Safeguards and Nuclear Security: Synergies, bridges and differences. Anita Nilsson, Jean-Maurice Crete, Miroslav Gregoric

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Safeguards and Nuclear Security: Synergies, bridges and differences Anita Nilsson, Jean-Maurice Crete, Miroslav Gregoric

Safeguards and Nuclear Security Synergies, bridges and differences From Greek sunergia, cooperation and sunergos, working together The synergies between international safeguards and nuclear security are recognized in multiple General Conference resolutions; contributions to nuclear security from the Agency s safeguards system In implementing the State s System of Accounting and Control (the SSAC) of nuclear materials In the protection of nuclear materials from theft, to combat illicit nuclear trafficking; the prevention of proliferation by non-state actors Safeguards and Nuclear Security p.2

Legal instruments Nuclear Security Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material & Amendment Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism Security Council resolution 1540 Security Council resolution 1373 CoC Safeguards Nonproliferation Treaty Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements Additional protocols Voluntary Offer Agreements INFCIRC/66 Agreements Safeguards and Nuclear Security p.3

Objectives Nuclear Security: Protect against the non- State, criminal or terrorist Actors Protection of nuclear and other radioactive material against theft during use, storage or transport as decided by the States Retrieve and return lost material Protect facilities, location and transports against acts of sabotage Implement obligations from international instruments Consider implementation of international guidance Safeguards: Ensure peaceful uses of nuclear material State declarations on the peaceful uses of nuclear material Establish a national SSAC for effective accounting and reporting International verification of obligations Implement obligations from international instruments Safeguards and Nuclear Security p.4

OBJECTIVES INFCIRC 153 corr INFCIRC 225 rev 4 Safeguards are applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of State, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere ( ). The objective of safeguards is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection. The objectives of the State's physical protection system should be: To establish conditions which would minimize the possibilities for unauthorized removal of nuclear material and/or for sabotage To provide information and technical assistance in support of rapid and comprehensive measures by the State to locate and recover missing nuclear material and to cooperate with safety authorities in minimizing the radiological consequences of sabotage. Safeguards and Nuclear Security p.5

Responsibilities: IAEA Nuclear Security Depositary of CPPNM and its Amendment Facilitates international cooperation and coordination Help retrieve lost material Provide guidance - Develop and publish Nuclear Security Series Provide services for system evaluation and human resource development Maintain ITDB Project and supply agreements Risk reduction measures upon request Safeguards Rights and Obligations as Party to Safeguards Agreements Verify State Declarations Receive reports of material, inventories and transfers Analyse and assess correctness and completeness of information Assess material unaccounted for Verify peaceful uses, including by relevant analysis Provide guidance for reports and SSAC Provide services, for SSAC evaluation and training Safeguards and Nuclear Security p.6

Responsibilities: State Nuclear Security National policy/responsibility International obligations Nuclear law National regulations (i.e.physical protection, accounting,..) Regulatory body: Licensing, Inspection, Enforcement Report on illicit trafficking Coordination regulatory bodies, customs, police, intelligence, border guards Safeguards National policy/responsibility Safeguards Obligations Nuclear law National Regulations (i.e. access, accounting, reporting) Regulatory body: Inspection Provide reports to IAEA according to SA Interaction with IAEA according to SA Safeguards and Nuclear Security p.7

Responsibilities: Operator Nuclear Security Implement all requirements that are established nationally for Physical protection Accounting; inventories, exports, imports, transports Report to States on incidents Obtain licenses for activities and use of material Ensure adequate knowledge of staff Ensure effective technical systems Performance assessments and audits Integrated risk assessment Safeguards Implement all requirements on nuclear material accounting, Report inventories, transfers, imports and exports to State Ensure adequate knowledge of staff Ensure effective technical systems Performance assessments and audits Integrated risk assessment Safeguards and Nuclear Security p.8

Nuclear Security Safeguards: comparison Safeguards Safeguards agreements aim at ensuring States peaceful uses of nuclear material All States do not have comprehensive safeguards agreements, all nuclear material is not subject to safeguards agreements The implementation of safeguards is vital for all States Timeliness - Month or more Nuclear Security Concerns all States - Proliferation by non-state actors, acts of sabotage Has a broader scope; include all nuclear material, and radioactive substances Includes the risk of sabotage at nuclear facilities or transports to disperse radioactivity Includes activities outside of established facilities or locations, measures to detect material out of regulatory control Includes nation-wide preparedness, including with law enforcement, to respond to theft, detect smuggling and characterize material through nuclear forensics as well as return lost or stolen material to its legitimate owner The implementation of Nuclear Security is vital for all States Timeliness - Real time / immediate Safeguards and Nuclear Security p.9

Nuclear Security Safeguards: Comparison Different quantities of concern 1 SQ Category I II III Pu, U 233 8 kg >2 kg 500 g- 2 15-500 g kg HEU >20% 25 kg >5 kg 1-5 kg 15 g-1 kg LEU >10% <10% Irradiated fuel 75 kg > 10 kg 1-10 kg >10 kg DU, natural, thorium, LEU Safeguards and Nuclear Security p.10 10

Challenges Expanding nuclear sector: More than 50 countries plan to enhance their use of nuclear technology More nuclear material, facilities and transport More Front-end and Back-end Nuclear Fuel Cycle activities Privatized nuclear sector requires transparency in the national requirements, to enable effective implementation by operators Globalization of nuclear trade free trade zones Clear responsibility on operators Non nuclear use of NM (sources containing Pu239, DU shielding containers ) Connection between NM smugglers and proliferators of sensitive technologies Vulnerabilities in cyber space Safeguards and Nuclear Security p.11 11

Ongoing interaction - synergies Education and training Advisory services Development of NDA equipment Cooperation on illicit trafficking and analysis Nuclear forensics research and development New accounting guidance; applicable for all, fully coordinated safeguards and nuclear security Security and safeguards by design New guidance on security of computer systems at facilities Safeguards and Nuclear Security p.12

Conclusion Increased recognition of synergies and bridges should influence future management of nuclear activities: Recognition of a common national infrastructure for nuclear security and safeguards, reflected in the nuclear law and the regulatory system IAEA to support human resource development programme IAEA to support evaluation services, recognizing the interdependence of accounting and physical protection IAEA to support risk reduction measures upon request Recognition of common techniques; NDA for verification and for detection of materials out of regulatory control, e.g. at border crossing points Interaction in the further development of advanced analytical techniques and methodologies, e.g. used in environmental monitoring and nuclear forensics Development of self assessment methodology of national infrastructure Comprehensive analysis of possible threats and scenarios by non State actors Effective nuclear security and safeguards are enabling factors for an expanding nuclear sector Safeguards and Nuclear Security p.13

Moving towards 3S? Safety: Int l Safety Standards And Conventions Safeguards: Non-Proliferation Agreements and Additional Protocols SYNERGY Security: Physical Protection, Detection and Response, Information; Conventions and Recommendations Safeguards Safety Security Promotes the Peaceful, Safe and Secure use of Nuclear Technology Safeguards and Nuclear Security p.14