Working Title Multi-Domain Command and Control of ISR: Ensuring support to Unit Level Intelligence DISCLAIMER The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government, the Department of Defense, or Air University. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States government. Research Questions What is the current process within the AOC/ISRD to provide products from the Air Tasking Cycle to supported units? What is the current process within the AOC/ISRD to incorporate inputs from supported units (MISREPs, RFIs, ect.) into the Air Tasking Cycle? If the ISRD is experiencing degraded or intermittent communication with supported units, what is the process for ensuring Air Tasking Cycle inputs and outputs are received? Problem Background and Significance Over the past 25 years, the US Air Force has enjoyed unchallenged command and control (C2) of its forces, with adversaries unable to target or affect its networks or systems to the degree that has impacted operations. Unfortunately, the service cannot continue to count on that advantage going unchallenged, due to the enormous importance of cyberspace capabilities and networks in today s US and coalition combat operations, and growing adversary capabilities around the world. 1 This quote from former Pacific Air Forces Vice Commander and 13th Air Force Commander Lt Gen (Ret) Stan Kresge highlights challenges to conducting C2 in an 1
environment where adversaries possess operational capabilities that are equal to if not superior to that of the United States Air Force. By 2030, threats challenging the United States ability to conduct C2 around the world will be formidable. Adversaries continue to develop anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) weaponry to keep the US and its allies at bay. 2 The increased lethality presented by enemy fifth-generation fighters, advanced air-to-air missiles, and long-range surface-to-air missiles can be countered by the further development of tactics and software to support fifth generation aircraft employment. While these weapons are capable of destroying aircraft, ships and air bases lend themselves to being obvious threats to operations, commonly disregarded threats are those that hold at risk the US s extensive reachback access to networks and databases that enable C2. 3 Our adversaries continued pursuit and development of advanced electronic warfare (EW), cyber, counter-space and ISR capabilities to monitor the disposition of our fielded forces are force multipliers that enable the ability to conduct CDO throughout multiple domains. Unlike the current development of tactics to support fifth-generation aircraft, the development of tactics to counter multi-domain threats is stagnant, leaving the US s valuable C2 architecture at risk. Also, our enemies look to deny the US information superiority by creating a CDO environment by denying what Lt Gen (Ret) Kresge calls assured C2, stating You can t effectively command if you can t control. You can t control if you can t communicate. 4 Identified as one of three focus areas by Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) Gen Dave Goldfein, enhancing multi-domain C2 is now a priority. General Goldfein states that While we dominate the air, space, and cyber domains today, our adversaries have invested heavily in technologies to deny us the superiority we have come to rely upon. 5 Analysis 2
This paper will examine Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) C2 from the Air Operations Center (AOC) Intelligence, Reconnaissance and Surveillance Division (ISRD) Analysis, Correlation and Fusion (ACF) Team down to Unit Level Intelligence (ULI) supporting Air Tasking Order (ATO) execution at a flying wing. This paper intends to create a model that is tailorable to meet every AOC/ISRD s unique mission and provide the ISRD the ability to conduct ISR C2 of ULI through the use of multiple domains while operating in a contested operations, degraded systems and operational limitations (CDO) environment. The definition of ISR C2 would differ if you asked a Missions Operations Commander (MOC) at a Distributed Common Ground Station (DCGS), an Electronic Warfare Officer (EWO) on an RC- 135 or a ULI officer at a flying wing. Joint and Air Force doctrine define ISR as: An integrated operations and intelligence activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. 67 This paper, we will focus specifically on the portion of the definition that highlights ISR as in direct support of current and future operations. and discuss the ISR C2 structure from the ISRD down to ULI. 8 In addition to developing a model for ISR C2, this paper is designed to complement Capt David Billeci and Capt Victoria Bieniek s USAF Weapons School papers Preparing for Unit Level Intelligence Operations in a CDO Environment and Unit Level Intelligence Support to Adaptive Basing respectfully. These documents identify tactical level recommendations for operating in a multi-domain CDO environment. Moving forward with my research my intent is to study the current architecture used by the ISRD to support ULI on a daily basis. When describing architecture, I will identify not only communication networks and nodes that would allow communication up and down the 3
chain but also how information doctrinally should be sent and received versus how it is sent and received. Also, I will make recommendations for integrating with joint and bilateral partners within the geographic locations of both the ISRD and ULI and how these partnerships can be leveraged. After establishing what the baseline expectations for operations are, I will further expand on recommendations for operating in a CDO environment. My recommendations for operations in a CDO environment will include how to prioritize information requirements, provide intel fusion options as well as tools that can be utilized to exercise and train in peacetime. Tentative Outline Introduction o Background of Problem o Thesis Statement What is ISR C2? o Definition What does Joint Doctrine say? What does Air Force Doctrine say? o Emerging threats to ISR C2 How do we counter emerging threats Defining Operational Domains and CDO Levels o Defining Operational Domains o Defining CDO Levels What defines the levels - Low - Medium - High - Extreme How are CDO levels determined - ATO cycle Examples of degradation - Low - Medium - High - Extreme AOC/ISRD Doctrinal Operations o Air Tasking Cycle Inputs/Outputs Outputs - Baseline updates to theater order of battle 4
o What is the timeline for updating o What information is included in updates - INTSUMs/DISUMs o What is the timeline for production o 96-hour assessment - MISREP Summary o What is the status of ATO operations o What are other operational units reporting - Updates to COP o Who as the OB changed o Where are the FSCL/FLOT - Updated codes to tasked aircrew/airframes o What is the new or critical information that my impact JFACC s mission - RFI answers o Are there any answers to questions/requests for information from the supported units Inputs - MISREPS o What were the results of ATO missions - RFIs o What information is needed to answer CC PIRs Recommendations for ISRD Support to ULI in a CDO Environment o Identifying communication networks, joint and bilateral partners within a geographic area of supported unit o Define supported unit s priority responsibility in conflict up and down chain o Determine specific information needed to drive local operations o Determine an operational structure and enterprise to distribute information Identify systems and communication means and methods available to supported unit o Determine information flow that will allow for intel fusion within the supported geographic area o Identify means and methods for supported units to communicate to/from HHQ o Identify bilateral considerations and determine and determine how to incorporate bilateral partners o Identify organic ISR that my leveraged by supported units and how they can incorporate those capabilities o Identify ways to exercise and train during peacetime to prepare for wartime operations Conclusion transition into ACSC Pro Paper BREAK TDY to 603 AOC - 15-22 December 2017 5
o The intent of my TDY to Ramstein AB is to research to validate the doctrinal construct of operations contrasted to actual operations within an AOC/ISRD. My visit is not intended to discredit operations within the 603 AOC/ISRD; the intent is to use it as a testbed for the implementation of my proposed model. In addition to accomplishing research at the 603 AOC/ISRD, I will conduct a site visit to Spangdalhem AB where I will be afforded the opportunity to interview ULI personnel at the 52 nd OSS which is directly supported by the ISRD that I have used as a case study. Conclusion The results of my research TDY to Ramstein AB and Spangdalhem AB will be used to validate the model for ISR C2 from the ISRD down to ULI. Preliminary Bibliography Air Force Doctrine Document 2-0, Global integrated intelligence, surveillance, & reconnaissance operations. 2012 Bell, Bryan M. Capt, USAF and 2d Lt Even T. Rodgers, USAF. Space Resilience and the Contested, Degraded, and Operationally Limited Environment: The Gaps in Tactical Space Operations. Air and Space Power Journal 28, no. 6 (November December 2014). http://www.airuniversity.af.mil/portals/10/aspj/journals/volume-28_issue- 6/SEW-Bell_Rogers.pdf Cliff, Roger, Mark Burles, Michael S. Chase, Derek Eaton and Kevin L. Pollpeter. Entering the Dragon s Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States. RAND Corporation. Santa Monica, CA 2007. Department of the Air Force. Chief of Staff, Author. CSAF Focus Area: Enhancing Multidomain Command and Control...tying It All Together. 2017. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations. 5 July 2014. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations. 17 January 2017. Jamieson, VeraLinn Maj. Gen, USAF and Lt Col Maurizio Calabrese, USAF, An ISR Perspective on Fusion Warfare, The Mitchell Forum, no. 1 (October 2015): http://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/a2dd91_df2f54c534b34ac1bac674b7379aa788.pdf Kresge, Stan T. Lt. Gen, USAF (Ret), Assured C2 for Airpower: A Proposed US Air Force Cyber Strategy, The Mitchell Forum, no. 9 (February 2017): http://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/a2dd91_50a1befabc114f96846cb972cca6958d.pdf Nicholson, Tom Col, USAF and Lt Col Nelson Rouleau, USAF, Order In Chaos: The Future of Informed Battle Management and Command and Control, The Mitchell Forum, no. 10 6
(March 2017): http://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/a2dd91_d636e1c1d2474badbd8979d3bb700b50.pdf 1 Lt. Gen (Ret) Stan T. Kresge, Assured C2 for Airpower: A Proposed US Air Force Cyber Strategy, The Mitchell Forum, no. 9 (February 2017): 1, http://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/a2dd91_50a1befabc114f96846cb972cca6958d.pdf 2 Maj. Gen VeraLinn Jamieson and Lt Col Maurizio Calabrese, An ISR Perspecitve on Fusion Warfare, The Mitchell Forum, no. 1 (October 2015): 1, http://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/a2dd91_df2f54c534b34ac1bac674b7379aa788.pdf 3 Lt. Gen (Ret) Stan T. Kresge, Assured C2 for Airpower: A Proposed US Air Force Cyber Strategy, The Mitchell Forum, no. 9 (February 2017): 1, http://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/a2dd91_50a1befabc114f96846cb972cca6958d.pdf 4 Ibid., pg. 1. 5 United States. Department of the Air Force. Chief of Staff, Author. CSAF Focus Area: Enhancing Multi-domain Command and Control...tying It All Together. 2017. 6 Joint Publication (JP) 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, 5 July 2014, GL-10. 7 United States. Department of the Air Force et al., 2015. Global integrated intelligence, surveillance, & reconnaissance operations. Global integrated intelligence, surveillance, & reconnaissance operations. 8 Joint Publication (JP) 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, 5 July 2014, GL-10. 7