Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP)

For Wargaming Purposes Only Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP) AY 2016-2017 January 2020 For Wargaming Purposes Only

DISCLAIMER The information in this document has been formulated by the Air Force Wargaming Institute for use in support of wargames conducted by this organization. It is intended for wargaming purposes only. As such, it contains material designed to promote discussion by wargame participants and should not be taken to represent expected or desired future conditions or forces. This document in no way constitutes an official position of Air University, Air Education and Training Command, the U.S. Air Force, DOD or any other U.S. government agency. All data and information used are notional and should not be confused with real world information or used for any other purpose. This information is not for general distribution, but may be released to officials within the DOD. Any release to persons outside the DOD, or any quotation or extract for publication, is prohibited without specific permission from the Director, Air Force Wargaming Institute, in each instance. ACADEMIC NON-ATTRIBUTION The LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education supports academic freedom. Participants are encouraged to state their opinions and support or criticize any objective, policy, strategy, or tactic while pursuing knowledge, understanding, and improvement of the military profession. Statements, disagreements, and other comments made by individuals or groups in this environment will be safeguarded through the practice of non-attribution. In other words, statements made in this forum should be treated as privileged information not to be attributed to a specific individual or organization. Air Force Wargaming Institute Warfighting Applications Operations Division The Lemay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, Air University Maxwell AFB, Alabama 36112-6428 DSN 493-4879 / 6169 2

AIR FORCE WARGAMING INSTITUTE Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan TABLE OF CONTENTS DISCLAIMER... II TABLE OF CONTENTS... III LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES... IV SECTION I INTRODUCTION... 1 1. PURPOSE... 1 2. SCOPE... 1 SECTION II STRATEGIC CONTEXT AND GLOBAL PRIORITIES... 3 1. THE JSCP AND NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY... 3 2. NMS FOUNDATIONS AND TENETS... 5 3. PRIORITIZATION OF WORK... 9 SECTION III RESOURCES AND FORCES... 11 1. GENERAL.... 11 2. FORCE APPORTIONMENT GUIDANCE... 11 3. PLAN SOURCING GUIDANCE... 12 4. ALLOCATION OF FORCES AND RESOURCES... 12 SECTION IV GLOBAL DEFENSE POSTURE... 15 1. GENERAL.... 15 2. THEATER POSTURE PLAN FORMAT.... 15 SECTION V CAMPAIGN PLAN REQUIREMENTS... 19 1. OVERVIEW... 19 2. INTENT... 19 3. STRUCTURE OF THE CAMPAIGN PLAN GUIDANCE... 20 SECTION VI GENERAL PLANNING GUIDANCE... 23 1. GENERAL.... 23 2. ADAPTIVE PLANNING GUIDANCE... 23 3. LARGE SCALE CONTINGENCY... 28 4. LESSER CONTINGENCIES... 28 5. PLANNING FOR CBRN CONTINGENCIES... 29 6. PLANS FOR FORWARD PRESENCE OPERATIONS... 29 7. ACCESS AND HOST-NATION SUPPORT.... 29 8. LOGISTICS... 29 SECTION VII FUNCTIONAL PLANNING GUIDANCE... 31 1. GENERAL.... 31 2. CAMPAIGN PLANS... 31 APPENDIX A TO SECTION VII GUIDANCE TO USSOCOM... 33 APPENDIX B TO SECTION VII GUIDANCE TO USSTRATCOM... 34 APPENDIX C TO SECTION VII GUIDANCE TO USTRANSCOM... 35 iii

APPENDIX D TO SECTION VII GUIDANCE TO Service Commanders... 36 SECTION VIII REGIONAL PLANNING GUIDANCE... 37 APPENDIX A TO SECTION VIII GUIDANCE TO USAFRICOM... 41 APPENDIX B TO SECTION VIII GUIDANCE TO USCENTCOM... 43 APPENDIX C TO SECTION VIII GUIDANCE TO USEUCOM... 45 APPENDIX D TO SECTION VIII GUIDANCE TO USMEDCOM.47 APPENDIX E TO SECTION VIII GUIDANCE TO USNORTHCOM and CDRNORAD... 49 APPENDIX F TO SECTION VIII GUIDANCE TO USPACOM... 51 APPENDIX G TO SECTION VIII GUIDANCE TO USSOUTHCOM... 54 SECTION IX IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE... 58 1. General... 58 2. Development of Plans...59 3. In-Progress Reviews...59 SECTION X - ASSESSMENTS... 60 1. Purpose... 60 2. Assessment Content and Format... 60 3. Assessment Cycle... 61 LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES FIGURE II-1 1-4-2-1 STRATEGY... 5 FIGURE VI-1 ADAPTIVE PLANNING OPTIONS... 23 FIGURE VI-2 JSCP OPTION RELATIONSHIPS... 24 FIGURE VI-3 DIPLOMATIC FDOS... 25 FIGURE VI-4 INFORMATIONAL FDOS... 25 FIGURE VI-5 ECONOMIC FDOS... 25 FIGURE VI-6 MILITARY FDOS... 26 FIGURE VI-7 RESPONSE AND TYPE FORCE RELATIONSHIP... 28 TABLE VIII-1 JSCP REGIONAL ASSUMPTIONS... 37 TABLE VIII-2 COMMON REGIONAL TASKS... 38 1

1. PURPOSE. SECTION I INTRODUCTION This Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP) translates the national security strategy into planning guidance for the Combatant Commanders of the Unified Commands and Chiefs of the military services. This guidance includes a military strategy, strategic tasks and objectives for contingency planning for peace and war. 2. SCOPE. a. The JSCP implements the strategic policy direction provided in the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) and initiates the planning process for the development of campaign, campaign support, contingency, and posture plans. The JSCP contributes to the Chairman s statutory responsibility to assist the President and the SecDef in providing for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces of the United States and conduct contingency planning for the Nation. b. The global security environment mandates a flexible, adaptive approach to planning for the use of military forces in support of U.S. national security objectives. Combatant commanders (CCDRs) must balance and integrate shaping the current environment and future outcomes through proactive efforts such as security cooperation activities, with preparations to respond to potential contingencies. The campaign plan requirement tasked in this document provides a framework for this balancing effort, as well as aligning and de-conflicting competing planning priorities, and mitigating near-term risk by accounting for the impact of force availability and posture on planning for contingencies and current operations. 1

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 2

SECTION II STRATEGIC CONTEXT AND GLOBAL PRIORITIES 1. THE JSCP AND NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY. a. General. The Armed Forces are the Nation s military instrument for ensuring our security. Accordingly, the primary purpose of U.S. Armed Forces is to deter threats of organized violence against the United States and its interests, and to defeat such threats should deterrence fail. The military is a complementary element of national power that stands with the other instruments wielded by our government. The Armed Forces core competence is the ability to apply decisive military power to deter or defeat aggression and achieve our national security objectives. b. National Military Strategy (NMS). The purpose of the NMS is to prioritize and focus the efforts of the Armed Forces of the United States as we provide for the common defense by deterring attacks on our nation, our citizens, allies, and partners. This defense strategy serves the broad national objectives of peace, freedom, and prosperity. Diplomatic and economic efforts seek to promote these objectives globally by encouraging democracy and free markets. U.S. defense strategy seeks to defend freedom for the United States and its allies and friends, and it helps to secure an international environment of peace that makes other goals possible. Our NMS depends first and foremost upon the United States remaining secure from external threats. A secure homeland is fundamental to U.S. global leadership; however, it is not the only prerequisite. To protect and promote U.S. national interests, our national military objectives are: counter violent extremism, deter and defeat aggression, strengthen international and regional security, and shape the future force. The end state of this strategy is to provide enduring security for the American people, in a stable and prosperous international system. c. Strategic Environment. We continue in a period of profound strategic change. Today s global security environment offers great opportunities for international cooperation and progress while also posing profound dangers. The bipolar stability that was the hallmark of the Cold War era is well past, superseded by explosive global economic growth, unprecedented international integration, expanding transnational movements of all types, near-instantaneous world-wide communications across myriad paths, and rapidly proliferating technologies. This period of unprecedented human integration - or globalization - has benefited many people around the world. However it has also pressurized long-standing regional, cultural and ethnic tensions resulting in turbulence. This has given rise to diverse yet interrelated strategic challenges of varying intensity, immediacy, and danger. Key developments include: (1) The rise of transnational terrorism. (2) The spread of weapons of mass destruction. (3) Rising regional instability. (4) Increasingly powerful state adversaries. (5) Growing competition for natural resources. (6) The threat of natural disasters and pandemics. (7) Cyber and space vulnerability and competition. 3

d. NMS Objectives. The National Military Strategy (NMS) focuses on achieving the following common defense objectives. These objectives are not in priority order. 1. Protect Homeland & US Interest Abroad 2. Prepare a Joint Force to Deter, Deny, Defeat any Adversaries 3. Joint Force Resilient and Flexible 4. Build Alliances and Partnerships Enhanced 5. Access to Global Commons 6. Prevent WMD Proliferation e. Strategic Approach. To succeed in meeting these objectives, we must integrate with all elements of national power and work closely with friends and allies. The sustained presence and persistent engagement of our forces deployed around the globe is the most effective way for the military to develop lasting relationships, promote common interests and facilitate the cooperative security that supports those mutual interests. f. Full Spectrum Planning Strategy. To more clearly define Combatant Commanders planning tasks, a planning strategy was developed to support achieving the national military objectives. Planning for the defense of the homeland is the first and most important part of this strategy. Secondly, the U.S. must maintain successful engagement in any long term, on-going fight or contingency operations (i.e. global operations against violent extremist organizations (VEO)). Thirdly, the U.S. must promote security and deter aggression in four critical regions of the world (Europe, East Asian littoral, Northeast Asia and Middle East/Southwest Asia). Finally, based on national interests, the President and Secretary of Defense must preserve the options to win decisively (WD) crises or conflicts; ending them on terms favorable to the US. Figure II-1 illustrates this planning strategy. 4

Steady State Surge Active Partnering w/ USG Agencies Global Deterrence Active Partnering & Tailored Shaping Transnational Deterrence Active Partnering & Tailored Shaping Regional Deterrence Homeland Defense Interdiction War on Terror/ IW Info Ops/FID WMD Elimination Conventional Campaign(s) Info Operations Consequence Management Counterinsurgency Stability Operations Major Combat/Strike Stability Operations Reconstruction Spt Cons. Management FIGURE II-1 1-4-2-1 STRATEGY 2. NMS FOUNDATIONS AND TENETS. a. Defense Policy Goals. The challenges and opportunities of the security environment over the past decade, as well as the demands of the war against terrorism, required the U.S. military to chart a new strategic course. During the past decade, some modifications in the U.S. military strategy and force structure have been made. United States defense policy goals formulated a decade ago defined a new set of tenets that comprise the military strategy, and created a new framework for managing risks. Over this past decade these goals have been modified to respond to new challenges; however, the basic foundation upon which these goals were established has remained fairly constant. 5

Assuring Allies and Friends. The United States cannot retreat from the world. The presence of American forces overseas is one of the most profound symbols of the U.S. commitment to allies and friends. The U.S. military plays a critical role in assuring allies and friends that the Nation will honor its obligations and will be a reliable security partner. Through its willingness to use force in its own defense and that of others and to advance common goals, the United States demonstrates its resolve and steadiness of purpose and the credibility of the U.S. military to meet the Nation's commitments and responsibilities. Toward these ends, the U.S. military will promote security cooperation with allies and friendly nations. A primary objective of U.S. security cooperation will be to help allies and friends create favorable balances of military power in critical areas of the world to deter aggression or coercion. Security cooperation serves as an important means for linking the strategic direction of the U.S. with those of its allies and friends. Dissuading Future Military Competition. Through its strategy and actions, the United States influences the nature of future military competitions, channels threats in certain directions, and complicates military planning for potential adversaries in the future. Well-targeted strategy and policy can therefore dissuade other countries from initiating future military competitions. The United States can exert such influence through the conduct of its research, development, test, and demonstration programs. It can do so by maintaining or enhancing advantages in key areas of military capability. Given the availability of advanced technology and systems to potential adversaries, dissuasion will also require the United States to experiment with revolutionary operational concepts, capabilities, and organizational arrangements and to encourage the development of a culture within the military that embraces innovation and risktaking. To have a dissuasive effect, this combination of technical, experimental, and operational activity has to have a clear strategic focus. New processes and organizations are needed within the defense establishment to provide this focus. Deterring Threats and Coercion Against U.S. Interests. A multifaceted approach to deterrence is needed. Such an approach requires forces and capabilities that provide the President with a wider range of military options to discourage aggression or any form of coercion. In particular, it places emphasis on peacetime forward deterrence in critical areas of the world. It requires enhancing the future capability of forward deployed and stationed forces, coupled with global intelligence, strike, and information assets, in order to deter aggression or coercion with only modest reinforcement from outside the theater. Improving intelligence capabilities is particularly important, as these assets provide U.S. forces with critical information on adversaries' intentions, plans, strengths, and weaknesses. This new approach to deterrence also requires forces that can strike with precision at fixed and mobile targets throughout the depth of an adversary's territory; active and passive defenses; and rapidly deployable and sustainable forces that can decisively defeat any adversary. 6

Decisively Defeat Any Adversary if Deterrence Fails. U.S. forces must maintain the capability to support treaty obligations and defeat the efforts of adversaries to impose their will on the United States, its allies, or friends. U.S. forces must maintain the capability at the direction of the President to impose the will of the United States and its coalition partners on any adversaries, including states or non-state entities. Such a decisive defeat could include changing the regime of an adversary state or occupation of foreign territory until U.S. strategic objectives are met. b. Strategic Tenets. These defense policy goals are supported by an interconnected set of strategic tenets, or strategic concepts. It is only through careful attention and commitment to each of these tenets that the national military objectives will be achieved. These tenets comprise the essence of the National Military Strategy of the United States. Managing Risks. The United States faces a world in which change occurs with ever-increasing speed. New challenges are constantly emerging, while longstanding threats endure. We must prepare for future challenges over time, while meeting extant threats at any given time. This tension between preparations for the future and the demands of the present requires the United States to balance the risks associated with each. Because resources are always finite, hard choices must be made that take into account a wider range of risks than was necessary in the past. Some of these risks are familiar, such as the possibility of a major war. Other risks such as the possibilities of mass casualty terrorism, cyber warfare, or CBRNE warfare are less well understood. Adopting a Capabilities-Based Approach. The NMS is built around the concept of shifting to a "capabilities-based" approach to defense. That concept reflects the fact that the United States cannot know with confidence what nation, combination of nations, or non-state actor will pose threats to vital U.S. interests or those of U.S. allies and friends decades from now. It is possible, however, to anticipate the capabilities that an adversary might employ to coerce its neighbors, deter the United States from acting in defense of its allies and friends, or directly attack the United States or its deployed forces. A capabilities-based model one that focuses more on how an adversary might fight than who the adversary might be and where a war might occur broadens the strategic perspective. It requires identifying capabilities that U.S. military forces will need to deter and defeat adversaries who will rely on surprise, deception, and asymmetric warfare to achieve their objectives. Moving to a capabilities-based force also requires the United States to focus on emerging opportunities that certain capabilities, including advanced remote sensing, long-range precision strike, transformed maneuver and expeditionary forces and systems, to overcome anti-access and area denial threats, can confer on the U.S. military over time. 7

Defending the United States and Projecting U.S. Military Power. Defending the Nation from attack is the foundation of strategy. As the tragic September 2001 terror attacks demonstrate, potential adversaries will seek to threaten targets within the borders of the United States, its allies, and its friends. As the U.S. military increased its ability to project power at long-range, adversaries have noted the relative vulnerability of the U.S. homeland. They are placing greater emphasis on the development of capabilities to threaten the United States directly in order to counter U.S. operational advantages with their own strategic effects. Therefore, the NMS restores the emphasis once placed on defending the United States and its land, sea, air, and space approaches. It is essential to safeguard the Nation's way of life, its political institutions, and the source of its capacity to project decisive military power overseas. In turn, the ability to project power at long ranges helps to deter threats to the United States and, when necessary, to disrupt, deny, or destroy hostile entities at a distance. Strengthening Alliances and Partnerships. America's alliances and security relations give assurance to U.S. allies and friends and pause to U.S. foes. These relationships create a community of nations committed to common purposes. The NMS is premised on efforts to strengthen America's alliances and partnerships and to develop new forms of security cooperation. The American commitment to these security arrangements bolsters the security of U.S. allies and friends. Likewise, as witnessed in the wake of the terrorist attacks on the United States, NATO's invocation of Article V demonstrates the commitment of America's partners to collective defense, which bolsters the security of the United States. These mutually reinforcing security relationships underpin the political stability on which the prosperity of civilized nations is built. Additionally, these arrangements are based on the recognition that a nation can be safe at home only if it is willing and able to contribute to effective security partnerships abroad. The need to strengthen alliances and partnerships has specific military implications. It requires that U.S. forces train and operate with allies and friends in peacetime as they would operate in war. This includes enhancing interoperability and peacetime preparations for coalition operations, as well as increasing allied participation in activities such as joint and combined training and experimentation. Maintaining Favorable Regional Balances. The NMS also places emphasis on maintaining favorable military balances in critical geographic areas. By maintaining such balances, the United States can secure peace, extend freedom, and assure its allies and friends. It can create high costs on a decision by potential adversaries to pursue dangerous forms of military competition. Finally, it may convince potential adversaries that the benefits of hostile acts against the interests of the United States are far outweighed by their costs and consequences. 8

Developing a Broad Range of Military Capabilities. Creating substantial margins of advantage across key functional areas of military competition (e.g., power projection, space, and information) will require developing and sustaining a portfolio of key military capabilities to prevail over current challenges and to hedge against and dissuade future threats. Building upon the current superiority of U.S. conventional forces, this portfolio will include capabilities for conducting information operations, ensuring U.S. access to distant theaters, defending against threats to the United States and allied territory, and protecting U.S. assets in space. It will also require exploiting U.S. advantages in superior technological innovation; its unmatched space and intelligence capabilities; its sophisticated military training; and its ability to integrate highly distributed military forces in synergistic combinations for highly complex joint military operations. Transforming Defense. Finally, the NMS calls for continuing the transformation of the U.S. Armed Forces over time. Transformation is at the heart of this new strategic approach. The CJCS, the leadership of the Services, and the Combatant Commanders recognize that building on the decade of transformation that has already taken place within the military establishment is absolutely necessary given the new strategic era and the internal and external challenges facing the U.S. military. Substantial progress has been made over the last decade by carefully balancing transformation against maintaining adequate forces to meet these challenges and potential threats to our security. 3. PRIORITIZATION OF WORK. The following prioritization of planning requirements is provided as a guide: Combatant Command Level of Plan 1 USPACOM USCENTCOM USNORTHCOM USEUCOM USAFRICOM USMEDCOM USNORTHCOM USSOUTHCOM Level 4 Level 3/T All Regional Combatant Commanders Level 3 All Combatant Commanders as applicable Level 2 1 Level of plans: 1 = Commander s Estimate, 2 = Base Plan, 3 = CONPLAN, 3/T = CONPLAN with TPFDD, 4 = OPLAN. See CJCSM 3122.01 and JP5-0 for more information on levels of planning. 9

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 10

1. GENERAL. SECTION III RESOURCES AND FORCES This section provides CCDRs with guidance concerning the apportionment of forces. It is informed by the resourcing and forces guidance contained in the GEF and the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG). 2. FORCE APPORTIONMENT GUIDANCE a. General. Apportioned forces are combat and related support capabilities provided to CCDRs for planning purposes only. Apportionment supports the overlapping requirements of the QDR and NMS. Available Forces are apportioned without consideration to readiness status; however, apportioned forces are what a CCDR can reasonably expect to be available, but not necessarily allocated for use when a contingency plan transitions to execution. b. Force Planning Construct. Forces are apportioned in accordance with the refined force planning construct found in the latest Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). In addition to normal force generation, sustainment, training activities, and partner enabling theater security cooperation activities, US forces must: (1) Be prepared to defend the homeland to include responding to and managing the consequences of multiple nearly-simultaneous WMD attacks or other catastrophic events. (2) If directed, conduct a large scale, potentially long-duration irregular warfare campaign to include counterinsurgency (COIN) and stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations. (Continuing operations against VEO and ongoing operations like those of the first decade of the century - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)-Afghanistan, constitute a large-scale, longduration, irregular campaign.) (3) If directed, conduct and win up to two nearly-simultaneous large scale campaigns (or one conventional campaign if already engaged in a large scale, longduration irregular campaign) while selectively reinforcing deterrence against opportunistic acts of aggression or coercion. (4) Be prepared to transition in one of the conventional campaigns to remove a hostile regime, destroy its military capacity (to include WMD) and set conditions for the transition to, or for the restoration of, civil society. c. Force Apportionment Construct. The JSCP apportionment construct is based on the assumption that the US Armed Forces will be engaged in homeland defense (HD), and high priority VEO operations throughout the life cycle of this document, thereby limiting readily available apportioned forces to one additional large scale conventional 11

campaign. The apportionment construct accounts for the commitment of HD, any high priority operations forces and force availability through the use of three force divisions (see GFMIG). This new construct provides CCDRs a more realistic starting point for planning by accounting for the unavailability of forces due to campaign execution, training, equipping and dwell requirements. 3. PLAN SOURCING GUIDANCE a. Preferred Forces. (1) Preferred forces are forces identified by the supported CCDR to continue employment, sustainment and transportation planning and assess risk. These forces are planning assumptions only, are not considered "sourced" units, and do not indicate that these forces will be contingency or execution sourced. The preferred forces identified for the plan by the CCDR should not be greater than the forces apportioned for planning. (2) To the degree the CCDR is able to make sound assumptions with respect to preferred forces for planning, the Joint Force Providers (JFPs) will begin with a higher fidelity solution should the plan be designated for contingency or execution sourcing. Combatant commands and Services are encouraged to work with JFPs and their components to make the best possible assumptions with respect to preferred forces for planning. b. Contingency Sourcing. Contingency sourced forces are specific forces identified by JFPs, assisted by their Service components and the parent Services, which meet the CCDR s planning requirement at a specified point in time. The Joint Staff provides specific guidance through a list of sourcing assumptions and planning factors contained in the contingency sourcing message. The JFPs have final approval of the total sourcing solution and provide the approved solution back to the supported CCDR in the CCDR requested format. The Joint Staff provides specific guidance for the selection of forces in a contingency sourcing message. (1) Variables for contingency sourced units include but are not limited to the current disposition of forces, a specified as-of date, categories of forces to be excluded from consideration, defined C-Day or C-Day window, substitution and mitigation options or factors, readiness reporting requirements and training requirements. (2) JFPs will take into account location, availability, and readiness when contingency sourcing to evaluate whether sufficient forces are available to meet the stated requirements of a plan. 4. ALLOCATION OF FORCES AND RESOURCES. The GEF provides force allocation guidance for use by the Global Force Management Board (GFMB) and JFPs. The GEF also provides functional CCDRs and Services with 12

global prioritization guidance for resources (time, funding, and effort). Geographic CCDRs will find resourcing priorities in the regional guidance sections of the GEF. Development of campaign and campaign support plans should be informed by this allocation and resourcing guidance. 13

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 14

1. GENERAL. SECTION IV GLOBAL DEFENSE POSTURE This enclosure provides guidance to CCDRs and the Services on preparing posture plans in accordance with the global defense posture guidance issued in the GEF and FY 2022-25 Guidance for Development of the Force (GDF). This posture guidance may be modified after the Deputy Secretary of Defense approves an implementing instruction for global defense posture process reform. a. Theater posture plans must be integrated and synchronized with the CCDR s Theater Campaign Plan. The posture plan must demonstrate the CCDR s efforts to integrate posture planning with the campaign plan s theater objectives and near-term objectives. b. Each geographic CCDR (excluding CDRUSNORTHCOM) will submit a Theater Posture Plan as an annex to their Theater Campaign Plan. The CJCS will forward Theater posture plans to USD (P) and USD (AT&L). In the event a CCDR s Theater Campaign Plan is not ready for submission when the Theater Posture Plan is due, the CCDR will submit the Theater Posture Plan separately. c. Theater posture plans also serve as subordinate plans to the global defense posture synchronization report. This annual synchronization report is developed by OSD and approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. It will serve as DOD s primary internal source document for codifying the regional posture plans and synchronizing them with the Department s efforts in each of the four global defense posture lines of operation: strategy development, diplomacy, implementation, and sustainment. d. Geographic CCDRs will account for and support the posture needs of functional CCDRs and others (e.g., Defense agencies), as appropriate, in the development of their Theater posture plans. Functional CCDRs, Service Chiefs, and Directors of Defense agencies (DDAs) will ensure their global perspectives on access and capability needs in the posture network are integrated with geographic CCDR posture plans through the staffing process for theater posture plans. 2. THEATER POSTURE PLAN FORMAT. Theater posture plan submissions will consist of three sections a narrative overview, a matrix with information on approved/proposed footprint locations and host-nation relationships, and the CCDR s assessment of the current plan. a. The narrative section will provide an overview of the Theater Posture Plan with the following information for each posture line of operation, as applicable: (1) An overview of major ongoing and new initiatives, 15

(2) The general status of the CCDR s efforts to develop and execute the plan, to include: (a) Priority areas of regional and seam planning efforts, below, (b) An executive summary of the assessment required in paragraph 2c (c) Needed decisions and related milestones, Congress, changes, (d) Outreach 2 efforts to other Commands, host-nation partners, and (e) Resourcing and execution efforts and issues related to approved posture (f) Areas of planning/execution that merit further attention in the global defense posture synchronization report, (g) Areas of planning/execution that may be better synchronized with theater campaign planning. (3) Identify existing or emerging risks to assured access and capability in the AOR. This should include a discussion of any diplomatic and implementation challenges that may cause DOD to reassess posture plans and eliminate or refine previously stated access and/or capability requirements. Examples are operating challenges, impacts on quality of life and force well-being, political obstacles, funding delays, and training shortfalls. (4) Provide an overview of key, proposed refinements to the posture plan, to include geographic and functional CCDR posture requirements for changes in footprint and host-nation arrangements for DOD review and assessment. (5) Where possible, provide anticipated costs for executing approved and planned posture changes, to include any new proposals. CCDRs should highlight any anticipated congressional issues with the posture plan. (6) Where applicable, identify any issues arising from the intersection of the posture plan with other DOD efforts, for example, global force management decisions and building partner capacity efforts. b. The locations matrix will provide updates on both infrastructure/locations and host nation arrangements. 2 Outreach is defined as efforts to develop DOD-internal consensus on new posture initiatives and DODexternal diplomatic efforts to develop and/or solidify posture changes with host nations. 16

(1) Arrange the infrastructure update by location/installation (Main Operating Base (MOB)/Forward Operating Site (FOS)/Cooperative Security Location (CSL)) and country. For each location/installation provide the following information: (a) The broad purpose of each location/installation, (b) The host Service, (c) The major equipment types permanently stationed at the location/installation, (d) The estimated number of military personnel stationed at the location/installation, (e) The availability of MWR programs and services, (f) The current year and five-year planned military construction requirements listed by title and cost, (g) Proposed changes to designations and capabilities needed at existing installations, (h) New access and/or capability needs of both geographic and functional combatant commands in the AOR. This includes recommendations to close installations and recommend desired new CSL/FOSs. If recommending new CSL/FOSs, include the same information listed in (a)-(g) above. (2) Arrange the host nation arrangements update by location and country. Include the following information for each location: (a) The status of relevant host-nation arrangements in place or being developed, to include formal legal arrangements or informal arrangements, (b) The status of any host-nation consultations or negotiations, (c) Planned next steps for diplomatic efforts, to include DOD-wide actions or necessary support, (d) Future milestones and critical timing issues to include identifying agreements expiring in the next 2-3 years, and (e) Shortfalls in international agreements that need to be addressed to support implementation of planned posture changes. c. The CCDR s posture plan assessment will address the following: 17

(1) Assess activities and missions by sub-region and/or by country. Illustrate the linkage between key locations and/or host-nation arrangements to regional security objectives and mission priorities outlined in the campaign plans. Where applicable, explain needed refinements in the posture plan and necessary adjustments to campaign plans to support these refinements, as well as implementation of existing plans. (2) Assess host-nation relationships by country. Assess the status of host-nation relations in the AOR to include host-nation issues with key planned or proposed posture changes. (3) Assess MOB/FOS/CSL readiness. Provide a regional map that overviews the planned MOB/FOS/CSL network and provide the status of FOS/CSL development by location. This should include an assessment of progress in implementing approved FOS/CSL changes, as well as an assessment of new FOS/CSL proposals. Use the posture lines of operation as an organizing construct (e.g., still in strategy development and assessing alternatives, in full operational capability and being used or sustained, facing fiscal or training constraints in implementation, etc.). 18

1. OVERVIEW. SECTION V CAMPAIGN PLAN REQUIREMENTS This section provides guidance concerning the intent and structure of the campaign plan requirement. It should be read in conjunction with Chapter V of the GEF, The Campaign Planning Construct. That chapter provides the logic behind the requirement and what it is intended to accomplish. It also describes how the campaign plan is intended to achieve integration not only across all steady-state activities within a particular combatant command, but also across combatant commands. The GEF guidance does not tell CCDRs how to develop their campaign plans. Campaign plans should be developed using the planning process described in JP 5-0. The campaign plan should generally follow the 5-paragraph Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Basic Plan format, and information normally contained in key annexes should be addressed. Because security cooperation guidance is incorporated in the GEF campaign guidance, security cooperation planning should be incorporated within the combatant command s broader campaign and contingency planning efforts, to include the integration and synchronization of shaping and security cooperation activities. Campaign plans should be synchronized with and support ongoing named operations such as OIF. Currently distinct planning efforts such as Combating WMD (CWMD) will be incorporated as subordinate campaign plans. 2. INTENT a. As described by JP 5-0, a campaign is a series of related major operations aimed at accomplishing strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. Planning for a campaign is appropriate when the contemplated simultaneous or sequential military operations and activities exceed the scope of a single major operation. While intended primarily to guide the use of military power, joint operational plans for campaigns should consider all instruments of national power and how their integrated and/or coordinated efforts work to attain national strategic objectives. This coordinated approach is particularly important for campaign planning since, in many instances, other USG agencies have the lead role for shaping activities, which DOD efforts must complement and support. The campaign plans tasked by the JSCP integrate security cooperation, shaping, and other steady-state activities, with operations and contingency plans to attain intermediate objectives that contribute to the broad, strategic objectives established in the GEF. b. In accordance with the strategic policy guidance provided by the GEF, the JSCP tasks CCDRs to develop and execute campaign plans that integrate, synchronize, and prioritize daily activities in support of strategic objectives, to include security cooperation and shaping actions. CCDRs will use their campaign plans to articulate resource requirements in a comprehensive manner, vice an incremental basis. Campaign plans also provide a vehicle for conducting a comprehensive assessment of how the combatant command s activities are contributing to the achievement of intermediate objectives and strategic objectives. 19

c. The JSCP tasks CCDRs to develop three different types of campaign plans as appropriate to address their regional and functional responsibilities. (1) The Chairman directs CCDRs to develop campaign plans when achieving strategic objectives requires joint operations and activities conducted in multiple AORs. Campaign plans establish the strategic and operational framework within which subordinate campaign plans are developed. The campaign plan s framework also facilitates coordinating and synchronizing the many interdependent, cross-aor missions such as security cooperation, intelligence collection, and coalition support. An example is USNORTHCOMs Campaign Plan for Pandemic Influenza (PI). This plan provides the strategic framework that guides the development of geographic CCDR pandemic influenza plans. These regional plans, synchronized with both the Theater Campaign Plan and USNORTHCOM s Campaign Plan, direct the execution of operations and activities in each geographic CCDR s AOR. (2) A theater or functional campaign plan encompasses the activities of a supported CCDR, which accomplish strategic or operational objectives within the CCDR s AOR or functional responsibilities. The campaign plan is the operational extension of a CCDR s strategy, and translates strategic concepts into unified actions. The JSCP tasks all CCDRs to develop Campaign Plans that integrate security cooperation, shaping, and other steady-state activities, with operations and contingency plans. CCDRs may develop strategies to inform campaign plan development, but these are not formally tasked in the JSCP. (3) The JSCP tasks CCDRs to develop subordinate campaign plans in support of global or theater campaigns. For example, geographic CCDRs are tasked to develop plans in support of DOD s VEO Campaign Plan. Subordinate campaign plans should be consistent with the strategic and operational guidance and direction developed by the supported CCDR. The subordinate campaign plans should nest under the CCDR s Theater Campaign Plan, as well as the Functional Campaign Plan they support. This nesting provides the mechanism to synchronize and prioritize all steady state activities across the CCDR s planning requirements and eliminate redundant or contradictory activities. d. Subordinate campaign plans are nested under the Theater Campaign Plan and synchronized with the Functional Campaign Plans. The relationship of Theater Campaign Plans, Functional Campaign Plans, subordinate campaign plans, and contingency plans are unique to each functional CCDR. 3. STRUCTURE OF THE CAMPAIGN PLAN GUIDANCE. The JSCP provides the Chairman s strategic military direction to CCDRs to implement the President s strategic policy guidance contained in the GEF. The JSCP does this by translating and consolidating GEF regional and functional guidance into specific campaign and contingency planning requirements to CCDRs. Outlined below is the 20

structure of the combatant command appendices and the type of guidance contained in them. a. General Planning Guidance. Each combatant command appendix begins with general planning guidance that applies to both campaign and contingency planning requirements. This section guides coordination to cover regional and functional seams between combatant commands and other USG agencies. b. Campaign planning requirements. This section formally tasks the combatant command campaign planning requirements and includes the following: (1) The campaign plan description, which includes the level of plan required. The campaign plan should use the APEX Volume II Basic Plan format as a start point to establish an appropriate level of commonality across combatant commands. CCDRs are free to modify the subparagraphs within the Basic Plan to account for the unique aspects of their AORs and specific planning requirements. While specific annexes are not required, CCDRs must address how they will conduct interagency coordination, strategic communication, and security cooperation activities. If the CCDR addresses these within Annexes, the CCDR can modify the APEX format as necessary. There is no requirement to develop or maintain a separate Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP) or Strategy. If CCDRs decide to retain a separate TSCP, it should be incorporated into the campaign plan. (2) The JSCP provides specific planning tasks that link to GEF strategic objectives, priorities, and security cooperation activities. These planning tasks are not objectives and clearly nest under the strategic objectives specified in the GEF. The CCDR is expected to develop intermediate objectives that contribute to the achievement of the GEF strategic objectives. (3) Functional or regional planning assumptions are intentionally limited in number and only provided where necessary to enable combatant command planning to continue. Global planning assumptions that apply to all CCDRs are provided in Section II. (4) Additional planning guidance to cover seam issues between combatant command AORs particular to the campaign plan, as required. (5) Other planning requirements or considerations, as required. c. Contingency Planning Requirements. Under the new campaign plan construct, contingency plans are conceptually considered branches of the overarching campaign plan. Shaping activities associated with precluding full contingency plan execution or with enabling follow-on execution if required should be addressed in the campaign plan. Guidance for each contingency plan requirement is similar to previous JSCPs and includes: 21

(1) The formal tasking to the combatant command to write a specific contingency plan and the level of planning detail required. (2) Detailed planning options that the commander must address in the plan. If appropriate, the guidance will provide the commander with the freedom to address planning options as part of one plan with branches or multiple, stand-alone plans. (3) Functional or regional planning assumptions are intentionally limited in number and only provided where necessary to enable combatant command planning to continue. Global planning assumptions that apply to all CCDRs are provided in Section II. (4) Specific guidance necessary to cover seam issues between combatant command AORs particular to the contingency plan, as required. (5) Any other planning requirements or considerations, as required. d. Posture Planning Guidance. The JSCP tasks CCDRs to develop Theater Posture Plans, integrated and synchronized with Theater Campaign Plans, and in accordance with the regional and functional posture guidance contained in the GEF. The format for Theater Posture Plans is presented in Section IV. 22

1. GENERAL. SECTION VI GENERAL PLANNING GUIDANCE Planning assumptions for warning and force availability, reserve call-up, mobilization, movements, and other executive emergency measures, while necessary to develop operational plans, will likely change at execution. An element of uncertainty encompasses diplomatic, informational, military and economic considerations. Thus, the effective use of available response time requires that the President and Secretary of Defense have a menu of discriminate preplanned options. The adaptive planning guidance described in this section addresses this requirement. 2. ADAPTIVE PLANNING GUIDANCE. Adaptive planning guidance is premised on an assumption that crises can and will arise under a variety of circumstances that will, in turn, elicit a variety of responses. The JSCP assigns planners the task of developing response options keyed to a specific set of conditions at the onset of a crisis. These options FDO, DDF, and NWA and the crises with which they are associated are portrayed in Figures VI-1 and VI-2. SITUATION Peacetime / Instability RESPONSE Flexible Deterrent Options I C C C Crisis / Imminent Conflict / Conflict Deploy Decisive Force I W C D No Warning Attack No Warning Attack I D C I = Intelligence Indicators C = Deploy Forces W = Warning D = Conflict FIGURE VI-1 ADAPTIVE PLANNING OPTIONS 23

Major War or Lesser Contingency Deter Defend Attack Crisis / Imminent Conflict / Conflict (No Warning Attack) FDO Deploy Decisive Force No Warning Attack FIGURE VI-2 JSCP OPTION RELATIONSHIPS Although Combatant Commanders are directed to develop response options on the basis of specific threats, the intent of the JSCP is to produce plans varied and flexible enough to apply with only modest modification to unforeseen regional threats and unexpected contingencies. a. Flexible Deterrent Options. Adaptive planning underscores the importance of early response to an emerging crisis. It facilitates early decision making by laying out a wide range of interrelated response paths that begin with multiple deterrent-oriented options tailored to avoid the classic dilemma of too much too soon' or 'too little too late. These deterrent-oriented early response options are called FDOs. (1) During the planning process, Combatant Commanders plans will include requests for appropriate political and economic options by non-dod agencies, to be executed in concert with military options. Examples of diplomatic, informational, economic and military options are depicted in Figures VI-3 through VI-6. (2) All regional operation plans will have FDOs. It is expected that FDOs will have a regional flavor, uniqueness or variation. Also, certain FDOs will be linked to actions not under the direct purview of the supported Combatant Commander, such as lift staging and readiness upgrades in CONUS. For the most part, plans for FDOs should use active, in-place and/or designated augmentation forces. In some crises, additional CONUS-based forces may be needed to bolster deterrence, as a Major Flexible Deterrent Option (MFDO). A FDO should be approximately brigade, squadron or strike group size. Primarily active-duty support forces should furnish combat support and combat service support. 24

* Reduce international diplomatic ties * Increase cultural group pressure * Alter existing meetings, programs, or schedules * Prepare to withdraw U.S. embassy personnel * Pursue measures to increase regional support * Identify the national leader who may be able to solve the problem * Develop or work within existing coalition (avoid unilateral actions when possible) * Alert and introduce special teams: Public diplomacy, MTT, Communication * Initiate noncombatant evacuation procedures * Use the UN or other international institutions * Identify clearly the steps to peaceful resolution * Restrict activities of diplomats; Reduce national embassy personnel * Take actions to win support of allies and friends * Coordinate efforts to strengthen international support * Promote democratic elections * Heighten informational efforts directed at the International community, opinion leaders within the national population and coalitions formed to overcome the situation FIGURE VI-3 DIPLOMATIC FDOS * Promote U.S. policy objectives through public policy statements * Take measures to increase public support * Keep selected issues as lead stories * Heighten public awareness of the program and potential for conflict * Maintain an open dialogue with the press * Invite in impartial observers * Impose sanctions on C 4 ISR technology transfer * Protect friendly C 4 ISR assets * Interrupt satellite downlink transmissions * Implement psychological operation plans * Increase C 4 ISR processing and transmission capability * Publicize violations of international law FIGURE VI-4 INFORMATIONAL FDOS * Seize real property in the United States * Embargo goods and services * Cancel United States-funded programs * Heighten informational efforts directed at financial institutions * Reduce or eliminate corporate transactions * Freeze monetary assets in the United States * Freeze international assets * Enact trade sanctions * Encourage corporations to restrict transactions * Reduce security assistance programs * Subsidize allies efforts to improve CBRNE defense capabilities FIGURE VI-5 ECONOMIC FDOS 25