-90 Gold. 11-116 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Module 11: Terrorism 11-117

IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Student Text 11-118 Module 11: Terrorism

Student Text IAFF Training for Hazardous Materials: Technician Module 11: Terrorism 11-119