NATO MEASURES ON ISSUES RELATING TO THE LINKAGE BETWEEN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM AND THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

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NATO MEASURES ON ISSUES RELATING TO THE LINKAGE BETWEEN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM AND THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION Executive Summary Proliferation of WMD NATO s 2009 Comprehensive Strategic-Level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of WMD and Defending Against CBRN Threats states that NATO will work actively to prevent the proliferation of WMD by state and non-state actors. The 2010 Strategic Concept, endorsed at the Lisbon Summit, identifies terrorism as a direct threat and reaffirms the Alliance s determination to ensure that NATO has the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety of its populations and security of its territories. It specifically emphasises the need to further develop NATO's capacity to defend against the threat of CBRN weapons. CBRN Defence Capabilities NATO has significantly improved its CBRN defence posture with the establishment of the Joint CBRN Defence Centre of Excellence (COE) in the Czech Republic and other COEs and agencies that support NATO s response to the WMD and terrorism threat. The recently established multinational CBRN Defence Task Force is key to the protection from, and response to, an attack or event involving CBRN materials. This high-readiness force adds significantly to the specialised capabilities that the Alliance has to offer to Allies and partners. Intelligence Sharing Information and intelligence sharing on terrorism remains fundamentally important in the defence against this global threat. Intelligence sharing with partner nations continues to grow at a steady pace. Cooperation with Partners Through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), the NATO-Russia Council, and with other partners around the globe, NATO has deepened cooperation and information sharing on WMD threats and strengthened non-proliferation initiatives. The annual conference on WMD arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation is one of NATO s largest outreach activities. It gathers together decision-makers, senior officials and distinguished academics in the field of WMD and security from a wide range of countries and enables them to openly exchange views. On average, 150 participants from more than 50 countries attend this event every year. 1

Science Cooperation Defence Against Terrorist Threats is one of two key priority areas under NATO s Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme. This programme supports security-related civil science and technology collaboration between scientists and experts from NATO and partner countries. Between 2006 and 2010, 68 activities (multi-year projects, workshops and training courses) were completed under this Programme in a range of CBRN-related areas. There are also 33 ongoing multi-year projects in these areas. Full Submission Proliferation of WMD Non-adherence to international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation commitments and programmes to develop WMD and their means of delivery undermine global norms and pose a threat to Alliance security. Nuclear weapons and radiological and chemical agents that remain in the world could be vulnerable to exploitation if not properly secured. Rapid advances in biological science and technology continue to increase the bio-terrorism threat and there are indications that terrorists intend to acquire chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) materials for malicious purposes. In response to this threat, NATO places a high priority on preventing the proliferation of WMD and defending against CBRN threats and hazards. The 2009 Comprehensive Strategic-Level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of WMD and Defending Against CBRN Threats, endorsed at the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit, states that NATO will work actively to prevent the proliferation of WMD by state and non-state actors. The 2010 Strategic Concept, endorsed at the Lisbon Summit, identifies terrorism as a direct threat and reaffirms the Alliance s determination to ensure that NATO has the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety of its populations and security of its territories. It specifically emphasises the need to further develop NATO's capacity to defend against the threat of CBRN weapons. Of particular note, at the Lisbon Summit NATO Heads of State and Government called for universal adherence to, and compliance with, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the additional protocol to the International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguard Agreement, and called for full implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540. NATO Heads of State and Government also confirmed the continued implementation of NATO s Comprehensive Strategic-Level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of WMD and Defending Against CBRN Threats. Moreover, the North Atlantic Council was tasked to assess and report, before the meeting of NATO Defence Ministers in June 2011, on how NATO can better counter the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery. This extensive and detailed report is nearing completion. 2

NATO Heads of State and Government continue to be concerned over the proliferation of WMD. Iran s nuclear programme highlighted at the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit and by the United Nations Security Council, remains a serious problem, and NATO calls on Iran to comply fully and without delay with all relevant UNSCRs. In this context, the resumption of talks between the P5+1 and Iran are welcomed. There are also similar concerns over the nuclear programme of the Democratic People s Republic of Korea and the Alliance calls on Korea to comply fully with UNSCRs 1718 and 1847 and relevant international obligations. CBRN Defence Capabilities The probability of large-scale aggression against the Alliance continues to be assessed as highly unlikely. However, an attack from beyond the Euro-Atlantic area involving unconventional forms of armed attack may occur sometime in the future. Potential aggressors might include non-state actors or terrorist groups. This would increase the risk of attack with asymmetric means, which could involve the use of CBRN. Currently, efforts are underway to identify capabilities to detect which chemical and biological agents have been used in an attack and to provide appropriate warning against these identified materials. NATO and NATO Allies have significantly improved and are further improving the Alliance s CBRN defence posture with the establishment of the Joint CBRN Defence Centre of Excellence (COE) in the Czech Republic, the Defence Against Terrorism COE in Turkey, the Cooperative Cyber Defence COE in Estonia and other COEs and agencies that support NATO s response to the WMD and terrorism threat. The recently established multinational CBRN Defence Task Force (a multinational CBRN Defence Battalion and a CBRN Joint Assessment Team) is key to the protection from, and response to, an attack or event involving CBRN materials. This highreadiness force regularly participates in NATO Response Force (NRF) rotations and adds significantly to the specialised capabilities that the Alliance has to offer to Allies and partners. This force also serves as a catalyst for further transformation of our armed forces, not only for the benefit of NATO, but also for EU, UN or national purposes. Operation Active Endeavour (OAE) is a NATO anti-terrorist maritime operation that continues to make an important contribution in the fight against terrorism through surveillance and monitoring operations in the Mediterranean Sea. Its effectiveness has been further enhanced through the support of partner countries that are also concerned by the threat of terrorism. The possibility of expanding the mandate for OAE to include WMD and CBRN is currently being discussed, although there are serious legal, technical and resource issues that would need to be addressed. 3

Intelligence Sharing Information and intelligence sharing on terrorism remains fundamentally important in the defence against this global threat. Intelligence sharing with partner nations continues to grow at a steady pace. The formation of the Intelligence Fusion Centre (IFC) at RAF Molesworth in the UK is a major success story. The IFC is a multinational intelligence organisation at which 24 NATO nations are represented. Its mission is to provide timely, effective, full-spectrum, network-enabled intelligence in support of the planning and execution of operations. The manning includes an analyst responsible for strategic intelligence assessments concerning WMD and CBRN. Cooperation with Partners NATO s partnership network has been an area of great success for the Alliance. Through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), and with other partners around the globe (Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, Singapore), NATO has deepened cooperation and information sharing on WMD threats and strengthened nonproliferation initiatives. These efforts allow us to exchange information more regularly on CBRN threats that may be developing regionally. The Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism is the framework through which Allies and Partner countries, as well as organisations such as the EU, OSCE and UN, work to improve cooperation in the fight against terrorism. The Action Plan facilitates greater intelligence sharing and cooperation in areas such as border security, terrorism-related training and exercises, the development of capabilities for the defence against terrorism and managing the consequences of attack. NATO and Russia also cooperate bilaterally in the framework of a NATO-Russia Council Action Plan on Terrorism. The annual conference on WMD arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation is one of NATO s largest outreach activities. It gathers together decision-makers, senior officials and distinguished academics in the field of WMD and security from a wide range of countries and global regions and enables them to openly exchange views. On average, 150 participants from more than 50 countries attend this event every year. Science Cooperation Defence Against Terrorist Threats is one of two key priority areas under NATO s Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme. This programme supports security-related civil science and technology collaboration between scientists and experts from NATO and partner countries. Between 2006 and 2010, 68 activities (multi-year projects, workshops and training courses) were completed under this Programme in a range of CBRN-related areas such as: physical protection, rapid detection, decontamination and destruction of CBRN agents and weapons, rapid diagnosis of their effects on people and medical countermeasures, and explosives detection. There are also 33 ongoing multi-year 4

projects on these topics. The launch of the NATO-Russia STANDEX Programme on Stand-off Detection of Suicide Bombers and Mobile Projects in May 2009 was one of the most prominent milestones of the SPS Programme. An innovative solution, the STANDEX Programme combines 4 technologies to detect and prevent potential suicide bombers at mass transportation depots. Plans for Big City Trials are currently under preparation with the intention of conducting trials in the Paris Metro System, with an additional offer for trials to be held at the Moscow St. Petersburg subway system in Russia. These trials are scheduled for the end of 2012. 5