COORDINATING CB ENGAGEMENT SCENARIOS WITH THE CBRN DATA MODEL

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COORDINATING CB ENGAGEMENT SCENARIOS WITH THE CBRN DATA MODEL by Stephen Helmreich Computing Research Laboratory / NMSU Sundara Vadlamudi,, Markus Binder Monterey Institute of International Studies

OUTLINE Introduction CB Scenarios General CB Scenarios Detail CB Scenarios and the CBRN Data Model Conclusion

Visualization of Mockup System Consequences per Incident Scenario Incident Scenario Tree Effectivity Matrix Expected Consequences Likelihood of Incident Scenario Funding Portfolio Remediations

Criteria for a useful CB incident scenario Able to deal with uncertainty Accessible to experts Compatible with deeper scenarios Can be used to generate interpolated scenarios Can deal with hypothetical improvements to defensive measures

Utility of the CB incident scenario For S&T funding allocations for CB research For development / deployment of CB mitigation projects For similar tasks in similar areas (e.g., RN research, development, deployment) For other tasks requiring similar capabilities

CB incident scenario detail Inherent vulnerability Inherent characteristics Defensive measures Cost/impact

Inherent vulnerability-1 Inherent Vulnerability Parameter Range of Values / Units Agent Characteristics (CW) Agent One of the following: {Sarin, soman, tabun, VX, mustard, lewisite, chlorine, hydrogen cyanide, phosgene, cyanogens chloride} Persistency low / medium / high Ect50 (mg-min/m 3 ) Time for effect minutes Mortality (untreated) 0%-100% Prophylaxis available Treatment available YES / NO YES / NO

Inherent vulnerability-2 Inherent Vulnerability Agent Characteristics (BW) Agent Parameter Range of Values / Units Sunlight Degradation Rate One of the following: {anthrax, botulinum toxin, ricin, smallpox, yersinia pestis, glanders, tularemia, brucellosis} 0%-100% / minute Ect50 (mg-min/m 3 ) Incubation period days Mortality (untreated) 0%-100% Vaccine Treatment available YES / NO YES / NO Disperal Pattern Mode of agent delivery Point Source / Line Source

Inherent characteristics-1 Inherent Characteristics Parameter Range of Values / Units Proximity to Civilian Infrastructure Civilian infrastructures close to facility One or more of the following: {major highway; civilian airport; city center; civilian port; other high-density civilian population} Air Flows Prevailing wind direction (Compass coordinates, e.g. NE, SSE,W, etc.) Ambient Temperature Prevailing temperatures in target area at time of attack Time of Attack Time of day HH:MM Degrees fahrenheit

Inherent characteristics-2 Inherent Characteristics Parameter Range of Values / Units Access to Offsite Medical Service Access to Civilian Hazmat Response Rating of facility where 0 represents a facility with no immediate access to an offsite medical service and 5 represents immediate access to a large wellequipped medical service Rating of facility where 0 represents a facility with no access to a Hazmat team and 5 represents immediate access to a large wellequipped Hazmat team 0-5 0-5

Defensive measures-1 Defensive Measure Parameter Range of Values / Units Chemical Agent Detector Type C1, C2, C3,,C27, (0 indicates null set) Agents detectable by sensor Range of detection Time for detection One or more of the following: {Sarin, soman, tabun, VX, mustard, lewisite, chlorine, hydrogen cyanide, phosgene, cyanogens chloride} (in meters) (in minutes) False positive rate 0%-100% False negative rate 0%-100% Number of detectors deployed at facility (integer)

Defensive measures-2 Biological Agent Detector Type B1, B2, B3,,B27, (0 indicates null set) Agents detectable by sensor Range of detection One or more of the following: {anthrax, botulinum toxin, ricin, smallpox, yersinia pestis, glanders, tularemia, brucellosis} (in meters) Time for detection (in minutes) False positive rate 0%-100% False negative rate 0%-100% Number of detectors deployed at facility (integer)

Defensive measures-3 Perimeter Protection Presence of wall and fence Presence of barricaded gates Number of armed guards Anti-missile Defense YES / NO YES / NO (integer) YES / NO

Defensive measures-4 Protective Equipment Mask Type MK1, MK2, MK3,,MK27, (0 indicates null set) Avbl of Masks 0%-100% Suit Protection factor (0-5) Mask Wearability (0-5) NBC Suit Type S1, S2, S3,,S27, (0 indicates null set) Avbl of NBC Suits 0%-100% NBC Suit Protection factor (0-5) NBC Suit Wearability (0-5) Positive pressure system YES / NO Personnel indoors 0%-100%

Defensive measures-5 MOPP Level Level of defense preparedness MOPP 1-4 Trained Onsite Personnel Rating of facility, where 0 represents a facility with no dedicated medical response team with CB defense training and 5 represents a facility with a dedicated CB response team. 0-5

Chemical Prophylaxis Defensive measures-6 Type PC1, PC2, PC21, (0 indicates null set) Agents effective against Risk level of side-effects combined measure of probability and severity Effectiveness Maximum number of days safe to take prophylaxis continually Number of days before prophylaxis becomes effective Minimum number of days between pre-treatment cycles Average percentage of base personnel receiving prophylaxis at any given time under normal conditions Nerve agents, blood agents, choking agents, vesicants low / medium / high low / medium / high (integer) (integer) (integer) 0-100%

Defensive measures-7 Defensive Measure Parameter Range of Values / Units Biological Prophylaxis Type PB1, PB2,, PB42, (0 indicates null set) Agents effective against Risk level of side effects Effectiveness Number of days after inoculation commences before prophylaxis is effective Duration of effectiveness in days Percentage of base personnel inoculated anthrax, botulinum toxin, ricin, smallpox, yersinia pestis, glanders, tularemia, brucellosis Low / medium / high Low / medium / high (integer) (integer) 0-100%

Defensive measures-8 Medical Treatment (Chemical) Medical Treatment (Biological) Type MT1, MT2,,MT47, (0 indicates null set) Agents effective against Effectiveness 0-5 Percentage of facility personnel covered by the antidote stockpile Nerve agents, blood agents, choking agents, vesicants 0-100% Type MT1, MT2,,MT47, (0 indicates null set) Agents effective against Effectiveness 0-5 Nerve agents, blood agents, choking agents, vesicants Percentage of facility personnel covered by treatment 0-100%

Impact/Cost Impact / Cost Parameter Range of Values / Units Casualties Mission impact Remediation costs Personnel killed or and / or injured Service dependent, (eg: Air- Force Sortie generation rate reduction) Cost to restore facility to full pre-attack capability (integer) 0-100% millions of $US Geopolitical Impact Affect on USG prestige low / medium / high S&T cost Deployment cost S&T time Deployment time Cost for research for new CB defensive measures Cost for fielding of new CB defensive measures Time to complete research for new CB defensive measures Time to complete fielding of new CB defensive measures millions of $US millions of $US (in months) (in months)

Connections to the CBRN Data Model Top level: ACTIONs and OBJECTs ACTIONs are either EVENTs (unplanned) or TASKs (planned) Our SCENARIO is a conjoined CBRN- EVENT and a response TASK Connected by an ACTION-FUNCTIONAL ASSOCIATION OBJECTS are connected to the EVENTs and TASKs

Basic connections Inherent vulnerability CBRN-EVENT / CHEMICAL-BIOLOGICAL-EVENT Inherent characteristics FACILITY Defensive measures ACTION-EVENT Cost/Impact limited connection to Data model

Connections Examples (Scenario) Air flows (Data Model) WIND Agent CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL- MATERIEL-TYPE Dispersal Mechanism CBRN-EVENT- DELIVERY-MECHANISM Sensor CBRN-SENSOR-TYPE

Connections More examples Wall WALL Gate GAT Armed guards GUARDN / GUARD Casualities MEDICAL-FACILITY- STATUS-INTERVAL-CASUALTY-GROUP

Conclusions We have presented a detailed CB incident scenario that we believe is Useful for our purposes Is compatible with the CBRN Data Model May be useful for other purposes Feedback? Questions?