Interaction Research Institute, Inc.

Interaction Research Institute, Inc. Technical Report 0615 June 2009 U.S. Marine Corps Advisor Training Impact System (MATIS) DEBRIEFS November 2008 - May 2009 Prepared for: I Marine Expeditionary Force Advisor Training Group Camp Pendleton, CA 4428 Rockcrest Drive Fairfax, VA 22032-1820 (703) 978-0313 1-800-STATMAN Fax: (703) 978-1776 iriinc@aol.com www.irism.com

Interaction Research Institute, Inc. 4428 Rockcrest Drive, Fairfax, Virginia 22032 iriinc@aol.com www.irism.com 703.978.0313 1.800.782.8626 USMC Advisor Training Impact System Survey: www.irism.com/usmc USMC COVAN (Vietnam) Survey: www.irism.com/covan USMC Advisor Publications: www.irism.com/pubs Point of Contact: Thomas D. Affourtit, Ph.D. Lieutenant Colonel, USMC (Ret) iriinc@aol.com www.irism.com (703) 978-0313 1.800.STATMAN

Forward The Marine Advisor Training Impact System (MATIS) was developed to provide an efficient method to track advisor effectiveness in terms of impact in theater. The system focuses on specific competencies as measured by results and outcomes during deployment, and by host country readiness to assume security operations. The system is designed to assure timely and concise mission relevant feedback that can be linked to training effectiveness and mission accomplishment. Dynamic reports of progress provide actionable findings and training recommendations during and after deployment. Implementation requires less than 30 minutes to complete data collection, and the dynamic system can produce instant feedback on request. The MATIS measures advisor readiness to accomplish mission requirements. The program is designed to provide direct feedback to practitioners; those who implement the training and preparation process. The MATIS is administered on a voluntary and anonymous basis. Results can be quickly analyzed to assess training readiness and mission accomplishment by team type, area of operation, billet, deployment period, rank, MOS, time with counterpart, and other relevant criteria. The MATIS is augmented with a series of direct narrations of debriefs that further qualify responses to the survey, and lend interpretive evidence to support conclusions and recommendations. In summary, the MATIS is a systematic approach to advisor preparedness that provides detailed information on training effectiveness and impact in theater for the planning and execution of all phases of the training cycle. i

CONTENTS Page Forward... i Military Transition Team Debriefs Bn MTT (19 Nov 08) Hit... 1 Bn MTT (19 Nov 08) Hadithah... 4 Bn to Super MTT (19 Feb 09) Al Qaim... 7 Bn to Super MTT (19 Feb 09) Al Qaim... 12 Overwatch MTT (12 May 09) 26 th Bde... 16 Police Transition Team Debriefs District PTT (19 Feb 09) Rutbah... 23 PTT (19 Feb 09) Baghdadi... 27 PTT (19 Feb 09) Hadithah... 32 District PTT (19 Feb 09) Rawah... 37 District PTT (30 Mar 09) Fallujah... 46 District PTT (30 Mar 09) Fallujah... 49 District/Station PTT (6 Apr 09) Fallujah... 53 PTT (6 Apr 09) Waleed... 59 PTT (6 Apr 09) Waleed... 64 Border Transition Team Debriefs Regional BTT (28 Jan 09) Ramadi... 67 Regional BTT (28 Jan 09) Ramadi... 71 Bde BTT (28 Jan 09) Waleed... 73 BTT (29 Jan 09) Waleed... 75 BTT (30 Jan 09) Ar Ar... 78 BTT (25 Feb 09) Waleed (remissioned MTT)... 80 BTT (11 Mar 09) Trebil... 86 BTT (11 Mar 09) Border Fort 9... 90 BTT (11 Mar 09) Husaybah... 95 Port of Entry Transition Team Debriefs POETT (11 Mar 09) Husaybah... 99 POETT (11 Mar 09) Trebil... 104

Military Transition Teams

I MEF MATIS Debriefs 19 Nov 08 Deployment : Apr Nov 08 Location : Hit Team : Bn MTT Ranks : LtCol, Maj, Capt (2), Lt Training : I MEF, 29 Palms Background: 1. Second deployment as a MTT. 1 st MTT, Dec 2006 to July 2007. 2. We focused on survival during the first deployment; constant attacks, experienced casualties. During the 2nd deployment, almost no fighting. For the 2 nd round, we created our own training, since most of the members served on the first team. 3. There were 16 members on the team; six officers. What went well: The Iraqis came up with effective solutions that Americans would never come up with. The refrigerators used to store meat broke down, and would take a long time to fix. The Iraqis decided to buy a herd of sheep instead. They did not need a refrigerator. What did not go well: 1. The Iraqis were partnered with an adjacent USMC unit. The IA had different perspectives on the job and time frame. They dragged their feet on an operation. They felt that the Intel was not good, and they had a fuel shortage. They delayed for four months, then executed half-heartedly. Success is measured in operations executed vs. operations successfully completed. 2. During the operation above, they stole two cars from a woman, and left her with no transportation. It was reported to higher HQ, but nothing ever came of it. Beneficial Training: 1. We had a free hand with our training, since all the key members had been through training before. The team set up our own training. We thought we knew what to train towards. However, we focused a bit too much on kinetic training. There were only a few kinetic situations during our second MTT tour. 2. Comm: everyone needs to know how to use all the radios. 3. During 2006, 29 Palms was, "do your own thing," no SCETC. This was good prep because in theater you need to do everything on your own. We developed good team dynamics and bonding. We skirted the rules and took all members to the "O" club. One severely wounded member from the first tour recalled the prep experience as most memorable when visited in the 1

I MEF MATIS Debriefs 19 Nov 08 hospital by other team members. Least Beneficial Training: 1. Incredible repetitiveness Pendleton, 29 Palms, Taji, MEF HQ. All start with basic introductory language not progressive. 2. Vast disparity in quality of U.S. contractors. Some had no clue what they were talking about. Additional Training Needed: Need to push more on relying on ourselves to train ourselves. Major barriers: 1. Team dynamics was a major barrier we witnessed in other teams. Our strategy: everybody does everything; lift sandbags, COC watch, driver, gunner, lead patrols. This creates a share mentality and helps with rotations. Members are less likely to complain about dirt work if everyone participates. 2. Command support structure and reporting chain of command. It was sometimes hard to get support. 3. The infantry regiment treated us like all MTTs work for them. Perception: MTTs are the Iraqis the infantry regiment would not pass along info to us. Characteristics about counterparts liked most: Friendly and open people. Whatever they had they would share. Characteristics about counterparts liked least: 1. Neediness, they are always seeking to get something. 2. Shifting view of the truth. Inability to tell the truth for face-saving. Example: they would say they would leave at 0500, but did not leave until 0700, Marines got ready at 0500. Other comments & recommendations: 1. The Iraqis wanted to talk about religion and were interested in our election. The "experts" over here said that would be offensive. 2. Do not think the overwatch concept will work. It will be like another inspection team, and will miss part of the iceberg. Most of the work is accomplished after 9 PM over Chai. 2

I MEF MATIS Debriefs 19 Nov 08 3. The number of people and rank levels on transition teams has been reduced, to the detriment of the mission. First vs. Second tour: 1. During the first tour, the IA was willing to fight. The IA was not as willing to conduct combat operations during the second tour. We would go back again under the first tour conditions, not the second tour conditions. 2. The Iraqi 2 nd Bn Commander was more concerned about image than operations. 3

I MEF MATIS Debriefs 19 Nov 08 Deployment : May 08 Nov 08 Location : Hadithah Team : Bn MTT Ranks : Maj, 1stLt, 2ndLt Training : I MEF, 29 Palms Background: 1. Conducted Nation Building in Hadithah. Assisted in building road from Hadithah to Ta min. 2. 7 th MTT, not replaced. Instead, an over-watch team replaced three MTTs. Realizing this, there was less and less interaction as time progressed. What went well: 1. Immediate and complete involvement with Iraqi counterparts. We were the 7 th team. The IA counterparts knew not to ask for supplies. 2. S-4 Advisor: The Bn was pretty squared away. What did not go well: 1. Things were held up in the hierarchy beyond battalion, especially supplies. 2. The S-2 replaced an inexperienced S-2. Therefore, we stepped into a tepid environment. We tried to start a working relationship versus supply ("give me") relationship. 3. The IA Bn was given old American Humvees. The MEF wanted them picked up, and gave the IA the date to be ready. The actual pick-up date was one month late. The Iraqis kept resetting the date and lost credibility. When the date came, two vehicles were missing. The Iraqis had put them back into service. 4. The Iraqi leave cycle, due to no banking system. They were supposed to have an alpha Battalion Commander. In actuality, stuff slows down when the Bn Cmdr is on leave. The alpha Bn Cmdr did not visit company positions. 5. Operations planning occurred one or two hours before the operation. The Americans were shadows. They started planning only enough to keep Americans happy. They went through the motions, it was not sustainable. 6. Coalition Intel was passed to the IA. But it took them a week to do something. Finally, they executed to please the Americans. Their metric is executions vs. successful operations. 7. The Bn Cmdr would wait for the Bde Cmdr to give them missions. The Brigade wants control. The young officers will be good someday. The old officers are maintaining the status quo. 4

I MEF MATIS Debriefs 19 Nov 08 Most beneficial training: 1. Culture. Understanding the reasons behind what they do, their history. 2. Language. Needed more conversational language and less repetition (example: counting). We had 10 Terps for 15 team members, brought four into the country, and got six local nationals. Therefore, we did not need tactical language. 3. The negotiation training was good. Least beneficial training: 1. CAST (Combined Arms Staff Trainer). Had an Anglico unit on location. We do not need to learn to call artillery. Additional training needed: 1. Military decision making and staff functions. The Staff Advisors did not understand staff functions. 2. The training and preparation sets you up to waste about 4.5 months of a 7 month tour. 3. We need more training on how to use an interpreter. 4. Cultural nuance: they thought that taking off the glove to shake hands was an American tradition. 5. M409 training does not reflect what is going on. Advisors are going over ready to kick down doors. 6. Tailor training to AO. Don t need to learn about a radio we never use. 7. Use the white space training for a briefing on the AO (e.g., the Iraqi pay process, how long can you keep a guy in detention, etc.) Major barriers to mission accomplishment: 1. Battalion Transition Teams should not be expected to do anything at the company level. We are asking too much of a Bn MTT during a seven month tour. 2. The partnered Marine Coalition Forces need more focus and understanding about supporting MTTs. 3. Long haul mindset of the IA. We treat everyday as a deployed combat zone; they treat it as their job. Everything stopped for Ramadan. 5

I MEF MATIS Debriefs 19 Nov 08 4. The IA cannot conduct live fire training because they cannot get ammo. Issued 30 rounds per man. They are making do with what they have got. 5. Inshallah if God wants us to die, we will die. Characteristics admired most: 1. S-4 was agreeable to work with, listened to what I had to say. 2. The S-2s had lots of common experiences. 3. The Iraqi first Bn Cmdr was an empty shell. The second was very squared away. He visited company positions twice a week. Characteristics admired least: 1. The S-4: he was distant sometimes. An Iraqi Major partnered with a USMC 2ndLt big gulf to cross. 2. Every Jundi has to cough up money for food. It s called a Life Support Fund. Most important characteristics for advisor: All MTT members should have at least one prior deployment. You can t teach something that you can t do. Recommendations: 1. The IA is as good as they want to be. We can continue to thrust Marines over there, but not much more can be accomplished. 2. RIP one hour on major issues. Recommend more RIP being turned over digitally. Also, a watch what I do, for three days. The local national Terps provided more helpful info than the RIP. 6

I MEF MATIS Debriefs 19 Feb 09 Deployment : Jul 08 Feb 09 Location : Al Qaim Team : Bn to Super MTT Rank : Major Training : I MEF, 29 Palms What went well: We organized an Intel meeting with all the Intel officers in the AO to include Border Patrol, Police, National Police, and the Iraqi Army. The first meeting was pretty much meet and greet. There was an Iraqi intelligence officer who worked less than one kilometer away from the downtown area where a Joint Coordination Center was located. All the agencies had a liaison: Army, Police, Border Patrol. The intent of the coordination center was to facilitate information flow and operations amongst all the agencies. The Iraqi intelligence officer didn t even know it existed. The second meeting turned to an attitude of; Since all the Americans are here, it s an opportunity to have them give us this and that. They were asking for us to make decisions that had to be made on a national level and not on a strategic level. By coincidence, most of the Marines couldn t make it to the third Intel meeting. The Iraqis pretty much stepped up and said they wanted to have the meeting. Once they were alone, they performed the meeting like they were supposed to. If there are no Americans, they will actually pass Intel, which was the objective when we put the meeting together. It accidentally worked well. They don t perform the way they should and get down to the nuts and bolts when Americans are there. Or they use it as a platform to complain and ask us for stuff. Doing nothing is a course of action that all MTT s need to know, but it is so un-american. What did not go well: We looked at our jobs as if we were the bridge of Intel sharing between Coalition Forces and Iraqi forces. We are the ones who were supposed make the information flow back and forth. Our role was to work the Coalition Forces out of a job. One of the things I was nervous about that didn t go so well was having the Iraqi Army start taking over tribal engagements that the coalition typically did. We will know in a few years if that went well because relationships can turn sour. In fact, it was harder to get the Americans out of the business than to get Iraqis into it. An American Battalion Commander shows up and not knowing what to do, he goes to visit the tribes. What he should have done was launder all of the information through the Iraqi Army, so that there is an Iraqi Army face on it, not a Coalition face. Then he is working himself out of a job. We have a Battalion Commander and Regional Commander who want to talk to the tribes. Tribes are masters at telling the Americans what they want to hear. The Bn and the Regional Commanders are great - perfect belt-fed Marines. They want to make things happen, but they don t realize they are getting talked into things by the tribes. The tribes have an agenda. So when the Iraqi Army goes and tries to talk to the tribes they don t care. They are getting things done by the Bn 7

I MEF MATIS Debriefs 19 Feb 09 and Regional Commanders. It makes the Iraqi Army not relevant. If we are trying build a relevant democracy, Iraqi Army and Police must represent the government. The social contract, as St. Thomas Aquinas said, is that people will follow social laws if the government provides them security. But when they see the Iraqi Army and Police being undermined by an outside body, the people will fulfill their social contract and build a loyalty to the Coalition. The Coalition is providing security and essential services. The Iraqi Army and Police are irrelevant. Our job is essentially building that social contract back into an Iraqi government, so we can leave. Most beneficial training: The medical training we did was outstanding. It wasn t specific for the mission. We did a lot of training such as "this is what it will be like engaging with a Sheikh." Least beneficial training: We didn t really do that much training at 29 Palms. When we actually showed up, they weren t expecting us. They attached us to a Bn that was running through there, and we sat in and about town for the majority of two weeks, not really doing anything. That as a whole was probably not beneficial. Additional training desired: We could have spent more time on preparing for our individual roles that we were going to fill. Walking in knowing exactly what an Intel advisor does. What does an Operations Officer do in regards to working with the staff section of an Iraqi Army Brigade? When I showed up in the country, I got to look at it fresh. I saw a whole bunch of talented people that had no clue where they fit in. They didn t know what their role was and what they were supposed to do with the Iraqi Army. If you don t know what to do, you do what you know. We didn t have any focus on the team. Where we fit in, why we re in this place, why we're with this Brigade. What about this environment? Where are they along the lines of a developing democracy, so what steps do we need to start taking to keep promoting that? The bigger understanding of where you fit in didn t happen in training. It s not training that is needed. It is education. Education teaches you how to think, rather than what to think. Major barriers to mission accomplishment: The rules that we have to operate under. We have to travel with all our armor. We have to go out in certain numbers. We have to go out with a certain number of vehicles. The rules. Three of us show up with ten Iraqis to go downtown to the market. We look like storm troopers or zombie men from Mars because of the rules we have to operate under. The Iraqis are wearing 8

I MEF MATIS Debriefs 19 Feb 09 jam jams and flip flops. We look scared. Everyone sees us and they say "there are the scared Americans." It s a barrier because actions speak louder than words. If I say I would love to go there with you, to my counterpart, it's like saying "let me get my 80 pounds of armor, my five trucks, my 19 Marines, and all the other stuff just so I can go with you where the real work is going to happen." That was real barrier for me as the Intel officer, because there is so much that has to be done Intel wise. In America, we have a big Intel picture; satellites, planes, internet. In Iraq they have dudes. They know dudes who tell you stuff. They want us to talk to them personally. But I can t do that, the way I look. We have to roll up three trucks, get 10 guys geared up at a minimum, and roll out there in force. They re rolling out with three guys to do it. If you break the rules, it is a career ending choice. You re put in a position where you have to break the rules for mission requirements, and then you have to hide it and essentially ask your team to lie for you. I should be entrusted to make a decision to wear armor based on what we need and what the requirements are. I can read the environment and make that decision. I don t need a General in Baghdad to make that decision for me. The rules are designed for the conventional infantry Bn and units living on big bases. Counterpart characteristics admired most: 1. Hospitality. Even if they didn t like you they would act like they did. I had an Iraqi officer say flat to my face, I don t like the United States. I don t think the United States should be in Iraq anymore. But I had a good working relationship with him. We would work together. They were solidly hospitable regardless of how they felt about you. 2. They have a protective system. If you go into their tribal headquarters, even if you are their worst enemy, you re automatically protected. We went into tribal areas to card some people somewhat brutally. But we were safe the whole time. Counterpart characteristics admired least: 1. Their greed. Everybody takes their cut. They feed themselves and engorge themselves on whatever. You can give them a box of widgets and even if they don t know what it is or what it does, they will horde it. You have to force them to get it down the chain of command. They are like the Tasmanian Devil; they will take things they don t even need. But if someone tries to get one they fight to the death to keep it. 2. They live for the moment. A perfect example is the cell phone towers. The U.S. pays for cell phone towers. And, the Iraqis complain that it is our fault that they don t have good cell coverage. But what happens is that the U.S. puts up the tower and when one gets blown up (by insurgents or a tribe), the U.S. pays the tribe in that region to protect the tower. The next tribe over decides to blow up their tower so that they can also get paid to protect it. Over time, the Americans caught on and decided to stop putting cell phone towers up and paying to protect them. So now the Iraqis don t have cell service. They just wanted the money to protect the cell 9

I MEF MATIS Debriefs 19 Feb 09 phone tower. They never thought that in two years they would have great cell phone coverage. They would rather have the ten bucks for security service now. RIP process: We essentially had no RIP. My RIP consisted of my relief telling me basically that the IPs were crooked, the Iraqi Army was good, and that s about it. They were already leaving country as we walked in. We drove around the AO for two days and they took off. So we didn t really get too much of a RIP. Team dynamics: I think there may be some issues with the rank structure. Say you have a LtCol working with a LCpl hand-in-hand. That may be difficult for both sides. It s going to be different than how the standard infantry Bn is going to be run. You have to be able to work with each other hand-inhand and to see through the rank to the individual person. Some people who have never worked on a small team before may have a little difficulty with that. I think that should be covered in the training process. Recommendations: 1. The training needs to be more forward looking. Things are going to change rapidly - especially with the Iraqi Army at this stage when they are so advanced. Basing a training program for what is going to happen in the next six months on what happened a year ago will make the team way behind. We thought that we were going to be physically training the Iraqis. But when we got there, we realized they already knew how and could go out and take care of things without training. 2. Be as American as you can be because that is the critical capability that you bring. Iraqis copy everything you do. Don t try to be an Iraqi because then you would have an Iraqi copying a guy trying to act like an Iraqi. Be as American as possible. That is your critical capability. You don t have to show off your knowledge of Iraqi culture. You just have to be yourself. Don t try to put on a show. They will see through it. Just get down to business with them. They know we are different from them. They can turn on a TV or put on MTV and see what Americans are like. When you get to know these guys they ask all kinds of questions about the girls in bikinis in California, what it is like in Oceanside, etc. They all want to be like us. They don t care if we don t follow the rules. Marines are naturally respectful. Marines will be professional wherever they go. 3. An Iraqi general told me: If we came to your country, we would have burned all your churches, raped all your women, and took all your oil, make no mistake about it. That is what we did in Kuwait. You Americans come here, you win. We expect all our mosques to be burned, all our women shipped overseas, and all our oil to be pumped directly to the Port in L.A. You guys didn t do that. What you did was help us build an Army, help us secure our borders, build our schools, and set up cell phone towers. We see that, we see that very clearly. It is not a 10

I MEF MATIS Debriefs 19 Feb 09 matter of liking you. We wish we were just like you! The point is we are relevant to them, regardless of what cultural mistakes we make. 11

I MEF MATIS Debriefs 19 Feb 2009 Deployment : Jul 08 Feb 09 Location : Al Qaim Team : Bn to Super MTT Rank : Capt Training : I MEF, 29 Palms Background: 1. The team became an over-watch MTT as soon as they arrived in country, spanning Al Qaim, Husaybah, & Rawah. We later combined with to become Super MTT. Partnered with 28 th Infantry Brigade. 2. 11 member team. Lost four members. Lived with the Brigade MTT. What went well: 1. The relationship building portion went extremely well. I was a company commander last year in Ramadi and was the ISF coordinator for the battalion. I dealt with the IPs and understood the importance of building relationships; what to say, and what not to say, and how to go about it. We were more advanced than most teams because a lot of guys were with me last year. I told my guys the focus isn t training. The focus will be on building relationships, making the Iraqis feel adequate about what they are doing, and letting them know that they can actually do the mission. At no time did we say, Hey, you re going to do what we tell you to do. That s not why we were there. If the Iraqis say they can t do it, we say we can work on it to help you get to where you can do it on your own. So the whole building relationship thing was our mission. We were assigned as an over-watch. And that s what we did. We spent two to three days initially building relationships with each battalion. I would brief the Bn Commander and his staff that we were not there to give them things. We were not there to tell them how to do things. We were there strictly as liaisons, making sure that everything passed up to the Brigade level was followed through. Our main mission was making sure the links between Battalion, Brigade, and Division were followed through. The Iraqi first concept is in full swing over there. 2. You cannot go over there with a specific idea of I m going to fix this, because you will not do it. They have been dealing with the Americans for the last five years. They have seen teams come and go. They feel they really don t need us anymore. But once you understand them, and build relationships, and become friends, they are sorry to see us go. Then we feel, you know what, we did something over here. If it wasn t anything but building relationships; and letting them know that we care enough about them to be over there, to be away from our families, to spend all this time with them even if it s just to make them feel better about themselves. Get rid of the whole Americans are bad, Iraqis are bad attitude. 3. We had general goals for them to increase their intelligence based operations, and also to start getting a handle on civil affairs, and civil military operations. We felt that on most of those we gained significant ground. 12

I MEF MATIS Debriefs 19 Feb 2009 What did not go well: Logistically, the main problems we saw across all three battalions and brigade headquarters was the hoarding mentality. The Brigade Commander felt that if he had something he was going to keep it because he might need it in two weeks. Instead of saying, My battalions need it now to conduct operations, so I ll give it to them. We constantly told our counterparts in each battalion to keep requesting material and to continue sending paperwork, in order to make sure that the Battalion Commander is well read on what you need and why you need it. It needs to be put on paper so that the higher-ups can understand that the only way you can conduct operations is to have this, this, and this. We continued to push the idea that in order to function properly logistically, you need to give up that which makes you feel important. They don t understand. They think that if they have stuff, they're important and if they give it to you, you no longer need them and they're no longer important. Status is so important over there; it means everything to them. They would rather watch their Bn suffer and blame a higher-up, as long as they stay important. We tried to get them away from that mentality, but failed miserably. They are not willing to let something go because we can t assure them that there is a logistical chain that goes back to Baghdad. There is no faith in the process. They explain that they have submitted paperwork for months and nothing ever happens. And its true, nothing ever happens. The problem is not at the unit level, but at the administrative level. They have what they have been given. We gave them Humvees and everyone knows that it s difficult for us to get parts to fix our own, even through our chain. We ve given them American trucks and weapon systems that they really can t get parts for. Before we fixed it for them; now when they need parts we say we can t help them. You have to put it through your chain. So they take a piece of an American Humvee and get it fabricated in town because they can t wait for it to go through the logistics train. But the fabricating is woefully inadequate for the stresses of the Humvee. So they constantly have to fabricate and make do. That s not the way it should be. Most beneficial training: 1. The medical portion. Luckily we didn t need it, but it probably was one of the best packages when we went through. The weapons training and the small arms weapons were good, just as a refresher. 2. Negotiation training was good, not so much for showing how to negotiate, but for demonstrating how to never commit to anything and how to hold a conversation without promising anything. There needs to be more of that, but some of the role players haven t been to Iraq for years. It s different. Unless the Brigade Commander is talking, everyone else is talking at the same time. The role playing here is good as a start. But it's artificial. It felt like they were trying to catch us in a cultural faux pas all the time. They weren t actually trying to negotiate a fuel exchange. They were trying to catch you in a cultural mistake. 13

I MEF MATIS Debriefs 19 Feb 2009 Major barriers to mission accomplishment: 1. The Iraqis were dependent to the point of failure. They weren t interested in anything that would advance their cause. They were more interested in things that would advance their individual position. 2. Working with the other Coalition Force units was a big barrier. The Marine Corps does things one way, but since you fall under the Army, you have to go through different avenues to get things. Trying to get things through the Army is like pulling teeth. Then you have to deal with the MEF. They say, No, you have to deal with the Bn that is in your area. But the Bn says they don t owe us anything. TT supply or MEF don t understand. Because you are a Marine MTT, the Bn can pretty much tell you to get lost. And the whole reason is because the MTT before you made them angry. The MEF needs to make the Bns supply the MTTs with motor pool needs and a certain amount of supply because the Bns can deal with reasonable amounts. There is a lot of misunderstanding because the parts we need seem simple to us. The battalions are doing their mission and they don t have time to deal with the petty stuff we need. 3. The Iraqi brigades need to have weekly meetings with the Bn commanders. Sharing information among the battalions is not working. There is a huge trust issue. The Bde commanders do not trust the Bn commanders, and the Bn commanders do not trust the Jundi. Counterpart characteristics admired most: They are people just like us. They mess around with each other, they tell crude jokes; they re in the military just like us. The second you get there, they take care of you. They will not let anything happen to you. Counterpart characteristics admired least: They are lazy. But it's ok to be lazy and get through life. You have to understand that. If you go in with the attitude that they will do what you want, you will be frustrated the entire deployment. If they are going to do what you want, they will do it their way. There is no sense of urgency. As long as you can accept that they are going to do things when they want to and how they want to, then you can live with that and just understand. It s not going to be perfect, but that s the way they do it and it does work. It s their country. They are not going to operate like Marines. If we grade them to our standards, it s not right. I don t think we can go over there with a metric and say, "I m going to fix something." Because if you do you ll come back and feel like a complete failure. Team dynamics: There is only one person on the team who wears the rank and that s the team chief. Everyone else is a worker bee; you can t do it any other way. One person is in charge and that s it. It worked well because everybody understood that. 14

I MEF MATIS Debriefs 19 Feb 2009 If the camp needs to be clean everyone gets involved; anyone can clean toilets. I don t care if I am the team chief; I can clean toilets just as good as anyone else. We have seen other teams where that was an issue. The officers would sit around and tell Marines, Go clean toilets. We didn t have any issues with that because everybody understood. You have eleven men that are going to live together for seven months with the Iraqis. And if everyone is on the same sheet of music then things go a lot better. If you start separating right away by saying, Hey, I m an officer, you re an enlisted, officers don t do this, it s going to fail. You will fight amongst each other more than anything else. And the Iraqis will see right through it. Because that s how they are. Their officers don t do certain things. It doesn t set a good example if we act the same way. Recommendation: The Marine Corps is pushing that MTTs are important. But the sourcing is inadequate. Bns won t give up their best people. We are sending new lieutenants, who may know how to run basic logistics to tell a senior Iraqi colonel how to run battalion and brigade level logistics. The Colonel has been running logistics in Iraq for 30 years. In addition, Brigade Team Leaders were initially LtCols; now they are down graded to a Major. Better sourcing is needed. 15

I MEF MATIS Debriefs 12 May 2009 Deployment Period : Oct 08 May 09 Location : 26 th Bde Team Type : OW MTT Ranks : Major, Capt, 1stLt Training : I MEF, 29 Palms Background: The team was remissioned from a Battalion level MTT for the 27 th Brigade to an Overwatch MTT for the 26 th Bde. No additional personnel were assigned. What went well: 1. Moving the Iraqi Brigade from Basrah to Diyala. The Bde had been tasked to move. They had moved from Ramadi to Diyala the previous March, so they had some experience moving. They planned and executed the move independently. The Iraqi Bde created a timeline and the tasks to be accomplished by unit. They also developed a Recovery Plan. They invited us with them, and our MTT functioned in an observation mode. The Iraqi Bde kept us informed for the most part. The move was executed in two days on their own. Some vehicle actions could have been better (example, 10 minute stop every hour written into the plan), but the move was completed according to the timeline. Our input was primarily troop to task guidance; who is going to do what, and some organizational guidance. The Iraqi Brigade fell into a routine and wanted to do every maneuver in the same manner and time period. They did not want to change or adapt. This seems logical, but is not tactically sound. If checkpoints are always visited at the same time, it is too predictable for the enemy. 2. The biggest contribution we made to the 26 th Brigade was getting the Intel staff to do analysis after they moved to Diyala. The S-2 shop had been doing well until their budget was cut. Their primary Intel was HUMINT. They did not do any pattern analysis. The Iraqi Bde S-2 and S-3 shops did not collaborate. When we got there, the Ops would conduct operations without collaborating with Intel. About one and one half months was spent in training. The Iraqi S-2 1stLt energized the training. Eventually, they began conducting analysis and providing info to Operations. What did not go well: 1. The Iraqis stood up a Commando Company at the Bde level. We tried to help them develop a training plan. But, it s not something they buy into. Bde directed training is not executed. It is a day by day thing. They had a Bde directed training plan, but it was clear they never were going to execute it. For the entire year, it was the same training over and over. There were no METL s (Mission Essential Task Lists) to drive them. It does not occur to them to look at a METL and say, OK, our battalions need work here, here, and here. Let s map-out some training in those areas over the course of the next four months. 16

I MEF MATIS Debriefs 12 May 2009 My goal was to develop a plan for the commando company, everything from patrolling, area clearing, military ops in an urban terrain, and some shooting. It turned out to be the most frustrating thing I did over there. There was a lack of logistical support. In my opinion, there are some things that are very broken at the MOD and IGFC level. For about two weeks, I couldn t figure out why I couldn t get the training officer and the logistics officer to request ammunition from the division. I couldn t get them to request training ranges or a training area. Finally, I was told that they have made requests many times before, and were told no to ammunition. They get 10 rounds a year per man. They would not get any ranges or training areas unless the division says they can have it. They will not ask again. One of the reasons, we were told, is the government is afraid of the military becoming too good and too strong. This is at the MOD level. The concern is if the IA becomes too strong, they might overthrow the government. MOD will push ammo through for a specific operation, and if not used, the Bde will have to ship it back. The Iraqi government has put a glass ceiling out there. Now, there are units that are ORA 1 level like 26 th Bde; they are not going any higher. You can send America s best; advisors, special forces, Delta Force, whatever, out there and have them advise their brains out for three years, but if nothing else changes at the IGFC or MOD level, 26 th Bde will not get better. It operates at the Prime Minister level as well. There is a lot of fear. They are doing a balancing act between the Iraqi Police and the Army to make sure that one can t take over. 2. Some things are not going to change. There is still some Saddam style watchdogs that report on the Commanders to the MOD. We reached a point of diminishing returns on TTPs (tactics, techniques, procedures). They know what to do and how, but they are going to do it their way. If an American went on patrol with a ground soldier, they would execute perfectly. Most beneficial training: 1. The medical training and Live Tissue Training (LTT) conducted during our white space was outstanding. The LTT built confidence in the team. I have been in the Marine Crops for 14 years and have never received any medical training like that. Without our Doc there, we had confidence. I could keep someone alive long enough for survival. With the teams being cut down from fifteen to ten, the Corpsman could not always go with us. The LTT was not anything we got at 29 Palms or ATG, it was contracted. We elected to do that. MTT teams need that kind of medical training. 2. The live firing we did also was beneficial, with the recon or Special Forces guys. The Combat Marksmanship Program (CMP) was outstanding. 3. The culture training was good, at ATG Pendleton and at 29 Palms. 17

I MEF MATIS Debriefs 12 May 2009 Least beneficial training: 1. The language training was not too useful. There was no standardized approach to enforce the language training. We have interpreters anyway. If you do it, have a standard and make people meet the standard. 2. Too much time spent on individual skills, TTP training. For example, taking us out to the MOUT facility to go over urban patrolling. Too much time was spent and the wrong individuals were teaching it. We had corporals and sergeants teaching a MTT that is comprised of three combat arms officers and two infantry NCO s on their fourth tour to Iraq. Those sergeants teaching urban patrolling to a group of LCpls great. But the same sergeants teaching us a complete waste of time. Just give us some white space and some resources, and we could have done so much better. The instructors have to be as knowledgeable or more knowledgeable than the audience. That was not the case 90% of the time. 3. MNF-W policies instruction. The MTT was outside of MNF-W. The instructors need to get away form MNF-W and look at what are MNCI (Multi-National Corps Iraq) policies. Additional training desired: 1. There was no Intel piece whatsoever (any guidance, website, etc.) to help an Intel officer fresh out of Intel school. Individual billet training was almost non-existent. Our understanding of the Iraqi system was not there. Information about how to MOD worked was from 2003. We had to figure out how the system worked. We needed information on the old Iraqi Army and the new Iraqi Army. For example, how it is laid out: the 1 st Division, the 7 th Division, the QRF Division. It took four months to get an organization table. Finally, we did find a Transition Team at IGFC (Iraqi Ground Forces Command). We tried to push it up to the MEF and MOD. They didn t have the information either. This information we should have had from ATG. 2. We could have used a class on the pay process also. We were digging on that all the way up to the fifth month of deployment. Now they are doing the new MOD badging system. That s how there will reference everyone. That s how the pay system will work. We should have had a class on that here. There is somebody out there who knows the process very well. Whether it is at the IGFC level, or an Iraqi officer. I know our replacements will try to figure it out. As much as we turned over to them, it s still not enough. But, they are not going to find a document to use to guide the Iraqis responsible for the process. Major barriers to mission accomplishment: Going from a 15 man team to a 10 man MTT, and we still have to comply with all of the regulations from MNF-W, such as a three vehicle minimum, leaving five people back at a COC. The Doc can t drive. It doesn t make sense. With all of these rules and regulations, we are literally put into a position where you have to violate the rules or you never leave your COC! So the perception is that higher command is making us violate. They know they are making us violate to cover their own butt. They tell you to play by the rules, but it is impossible, and they know it. If their objective was to make sure we don t advise out of the COC, they have achieved 18

I MEF MATIS Debriefs 12 May 2009 it. I don t have a problem being a 10 man advisory team. I wouldn t have a problem being a three man advisory team. So long as they say you guys can ride in the Iraqi vehicles. Use your discretion. There is a reason this used to be a Special Forces mission, because these types of restrictions were not put on the Special Forces. They were trusted to do what they saw fit advise properly. That was extremely frustrating to us. Characteristics admired most: 1. Starting with the General, he was a religious man, he followed his religion. He was very friendly and meant well. 2. The Chief of Staff was tactically proficient. He always looked out for us. He made sure that we were informed, what was coming up, when they would have meetings, what they were going to be doing. 3. From the 2 side, my counterpart was trained in Taji, he spoke very good English. He had worked well with many American forces. He bent over backwards trying to support us. He was like another Marine. He lived with us most of the time, very friendly. 4. My Ops counterpart was a LtCol. He was very intelligent, very Coalition friendly. He cared about his soldiers. He was rare among the Iraqi officers. He wouldn t slap his Jundi around. He would mentor junior officers. And he had a strong work ethic. Characteristics admired least: 1. The General took too much leave, but the biggest issue was that they operate their unit out of funds from their soldiers. Therefore it breeds institutional corruption. There are allegations; he was investigated for corruption, but there was no proof. They understood the system they are operating in. So, while the soldiers are going to complain that too much is being taken from them, the books are fine. 2. Our counterparts were the most competent officers in the Bde. Outside the counterparts, you see all the laziness, all the stereotypes we went over there expecting to see. We didn t see these characteristics in our counterparts. My counterpart, the Chief of Staff, made sure the G-1 got his paperwork done on time. Team dynamics: As we are doing less, we have less to focus on. So there was plenty of movie watching, plenty of people bored. Some of the people who were getting bored and frustrated created a bit of drama. I just stepped in and said. This is what you are experiencing, drop the drama. Just bickering over areas of responsibility. It was a couple of sergeants. We go straight from the officers, we have a SSgt and then three sergeants. So naturally you are going to have who is the top dog? when the SSgt is not there. Just to say quit resolved the situation. We lived in close proximity to each other. We had sleeping rooms with the Terps in two rooms. 19

I MEF MATIS Debriefs 12 May 2009 Seven guys in each room sleeping on cots. We didn t have much relief from each other. But, overall I was extremely pleased with group dynamics. We divvied up the roles prior to going out there. But then we adjusted while there. The tone the Team Chief set was important. I heard of other team chiefs who tried to run the team as an infantry unit; you have three hours for internet, we have three meetings a day, etc. Living in close proximity in close quarters with Iraqis all around, that approach will make us want to drive a nail through our forehead. We didn t have that, the Major built that into the battle rhythm from the beginning. If you want to stay up til two in the morning and get up at 1000, that s OK. If you are assigned to PM the truck, you still PM the truck. Roger that! It s a big boy game. That s exactly how the team was managed and run. This is a big boy world. You guys have been around the Marine Corps for a bit, and that s how you will be treated. That environment was extremely beneficial to the team. Recommendations: 1. Make the pre-deployment process shorter. In my opinion, there seems to be ATG here and ATG at Camp Wilson. There seems to be some sort of fight between who wears the ATG logo on their tee-shirts. To have these two entities rolling around without much direct interaction is not something we allow to happen in the Marine Corps, but it s been allowed to happen here. From my opinion, and from the student perspective, ATG Pendleton is meant to form teams together. It should be maybe three weeks in length to get guys ready with level one: rifle range, gas chamber, audits, etc.; getting them ready to go. Then ATG at 29 Palms is the level two and three stuff. You could cut a month and a half off the training cycle schedule without losing anything. Can t say how frustrating it is to sit through the same classes four times not an exaggeration. Between here, ATG 29 Palms, the Phoenix Academy, and the MEF training. How can we as a Marine Corps allow something to be so inefficient? 2. The majority of the people that get picked for a MTT are coming from a B billet or another location where they haven t had time. I haven t been to a rifle range in four years. I haven t been to a gas chamber in so many years. Al these little things that are supposed to be predeployment, but we are not getting them because ATG wants to be responsible for the fancy stuff. Nobody wants to take the time to do the basic stuff we really should be doing. What they are really doing is failing Marines at a personal level. 3. When teams come back, have members teach here and at Camp Wilson, instead of contractors, 300 pounds overweight, teach us. They were terrible. So many got out as sergeants and they say, From my experience in Fallujah in 2004, this is how you have to do things. It s Iraq in 2008 now. Don t spend half an hour telling us how you cleared a zone in Fallujah. It was a weird dynamic for the team going through here to have to suffer corporals and sergeants trying to teach something that they are not duty experts in. And, contractors trying to teach something they have never done. These contractor companies are hiring like 90% of their cadre are sergeants that got out after three years. They need to focus on the stuff we don t know. Have them teach the Iraqi system. Let the contractors become the duty experts in something. They are not going to teach me too much about the infantry. They have had four years. I have 16. But, I have zero on the Iraqi political system, and the dynamics that are currently going on over there. We could not get any information on that. If the contractors could learn that, then they would be 20

I MEF MATIS Debriefs 12 May 2009 worth the money they are paid. Contractors should spend some time learning the Iraqi system and where it is going, what their time line is. We need Foreign Area Officers who are professionals in that part of the world. 21

Police Transition Teams