12/4/15 Stopping the Reinvasion of the Baltic States Chariots of Fires Taking the High Ground on Future Warfare Low Density, Nonlinear Fight The Objectives Give the Russians pause Set a framework for analysis Introduce a concept that can be tested in games and exercises Guide force development but first where are we? Sam Gardiner 9 December 2015 1 20th Guards Combined Arms Army Reconnaissance Brigade Air Missile Brigade Missile and Ar;llery Brigades Helicopter Regiment Logis;cs Brigade (Heavy with AFV s) Tank and Motor Rifle Brigades Formed Holding 6th Air Defense Army Main Axis Since 1994 Center of Gravity Holding Maneuver Element 1st Guards Tank Army Reconnaissance Brigade Air Missile Brigade Missile and Ar;llery Helicopter Regiment Logis;cs Brigade (Heavy with Tanks) D+1 Holding Re-Invasion Concept of Operations Russian Reorganization 1
12/4/15 Distributed Lethality A New Threat Ring Centers of Strategic Air Defenses Severmorosk 2000km CEP 3 meters St. Petersburg Moscow Kaliningrad Tactical Fires Deficiency Estonia 155mm 105mm (32) 122mm (42) 155mm (24) Supports the Lithuanian Wolf Mechanized Brigade 155mm Latvia 100mm Lithuania 105mm 155mm New SP Howitzer 70km Polonez - Belarus 200km 10km 7 10km 8 2
Leverage in Opera2onal Art Simple leverage - Lanchester s square law of effecjveness... Complex leverage Maneuver warfare consequences... 9 Airland Ba7le Future: The Nonlinear, Low Density Ba7lefield The Cycle of Future Battle Disperse Mass Fight Re- disperse ReconsJtute 11 12 3
Interchangeability When Units Are the Target Used to be: (Triandafillov) Troops Fires Now: Troops Multi-Service and Multi-Nation Fires Cyber and Electronic Warfare Information Operations Essence of Stopping the Reinvasion Attack the Russian plan Focus fires Target units Integrate combat power FOI Workshop 9 December 2015 13 14 Operational Art: Focused Fires General: Time is crijcal and is against NATO culminajng point. Horizontal escalajon is not in U.S. interests. Seek dominance of the air ba]le only to the extent of being able to concentrate on the ground ba]le. Focus fires on those aspects of the a]ack that would bring a Russian success, understanding Russian vulnerabilijes (integrated combat power plan). Defeat Mechanism Shock ANacking Units Rather than Weapons Disrup;on Disloca;on Destruc;on FOI Workshop 9 December 2015 15 16 4
Unit Damage Consequences Target Selection and Planning Shock - Individuals can t respond as a unit. (>hour) Disruption Command is unable to respond. (>day) Dislocation Response is disoriented and lacks focus. (days) Destruction Unit is dead as a fighting force. (weeks) Unit Mission Unit Movement Passage of Lines Offensive - Open Terrain Defense - Open Terrain Defense - Urban Target Kill Required for Unit Mission Kill 20% 10% 15% 30% 60% 18 Principles of the Unit Target Concept More rapid application of force on the target unit achieves destruction with less application of force. More varied application of force on the target unit achieves destruction with less application Amount of force required to generate a damage level is primarily a function of the mission of the target unit. It s easier to move to a higher damage level by preceding from a lower. Dynamic Target Selection and Planning Traffic Control Point Commander's Net Assembly Area...means being able to identify and target the key elements of movement command and control. 19 20 5
Dynamic Target Selection and Planning Dynamic Target Selection and Planning defensive posi;ons being prepared Enroute Fuel Facili;es battalion messing area...means being able to identify and target the key elements of enemy logistics....means being able to tell when a unit is going to the defense. 21 22 Russian Theorists Focus 1985-1987 The EvoluJon of Soviet OperaJonal Art, 1927-1991 Translated by S. Orenstein The future evolujon of land- air ba]le and the development of the air echelon. The future development of non- linear warfare. 23 Sixth Generation Warfare Major General Vladimir Slipchenko Moscow 1999 Development of precision strike systems Massing of conventional forces would be an invitation to disaster Demands the need to mass effects Ultimate evolution would be the capability to conduct distant, no-contact operations. Reported in Jacob W. Kipp, Russian Sixth Generation Warfare and Recent Developments. Eurasia Daily Monitor, January 25, 2012. 24 6
Ahead More than anything, we need to communicate that we can deal with the Russian threat to the Baltic States. Analytic community needs to focus on the details of Baltic defense. We need a better mix of precision munitions. NATO needs to refocus infrastructure funding to dispersal and hardening. Countries of the Alliance need to invest in more standoff fires. We need more aerial tankers. We need a reinvigoration of the study of the operational art. The use of offensive cyber operations. Stronger electronic warfare component. Some of us outside the official structure need to write more about how NATO might use nuclear weapons in the defense of the Baltic States. We need to understand how to limit escalation if there were a conflict in the Baltic States. 7