CAREER COURSE SEMINAR LESSON 11: EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS (6710)

CAREER COURSE SEMINAR LESSON 11: EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS (6710) 1. Purpose and Overview This guided discussion allows your students to discuss current Marine Corps doctrine for the conduct of expeditionary operations. The students will be exposed to how the Marine Corps as an expeditionary force in readiness is manned, trained, and equipped specifically to respond to a broad variety of crises and conflicts across the full range of military operations anywhere in the world. The readings ( MCDP 3, EF 21, and U.S. Amphibious Forces pamphlet) emphasize the naval character of Marine Corps forces and underscore the value of Marine Corps forces as a highly cost-effective option in a wide range of situations, including crises that require forcible entry. Since the attacks on the World Trade Center on 9/11, Marines have successfully conducted a wide variety of expeditionary missions. These missions have included the projection of a landing force from amphibious ships in the Indian Ocean more than 400 miles inland into Afghanistan; a mechanized attack from Kuwait to Baghdad, followed by prolonged counterinsurgency operations to pacify major portions of Iraq; and numerous foreign humanitarian assistance and crisis response operations worldwide. Forward-postured, sea-based forces, along with resources that were surged from dispersed global locations, were critical to the success of these missions. Crisis response has long been the stock-in-trade of indeed the rationale for forward-deployed, sea-based Marines; however, Marines have also become a force of choice for various engagement activities employed by the geographic combatant commanders to build partnerships and proactively shape the operational environment. 2. Method Using this spool, lead a two-hour discussion on expeditionary operations and oversee a onehour breakout/discussion that introduces joint force organization using an expeditionary operation, the Lebanon NEO in 2006. 0:00 1:45 Issues for Consideration () 1:45 2:15 Break to discuss Lebanon NEO and attributes that underpin the EF 21 design (30 Minutes-monitor) 2:15 2:50 Groups take turns presenting key points regarding the attributes of EF21 demonstrated (or not) during the Lebanon NEO; Instructor summary/wrap-up 2:50 3:00 Admin notes for following week. 3. End State A SNCO must have a firm foundation in Marine Corps doctrine. Expeditionary operations are the reason for the existence of the U.S. Marines. Therefore, the end state for this lesson is

for the students to understand and be able to articulate expeditionary doctrine as promulgated in MCDP 3 and Expeditionary Force 21. Key takeaways: a. While the Marine Corps may operate on and from the sea, in and from the air, and on the land, it is not optimized to dominate any domain. Rather, the Marine Corps is optimized to be expeditionary a strategically mobile force that is light enough to get to the crisis quickly, yet able to accomplish the mission or provide time and options prior to the arrival of additional forces. b. Being expeditionary runs through everything we do as U.S. Marines. An expeditionary mindset is part of our ethos, our maneuver warfare doctrine supports our expeditionary mindset. The expeditionary mindset is not dependent on acquisition. It is instead derived from discipline, training, and an overwhelming need to accomplish the mission regardless of the situation. c. The Marine Corps as an expeditionary force in readiness is manned, trained, and equipped specifically to rapidly respond to a broad variety of crises and conflicts across the full range of military operations anywhere in the world. d. Expeditionary Force 21, our capstone concept, evolves the Marine Corps construct for deployment and employment to: Deploy as SPMAGTFs and MEUs for steady-state engagement activities (security cooperation) and crisis response, composite forward into a MEB for more significant crises and contingencies, expand the MEB into a MEF to fight major operations and campaigns. 4. Requirements a. Reading Requirements. Read the Lesson 11 course card and the assigned readings: (1) CC6710REQA: MCDP 3,, chapters 2, pages 29-59 (30 pages). (2) CC6710REQB: Expeditionary Force 21 excerpt (21 pages). (3) CC6710 REQC: U.S. Amphibious Forces: Indispensable Elements of American Seapower (12 pages). (4) CC6710REQD: NEO Practical Application (2 pages) b. Other Requirements. (1) Review: EPME6212AA (Joint Operations from EPME6000AA Career Course DEP). (2) View Video: CC6710VID, watch the complete Expeditionary Force 21 video. (11 minutes). 5. Issues for Consideration a. What are expeditionary operations? Discuss various examples. (1) An expedition is a military operation conducted by an armed force to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country. Expeditionary operations involve the establishment of a forward base on either land or sea from which to project power. In

some instances, an armed force may have to establish its presence in the face of hostile resistance or forcible entry. (2) Power projection does not imply that expeditionary operations are always offensive in nature. Desert Shield was defensive in nature until it transitioned into Desert Storm, an offensive operation. An expeditionary force does not always need to be focused on ground combat. The logistics combat element is the likely main effort for a disaster relief operation. Expeditionary operations can range from full-scale combat to noncombat missions. Expeditionary implies a temporary duration with the intent to withdraw once the mission is accomplished. Expeditionary also implies that force protection and intelligence prevail over administrative, quality-of-life, or other considerations. (3) By the above definition, all branches of the armed forces participate in expeditions, and they do. But to be expeditionary requires a special mindset one that is constantly prepared for immediate deployment overseas into austere operation environments, bringing everything necessary to accomplish the mission. Ready to fight tonight! Our purpose, by congressional mandate, is to be our nation's rapid response force; we are thus called to be "most ready when the nation is least ready." From humanitarian relief efforts to combat operations; from air, land and sea to every clime and place, the Marine Corps is ready to answer our nation's call. (4) Below is a listing of examples of expeditionary operations since September 11, 2001 (a) 2001: Afghanistan - Amphib assault (TF 58) (b) 2002: Kosovo Peacekeeping (c) 2003: Iraq: Amphib assault (Basra) (d) 2004: Southeast Asia HA/DR (Tsunami) (e) 2005: Liberia NEO (f) 2006: Lebanon -- NEO (g) 2007: Bangladesh HA/DR (Cyclone) (h) 2008: Burma HA/DR (Typhoon) (i) 2009: Gulf of Aden -- Counter Piracy (TF 151) (j) 2010: Haiti HA/DR (Earthquake) (k) 2011: Libya -- TRAP (5) Figure 1 shows the types and locations of 137 expeditionary operations from 1990-2011.

Figure 1: 137 Expeditionary Operation 1990-2011 b. What are strategic and operational mobility and how do Marine forces achieve both? What are the primary threats against our ability to exploit these capabilities? Discuss various examples. (1) Strategic mobility: closure rate and global reach. Closure rate refers to how quickly a military force can close on an objective area after being tasked. Reach refers to the geographical limits to which a force can deploy and sustain credible military power. The Marine Corps gains its strategic mobility from its naval character. The Marine Corps sustains its strategic mobility in three ways: forward deployment of MAGTFs, prepositioning of equipment and supplies at sea, and rapid deployment of units by sea and air. (2) Operational mobility. Operational mobility is the capability of military forces to move from engagement to other actions within the context of the campaign. Strategic mobility is the ability to move from theater to theater (e.g., from Iraq to Afghanistan). Tactical mobility is the ability to move in combat. The Marine Corps achieves operational mobility in several possible ways: amphibious shipping, assault support aircraft, landing craft, assault amphibious vehicles, and light-armored vehicles. (3) The primary threats against our ability to exploit these capabilities are new challenges

from increasingly capable anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategies designed to disrupt U.S. power projection. The relatively few states with modern, integrated systems will pose the most lethal long-range anti-access threat. A larger number of threats will employ shorter-range, area denial capabilities to impede access, cause U.S. casualties, intimidate allies or gain a better bargaining position. (a) States and non-states alike have demonstrated a willingness to accept casualties in an area denial campaign that establishes them as a credible counter to U.S. power. While military technology is the most obvious form of A2/AD [anti-ship ballistic missiles and anti-ship cruise missiles (ASBM/ASCM), submarines, and mines], unconventional methodologies will likely emerge including civilian flash mobs, human shields, blocked infrastructure, diplomatic restraints, economic penalties or the threat of lost commerce or increased oil prices. Presenting a thicket of A2/AD obstacles cyber attacks, proxy organizations, attacks on rearming sites, diplomatic maneuvering or ally intimidation forces the United States to think of power projection in new ways. Mutually assured economic disruption will be a powerful anti-access tool in the new and connected global society. (b) The increased range, precision, and proliferation of A2/AD systems highlight the need to conduct dispersed operations with smaller, task-organized forces. There are other reasons to operate in this way. The GCCs are increasing their demand for tailored forces to conduct theater security cooperation activities with a wider number of partner nations. Ranging from security force assistance to combined training exercises, Phase 0 activities are important elements of both a service s engagement strategy and the GCC s Theater Security Cooperation Plan. These activities ensure access prior to the start of contingencies and contribute directly to the reduction of ungoverned spaces from which future adversaries may originate. Notwithstanding, theater commanders must still be prepared to quickly consolidate and reorganize forces into larger formations to expeditiously deal with escalating crises and contingencies. These competing demands call for a new approach to how we organize, deploy and employ forces especially with regard to effectively linking Marine Corps, Navy, Coast Guard, Special Operations Command and partner capabilities. This starts with revising our approach to capability and capacity development. (c) Future fights will likely be short-warning come as you are challenges posed by irregular adversaries. Sea-based Marines must be organized, trained, and equipped to engage, respond, and project. In order to meet the nation s needs, the Marine Corps must enhance its ability to engage with a wider set of partners in order to build capability, forge solid relationships, and promote diplomatic access. At the same time, Marine Corps forces must remain ready to respond to crises whether natural or manmade. They must also be able to project power either soft or hard as the situation requires from the sea. Collectively, these enhancements will expand the Marine Corps contribution to preventing conflict, protecting national interests, and ensuring overseas access. c. How does the structure of the MAGTF support expeditionary operations? What changes are occurring to maximize the ability of the different MAGTFs to meet the

conditions imposed by the evolving security environment? (1) MAGTFs are organized, trained, and equipped to perform forward-presence, crisisresponse, and full-scale combat missions. MAGTFs can perform missions ranging from humanitarian operations to peacekeeping to intense combat and can operate in permissive, uncertain, and hostile environments. They can operate from sea or expeditionary bases or both. Every MAGTF consists of a command element, ground combat element, aviation combat element, and logistics combat element. (2) The preferred method of deploying Marines is aboard Navy amphibious ships to form ARG/MEU Teams. These are the Nation s most-ready, forward-postured forces. This capability provides strategic speed, agility, and options to our National Command Authority. They operate in international waters retaining flexibility for the Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) while respecting the sovereign territory of individual nation states. The ARG/MEU team can respond faster from longer ranges with greater capabilities across the ROMO than any other conventional forces in the Department of Defense and are also capable of enabling Joint, interagency and coalition forces. We have increased collaboration with SOF, significantly improving our complementary capabilities. (3) Due to their forward presence, flexibility, ability to respond quickly and the decision space they afford our leaders, ARG/MEU s continue to be in high demand. Unfortunately, the Navy and Marine Corps can meet less than half of the GCC ARG/MEU crisis response force demand based on the ARG shipping available for tasking. Today, available expeditionary Navy/Marine Corps forces stand ready aboard ships to assure allies, deter potential adversaries, and provide persistent U.S. presence. Our Marines are forward deployed, with little to no footprint ashore, to respond and protect U.S. national security interests around the globe. (4) With the high demand for Marine crisis response capabilities and the shortage of amphibious platforms from which to forward deploy forces, SPMAGTF-CRs were developed. While they don t provide the flexibility and responsiveness of an ARG/MEU, they mitigate a capability gap for the combatant commanders. Our SPMAGTF-CRs are tailored to respond to crisis and also conduct security cooperation activities with partner nations in order to develop interoperability, facilitate access, build partner capacity and security relationships, and gain regional understanding. This past year (2015), SPMAGTF-CR units assigned safeguarded the lives of our diplomatic personnel, conducted embassy reinforcement and military-assisted departures from U.S. Embassies, participated in TSC exercises, and provided critical aviation and ground capabilities in the fight against ISIL. The placement of these Marine Corps tailored task force capabilities forward, where GCC s need them, provides enhanced diplomatic protection and additional crisis response options. Figure 8 depicts Marine Corps goals for assigning and allocating forces to meet GCC requirements.

Figure 2: Marine Forces Poised for Response d. How are Marine forces regionally oriented, but globally employable? Why is this desirable? (1) Regional orientation is intended to promote consistency in operations and procedures among naval forces, special operations forces (SOF), partners and the interagency communities. The Marine Corps is attempting to regionally orient, resource, and employ Marine Corps operating forces to ensure familiarity between Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC) and Marine Corps commanders and staffs. (a) Regionally concentrated, credible combat power to: limit regional conflict with deployed, decisive maritime power. deter major power war. win our nation s wars. (b) Globally distributed, mission-tailored maritime forces to: contribute to homeland defense in depth. foster and sustain cooperative relationships with more international partners. prevent or contain local disruptions before they impact the global system. (2) Regionalization attempts to minimize potential adverse cultural and political impact by stepping lightly in all areas of support and infrastructure and working with our regional partners to achieve success. Regional orientations enhance habitual relationships but do not preclude forces from being available to support requirements on a global scale. (3) MEB development includes establishing JTF-capable MEB command elements (CEs)

that are regionally focused to meet GCCs needs. Another characteristic is the ability to composite forward and merge rapidly deploying Marine Corps forces into a cohesive, agile force scaled to the mission. This will make the MEBs the centerpiece of an expeditionary force in readiness prepared for immediate, effective employment in any type of crisis or conflict. (4) While Marine forces are regionally oriented for the reasons identified above, the force remains globally employable. As our nation continues to face fiscal uncertainty, the Marine Corps is responsibly building a relevant and lean force for the 21st century. The emerging security threats to our Nation demand that America has a globally responsive, truly expeditionary, consistently ready, maritime crisis response force. The Marine Corps remains committed to building the most ready force our nation can afford, but this comes at a risk. Forward deployed naval forces enable our nation to rapidly respond to crises throughout the world. For approximately eight percent of the Department of Defense s (DoD s) budget, the Marine Corps provides an affordable insurance policy for the American people and a highly efficient and effective hedge against global and regional tensions that cause instability. We provide our nation s leaders with time and decision space by responding to today s crisis, with today s forces...today. e. Discuss the current role of expeditionary operations in the "Pivot to the Pacific" and explain why you think the role will either expand or contract. (1) Pacific Command (PACOM), the largest of the geographic Unified Combatant Commands, spans 105 million square miles and encompasses about half the earth's surface, stretching from the waters off the west coast of the U.S. to the western border of India, and from Antarctica to the North Pole. The thirty-six nations that comprise the Asia-Pacific region are home to more than 50% of the world's population. Concurrently, U.S. Marine Forces, Pacific (MARFORPAC) possesses about two thirds of U.S. Marine Corps combat strength, includes I and III Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF), and comprises about 85,000 personnel. Within an area as vast as PACOM, the timeliness to respond does not exist solely in maritime transport, although the presence of the 31st Marine Expeditionary Force (MEU), 7th Fleet naval assets, and High Speed Vessel (HSV) remain a part of our nation s ability to respond to crisis within the region. (2) Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region places a renewed emphasis on air and naval forces, according to the Defense Department s January 2012 Defense Budget Priorities and Choices document that detailed changes in Pentagon spending during the next decade. The Marine Corps/ Navy amphibious forces stand on the threshold of an era that will place high demands on America s maritime capabilities, particularly as the military rebalances to the Asia Pacific region. Allies and stakeholders in the Pacific region increasingly desire amphibious force and other theater security training. (3) The achievements of the Marine Corps in the Pacific within the last decade are numerous. The leadership, rapid response, and enduring presence exhibited during various humanitarian assistance / disaster relief (HA/DR) efforts such as the 2005 Pakistan earthquake relief operations, Operation Unified Assistance for tsunami relief in 2004, and nearly a dozen of operations in support of typhoon destruction demonstrate the capabilities of the U.S. Marine Corps in WestPac. In addition, Operation Tomodachi, a

45-day evolution in 2011 to engage the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear catastrophe on mainland Japan, demonstrated the versatility of III MEF while it simultaneously supported efforts for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). (4) As our nation continues to shift its strategic focus to the Asia-Pacific, it is important to note that that the Marine Corps specifically, III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) has been forward based there since the 1940s. Marines have a long history in the Pacific, replete with many hard-won victories. We are ideally suited to operate within this maritime region and we are adjusting our force lay-down to support the President s Strategic Guidance for the Department of Defense issued in January 2012. We remain on course to have 22,500 Marines west of the International Date Line forward based and operating within the Asia-Pacific theater. (5) Marines have the experience, capabilities, and most importantly, the strategic relationships already in place within the region to facilitate the national security strategy. Marines forward deployed and based in the Asia-Pacific Theater conduct more than 70 exercises a year, all designed to increase interoperability with our regional partners, build theater security cooperation, and enhance prosperity and stability in this region. By strategically locating our forces across the region, we enable more active participation in cooperative security and prosperity. No forces are more suited to the Pacific than naval amphibious forces. We envision an Asia-Pacific region where our Marines presence will continue to build upon the excellent cooperation with our regional partners and allies to advance our common interests and common values. 6. Lebanon NEO Discussion. a. Break into groups of 3 or 4. Have each group discuss and be prepared to explain how the MEU/Phibron team exemplified, or failed to exemplify, each of the eight attributes that underpin the EF21 design. (1) Expeditionary Force In Readiness 1/3 of operating forces deployed forward for deterrence and proximity to crises Self-sustaining under austere conditions (2) Middleweight Force Light enough for rapid response Heavy enough to prevail in the littorals (3) Modern Force Preserves quantitative edge over opponents Exploits innovative concepts and approaches (4) Integrated Combined Arms Force Applies all aspects of joint combat power Extends power of naval forces

(5) Integrated Naval Force Command and control exploits the sea as maneuver space Leverages traditional and innovative operating concepts (6) Force Biased for Action Poised for rapid crisis response no tiered readiness Readily Deployable-Employable-Sustainable forces (7) Leading Edge of Joint Force Regionally oriented MEFs and MEBs Small fly-in command element capable of transitioning to a joint warfighting headquarters (8) Forcible Entry In Depth Scalable to crisis, contingency or forcible entry Capable of projecting two MEBs from the sea Seizes and holds for follow-on joint forces b. Bring the groups back together and discuss each of the attributes listed above. Select a group to present how the 24th MEU/CPR-4 team exemplified, or failed to exemplify, each of the attributes. After discussing the attributes, conclude with the following questions: (1) At the outset of the 2006 Israel Hezbollah War, the 24 th MEU/CPR-4 are forward deployed in the Red Sea. 24 th MEU is ashore in Jordan, interacting with our Allies, participating in Exercise INFINITE MOONLIGHT. Why is this important? This is a demonstration of the many benefits of expeditionary forces. The MEU is: A. Forward deployed with minimal footprint ashore. B. Engaged with our allies. C. Near a crisis spot and ready to respond to crisis. (2) What capabilities did the MEU/Phibron provide to the Combatant Commander? The MEU/Phibron provide the combatant commander: A. Ready forces that possess both operational and tactical mobility B. Command and Control C. Secure staging area D. Logistics E. Options

(3) Which Combatant Commander is responsible for Lebanon NEO? It is not obvious which combatant commander would be responsible for supporting this NEO. Lebanon is within CENTCOM, while Israel and Cyprus are in EUCOM s region. US CENTCOM s NAVFOR initially supported the 2006 Lebanon NEO. After the crisis, support to the NEO continued as a JTF within EUCOM.

**********************************BACK-UP******************************* Lebanon NEO Timeline 12 July 13 July 14 July 15 July 16 July 17 July 18 July 19 July The conflict began on 12 July 2006 when 8 Israeli soldiers were killed and two were captured during a cross-border attack. At 9:05 AM local time, Hezbollah's military wing launched a barrage of rockets and mortars on the northern Israeli town of Shlomi. Israel called together an emergency cabinet meeting, and said that it held the Beirut government responsible for the attacks, adding "The Lebanese government, of which Hezbollah is a part, is trying to shake regional stability". In response, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) launched a series of air and artillery strikes at positions in southern Lebanon, generally seen as the support base for Hezbollah. MEU ashore in Jordan (~175 nm N of Aqaba) participating in exercise Infinite Moonlight with Jordanian armed forces. Israel began implementing a land and sea blockade on Lebanon. The Beirut International Airport (the sole international airport in Lebanon) was bombed, forcing all international flights to be diverted to Cyprus. The Israeli army said the airport had been used to smuggle in weapons to Hezbollah. The seaports were also blockaded by Israel. Israeli SAAR hit by C802 (anti-ship missile) & Egyptian Ferry Sunk NAVCENT tethers IWO ISG to Aqaba, Jordan (36-hr tether). Beirut Damascus highway cut by IDF air forces 3 MEU CH-53s, 2 KC-130s, and 40 man security and maint team sent to Cyprus. NAVCENT orders IWO ISG to backload MEU from Aqaba. 2 x CH-53s evacuate first 21 AMCITS from Beirut to Cyprus. CTF-59 deploys from Bahrain to Cyprus NSH begins backload; ACE fly-on to IWO IDF warns S. Lebanon residents to evacuate. NSH completes backload enroute through SUEZ canal IWO/WBI commence backload 3 x CH-53s evacuate 42 AMCITS from Beirut to Cyprus. IDF warns S. Lebanon residents to evacuate. WBI backload complete. MEU CH-53s evacuate 121 AMCITS from Beirut to Cyprus. Orient Queen (contract carrier) evacuates 1066 AMCITS. IWO Strike Group completes backload, all ships enroute Suez. MEU CH-53s evacuate 157 AMCITS from Beirut to Cyprus.

20 July 21 July 22July 23 July 24 July 25 July 26 July 27 July 28 July IDF forces massed on the border. NSH evacuates 1058 AMCITS to Cyprus CH-53s/MH-53s evacuate 191 AMCITS to Cyprus IWO/WBI/TRE/BHN transit Suez Canal. Canadian ship evacuates 160 AMCITS to Turkey Orient Queen evacuates 874 AMCITS from Beirut to Cyprus 500,000 Lebanese displaced 150,000 refugees to Syria TRE evacuates 1854 AMCITS to Cyprus NSH evacuates 1130 to Cyprus CH/MH-53s evacuate 191 to Cyprus Rahmah (contract carrier) evacuates 824 AMCITS to Cyprus Shortages increase in Lebanon. Lebanon calls for U.S. help to create secure route out of Southern Lebanon. WBI evacuates 817 AMCITS to Cyprus MH53s evacuate 40 AMCITS to Cyprus Hezbollah digs in for anticipated Israeli ground assault TRE evacuates 1641 AMCITS to Cyprus NSH evacuates 526 AMCITS to Cyprus MH-53s evacuate 39 to Cyprus Israeli Defense Force begins ground attack into South Lebanon. Secretary of State Rice visits Beirut Orient Queen evacuates 776 AMCITS to Cyprus Rahmah evacuates 154 AMCITS to Cyprus MH53 evacuates 28 AMCITS to Cyprus Vittoria-M evacuates 282 AMCITS to Cyprus Orient Queen evacuates 489 AMCITS to Cyprus MH-53s evacuate 40 to Cyprus MH-53s deliver 3 HA kits Looting begins in Beirut Princess Marissa evacuates 173 AMCITS from Tyre to Cyprus Orient Queen evacuates 379 AMCITS to Cyprus Vittoria-M evacuates 250 AMCITS to Cyprus Humanitarian Crisis determined; USAID to coordinate HA efforts. Vittoria-M attempts to continue evacuation from Tyre security deteriorates, AMCITS taken overland to Beirut. MH53 evacuates 2 AMCITS to Cyprus Israeli Defense Force expands ground attack to Bint Jbeil (South Lebanon). Departure from Beirut upgraded from Authorized to Ordered. MH53 evacuates 5 AMCITS to Cyprus Orient Queen evacuates 308 AMCITS to Cyprus

29 July 23 Aug HSV Swift delivers HA supplies to Beirut Vittoria-M/Orient Queen contract cancelled by DOS. 14,455 AMCITS evacuated to date. ISG remains on station Mission authority transitioned from CENTCOM to EUCOM EUCOM directed JTF Lebanon to assume responsibility for military support to American USS Mount Embassy Whitney Beirut serves and as to JTF help Lebanon Department flagship. of State-led humanitarian a. What are expeditionary operations? Discuss various examples. (1) Below is an excerpt from a recent CMC Address to the Center for Strategic and International Studies Marines are daily engaged in everything from reinforcing our embassies with FAST teams, to supporting Joint Special Operations, counter-piracy and counter-terrorism missions around the globe. Marines are purpose- built for exactly the kind of security environment that we are living in today. In that regard, I d like to talk briefly about the role of the Marine Corps in today s security environment. First, let me reiterate that Marines are an inherently naval force. I know that does not sit comfortably with some whose context for warfare is strictly tied to physical domains. There may be added complexity in the idea of a force that operates comfortably on land, air, and sea... one that specializes in those cross-domain seams. Some would like to see us branded as ground forces, or as a second land army. We are not! The Marine Corps fills a unique lane in the joint fight... one that leverages the sea as the primary conduit for global power projection. The sea provides the primary global commons through which American power is projected... and Marines...with the amphibious warships that carry them... are purpose-built for exploiting this avenue. But, while we are not a second land army, we are still able to contribute to a land campaign. We ve done that many times over our nation s history, and in each case we have acquitted ourselves well. From Trenton to Belleau Wood, from Anbar to Helmand province... when the nation has needed to throw us into the breach, we have been there. You ll get no apology from me for our broad utility and flexibility for our national leaders. But that should not serve to confuse anyone about our primary role. Our nation pays for a Marine Corps to be its principle Crisis Response Force...a force that is in such a high state of readiness that it can respond to today s crisis...with today s force...today. Not tomorrow...or two weeks from now...but today!

Amphibious forces provide a range of capabilities from the sea. We can loiter unseen over the horizon or provide a visible deterrent. We can temporarily work ashore building strong partnerships, then swiftly re-embark that same force to respond to a distant crisis. With modern aviation, we can provide kinetic strike or responsive maneuver from hundreds of miles out to sea. We can influence events ashore and return to the sea with the same swiftness we arrived. That broad-based utility makes amphibious ships with embarked Marines... the ultimate Swiss Army knife of the Joint force. Instability is an enduring feature of a rapidly globalizing world. Changing demographics and competition for resources breeds violence and extremism. The Marine Corps provides the force able to swiftly intercede in crisis. Our readiness buys time and decision-space for our national leaders, probably their most valuable commodity when things have gone bad. Our readiness and strategic mobility gives our leaders time to assess the situation and formulate a more deliberate response. As a nation, we desire peace, but there are times when our enemies compel U.S. intervention. Because we operate from the sea and forward deployed locations, we provide an effective initial crisis-response capability when our citizens, allies or interests are threatened. Third, Marines provide a stabilizing forward presence that deters conflict. Forward presence builds trust that cannot be surged when conflict looms. Forward presence matters. I ve heard folks talk about virtual presence, and I understand what they are trying to say. But from our allies perspective, virtual presence is actual absence. Actual presence demonstrates shared commitments and shared dangers. These are critical as we bolster national credibility and deterrence through persistent forward naval engagement. Virtual presence says something much less powerful. Virtual presence would not have helped in Sendai. It would not have helped in Pakistan, and it would not have helped in the Philippines. With dispersed expeditionary units afloat near likely crisis areas, and prepositioned equipment stationed forward aboard deployed shipping, the Navy/Marine team is a visible and tangible reminder of our nation s resolve. Fourth, Marines build strong partners. Marines build trust. I get the sense at times when I am speaking publically that some folks think that investment in building partner capacity is charity work. It is not! It is an investment in collective security throughout the global commons. If our national grand strategy has an element of collective norms and collective security at its core, then partnerships are incredibly important. Marines have long been a security partner of choice. Sea- based Marines tread lightly on host nation infrastructure and sovereignty, making our presence less onerous to host governments. Most of the nations we deal with have defense forces that are much smaller than their US counterparts. Because we re sized more-closely to the security forces of many other nations, the U.S. Marine Corps provides a model of a tightly integrated air-ground- logistics force. That s something they are eager to achieve with their own armed forces. The scalability of Marines resonates with them, as does our warrior ethos.

Fifth, Marines assure access ashore. Nobody likes to think about this one... but I think we take great risk if we discount the capability to project our national power at the place and time of our choosing. There are times where the US must create access to protect our citizens, defend innocents, and intervene in dangerous situations... even when that access is not freely given. Our power projection capabilities enable the U.S. joint force to push open the door of access where we need to. This ability to go where the nation is not invited fundamentally underwrites the deterrent value of the joint force, and provides strategic decision-makers options that complement precision strike or nuclear capabilities. This doesn t mean amphibious assaults like you ve seen in the movies. Those images of past successes sometimes cast a long shadow. That isn t how it is done in the modern day. It is not how we do it as part of the Joint team. Modern amphibious operations seek to achieve precision maneuver that creates and exploits seams in forces that might oppose a landing. Uniquely, Marines operate without the requirement for nearby land bases, and can sustain themselves from the sea without intact and secured ports and airfields. The fact that you can accomplish that mission with the same forces that are out there daily building collective security partnerships and responding to crisis... makes Marines a pretty compelling security investment when money is tight. And, let s talk quickly about how Marines respond to human disaster. Although amphibious capabilities are built for war and maintained to fight, their application to relieving human crisis is a natural extension of our multi-domain utility. In this increasingly globalized age, one where every natural or manmade disaster draws the attention of the world, the U.S. cannot be silent in the face of humanitarian crisis. I absolutely believe that timely U.S. responses strengthen the credibility of our security promises, and increase the effectiveness of our deterrence. The ability of amphibious forces to provide air, ground, and sea response in times of humanitarian disaster... without imposing burdens on already stressed infrastructure... makes us a unique contributor to US capability and influence. That s a short list of some of our major roles. I may be a little biased, but I think when you look at the numbers, Marines are a pretty compelling security investment. The Marine Corps provides significant return on investment for every security dollar. When the Nation pays the sticker price for her Marines, she gets not only the least-expensive force in the DoD arsenal... she also gets one that s highly skilled, forward deployed... and able to operate across the full range of military operations. Perhaps our most important role is the Congressional mandate we have carried proudly since 1952. For over half a century, the Marine Corps has met the mandate of the 82d Congress to be, the most ready when the nation is generally least ready. Perhaps Jay Leno said it best 3 days after the attacks on 9/11 when he said... Now it s time to send in the Marines to settle the score! f. What are the primary threats against our ability to exploit these capabilities? Discuss various examples.

(a) Naval forces must consider multiple A2/AD threat constructs in order to be ready to react, especially as forward basing is diminished and U.S. conventional dominance is no longer a guarantee. (b) A multi-domain force operating from the sea has the ability to advance sea control through raids ashore against hidden targets, can disrupt integrated air defenses through naval surface fires, and can use fleet aviation to create conditions for placing forces ashore if required by the objectives of the campaign. Littoral maneuver, as a methodology to bypass fixed defenses and exploit enemy seams, must overcome the potentially widening gap between ship and shore. The naval force must outmaneuver the enemy in the intellectual environment, not present an overmatch in firepower alone. New concepts and approaches such as the Single Naval Battle, an integrated naval expeditionary system, and broadened combinedarms special-operations integration are potent counters to these emerging A2/AD threats. g. How does the structure of the MAGTF support expeditionary operations? What changes are occurring to maximize the ability of the different MAGTFs to meet the conditions imposed by the evolving security environment? (1) The seabase provides a ready platform to link the naturally complementary capabilities of the MAGTF and special operations forces. The idea of afloat prepositioned resources as relevant only to major theater war masks its greater potential. The naval force must develop innovative new concepts for employing intra-theater sea lift/seabase platforms in littoral operations to enable unprecedented operational distances. Concepts such as Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS), Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM), and Distributed Operations (DO) are well aligned to the 21st-Century security environment, but require continued innovation in organization, equipment and execution.