There are five legally acknowledged nuclear weapon states under

PART TWO Declared Nuclear Weapon States There are five legally acknowledged nuclear weapon states under the terms of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). All five China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States are also permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. Together, the five nations possess more than 25,000 nuclear weapons, the vast majority of which belong to the United States and Russia. Under the terms of the NPT and the commitments taken at its fiveyear review meetings, the five states have agreed to an unequivocal undertaking... to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, and to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. The deployed arsenals of the nuclear weapon states are declining, with many thousands of nuclear weapons having been withdrawn and eliminated since the mid-1980s. Several countries, including the United States and Russia, however, still stockpile huge amounts (hundreds of metric tons) of nuclear-weapons-usable materials. This problem adds to global concern regarding the security of nuclear materials, the protection of which is of major importance in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The following chapters on the five nuclear weapon states review the quantity of nuclear weapons and delivery systems possessed by each nation. Each chapter also looks at the issues that affect efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 119

CHAPTER 6 Russia Nuclear Weapons Capability The Russian Federation is a recognized nuclear weapon state under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and it possesses thousands of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Under the accounting rules of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), Russia maintains an accountable strategic nuclear force of 981 delivery vehicles with 4,732 associated warheads, although the actual number of deployed strategic weapons is about 3,800. Russia also is estimated to have 3,400 operational nonstrategic warheads and about 8,800 additional intact warheads retained in reserve or inactive stockpiles. Overall, Russia may possess as many as 16,000 intact nuclear weapons. To support this arsenal, Russia maintains a massive nuclear complex that consists of ten formerly secret nuclear cities that house hundreds of metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear materials and hundreds of thousands of trained scientists and engineers with weapons-related knowledge. Russia is in the process of dramatically reducing the size of its nuclear arsenal and weapons complex owing to changed international security conditions, the negotiation of arms control agreements with the United States, and the retirement of older systems that are reaching the end of their service lives. If current trends continue, Russia may only deploy 1,989 strategic nuclear weapons by the end of the decade, although it could maintain a substantially larger nuclear arsenal given adequate resources. 1 The Soviet Union conducted 715 nuclear weapons tests, the first on August 29, 1949, and the last on October 23, 1990. Russia has not conducted any tests since the fall of the Soviet Union. Russia has signed and ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has provided approximately $10.3 billion to assist the states of the former Soviet Union to secure nuclear weapons and materials; eliminate aging nuclear weapon delivery systems; and find alternative, benign employment for its nuclear workforce, in addition to work on the former Soviet chemical and biological weapons complex. 2 Despite these efforts, Russia s nuclear complex continues to pose a serious proliferation risk, and much more remains to be done to adequately secure Russian nuclear materials and expertise. A failure to effectively address the proliferation challenges in Russia could result in the spread of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons to other countries or subnational groups. 121

122 Declared Nuclear Weapon States Aircraft and Missile Capabilities As of the spring of 2005, Russia deployed 777 land- and submarine-based strategic ballistic missiles with intercontinental range, in addition to 78 strategic nuclear-capable bombers. 3 Most of the major strategic ballistic missile production facilities of the former Soviet Union were located outside Russian territory, largely in Ukraine. Russia continues to possess an advanced and accomplished, albeit currently depressed, missile design and production infrastructure. Many of Russia s currently deployed strategic missiles are reaching the end of their service lives and are being retired, with the direct assistance of the United States under the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program (also called the Nunn-Lugar Program, after its original congressional sponsors). Russia continues to produce limited numbers of its new SS-27 land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) (40 were deployed as of the spring of 2005). It also seeks to test and develop a new submarine-launched ballistic missile, the Bulava (SS-N-27), for deployment on its next-generation strategic submarine, also under construction. 4 As with Russia s nuclear complex, the combination of Russia s extensive missile expertise with the economic hardships of its missile experts have raised concerns that, driven by economic necessity and profit motive, Russian equipment and technology may be finding their way into the missile programs of other countries. It appears that Russia may have had some limited missile-related contacts with Iraq before March 2003, in violation of U.N. sanctions, although this cooperation was limited to surface-to-air missiles and does not appear to have extended to ballistic missiles. 5 The United States has levied sanctions against more than a dozen Russian groups for such cooperation since 1998. Russian government officials deny that any assistance is being provided to the military missile programs of either India or Iran, and Moscow has taken significant steps to improve its export controls over missile-related technology. 6 Biological and Chemical Weapons Capability The Soviet Union had vast offensive chemical weapons (CW) and biological weapons (BW) programs. Today, Russia is a state party to both the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. However, Russia continues to possess almost 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons, a massive stock of BW samples, and a latent BW production capability. The Soviet BW program reportedly weaponized plague, anthrax, smallpox, tularemia, brucellosis, and the Marburg virus and developed other possible agents. 7 Russia inherited the vast majority of the Soviet Union s chemical and biological weapons stocks and facilities and is responsible for the elimination of the weapons and stocks in its possession. Russia faces significant problems in complying with its commitments to eliminate these weapons, despite extensive international assistance, and it is likely to retain a considerable chemical and biological weapons

Russia 123 stockpile for many years to come. In the meantime, there is much concern over the security of these materials as well as over the experts who are responsible for their production. The risk that chemical or biological weapons or critical production technology might leak out of Russia to proliferant states or terrorist groups remains high and will require a continued investment (domestic and international) to ensure that the Soviet chemical and biological weapons legacy does not lead to further proliferation. Nuclear Analysis During the Cold War, the potential, deliberate use of Soviet nuclear weapons posed the main security threat to the United States. In the aftermath of the Cold War, concern over Russia s nuclear arsenal shifted to a new set of concerns. These dangers included several risks: Nuclear weapons deployed in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine might not return to Russian control. Russia might lose control of nuclear weapons (especially tactical nuclear weapons) in its inventory. Russian nuclear materials and expertise might be bought or stolen and thus assist the efforts of countries or terrorist groups in developing nuclear weapons. Former U.S. senator Sam Nunn summed up the risk when he said: The old threats we faced during the Cold War, a Soviet strike or an invasion of Europe, were threats made dangerous by Soviet strength. The new threats we face today increased Russian reliance on early launch and first use and increased reliance on tactical-battlefield nuclear weapons are threats made dangerous by Russia s weakness. The threats of today go beyond nuclear forces and include terrorist groups. Much of Russia s nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and materials are poorly secured; its weapons scientists and guards are poorly paid. We can t risk a world where a Russian scientist can take care of his children only by endangering ours. 8 Those weapons deployed outside Russia when the Soviet Union dissolved have all been returned to Russia. The return of the nuclear weapons deployed in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine was a tremendous achievement in international efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The creation of three new nuclear weapon states out of the Soviet Union would have been an almost certain fatal blow to international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons (see chapter 18). Strategic Weapons Russia possesses a large, diverse, and advanced arsenal of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. These weapons serve as the ultimate guarantor for Russian

124 Declared Nuclear Weapon States Table 6.1. Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces Type ICBMs SLBMs Bombers Totals START I Data, September 1990 START I Data, January 2005 1 Launchers 1,064 611 Warheads 4,278 2,436 Launchers 940 292 Warheads 2,804 1,672 Launchers 79 78 Warheads 570 624 Launchers 2,083 981 Warheads 7,652 4,732 ABBREVIATIONS: ABBREVIATIONS START I = Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty; ICBMs = intercontinental ballistic missiles; SLBMs = submarine-launched ballistic missiles. 1 START I Memorandum of Understanding Data Exchange, U.S. Department of State, April 1, 2005. Information contained in the April 2005 data exchange is for forces accountable as of January 31, 2005. national security. Some elements of Russia s nuclear forces have taken on an enhanced role in Russian security as its conventional military strength has faltered. Russia succeeded the Soviet Union as a nuclear weapon state and has assumed its legal obligations under arms control agreements, including the NPT, START I, and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Despite its continued importance to Russian security, the country s nuclear arsenal is shrinking. As the majority of Moscow s strategic weapons reach the end of their service lives and are being retired, many suffer from a lack of maintenance funds, raising questions about their long-term reliability and safety. Notwithstanding these concerns, the Russian nuclear arsenal remains formidable (see table 6.1; also see table 6.7 at the end of the chapter). It is not yet clear to what level Russia s strategic arsenal will drop by the end of the decade. On the basis of the most optimistic assumptions of Russia s relationship with the United States, the Russian deployed strategic arsenal could drop to just under 2,000 weapons by the end of 2010. However, Russia could potentially maintain as many as 2,800 weapons by the end of 2010 (table 6.2). Intercontinental ballistic missiles have historically made up the largest component of the Russian strategic nuclear triad. Yet of the five types of ICBMs that Russia deployed in 2005, only three (the SS-18, SS-19, and SS-27) are expected to be in service by the end of the decade. The other two systems the SS-24 (rail and silo) and SS-25 are expected to reach the end of their serviceable lives by 2010. 9 It is also not yet clear how many of the new SS-27 land-based ICBMs Russia will produce and deploy. It has produced only limited numbers of that system, although its production capability could theoretically reach as high as

Russia 125 Table 6.2. Projection of Russian Nuclear Forces Type 2010 Lower Limit (Launchers/ Warheads) 2010 Upper Limit (Launchers/Warheads) ICBMs SS-18 1 50/500 50/500 SS-19 30/180 30/180 2 SS-24 0/0 0/0 SS-25 0/0 0/0 SS-27 59/59 3 70/420 4 SLBMs Delta III/SS-N-18 0/0 96/288 5 Typhoon/SS-N-20 0/0 0/0 Delta IV/SS-N-23 (Sineva) 6 96/384 96/384 Borey/SS-N-27 (Bulava) 7 0/0 24/144 Bombers 8 Bear Tu-95 H-6 Tu-95 H-16 27/162 32/512 32/192 32/512 Blackjack (Tu-160) 16/192 16/192 Total 230/1,989 364/2,812 ABBREVIATIONS: ICBMs = intercontinental ballistic missiles; SLBMs = submarine-launched ballistic missiles. NOTES: 1. Russia currently deploys 100 SS-18 ICBMs. The older variant is expected to be withdrawn from service in the next few years, while the newer variant is undergoing a life extension program that will allow it to remain in service until approximately 2015 or 2020. 2. It is theoretically possible that Russia, which currently deploys 130 SS-19 ICBMs, could extend the lives of these systems again (they have already been extended to 25 years), but it is much more probable that Moscow will simply retire its older SS-19s, replacing them with the 30 that it purchased from Ukraine in 2003. See www.cdi.org/russia/267-5.cfm. 3. Russia currently only has plans to purchase 4 SS-27 ICBMs in 2005, which would give Moscow a total of 44 deployed at the end of this year; experts estimate Russia s production capability to range from 3 to 9 missiles per year. In a December 2004 interview, Strategic Missile Troops Commander Nikolay Solovtsov stated that Russia could add one regiment of SS-27s every two years (or roughly 5 missiles per year). The lower-limit calculation reflects the assumption that Russia will produce and deploy 3 missiles per year from 2006 to 2010, while the upper-limit calculation reflects the assumption that Russia will produce and deploy 5 missiles each year from 2006 to 2010. 4. This assumes that each SS-27 could be MIRVed with up to six warheads. See Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, NRDC Nuclear Notebook: Russian Nuclear Forces, 2005, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2005, pp. 70 72. 5. This assumes that all six Delta III nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) could remain in service if necessary. See Norris and Kristensen, NRDC Nuclear Notebook, pp. 70 72. 6. This estimate assumes that six Delta IV SSBNs will be deployed. 7. The lower limit assumes that no Borey class SSBNs will be deployed by 2010, while the upper limit assumes that two will be deployed by that year. 8. The lower-limit numbers depend on how many strategic bombers are converted to conventional roles. Experts speculate that some bombers will retain purely nuclear roles, while others will have the capability to carry out either nuclear or conventional missions.

126 Declared Nuclear Weapon States 50 a year with adequate funding. High-end projections suggest that Russia will have just 70 SS-27s by the end of the decade (see table 6.2). The Russian submarine force is also in a serious state of decline. The bulk of its submarine force is slated for elimination by the end of the decade, and it is likely that Russia will deploy only eight submarines (six Delta IVs, with a seventh for testing purposes, plus one Borey-class submarine) by 2010. 10 The six Delta III submarines in the current arsenal are slated for retirement by the end of the decade, though it is possible that some could be retained if necessary. There are three Typhoon submarines in the current arsenal, but the missile they are equipped to carry, the SS-N-20, is nearing the end of its service life. One of the Typhoon subs, the Dmitri Donskoi, serves as a test bed for Russia s not-yetdeployed, next-generation submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), the SS- N-27. 11 It is possible that some submarine launchers will remain operational in port if sufficient funds are not available for seagoing operations. Russia is pursuing work on the next generation of strategic ballistic missile submarines, known as the Borey class. Construction began on the first boat of this class, the Yuri Dolgoruki, in 1996. It may be deployed by 2006. Construction of the second and third boats is under way, and both could enter service by 2012. 12 The Russian bomber force is likely to remain the most stable component of the Russian strategic triad during the next ten years, although it too will decline in numbers as aging systems are retired. The two main bomber types in the Russian military are the Tu-160 Blackjack and the Tu-95 Bear. STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL AND REDUCTIONS. On July 31, 1991, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in Moscow. START I was the first arms control agreement to actually reduce the levels of deployed strategic weapons; previous agreements had served to cap the growth of existing arsenals. Under START I, the United States and Russia reduced their strategic accountable nuclear forces to 6,000 warheads each, deployed on no more than 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles that is, ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic bombers. The sublimits for warheads allow no more than 4,900 weapons to be deployed on either side s ICBMs and SLBMs and, of this subtotal, no more than 1,100 warheads may be deployed on mobile ICBMs. In addition, no more than 1,540 warheads may be deployed on heavy ICBMs. 13 The two countries completed their implementation of the agreement in December 2001, on schedule. The entry into force of START I was substantially delayed because many of the systems covered by the treaty were physically deployed in non-russian republics when the USSR fell. To address this dramatic development, the countries involved agreed that Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine would also need to ratify the agreement before the treaty would take effect. Upon the collapse of the Soviet state, Russia was almost immediately recognized by the international community as the main nuclear successor state of the Soviet Union, but obtaining agreement from the other three states required intensive diplomatic

Russia 127 and strategic maneuvering by the United States, Russia, and the other countries involved. The result was the negotiation of the Lisbon Protocol to the START I agreement, signed on May 23, 1992, by Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. Through the protocol, the four states agreed to participate jointly in START I as successors of the former Soviet Union and to implement the Treaty s limits and restrictions (article 2 of the protocol). In addition, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine agreed to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as non-nuclear weapon state parties in the shortest possible time (article 5 of the protocol). In separate letters to President George H. W. Bush, each of the three presidents of the state parties also agreed to the elimination of all strategic nuclear arms on their territories within the seven-year START I implementation period. In approving ratification on November 4, 1992, Russia s Supreme Soviet stipulated that Russia not exchange instruments of ratification until after the other three successor states had acceded to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states and carried out their other obligations under the Lisbon Protocol. The Belarusian parliament ratified START I on February 4, 1993, and Belarus formally acceded to the NPT on July 22, 1993. Kazakhstan s parliament ratified START I on July 2, 1992, and Kazakhstan formally acceded to the NPT on February 14, 1994. Ukraine s parliament approved START I and the NPT in two steps, on November 18, 1993, and on February 3, 1994, and it deposited its accession to the NPT on December 5, 1994. All nuclear weapons deployed in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine were returned to Russia by the end of 1996 (see chapter 18). START II. At the June 1990 Washington Summit, Presidents George H. W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev agreed that after the signing of START I, the two sides would begin new talks on further reductions at the earliest practical date. Those talks began in September 1991. At a subsequent summit in June 1992, Presidents Bush and Boris Yeltsin agreed on the basic principles of what was known as START II, including a ban on multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) land-based ICBMs. This was a significant development for two reasons. First, MIRVed ICBMs have been considered destabilizing weapons, posing an attractive target for a disarming first strike. Second, the majority of Russian nuclear arsenals were based on MIRVed ICBMs. Bush and Yeltsin signed the finalized START II agreement in Moscow on January 3, 1993. START II, had it ever entered into force, would have capped the number of deployed strategic warheads in both countries at 3,500 and resulted in the elimination of all land-based MIRVed ICBMs by January 1, 2003. The U.S. Senate ratified START II on January 26, 1996. After more than six years delay, the Russian Duma ratified the agreement on April 14, 2000. The Russian ratification included an important caveat, however, requiring the U.S. Senate to approve protocols to the 1972 Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty before START II would enter into force. When the George W. Bush administration chose to withdraw from the ABM Treaty on June 13, 2002,

128 Declared Nuclear Weapon States Moscow responded by declaring that it would no longer be bound by the limits agreed upon under START II, effectively killing the treaty. 14 START III. At their March 20 21, 1997, Helsinki Summit, Presidents Yeltsin and Bill Clinton agreed to begin negotiations on a START III agreement immediately after START II entered into force and identified certain parameters for the new treaty. First, they agreed that the pact would limit deployed strategic forces on both sides to between 2,000 and 2,500 warheads by the end of 2007. Second, they agreed that START III would be the first strategic arms control agreement to include measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the actual destruction of strategic nuclear warheads. In addition, they pledged to explore measures for long-range nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles and tactical nuclear systems. These discussions were to take place apart from, but in the context of, START III negotiations. 15 Despite several years of informal discussions between U.S. and Russian officials on issues to be addressed in the START III process, no negotiations ever took place and no agreement was ever produced. THE TREATY OF MOSCOW (SORT). During his November 2001 summit with President Vladimir Putin, President George W. Bush announced that the United States would reduce its strategic nuclear arsenal to between 1,700 and 2,200 operationally deployed nuclear weapons over the next ten years. Bush had previously announced that this would be the level of U.S. nuclear forces. Although in 2000 Putin had declared his interest in reducing the Russian nuclear arsenal to 1,500 or fewer weapons, he did not announce a formal Russian target for reductions. In a joint press conference with Bush after their summit meeting, Putin did express his interest in having the reductions made part of a formal treaty: For our part, [Russia is] prepared to present all our agreements in a treaty form, including the issues of verification and control. 16 This agreement, now known as the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), was signed in Moscow on May 24, 2002. The United States had previously resisted having the reductions codified in any legal agreement, but it finally accepted the Russian request to do so. The U.S. Senate ratified the pact in March 2003, and the Russian Duma followed suit in May 2003. The agreement capped the number of each side s strategic, offensively deployed, nuclear warheads at between 1,700 and 2,200 by December 31, 2012. SORT is a significant departure from past arms control treaties. It is just two pages long, compared with the much lengthier and more detailed START agreements. It abandons the START II pledge to eliminate all MIRVed ICBMs, and its elimination and verification measures are much weaker than those under the START agreement. Whereas START I and START II called for the total, verifiable elimination of all delivery systems that were subject to strategic reductions, SORT only requires that these systems, and their corresponding warheads, not be deployed. 17 Nor does SORT follow up on the ambitious START III agenda, which considered including controls on warheads, long-range nuclear-capable cruise missiles, and tactical nuclear weapons.

Russia 129 Table 6.3. Russian Tactical Nuclear Weapon Stockpiles Tactical Weapon Type Totals in 1991 1 Total to Remain under 1991 Bush Gorbachev Agreements Total Tactical Nuclear Weapon Stockpiles 2004 2 Deployed Tactical Nuclear Weapons, 2005 3 Land-based missiles 4,000 0 0 0 Artillery 2,000 0 0 0 Mines 700 0 0 0 Air defense 3,000 1,500 1,500 1,200 Air force 7,000 3,500 3,500 1,540 Navy 5,000 3,000 3,000 640 Total 4 21,700 8,000 8,000 3,400 NOTES: 1. Alexei Arbatov, ed., Yadernye Vooruzheniya Rossii (Moscow: IMEMO, 1997), p. 56. 2. Gunnar Arbman and Charles Thornton. Russia s Tactical Nuclear Weapons (Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2003), p. 17. 3. See William M. Arkin and Hans M. Kristensen, Russian Nuclear Forces, 2002, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2002, pp. 71 73. The authors note in subsequent notebooks (2003, 2004, 2005) that their estimates on tactical nuclear weapons remain unchanged since 2002. 4. All totals are approximations. THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY. U.S. and Russian nuclear deployments are also partly controlled by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) signed by Presidents Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan on December 8, 1987. The INF Treaty required both countries to eliminate all nuclear-capable ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles in their arsenals with a range of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers no later than June 1, 1991 (three years after the agreement entered into force). 18 The INF Treaty is the only pact to eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons. Its implementation resulted, by May 1991, in the verified destruction of 846 long- and short-range U.S. INF missile systems and of 1,846 Soviet missile systems. 19 Under the terms of the agreement, implementation was completed on May 31, 2001, and the two governments announced that they would no longer need to verify the complete elimination of weapons systems covered under the agreement. Tactical Weapons Much less is known about the size, composition, and deployment of the Russian arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons (table 6.3). At one point during the Cold War, Russia is believed to have possessed about 30,000 tactical weapons. 20

130 Declared Nuclear Weapon States Russia has substantially reduced its stocks of tactical weapons, and informed estimates suggest that Russia has between 3,400 and 8,000 of these weapons. 21 In October 1991, President Gorbachev responded to President George H. W. Bush s September initiative to dramatically reduce the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons. Gorbachev matched Bush by announcing a plan that would eliminate all Soviet nuclear artillery, short-range missile, and land-mine warheads; remove all nuclear weapons for air defense missiles from deployment areas (for storage or elimination); and remove tactical nuclear weapons from navy forces (ships, submarines, and land-based aircraft). In 1992, Russian president Yeltsin went further, announcing an end to the production of warheads for landbased tactical missiles, artillery, and land mines, as well as the decision to eliminate the stockpiles of those weapons. He also announced that Russia would eliminate one-third of its tactical sea-launched nuclear warheads, half of its tactical air-launched nuclear weapons, and half of its nuclear warheads for antiaircraft missiles. 22 Russian tactical nuclear weapons deployed in non-russian republics were returned to Russia in early 1992, and tactical weapons elimination is believed to have continued through the beginning of the new century. There are no formal verification procedures in place or associated with the initiatives, however, to ensure that the systems were in fact removed and destroyed. This uncertainty was reinforced in January 2001, when the Washington Times reported that Russia was transferring tactical nuclear weapons to Kaliningrad Oblast, which is an isolated enclave of Russian territory between Poland and Lithuania. Russia denied the claim, but in the absence of a formal inspection or other verification procedure, the truth of the allegations cannot be either confirmed or discounted. 23 Uncertainty about the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons has lingered, particularly with the general decline of Russia s conventional military forces. With that decline, tactical nuclear weapons have taken on greater importance in Russian security planning. This raises questions about whether Moscow will continue to eliminate these weapons. In late 2003, a high-ranking Russian general reaffirmed these concerns, saying that Russia would hold onto its stockpiles of tactical nuclear weapons. 24 In fact, it is likely that Russia is at least considering the development and deployment of new types of these weapons. 25 In October 2004, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for arms control, Stephen G. Rademaker, stated that Washington remains concerned that Russian commitments on tactical weapons in Europe have not been fulfilled. 26 Loose Nuclear Weapons and Materials There has been great concern that the security of Russia s nuclear complex since the collapse of the Soviet Union made the possible theft or unauthorized use of a Russian nuclear weapon a very real threat. As a result, the U.S. Congress started several programs to assist Russia in ensuring the security of its nuclear arsenal. U.S. assistance has been critical to improving the security of both nuclear weapons and nonweaponized nuclear materials in Russia and in other former Soviet

Russia 131 states. Nuclear weapons generally enjoy a greater level of security than do Russian nonweaponized nuclear materials (highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium). Although Russia has never disclosed the total number of sites where nuclear weapons and materials are stored, as of the spring of 2005, the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. Department of Energy had identified at least 91 warhead storage sites 27 and 40 fissile material storage sites. 28 NUCLEAR WEAPONS SECURITY. U.S.-funded programs have helped to secure the transport of Russian nuclear warheads and to develop a modern warhead accounting and tracking system. The program demonstrates an unprecedented level of cooperation between two former Cold War adversaries as well as their ability to cooperate in addressing common security threats. Initial Russian weapons security programs, collectively known as Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR), focused on helping to protect nuclear warheads during transit, especially those coming from the former Soviet republics to Russia. The programs also assisted with emergency planning and response in the event of an accident. For this purpose, the United States provided Russia with 4,000 Kevlar blankets, 150 supercontainers (used to carry several warheads at a time) for the physical and ballistic protection of nuclear weapons, and 117 special railcar conversion kits (100 cargo, 15 guard, and 2 prototypes) to ensure the security of warheads. In addition, the CTR programs have also provided Russia with five mobile emergency response complexes to deal with accidents. (An additional 150 supercontainers were provided by the United Kingdom in May 1997.) The railcars themselves were produced in Russia using U.S. funds and some U.S. materials; the rest of the equipment was produced in the United States. This program continues, and on November 1, 1999, the U.S. Department of Defense and the Russian Ministry of Defense signed a new memorandum for $41.7 million in additional assistance to purchase security systems for railcars. The program s aims have now shifted to the replacement of railcars that are nearing the end of their service lives. 29 Soviet-era warhead accounting and management relied upon the manual (handwritten) tracking of its nuclear arsenal. Through the U.S. CTR program, a new automated system of tracking and accounting is being implemented in Russia. Under the program, the United States has provided Russia with 100 personal computers, as well as software and training. It is also identifying additional needs, including site preparation for the installation of permanent communication equipment. The program has certified hardware and software for the tracking system at nineteen key field and regional sites. A demonstration facility, the Security Assessment and Training Center, was completed in 2003, and installation has begun at additional sites. The program is scheduled to be completed in 2005. 30 With shipments beginning in 1997, the U.S. Department of Defense CTR program transferred 123 quick-fix sets to the Russian Ministry of Defense for upgrading security at weapons storage sites. In 2002, however, the ministry indicated that it has installed only one-third of the fencing sets at 52 locations. 31 The ministry planned to install all the upgrades, but it then asked the United States for additional funding assistance. Disputes over U.S. access to Russian

132 Declared Nuclear Weapon States weapons sites have seriously stalled the upgrades. As of the spring of 2005, approximately half of the total 123 quick-fix sets had been installed. 32 At the same time, the U.S. Department of Energy has been working successfully to improve security at Russian navy sites that contain nuclear weapons. The project started in 1999, and the Energy Department expects to complete security upgrades at all 39 navy sites in 2006. 33 NUCLEAR MATERIALS SECURITY. Even if Russia were to eliminate its nuclear weapons, the country s vast holdings of nonweaponized nuclear materials will remain a major proliferation concern for decades to come. President Bush and President Putin have acknowledged this concern on a number of occasions. In a joint statement from November 2001, the two presidents said, Both sides agree that urgent attention must continue to be given to improving the physical protection and accounting of nuclear materials of all possessor states, and preventing illicit nuclear trafficking. 34 President Bush stated in February 2004 that the countries of the world must do all they can to protect nuclear materials. 35 Russia has the world s largest stocks of weapons-grade and weapons-usable nuclear materials: highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium. Much of this material is not adequately protected against theft or diversion. A U.S. Department of Energy advisory group, chaired by the former Senate majority leader, Howard Baker, and the former White House counsel, Lloyd Cutler, concluded in 2000: The most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation states and used against American troops abroad or citizens at home. This threat is a clear and present danger to the international community as well as to American lives and liberties. Though some progress has been made since that time, many experts believe this assessment is still correct. 36 Reliable estimates of the total Russian nuclear material stockpile vary, but Russia is believed to have produced roughly between 180 and 185 tons of weapons-usable separated plutonium (civil and military) and close to 1,100 tons of HEU. 37 Of this material, approximately 600 to 700 metric tons are thought to be in nuclear weapons. It is not possible to be absolutely certain of the actual amount of nuclear material that Russia has produced and holds because their production cannot be fully accounted for even under the best circumstances (for example, even the United States own nuclear production accounting system considered vastly superior to the former Soviet system has a margin of accounting error of almost 1 percent for plutonium). 38 Nuclear smuggling from Russian or former Soviet facilities continues to present an acute proliferation risk, despite considerable efforts to improve the security of loose Russian materials. The International Atomic Energy Agency has confirmed that, from January 1993 to December 2003, seventeen cases of smuggled nuclear-weapons-usable materials occurred, many originating in the former Soviet Union. For example, in 1994 and 1995, the Czech authorities recovered small amounts of HEU that had likely originated in Obninsk, Russia. In 1999,

Russia 133 Kyrgystani officials arrested two persons who were attempting to sell 1.5 grams of plutonium. 39 Hundreds of similar cases have been reported and investigated during the past decade. NUCLEAR MATERIAL PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTING. U.S. programs, run primarily by the Department of Energy, work to enhance security in the Russian nuclear complex. Initial security efforts covered more than two-thirds of the total number of sites containing fissile material, and emphasized locking down the most vulnerable facilities. Even after ten years of effort, however, a majority of nonweaponized Russian nuclear materials are inadequately protected. By the end of 2004, only 26 percent of materials had received comprehensive security upgrades. 40 Current U.S. government projects plan to complete comprehensive safeguards for all civilian and military material sites by the end of 2008. 41 Experts, however, believe that such a timetable may be unrealistic, for two reasons. First, Moscow and Washington still have unresolved issues regarding American access to Russian military sites. Consequently, much more has been done to install upgrades at civilian sites than at military sites. Upgrades at the civilian facilities had been nearly completed by the end of 2004, while a relatively small number of military sites, which hold about 83 percent of Russia s fissile material, lagged far behind. 42 Second, the Department of Energy s current plans anticipate that 50 percent of the material will be secured in 2007 and 2008, the last two years of the program, even though it will have taken the first twelve years of the program to secure the first 50 percent. If the rate of comprehensive upgrades remains the same as it was in fiscal year (FY) 2003, then the program will not be completed until 2013. 43 Even this final level of protection, however, will be below the accepted international standards for the physical protection of nuclear materials. No plans currently exist to provide Russia with the resources needed to reach this level of physical security and accounting. The U.S. Congress has broadly supported the Material Protection, Control, and Accounting Program (MPC&A), funding the program at the annual level requested by the Clinton administration. Despite statements of support from the George W. Bush campaign and then administration, its first budget request reduced funding for Russian nuclear material security from a little more than $170 million in 2001 to $138 million in 2002. Additional cuts in Russian nonproliferation programs, including the disposition of nuclear materials and brain drain programs (see below), totaled more than $100 million from the previous year s budget. Congressional action on the FY 2002 budget restored funding for nuclear security upgrades to 2001 levels. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress passed two supplemental appropriations for MPC&A, increasing total 2002 funding to $267 million. Budgets in the following years contained $194 million (FY 2003), $212 million (FY 2004), and $275 million (FY 2005) (see table 6.4). The Bush administration s request for FY 2006 was $246 million. 44 In addition to protecting nuclear materials in place, the United States also funded the construction of a large nuclear material storage facility in Russia to

134 Declared Nuclear Weapon States Table 6.4. Funding for Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting (millions of dollars) 1 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2.7 3.4 10.2 85.0 112.6 137.0 139.8 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 138.7 169.5 266.6 2 193.9 212.1 275.5 245.5 3 SOURCES: Nuclear Threat Initiative, Interactive Threat Reduction Budget Database: FY 1992 FY 2006, available at www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/overview/cnwm_home.asp NOTES: 1. The budgets for fiscal years 1993 to 2000 were submitted by the Bill Clinton administration. The budgets for fiscal years 2001 to 2006 were submitted by the George W. Bush administration. 2. This figure includes funding provided by supplemental appropriation passed by Congress in fiscal year 2002 in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. 3. This is the level of funding proposed by the Bush administration in February 2005. The actual appropriation will not be made until the fall of 2005. securely store nuclear materials released from dismantled nuclear weapons. The Fissile Material Storage Facility in Mayak was originally planned to have two wings, with each holding 25,000 canisters of nuclear material (50 tons of plutonium and 200 tons of HEU). The first wing was completed in December 2003, but Russia announced that it planned to store only 25 tons of plutonium and no HEU in the facility. No written agreement between the United States and Russia requires Moscow to store any material at Mayak, and the two states have been at odds over the need to amend agreements to include storage obligations. Additionally, the two sides have not agreed on transparency measures to verify the origin of the nuclear materials to be stored at the facility. Though they have made progress on resolving some transparency issues, disputes over measuring total mass of material remain a significant hurdle. 45 There are no current plans to construct the second wing. Even the best long-term storage and security of nuclear materials cannot eliminate the proliferation risks associated with these huge stocks. The continued possession of large stocks of excess nuclear materials is a recognized clear and present danger. 46 The disposal of those materials no longer required for defense purposes is vital to reduce the risk that these materials might again be used to produce nuclear weapons in Russia or in other states or by subnational groups. To this end, the United States and Russia have been cooperating on two important programs: the HEU purchase agreement and the plutonium disposition program. The Purchase of Highly Enriched Uranium On February 18, 1993, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that the United States would purchase 500 metric tons of Russia s HEU from dismantled

Russia 135 Russian nuclear weapons. 47 The program reduces the risk of the theft of Russian nuclear material and speeds the dismantlement of Russian nuclear weapons by freeing storage space for released nuclear materials. Under the program, Russia dilutes, or downblends, weapons-grade HEU into low-enriched uranium, which cannot be used directly in nuclear weapons. This process takes place under intrusive monitoring arrangements. Russia then ships the material to the United States for fabrication into fuel for nuclear power reactors. The entire program is designed to take place over 20 years and was originally expected to pay Russia $12 billion for the material and services. The agreement has since been renegotiated. Russia will now be paid according to market forces, which will be less than the original payment envisioned. 48 Executing agents appointed by the two governments carry out the pact. The U.S. executive agent is the privatized United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC), and the Russian executive agent is Techsnabexport (Tenex), the commercial arm of the Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency (Rosaton formerly Minatom). As of the spring of 2005, the United States (through USEC) had purchased the equivalent of 237 metric tons of HEU (6,974 metric tons of lowenriched uranium fuel) from Russia (enough material to produce 9,482 nuclear weapons), for which Russia received over $3.5 billion. 49 Russia may have hundreds of additional metric tons of HEU not covered by this purchase agreement, much of which could eventually become excess to Russian military needs. Numerous nongovernmental experts have called for an expansion of the HEU agreement to include the purchase of larger amounts of HEU. The economic considerations of such a move are complicated by the fact that the private USEC lacks a financial incentive to expand its purchases. This conflict between national security and financial considerations is a major point of contention between experts and government officials. There are no firm official plans to expand the scope of the purchase agreement, although the issue is reportedly under review by the Bush administration. Plutonium Disposition The United States and Russia have both declared large amounts of former defense-purpose plutonium to be excess to defense needs. On March 1, 1995, President Clinton designated 50 metric tons of plutonium as excess, 50 and Boris Yeltsin declared that up to 50 metric tons of plutonium would be made excess through the nuclear disarmament process in 1997. 51 Collectively, this material is enough to produce 25,000 nuclear warheads, and both countries have pledged to take steps to ensure that the material is never again used for weapons. These amounts represent significant portions of the plutonium produced in both countries. However, both countries will have large stocks of weaponsusable materials even after these amounts are dispositioned. At the June 2000 summit in Moscow, the United States and Russia agreed to dispose of 34 metric tons each of their excess weapons plutonium. Under the agreement, the two approved methods for the disposal of this material were the irradiation of plutonium in a nuclear reactor and the immobilization of

136 Declared Nuclear Weapon States plutonium with high-level radioactive waste (in either glass or ceramic form). The agreement called on both countries to seek to begin the operation of industrial-scale facilities no later than December 2007, at a disposal rate of 2 metric tons of plutonium per year. 52 There are several major problems looming over the implementation of the agreement, however. These include technical and political challenges to the U.S. program and a lack of financing for the Russian disposition effort. The Bush administration has decided to abandon immobilization and to pursue only reactor-based irradiation of this material. 53 The biggest remaining problem is a liability dispute, which has delayed the beginning of construction of special mixedoxide fuel facilities in each country by at least ten months. It appears unlikely that either side will begin disposing of significant amounts plutonium by the 2007 deadline. Russia has also stated that it does not possess the funds required to carry out the disposition alone and would simply store the material if international support were unavailable. Since the program was first funded in FY 1996, the United States has appropriated approximately $494 million for this effort. 54 Estimates now suggest that the entire Russian disposition program, including the construction and operation of facilities, could cost $2 billion. 55 Moreover, for the program to succeed, efforts to dispose of U.S. plutonium must also be sufficiently funded because Russia would be unwilling to dispose of its excess plutonium unless the United States does so as well. The 2005 budget sets funding levels for Russian disposition at $73 million, and U.S. disposition efforts at $464 million. 56 Furthermore, both countries are hoping that third parties can assist in this essential nonproliferation endeavor. The U.S. Russian agreement completed at the June 2000 summit in Moscow recognizes the need for international financing and assistance in order for Russia to implement its plutonium disposition plans. 57 The July 2000, Group of Eight (G-8) summit in Okinawa called upon the G-8 to develop an international financing plan by the 2001 meeting that was held in Genoa. Although this deadline was not met, by the spring of 2005, Canada, the European Union, France, Japan, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, in addition to the United States, had pledged $981 million for Russian plutonium disposition as part of the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, an initiative launched in 2002. 58 These pledges are signs of progress, but still only amount to 50 percent of the anticipated cost of the program. Nuclear Expertise The breakup of the Soviet Union and prolonged economic strain in Russia also pose serious nonproliferation risks in the form of Russian nuclear weapons expertise and technical know-how. International efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons have focused not only on trying to protect Russian nuclear materials but also on preventing Russian nuclear experts from selling their skills to would-be nuclear weapon states and organizations.

Russia 137 Russia s nuclear complex is filled with tens of thousands of scientists, engineers, and technicians who are responsible for the construction, maintenance, and dismantlement of Russia s nuclear weapons. Counts vary, but there are approximately 35,000 excess weapons scientists and workers in the Russian nuclear complex, many of whom have direct access to weapons-usable nuclear materials. 59 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the employees of Russia s nuclear complex fell on hard times. Formerly the privileged inhabitants of Russia s nuclear cities, after the Soviet collapse, these nuclear elite found themselves in geographically remote locations with rapidly dropping living standards and diminishing work orders from the central government. Collectively referred to as a brain drain, the risk that Russian nuclear experts might be forced by economic deprivation to sell their expertise or materials on hand rapidly changed the dynamics of Russian and U.S. security considerations. A 2002 National Intelligence Council study indicated that economic improvements in Russia would mitigate the problem slightly, but it also noted that officers responsible for warhead storage and maintenance receive wages that rarely exceed $70 a month. 60 A 2003 survey of Russian scientists with weapons expertise found that 20 percent of respondents would consider working in North Korea, Syria, Iran, or Iraq. 61 Both the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Department of Energy are involved in efforts to help prevent the brain drain. These efforts consist of projects designed to provide grants for civilian research to scientists and institutions formerly involved in weapons development, as well as to help in the conversion and commercialization of former defense industries. The three principal programs in this area are the International Science and Technology Centers (ISTCs), the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP), and the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI). In 2002, IPP and NCI were combined under the Russian Transition Initiative. In 2005, these efforts were extended to countries such as Iraq and Libya under the Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention. Science Centers The State Department manages U.S. participation in both the ISTC in Moscow and the Science and Technology Center of Ukraine (STCU). These centers are multilateral organizations designed to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology expertise by providing civilian employment opportunities to former weapons scientists and engineers in the newly independent states (NIS) of the former USSR. The ISTC was founded in Moscow in 1992. Its current members include the European Union, Canada, Japan, Norway, South Korea, and the United States as donors. Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Russia, and Tajikstan are recipient countries. 62 To ensure the full participation of all NIS member states, branch offices of the ISTC have been established in Almaty, Kazakhstan; Yerevan, Armenia; Minsk, Belarus; Tbilisi, Georgia; and Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic. 63 In July 1995 the STCU, a separate but parallel organization,