The FY2015 US Defense Budget, the New Quadrennial Defense Review and the U.S. Commitment to the Middle East and Asia

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The FY2015 US Defense Budget, the New Quadrennial Defense Review and the U.S. Commitment to the Middle East and Asia Anthony H. Cordesman March, 6, 2014 The United States has repeatedly made it clear that both the Middle East and Asia are its too main priorities for both defense strategy and military partnerships. The United States stated this repeatedly in the new Defense Strategic Guidance it issued in January 2012, and has done so every year since that time. 1 There still, however, is doubt and fear in much of the Middle East that the United States may be cutting its forces and commitments to the region, pivoting to Asia at the expense of its partners in the Middle East, or making some kind of deal with Iran. Secretary Hagel s Speech at Manama on December 7, 2013. This already has led senior U.S. officials to try to make it clear that this is not the case. Secretary Hagel stated in a speech at the Manama Conference in Bahrain on December 7, 2013 that, 2 I'm under no illusion, like all of you, about the daily threats facing this region or the current anxieties I know exist here in this region. These anxieties have emerged as the United States pursues diplomatic openings on some of the region's most difficult problems and most complex issues, including Iran's nuclear program and the conflict in Syria. And I want to also acknowledge and thank our partners, our allies, senior leaders in the U.K. here, and from other parts of the world who we are cooperating with in these areas dealing with these big problems. As the Department of Defense confronts new budget constraints at home, we still have responsibilities abroad, and we take those responsibilities seriously. Questions have been raised about America's intentions, America's strategy, and America's commitment to this region. The United States has enduring interests in this critical region of the world, and we will remain fully committed to the security of our allies and our partners in the region. My visit to the Manama Dialogue marks the first time that a United States secretary of defense has appeared at this forum since 2008. Much has changed for the United States and in this region since that dialogue five years ago. The U.S. ended its war in Iraq, and we're now winding down our combat mission in Afghanistan. The political landscape throughout the region has seen historic changes. Old regimes gave way in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen. Across the Middle East and North Africa, leaders have promised political reform. And the people of this region are demanding it and they deserve it. Every nation in this region has been affected by these unpredictable cross-currents. And while each nation has experienced them differently, they remain regional challenges. Many challenges that the region already faced, from violent extremism to failed states to proliferation, have actually intensified, and destabilizing actor, state and non-state actors alike, have adopted more and more advanced weaponry, weaponry from ballistic missiles to cyber capabilities. As America comes out of its longest war, the U.S. military is building new strategic agility. We're building that new strategic agility in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world. We know that our influence and our leadership depends not only on our

Cordesman, The New QDR and the US Commitment to the Middle East and Asia 5.3.14 2 power, but also an appreciation of its limits and on the wise deployment of our influence, as well as working closely with partners in helping them build their capacity and capabilities. Our experiences over the last decade have challenged us to use all our tools of foreign policy, including diplomatic, economic, trade, development assistance, and military power, use these powers more effectively and more in alignment with our partners and our friends. Two weeks ago, the president announced an interim deal in the P5-plus-one nuclear negotiations with Iran. It's only a first step, but it could be an important step. It halts any further expansion of Iran's nuclear program, begins to roll it back in important ways and provides sweeping access to verify unfettered verification of Iran's intentions. Its purpose is to facilitate a longer-term comprehensive solution and to ensure that Iran cannot use this period of negotiations to advance its nuclear program. We have bought time for meaningful negotiation, not for deception. All of us are clear-eyed -- very clear-eyed -- about the challenges that remain to achieving a comprehensive nuclear solution with Iran. I know that Iran's nuclear program is only one dimension of the threats Iran poses in the region. I'm briefed virtually every day about these threats. That's why we remain committed to ballistic missile defense for our partners here in the region and for Europe. No strategy is risk-free. Diplomacy takes courage. It takes vision. But our emphasis on diplomatic tools should not be misinterpreted. We know diplomacy cannot operate in a vacuum. Our success will continue to hinge on America's military power, the credibility of our assurances to our allies and partners in the Middle East that we will use it. They have bound the United States together with nations of this region for decades through administrations, all administrations, the administrations of both political parties, from Eisenhower to Obama. These commitments are not open for negotiation. As secretary of defense, it is my responsibility to maintain America's key defense relationships. And it is my responsibility to ensure that the Department of Defense advances America's core security interests in the region. These security interests include: defending against external aggression; ensuring the free flow of energy and commerce; dismantling terrorist networks that threaten America or its allies; and stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Our commitment to these core interests is absolute, and the interim agreement with Iran calls none of them into question. The Department of Defense will continue to maintain a strong military posture in the Gulf region, one that can respond swiftly to crisis, deter aggression, and assure our allies. DOD will not make any adjustments to its forces in the region or to its military planning as a result of the interim agreement with Iran. As we have withdrawn U.S. forces from Iraq, are drawing down our forces in Afghanistan, and rebalancing toward the Asia Pacific, we have honored our commitment to Gulf security by enhancing our military capabilities in the region. We have a ground, air and naval presence of more than 35,000 military personnel in and immediately around the Gulf. Two years after our drawdown from Iraq, the U.S. Army continues to maintain more than 10,000 forward-deployed soldiers in the region, along with heavy armor, artillery, and attack helicopters to serve as a theater reserve and a bulwark against aggression. We've deployed our most advanced fighter aircraft throughout the region, including F-22s, to ensure that we can quickly respond to contingencies. Coupled with our unique munitions, no target is beyond our reach. We've deployed our most advanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets to provide a continuous picture of activities in and around the Gulf. And we have fielded an array of missile defense capabilities, including ballistic missile defense ships, Patriot batteries, and sophisticated radar. As part of our efforts to ensure freedom of navigation throughout the Gulf, we routinely maintain a

Cordesman, The New QDR and the US Commitment to the Middle East and Asia 5.3.14 3 naval presence of over 40 ships in the broader region, including a carrier strike group, and conduct a range of freedom of navigation operations. These operations include approximately 50 transits of the Strait of Hormuz over the past six months. Earlier this year, we ramped up our minesweeping capabilities and added five coastal patrol ships to our fleet in this region. We are currently working on a $580 million construction program to support the expansion of Fifth Fleet capabilities. Yesterday, I visited the Navy's new afloat forward staging base, the USS Ponce, a unique platform for special operations, as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in areas where we do not have a permanent fixed presence. I'll also be meeting with U.S. personnel stationed at the Combined Air Operations Center in Qatar, where we have representatives from our GCC partners training and working together with us. We also maintain forces and assets at home and around the world ready to deploy to the region on a moment's notice. The United States military has made this commitment in resources, personnel and capabilities because of our nation's deep and enduring interest in the Middle East. That will not change. Although the Department of Defense is facing serious budget constraints, we will continue to prioritize our commitments in the Gulf, while making sure that our military capabilities evolve to meet new threats. Even with new budgetary constraints, the United States will continue to represent nearly 40 percent of global total spending. The U.S. military will remain the most powerful in the world, and we will honor our commitments, and the United States is not retreating, not retreating from any part of the world. A key vehicle for increasing partner capabilities is foreign military sales and financing. Over the last 20 years, the sale of advanced weapons has helped to shift the military balance in the region away from Iran and in favor of our Gulf partners, and this shift is accelerating. DOD has approved more than $75billion in U.S. arms sales to GCC states since 2007. These sales during the past six years are worth nearly as much as those made previously totally in the previous 15 years. During my last trip to the region, we finalized agreements with nearly $11 billion that will provide access to high-end capabilities, including F-15s, F-16s, and advanced munitions, such as standoff weapons. These are the most advanced capabilities we have ever provided -- ever provided to this region. We'll continue to ensure that all of our allies and partners in the region, including both Israel and the Gulf states, have these advanced weapons. Upgrades in military hardware have enabled the United States military to work more closely, more effectively with our partners and allies in a wide variety of joint exercises, training, and collaborative planning. American men and women in uniform, serving alongside the soldiers, sailors, and airmen of our partners in the region, are staring down the same threats, which is why we take these activities very seriously. This year, our successful training efforts have included: Our Eagle Resolve exercise, which began as a seminar in 1999. This year, hosted by Qatar, it included naval, land and air components. It included12 nations, 2,000 U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines, and 1,000 of their counterparts. Our Eager Lion exercise in Jordan this year involved 8,000 personnel from 19 nations, including 5,000 Americans from across the services. And here in Bahrain in May, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command hosted the International Mine Countermeasures Exercise, which included 40nations, 6,000 service members, and 35 ships across 8,000 nautical miles, stretching from the Gulf to the Strait of Hormuz. Because we must keep pace with emerging threats and technologies together in cyberspace. Last year, cyber attacks on Saudi Aramco and RasGas were a serious wake-up call to everyone. As many in this audience are fully aware, Saudi Aramco, which produces 3.5 billion barrels of oil per year, suffered an attack on 30,000 of its computers. Less than two weeks later, RasGas, which distributes about 36 million tons of liquefied natural gas each year, was taken offline for days. Such an attack could happen to any of the nations represented here today. The United States will continue to help build the capacity of partners and allies to defend their critical infrastructure from

Cordesman, The New QDR and the US Commitment to the Middle East and Asia 5.3.14 4 cyber attack, especially major energy, infrastructure, and telecommunications facilities. As we strengthen our bilateral relationships throughout the Gulf, we are also committed to advancing multilateral cooperation between our allies and partners, especially through the Gulf Cooperation Council. Nations are stronger -- not weaker, stronger -- when they work together against common interests. Closer cooperation between the GCC and the United States is in all of our countries' interests. The United States has been a force for advancing Gulf cooperation since the GCC was established more than 30 years ago. This will not only continue, but accelerate in the years ahead. Our engagement with Gulf nations is intended to support and facilitate, not to replace, strong ties within the GCC. In the council's early days, Sultan Qaboos of Oman welcomed what was hard to imagine just years before. He said, Gulf nations thinking together, talking together, planning together, and seeing together, instead of individually. The United States supports this vision and is committed to supporting the GCC as an anchor for regional stability. The United States will continue to work closely with each of our partners in the GCC, but we must remain together, and we must do more to strengthen multilateral defense cooperation. In support of that goal today, I'm announcing several new initiatives. First, in addition to our Gulf-wide joint exercises and training, DOD will work with the GCC on better integration of its members' missile defense capabilities. We applaud the efforts of many Gulf states to acquire new and enhanced missile defense capabilities in the face of growing regional missile threat. But the United States continues to believe that a multilateral framework is the best way to develop interoperable and integrated regional missile defense. Such defenses are the best way to deter and, if necessary, defeat coercion and aggression. To encourage this, we propose upgrading our regular air and air defense chiefs conference to include missile defense cooperation as a very distinct agenda item. We believe doing so will allow for continued progress in missile defense and will open the door to broader cooperation and burdensharing within the GCC. Second, we would like to expand our security cooperation with partners in the region by working in a coordinated way with the GCC, including through the sales of U.S. defense articles through the GCC as an organization. This is a natural next step in improving U.S.-GCC collaboration, and it will enable the GCC to acquire critical military capabilities, including items for ballistic missile defense, maritime security, and counterterrorism. And, third, building on both this event and the U.S.-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum, I'm inviting our GCC partners to participate in an annual U.S.-GCC Defense Ministerial. This ministerial will affirm the United States' continued commitment to Gulf security, and it will allow the U.S. and GCC member nations to take the next step in coordinating our defense policies and enhancing our military cooperation. I propose that our inaugural ministerial take place within the next six months. All of these new and ongoing initiatives will help strengthen the GCC and strengthen regional security. FY2015 Budget Submission The new U.S. Defense but for FY2015 and the new Quadrennial Defense Review issued on March 4, 2014, strongly reinforced these statements. The FY2015 budget overview issued by the Department of Defense stated that, 3 The 2014 QDR embodies the 21st century defense priorities outlined in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance. These priorities include rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific to preserve peace and stability in the region; maintaining a strong commitment to security and stability in the Middle East; sustaining a global approach to countering violent extremists and terrorist threats, with an emphasis on the Middle East and Africa; continuing to protect and prioritize key investments in technology while our forces overall grow smaller and leaner; and invigorating efforts to build innovative partnerships

Cordesman, The New QDR and the US Commitment to the Middle East and Asia 5.3.14 5 and strengthen key alliances and partnerships. The 2014 QDR builds on these priorities and incorporates them into a broader strategic framework. It also stated that U.S. force planning and strategy was based upon three pillars, one of which was to, 4 Build security globally, to preserve regional stability, deter adversaries, support allies and partners, and cooperate with others to address common security challenges. In practice, this means continuing to rebalance our posture and presence to the Asia-Pacific while maintaining a focus on the Middle East. The FY2015 budget request defined U.S. goals as rebalancing and sustaining its presence and posture in the Pacific and Middle East to better protect U.S. national security interests as, 5 In striving to achieve our pillars, the Department will also continue to rebalance and sustain our global posture. We will continue our contributions to the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, seeking to preserve peace and stability in a region that is increasingly central to U.S. political, economic, and security interests. Faced with North Korea s pursuit of long-range missiles, and weapons of mass destruction particularly nuclear weapons the United States is committed to maintaining peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. As part of our broader efforts for stability in the Asia-Pacific, the United States will maintain a robust footprint in Northeast Asia while enhancing our presence in Oceania and Southeast Asia. The United States also has enduring interests in the Middle East, and we will remain fully committed to the security of our allies and partners in the region. We will continue to maintain a strong military posture in the Gulf region one that can respond swiftly to crisis, deter aggression, and assure our allies while making sure that our military capabilities evolve to meet new threats. Quadrennial Defense Review The United States went further in its 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which was issued the same day as the US FY2015 budget request. The QDR is the main planning document the United States issues every four years to shape its long-range strategy in this case through FY2019 and beyond. The document repeats the U.S. strategic emphasis on both Asian and the Middle East repeatedly through the document, The United States exercises global leadership in support of our interests: U.S. security and that of our allies and partners; a strong economy in an open economic system; respect for universal values; and an international order that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through cooperation. Protecting and advancing these interests, consistent with the National Security Strategy, the 2014 QDR embodies the 21st century defense priorities outlined in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance. These priorities include rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region to preserve peace and stability in the region; maintaining a strong commitment to security and stability in Europe and the Middle East; sustaining a global approach to countering violent extremists and terrorist threats, with an emphasis on the Middle East and Africa; continuing to protect and prioritize key investments in technology while our forces overall grow smaller and leaner; and invigorating efforts to build innovative partnerships and strengthen key alliances and partnerships. 6 In striving to achieve our three strategic objectives, the Department will also continue to rebalance and sustain our global posture. We will continue our contributions to the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, seeking to preserve peace and stability in a region that is increasingly central to U.S. political, economic, and security interests. Faced with North Korea s long-range missiles and WMD programs particularly its pursuit of nuclear weapons the United States is committed to maintaining peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. As part of our broader efforts for stability in the Asia-Pacific region, the United States will maintain a robust footprint in Northeast

Cordesman, The New QDR and the US Commitment to the Middle East and Asia 5.3.14 6 Asia while enhancing our presence in Oceania and Southeast Asia. As we end combat operations in Afghanistan, we are prepared to transition to a limited mission focused on counterterrorism and training, advising, and assisting Afghan security forces. The United States also has enduring interests in the Middle East, and we will remain fully committed to the security of our partners in the region. We will continue to maintain a strong military posture in the Gulf region one that can respond swiftly to crisis, deter aggression, and assure our allies and partners while making sure that our military capabilities evolve to meet new threats. 7 U.S. strategy is adapting to the political and economic changes in both the Pacific and the Middle East, and the United States makes it clear that it still sees Iran as a serious threat, The Asia-Pacific region is increasingly central to global commerce, politics, and security. Defense spending in this region continues to rise. As nations in the region continue to develop their military and security capabilities, there is greater risk that tensions over long-standing sovereignty disputes or claims to natural resources will spur disruptive competition or erupt into conflict, reversing the trends of rising regional peace, stability, and prosperity. In particular, the rapid pace and comprehensive scope of China s military modernization continues, combined with a relative lack of transparency and openness from China s leaders regarding both military capabilities and intentions. A multilateral security architecture composed of groups such as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and regional actors collaborating on issues ranging from humanitarian assistance to maritime security to counterterrorism is emerging to help manage tensions and prevent conflict. Traditional anchors of regional security such as Australia, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (ROK), and growing powers such as India and Indonesia, are taking on additional leadership roles to foster increased communication and shared understanding. As many Asia-Pacific countries seek to achieve greater prosperity, establish regional norms, and strive for a stable military balance, North Korea remains closed and authoritarian. North Korea s long-range missile and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs particularly its pursuit of nuclear weapons in contravention of its international obligations constitutes a significant threat to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia and is a growing, direct threat to the United States. Friction points also endure in the Middle East. Religious differences, particularly a widening Sunni- Shi a divide, are among the sources of trans-national division in the region. Competition for resources, including energy and water, will worsen tensions in the coming years and could escalate regional confrontations into broader conflicts particularly in fragile states. In the region, Iran remains a destabilizing actor that threatens security by defying international law and pursuing capabilities that would allow it to develop nuclear weapons. Even as Iran pledges not to pursue nuclear weapons, Iran s other destabilizing activities will continue to pose a threat to the Middle East, especially to the security of our allies and partners in the region and around the world. Many countries in the Middle East and Africa are undergoing significant political and social change. People in countries including Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, and Egypt are seeking a greater voice in their governance, upending traditional power centers in the process. Terrorist groups seek to exploit transitional governments and expand their influence. Internal strife in Syria continues amid sectarian friction, at great cost to human life. Syria has become a magnet for global jihad a situation that is likely to persist as long as the current leadership remains in power. Ongoing, severe spillover effects include an influx of foreign fighters and a flood of refugees into neighboring countries. These difficult political transitions are a reminder that events in the region will take years perhaps decades to develop fully. 8 The United States recognizes that terrorism and extremism remain major threats to the United States and its allies, Whether employing high-technology tools or less-advanced weapons, the terrorist threat to our

Cordesman, The New QDR and the US Commitment to the Middle East and Asia 5.3.14 7 Nation s interests persists and has evolved greatly since 2001. Many of the leading al Qa ida elements who were responsible for planning and prosecuting attacks on U.S. soil have been captured or killed. Although core al Qa ida has been severely degraded, instability in the Middle East and civil war in Syria have enabled al Qa ida to expand its global, reach and operate in new areas. Terrorists remain willing and able to threaten the United States, our citizens, and our interests from conducting major and well-coordinated attacks to executing attacks that are smaller and less complex. Terrorist networks continue to demonstrate interest in obtaining WMD. Foreign terrorist groups affiliated with al Qa ida, as well as individual terrorist leaders, may seek to recruit or inspire Westerners to carry out attacks against our homeland with little or no warning. Homegrown violent extremists, for instance, have attacked DoD personnel and installations. Even groups that are unable to cause harm on U.S. soil may still threaten U.S. interests and personnel overseas. The possibility that rapidly developing threats, including violent protests and terrorist attacks, could escalate quickly and directly threaten U.S. interests at home and abroad is a significant challenge for the United States. 9 Protecting and advancing U.S. interests, consistent with the National Security Strategy, the 2014 QDR embodies the 21st century defense priorities outlined in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance. These priorities include rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region to preserve peace and stability; maintaining a strong commitment to security and stability in Europe and the Middle East; sustaining a global approach to countering violent extremists and terrorist threats, with an emphasis on the Middle East and Africa; continuing to protect and prioritize key investments in technology, while our forces overall grow smaller and leaner; and invigorating efforts to build innovative partnerships and strengthen key alliances and partnerships. The 2014 QDR builds on these priorities and incorporates them into a broader strategic framework. 10 The United States sees giving its allies missile defense as a key priority and highlights the fact Iran is a key threat, Advances in missile technology and the proliferation of these capabilities to new actors represent a growing challenge to the U.S. military s defense of the homeland. We must stay ahead of limited ballistic missile threats from regional actors such as North Korea and Iran, seeking to deter attacks or prevent them before they occur. To do this, we are increasing our emphasis on actively countering ballistic missile challenges by detecting missiles and continuously defending the U.S. homeland at longer ranges and at all altitudes. The ability to deter and defeat these kinds of threats protects the United States, reassures our allies and partners, and preserves strategic stability with Russia and China. 11 The United States still has not defined its future force posture in either Asia or the Middle East, but it makes it clear that it is based on creating far stronger partnerships with its allies in both regions, The centerpiece of the Department of Defense commitment to the U.S. Government s rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region continues to be our efforts to modernize and enhance our security alliances with Australia, Japan, the ROK, the Philippines, and Thailand. We are taking steps with each of our allies to update our combined capacity and to develop forward-looking roles and missions to address emerging regional challenges most effectively. We are also deepening our defense relationships with key partners in the region, such as Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam,, and many others. Through both our alliances and partnerships, we are focused on enhancing our partners capacity to address growing regional challenges in areas such as missile defense, cyber security, space resilience, maritime security, and disaster relief. With China, the Department of Defense is building a sustained and substantive dialogue with the People s Liberation Army designed to improve our ability to cooperate in concrete, practical areas such as counter-piracy, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. At the same time, we will manage the competitive aspects of the relationship in ways that improve regional peace and stability consistent with international norms and principles. Underpinning all of the Department s engagements in the Asia-Pacific region is our commitment to

Cordesman, The New QDR and the US Commitment to the Middle East and Asia 5.3.14 8 key principles and values that are essential to regional peace and security. We are working to support and expand the flourishing network of multilateral organizations and engagements that are taking root in the region. We are focused on promoting responsible behaviors and establishing mechanisms that will prevent miscalculation and disruptive regional competition and avoid escalatory acts that could lead to conflict. This includes supporting trilateral engagements and exercises, as well as strengthening ASEAN s central role in the region through participation in institutions such as the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting-Plus. As we end combat operations in Afghanistan, we are prepared to transition to a limited mission focused on counterterrorism and training, advising, and assisting Afghan security forces. We will continue efforts to help stabilize Central and Southwest Asia and deepen our engagement in the Indian Ocean region to bolster our rebalance to Asia. The stability of Pakistan and peace in South Asia remain critical to this effort. The United States supports India s rise as an increasingly capable actor in the region, and we are deepening our strategic partnership, including through the Defense Trade and Technology Initiative. The United States will retain a deep, enduring interest in and a commitment to a stable Middle East. We will seek to deepen our strategic cooperation with Middle East partners based on common, enduring interests. We will strengthen joint planning with allies and partners to operate multilaterally, across domains, and to counter challenges to access and freedom of navigation. The Department will develop new or expanded forums to exchange views with allies and partners on the threats and opportunities facing the Gulf, particularly through the multilateral forum of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The Department plans to pursue a U.S.-GCC Defense Ministerial in 2014 and deepen U.S.-GCC ballistic missile defense cooperation. The United States will continue to seek more innovative and flexible approaches to meeting its enduring commitment to a secure Middle East. 12 The P5+1 agreement with Iran may lead to a broad improvement in regional stability over time, but the United States is not seeking any form of unilateral settlement, and realizes that it will have to work with its regional partners until a broad multilateral solution has proven to be both possible and an enduring reality, We will retain and strengthen our power projection capabilities so that we can deter conflict, and if deterrence fails, win decisively against aggressors. The North Korean regime continues to pursue interests counter to those of the United States. Faced with this threat, the United States is committed to maintaining peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and closely monitors the situation through military and diplomatic channels incoordination with the ROK, Japan, China, and Russia. The U.S. Armed Forces will continue their close collaboration with the ROK military to deter and defend against North Korean provocations. The ROK military is a highly capable, professional force that is increasing its ability to lead the defense of Korea. The United States trains regularly with members of the ROK military and participates in a variety of bilateral and multilateral exercises aimed at increasing interoperability. The United States is also committed to ensuring it has the capability to win decisively in conflicts in the Middle East. Over the past five years, a top Administration priority in the Middle East has been preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, pursued through a multilateral, multipronged strategy combining diplomacy, international economic pressure, and the resolve to keep military options on the table. The November 2013 Joint Plan of Action in the P5-plus-one nuclear negotiations with Iran represents only a first step toward a longer term comprehensive solution. Concerns over Iran s destabilizing influence as well as the uncertain trajectory of the greater Middle East will require the United States and our regional partners to remain capable of defeating aggression in this volatile region. As diplomacy on nuclear issues continues, the Department will maintain all options on the table and counter other threats that Iran poses in the region, including development of mid- and long-range missiles and support to terrorists and insurgents. Maintaining power projection capabilities that can counter not only state threats but also non-state

Cordesman, The New QDR and the US Commitment to the Middle East and Asia 5.3.14 9 threats is also increasingly critical. The United States will maintain a worldwide approach to countering violent extremists and terrorist threats using a combination of economic, diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement, development, and military tools. The Department of Defense will rebalance our counterterrorism efforts toward greater emphasis on building partnership capacity especially in fragile states, while still retaining robust capabilities for direct action, including intelligence, persistent surveillance, precision strike, and Special Operations Forces (SOF). We will remain focused on countering the proliferation and use of WMD, which continues to undermine global security. The Department will continue to cooperate with regional partners to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qa ida and other extremist threats. We will remain vigilant to threats posed by other designated terrorist organizations, such as Hezbollah and Hamas. As these threats continue to diversify and adapt, we will increase the use of special operations capabilities to maintain security and preserve the element of surprise. 13 Building Stronger Regional Partnerships None of this means that the United States does not face challenges in shaping and funding its future forces, and in creating stronger strategic partnerships. No set of alliances is based on identical perceptions and interests, and almost all real-world alliances have serious tensions and differences that are outweighed by stronger common interests. Both the United States and its allies in the Pacific and Middle East need to listen to each other, respect the differences in their values and goals, and focus more on creating truly interoperable and effective deterrents to limit and contain the risk of war. The fact remains, however, that U.S. strategy is not somehow tilting towards Asia at the expense of the Middle East or towards Iran at the expense of its proven allies. The United States does not plan to weaken its commitment to the Middle East, and the details reported in both its FY2015 budget submission and its QDR show that it plans major increases in the effectiveness of its air, naval, missile and missile defense forces as well as improvement in readiness and power projection capability. Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). 2014 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved 1 See Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, Department of Defense, January 2012, pp. i, 1, 2, 4 2 IISS Manama Dialogue. As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, Manama, Bahrain, Saturday, December 07, 2013. Office of the Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs). http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1824. 3 US Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Request Overview, March 5, 2014, p. 2-2 4 US Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Request Overview, March 5, 2014, p. 2-2

Cordesman, The New QDR and the US Commitment to the Middle East and Asia 5.3.14 10 5 US Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Request Overview, March 5, 2014, p. 2-3 to 2-4. 6 US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, 2014, March 5, 2014, p. v. 7 US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, 2014, March 5, 2014, p. viii. 8 US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, 2014, March 5, 2014, pp. 4-5. 9 US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, 2014, March 5, 2014, p. 8 10 US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, 2014, March 5, 2014, p. 12 11 US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, 2014, March 5, 2014, p. 14 12 US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, 2014, March 5, 2014, pp. 17-18. 13 US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, 2014, March 5, 2014, pp. 21-22