Tactical Iraqi Language and Culture Training Systems Lessons Learned from 3 rd Battalion 7 th Marines 2007

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Arial 20 / Bold / Italics And/Or PG Logo Tactical Iraqi Language and Culture Training Systems Lessons Learned from 3 rd Battalion 7 th Marines 2007 LtCol Walt Yates A/PM Range Training Aids, Devices, and Simulators PMTRASYS

OIF 2007 Recap By 2007 US Forces had been fighting in Iraq for four years Dominance in combat against the insurgency had not been sufficient to win against the enemy Outmatched in combat the insurgents had become experts at oblique attacks using IEDs and snipers Security of the Iraqi populace was tenuous in many places and insurgents moved easily through the populace Page 2

Capability Gaps US forces tasked to provide security for the local populace, train Iraqi security forces, and pursue insurgents lacked the ability to communicate verbally with Arabic speaking Iraqis The numbers of trained Arabic linguists and local interpreters had been insufficient to meet the needs of daily operations. Marines in Al Anbar province at the squad level needed to converse directly with Iraqis Page 3

3 rd Battalion 7 th Marines In preparation for the unit s fourth deployment to Iraq since 2003, 3/7 sought to develop a small number of proficient Arabic speakers in each squad Resident schools were unavailable SME Linguist availability was limited Tactical Iraqi Language and Culture Training System was identified as a potentially suitable tool Page 4

The Plan Select two Marines from every squad Train them using TILTS at the MAGTFTC Battle Simulation Center for two hour blocks every Monday and Friday Training commences three months prior to Mojave Viper (capstone pre-deployment training exercise) Page 5

Deployment 3/7 deployed to FOB Hurricane Point in Ar Ramadi in 2007, the same FOB from which they operated in 2005 In 2005 the environment in Ar Ramadi was highly kinetic with almost daily combat Upon completing the deployment in November 2007 3/7 had the distinction of being the first Marine infantry battalion to return from an OIF deployment not to lose a single Marine Page 6

Gathering Lessons Learned Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) conducted a quick-look study in which the Marines of 3/7 who trained with TILTS were surveyed about their training and its effectiveness In addition to surveying the trainees, the officers of 3/7 were interviewed in a group and asked to assess the impact of the TILTS training and it contribution toward the success of their mission Page 7

Findings Page 8

Opportunities to Employ Skills We had a meal with a native local and held a small conversation that was both in English and Arabic. I worked on a military transition team (MiTT) team, so I used Arabic everyday trying to communicate with the Iraqi soldiers. I was able to direct traffic...with simple directional commands. Everyday, either on patrol or working with Iraqi Police. Page 9

Opportunities to Employ Skills On patrols I would engage locals in conversation about the area they lived in and any problems going on. I also stood a post where Iraqis would go through to get into the station, and I would have to ask them who they were and why they were there. I was working with the IA and IP everyday, so what I learned with this program helped for the first month until I learned more from the Iraqis. Page 10

Opportunities to Employ Skills I worked in the COC and an observation post (OP) and used my Arabic to communicate with and teach the IP/IA posted there with me. I would interact with IP station chiefs. I would request a working party or IP for a patrol. I would also communicate with the rest of the officers as well as enlisted Iraqi nationals. On patrol 60% of the time I did not use interpreters when talking with Civilians. Page 11

Student Opinion of TILTS If you put TILTS and a teacher together the outcome would be much better. Prior to deploying, I took a week long class given by an Arabic interpreter. I thought it was very effective, probably more so than TILTS because he was able to explain stuff that a computer couldn't, but it helped a lot having used both programs. Page 12

Student Opinion of TILTS Learning by direct interaction with another person would improve the speed of learning. TILTS should be given more time to train. I think Marines would go and learn better if there was a curriculum, like finish this amount and take this test by the end of the week. Page 13

Student Opinion of TILTS More time should be given to Marines during the week to learn Arabic. I think that you should add more hours to the class. It was a good class, but I don t think I had enough hours in the class to use it right. I recommend using TILTS daily. I feel that daily use will better help Marines retain the knowledge gained. Page 14

Student Opinion of TILTS Overall the system is good, but I think that to be the most effective Marines must use the course every day. I would just ask for more allotted time for TILTS. I would change the course to have it at least three times per week. Page 15

Impact Assessment From Students The Iraqi Arabic I learned, coupled with Arabic learned in country, allowed me to work with IP/IAs more efficiently, both in teaching/planning and on patrol. It also allowed me to create a stronger bond with the people, by communicating with them directly as opposed to through a translator while observing their culture and customs, which I believe caused the Iraqi people to open up to us more. When this occurred our area was more stable and the people began to aid us in our mission. Page 16

Impact Assessment From Students The skills I learned in the class played a major roll in the success of Iraq and 3/7. As a mechanic, I had to interact with IP and the IA; it was useful to have a grasp of Arabic for my job. It helped out very much in being able to communicate with Iraqis and Iraqi police without an interpreter. Page 17

Impact Assessment From Students TILTS impacted my success as well as 3/7. Iraqis saw that we were different from other Marines. I still have friends from Iraq calling me on the cell phone to keep in touch. The skill and language I learned helped me talk with Iraqi locals so that I could figure out what their neighborhoods needed (power, water, trash cleanup, etc.). Page 18

Spoken Dialog Builds Relationships We had one fixed that did not have an interpreter we brought out the Phrase- a-lator and the Iraqis did not like the idea of us trying to communicate through a box. They would rather pantomime. They would literally push it away and this happened several times. (Then it occurred to me that) it s more about the connection they re looking for. They would rather have the connection and try to work it out than have some piece of technology translate it for you - Weapons Company Commander 3/7 Page 19

Impact Assessment From Leaders Some of the Lance Corporals really did have a strategic impact out there these guys, though not formally trained Arabic speakers, through their normal conversations really helped us out of big jams looking for missing person out there in the city Marines with this (TILTS) training were able to locate people with the knowledge (of their whereabouts) and vector us in on them they were able to locate some high value individuals for us just by talking to neighbors 3/7 Rifle Company Commander Page 20

Impact Assessment From Leaders It did greatly enhance our operational capability. At one of my (Joint Security Stations) we had a 100 man (Iraqi Police)... We only had one interpreter who was (frequently) going out on patrol Having these Marines with the ability to communicate in the COC increased our tempo, it increased our understanding, it increased most of all our relationship with (the Iraqis) because they understood that we came in with a basic set of (Arabic) knowledge and were willing to learn -India Company Commander 3/7 Page 21

LtCol William Yates william.yates@usmc.mil Page 22