Profit Efficiency and Ownership of German Hospitals

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Profit Efficiency and Ownership of German Hospitals Annika Herr 1 Hendrik Schmitz 2 Boris Augurzky 3 1 Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf 2 RWI Essen 3 RWI Essen, IZA June 11, 2010 Annika Herr (DICE, HHU) Efficiency of German Hospitals June 11, 2010 1 / 20

The German Health Care System in 2003 The System System of cost reimbursement until 2004. Then: Introduction of capitation fees (DRG system) 50% increase in per capita costs since 1993 e235 billion spent on health care in 2003 (11.1% of German GDP) 30% spent on hospitals Market characterised by regulation of prices, quality, service provision, and location Annika Herr (DICE, HHU) Efficiency of German Hospitals June 11, 2010 2 / 20

Research Questions Results Technical and cost inefficiency had been detected in the system (Herr, 2008). Private hospitals are less cost efficient than public hospitals (in Germany, USA) However, private hospitals make higher profits and face lower risks of insolvency. Puzzle? With new data (2002 2006), no difference across ownerships when looking at technical and cost efficiency increase in efficiency scores, mean cost efficiency at around 94% private hospitals are significantly more profit efficient Annika Herr (DICE, HHU) Efficiency of German Hospitals June 11, 2010 3 / 20

How to measure efficiency? Definition of efficiency: Technical efficiency: minimise input use given a certain output level Cost efficiency: technical efficiency + input allocative efficiency given input prices and a certain output level Profit efficiency: cost efficiency + output allocative efficiency as well as some scale efficiency given input prices, output prices, amount of quasi-fixed inputs, and a certain output level. Profit efficiency: Producers face output prices p, input prices w and seek to maximise profits (π = p T y w T x) by choosing the best input-output combination. Existing methods DEA: deterministic, algorithm constructs frontier around data points, no assumptions but problems with definition of outliers SFA: stochastic, assumptions on production function and distribution of noise and efficiency Annika Herr (DICE, HHU) Efficiency of German Hospitals June 11, 2010 4 / 20

Literature overview: Hospital cost efficiency studies Author Method Least efficient type Germany Helmig & Lapsley (2001) DEA Private Werblow & Robra (2006) DEA Public Staat (2006) DEA no significant diff. Herr (2008) Truncated SFA Private Schreyögg & Tiemann (2009) DEA Private Werblow et al. (2009) DEA Public Herwatz & Strumann (2010) DEA Private & Non-profit USA Hollingsworth (2003) DEA mainly Private (for-profit) Zuckerman & Hadley (1994) Half-normal Private (for-profit) Folland & Hofler (2001) Half-normal Private (for-profit) Rosko (1999) 2 step Private (for-profit) Rosko (2001, 2004) Truncated Private (for-profit) Brown (2003) Truncated Private (for-profit) Switzerland Farsi & Filippini (2006, 2008) 2 step, trunc. no significant diff. The base group varies between only non-profit, only public and non-profit and public hospitals. Annika Herr (DICE, HHU) Efficiency of German Hospitals June 11, 2010 5 / 20

Literature overview: Profit efficiency studies Author Country market method agriculture Ali & Flinn (1989) Pakistan Basmati rice SFA, 1-equ. Ali et al. (1994) Pakistan farms SFA, 1 equ. Khumbhakar (2001) Norway salmon farms NLITSUR banking Akhavein et al. (1997) USA banks NLITSUR, with DFA Berger & Mester (1997) USA banks DFA, 1-equ. Khumbhakar (2006) USA banks cost eff., SFA health Bradford & Craycraft USA hospitals 2SLS, with SFA (1996) Knox et al. (1999) Texas, USA nursing homes SUR, with OLS Annika Herr (DICE, HHU) Efficiency of German Hospitals June 11, 2010 6 / 20

Estimation Strategy Estimate technical (output: number of weighted cases) and cost efficiency (output: total adjusted costs) and profit efficiency (dep. var.: EBIT, EAT) and compare Assumptions Cobb Douglas production function random noise: normally distributed inefficiency: truncated-normally distributed and to depend on exogenous variables such as ownership type, region, and patients characteristics only one output, output price is fixed one step model feasible Pool data over time, cluster by hospital Predict expected efficiency conditional on the estimated composite error Bootstrap standard deviations to test for differences in group means by ownership type Annika Herr (DICE, HHU) Efficiency of German Hospitals June 11, 2010 7 / 20

SFA Cobb-Douglas production function assumed Log-linear profit model ln π i = β 0 + β n ln w ni + β y ln p i + β b ln b i + v i u w ki w ki }{{} i n k ɛ i, where y i is a single output, w i = [w 1i,..., w Ki ] is the vector of input prices of variable inputs x i, b i is a quasi-fixed input, v i is random noise and β = [β 1,..., β N ] is the vector of parameters to estimate. u i 0 is the output decreasing inefficiency. Distributional assumptions v i N[0, σ 2 v], u i N + [z i δ, σ2 u], u i and v i are independent of each other and of the regressors. firm-specific (time variant) variables z i = [z 1i,..., z Ki ] account for heterogeneity of the hospitals Annika Herr (DICE, HHU) Efficiency of German Hospitals June 11, 2010 8 / 20

The Hospital Statistics of the Statistical Offices of the Länder full set of German hospitals, 1,800 general hospitals full set of patient data (17 mio treatments per year) aggregated on diagnosis level (830,000-930,000 observations per year) patients statistic contains: age, sex, death, main diagnosis (ICD 9, 3 digits), length of stay (los) information about los of each diagnosis treated in each hospital enables construction of case-mix weights years 2002 to 2006 Annika Herr (DICE, HHU) Efficiency of German Hospitals June 11, 2010 9 / 20

The Hospital-Database of the RWI balance sheets of 541 hospitals over 1-4 years with more than 100 beds information on EBIT, EAT (earnings after tax), turnover urban vs. rural dummy Annika Herr (DICE, HHU) Efficiency of German Hospitals June 11, 2010 10 / 20

Profit Efficiency: Specification Standard Profit Efficiency dependent variable EBIT/EAT independent variables costs per doctor as price for variable labour input costs per nurse (used for normalisation) costs per other staff medical requirements per case number of beds (quasi-fixed input) base rate (Basisfallwert) as exogeneous output price Annika Herr (DICE, HHU) Efficiency of German Hospitals June 11, 2010 11 / 20

Exogenous influences on inefficiency: z i private and non-profit vs. public ownership eastern vs. western Germany share of female patients ratio of patients older than 75 years ratio of surgeries Hirshman-Herfindahl-index (HHI) per county urban vs. rural reform: after vs. before 2004 (shift in profit frontier) year dummy variables: change in inefficiency Not feasible in hospital statistics ratio of privately insured patients quality other than death ratio Annika Herr (DICE, HHU) Efficiency of German Hospitals June 11, 2010 12 / 20

Results: SFA, Profit Efficiency effects on profit frontier ln EBIT (adjusted) a ln EAT (adjusted) a ln costs per doc b 0.014 (0.026) -0.050 (0.021)** ln costs per other staff b 0.012 (0.014) -0.008 (0.019) ln medical requirements/ case b 0.013 (0.006)** 0.006 (0.007) ln base rate b 0.036 (0.030) 0.161 (0.012)*** ln number of beds 0.011 (0.006)* 0.013 (0.006)** reform 0.896 (0.015)*** -0.009 (0.016) constant 0.470 (0.106)*** 0.864 (0.068)*** exogenous variables (effects on inefficiency) private -0.227 (0.091)** -0.158 (0.055)*** non-profit -0.144 (0.091) -0.097 (0.057)* year=2003-4.375 (1.729)** -3.543 (0.901)*** year=2004 0.729 (0.049)*** -0.436 (0.054)*** year=2005-1.249 (0.324)*** -3.727 (1.120)*** year=2006-5.583 (1.759)*** -0.537 (0.080)*** constant 1.191 (0.117)*** 1.354 (0.116)*** N 1,579 1,579 coefficients on east, urban, HHI, elderly, surgery, female: insignificant Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The signs Annika of the Herr exogenous (DICE, HHU) variables Efficiency coefficients of German are Hospitals to be read as effectsjune on11, inefficiency. 2010 13 / 20

Robustness Checks generalized model: it is not assumed that hospitals are input allocative efficient two-step SFA (1. half-normal model, 2. OLS on efficiency scores) Fixed-effects estimator, assuming that fixed effects captures inefficiency mortality rate as quality indicator Tabelle: Pairwise correlation coefficients of profit and cost efficiency rankings across different models. SFA cost eff. SFA profit efficiency OLS FE model truncated truncated half-normal dependent variable adj. costs EBIT EBIT EBIT SFA truncated: EBIT 0.17* 1 SFA half normal: EBIT 0.23* 0.93* 1 OLS Fixed Effects: EBIT 0.06 0.59* 0.47* 1 public 0.12* -0.23* -0.18* -0.16* non-profit 0.05 0.09* private -0.10* 0.24* 0.12* 0.23* The highest efficiency score has the highest rank. Printed correlation coefficients are significant at a 5% level, correlation coefficients additionally marked with are significant at a 1% level. Annika Herr (DICE, HHU) Efficiency of German Hospitals June 11, 2010 14 / 20

Conclusion: Cost, Technical, and Profit Efficiency To do First study to analyse profit efficiency of German hospitals (and to compare with cost and technical efficiency) Private (for-profit) ownership exhibits higher profit efficiency than public ownership but not significantly diff. cost or technical efficiency Reasons may lie in specialisation, higher flexibility, need to gain more capital for investments From a welfare perspective, cost-reduction is probably preferred to profit maximisation in publicly financed markets. However, private hospitals may provide higher quality. Thus, no clear decision for or against privatisation yet to make. Identify behavioural incentives of different hospital ownership types Account for hospital quality, identify good measure for Germany Annika Herr (DICE, HHU) Efficiency of German Hospitals June 11, 2010 15 / 20

Finally Thank you for your attention and your comments! Annika Herr Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf annika.herr@dice.uni-duesseldorf.de Annika Herr (DICE, HHU) Efficiency of German Hospitals June 11, 2010 16 / 20

Case-Mix-Weights Los for each diagnosis m = 1,..., M over all German hospitals i = 1,..., I: los m = days mi / cases mi. i i Mean length of stay over all diagnoses and hospitals: los G = 1 los m M which is 8.9 days in 2003. The number of weighted cases in hospital i: m with 1 M M m π m = 1. w cases i = m los m los G cases mi = m π m cases mi Annika Herr (DICE, HHU) Efficiency of German Hospitals June 11, 2010 17 / 20

Results: Cost and Technical Efficiency cost efficiency technical efficiency log adjusted costs log weighted cases cost frontier technical frontier cost and production frontier variables reform -0.020 (0.008)** 0.005 (0.010) constant -1.153 (0.234)*** 3.664 (0.172)*** exogenous variables (effects on inefficiency) private 0.770 (0.687) 0.791 (0.689) non-profit 0.150 (0.417) 0.455 (0.473) eastern Germany 0.985 (0.544)* 0.750 (0.426)* urban 0.203 (0.267) 0.143 (0.147) HHI -0.709 (0.678) -0.571 (0.660) ratio of elderly patients 4.992 (1.951)** 2.588 (0.905)*** surgery-ratio -0.697 (0.580) -0.210 (0.251) ratio of female patients -5.000 (2.373)** -1.988 (1.081)* year=2003 0.079 (0.168) 0.101 (0.127) year=2004 0.121 (0.194) 0.025 (0.134) year=2005-0.320 (0.254) -0.122 (0.137) year=2006-0.488 (0.327) -0.301 (0.157)* constant -0.098 (1.162) -0.561 (1.336) Sample Size N 1,579 1,579 SFA estimates. a: Costs per nurse used for normalisation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Clustered at hospital Annika Herr (DICE, HHU) Efficiency of German Hospitals June 11, 2010 18 / 20

Robustness Checks I: Generalised SFA effects on profit frontier ln EBIT (adjusted) a ln EAT (adjusted) a ln costs per doc b -0.012 (0.025) 0.018 (0.018) ln costs per nurse b 0.066 (0.033)** 0.037 (0.025) ln costs per other staff b -0.015 (0.012) -0.014 (0.018) ln medical requirements/ case b -0.011 (0.005)** -0.013 (0.006)** ln number of beds 0.015 (0.007)** 0.014 (0.006)** reform 1.504 (0.026)*** 0.098 (0.027)*** constant 5.01 (0.150)*** 5.141 (0.145)*** exogenous variables (effects on inefficiency) private -0.597 (0.358)* -0.563 (0.337)* non-profit -0.451 (0.339) -0.405 (0.289) year=2003-13.046 (7.784)* -11.744 (6.060)* year=2004 0.965 (0.247)*** -1.122 (0.397)*** year=2005-3.628 (1.601)** -13.878 (7.666)* year=2006-17.863 (7.219)** -1.106 (0.416)*** constant 2.033 (0.231)*** 2.293 (0.272)*** Sample Size N 1,579 1,579 coefficients on east, urban, HHI, elderly, surgery, female: insignificant Robust standard errors in parentheses. Clustered at hospital level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The signs of the exogenous variables coefficients are to be Annika Herr (DICE, HHU) Efficiency of German Hospitals June 11, 2010 19 / 20

Robustness Checks II: OLS fixed effects predict fixed effects assume that unobserved heterogeneity mirrors inefficiency regress calculated relative efficiency scores on factors using OLS Efficiency scores based on FE-estimtes effects on efficiency based on EBIT based on EAT private 0.059 (0.015)*** 0.026 (0.008)*** non-profit 0.026 (0.013)** 0.016 (0.007)** eastern Germany -0.035 (0.022) -0.023 (0.012)** year=2003 0.033 (0.039) -0.003 (0.021) year=2004 0.001 (0.033) -0.003 (0.018) year=2005 0.049 (0.033) -0.001 (0.018) year=2006 0.031 (0.030) -0.005 (0.016) constant -0.026 (0.055) 0.025 (0.030) Sample Size N 540 540 urban, HHI, elderly, surgery, female insig. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Annika Herr (DICE, HHU) Efficiency of German Hospitals June 11, 2010 20 / 20