Gulf shield: Missile threats and defence in the GCC

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Jane's Defence Weekly [Content preview Subscribe to IHS Jane s Defence Weekly for full article] Gulf shield: Missile threats and defence in the GCC Missile defence has become a more urgent priority for the Gulf Arab states now the arms embargo imposed on Iran is set to be lifted. Jeremy Binnie reviews the performance of Saudi missile defences during the current Yemen conflict, outlines the growing Iranian threat, and looks at how the Gulf states are responding. The current conflict in Yemen has highlighted the continued importance of ballistic missile defence in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). A Saudi-led coalition that includes five of the six GCC states launched a military intervention to restore Yemen's ousted president in March. Despite the coalition's claims to have destroyed Yemen's ballistic missile capability in the opening airstrikes, it subsequently became clear that military units allied with the Ansar Allah group (popularly known as the Houthis) successfully dispersed some of the launchers and missiles under their control. It also emerged that the Saudi military had taken the precaution of redeploying Patriot air defence batteries - most of which are based in the east of the kingdom - to the southwestern provinces near Yemen. The Saudi Patriots are PAC-2 systems that were acquired in the 1990s. This is essentially the same version that was initially credited with intercepting the vast majority of the ballistic missiles that Iraq fired at Israel and Saudi Arabia during the 1990-91 Gulf War. Serious questions were subsequently raised about the effectiveness of the PAC-2 during that conflict. A US congressional investigation found that the missile's proximity fuze and fragmentation warhead struggled to effectively destroy Iraqi 'Scud'-type variants with higher velocities than the tactical ballistic missiles the PAC-2 was designed to destroy. The Iraqi missiles were also unstable due to their poor design and consequently tended to break up on re-entry. The Patriot radars struggled to identify the warheads among the resulting clutter, so often guided missiles to engage falling debris. "A strong case can be made that Patriots hit only 9% of the 'Scud' warheads engaged, and there are serious questions about these few hits," the investigation summary said. Despite the doubts surrounding the PAC-2 missile, the official Saudi Press Agency (SPA) has reported two successful interceptions of 'Scud' missiles fired into the kingdom from Yemen: the first on 6 June, the second on 26 August. The Yemeni missiles could have been examples of the original Soviet R-17 (SS-1C 'Scud-B'), the North Korean Hwasong-5 'Scud-B' copy, or the longer-range Hwasong-6 (often referred to as the 'Scud-C'). Page 1 of 9

Airbus Defence and Space imagery showing Arab coalition helicopter and Patriot air-defence systems deployed at the Safir airstrip in Yemen's Marib province on 1 October. The 4 September ballistic missile attack may have hit the military base to the southwest where the coalition was building new structures. (Airbus DS/IHS) 1640222 Iranian uprising Yemen's ballistic missile capabilities are minor compared with those of Iran, which has been pouring considerable resources into developing missiles that can compensate for the weakness of its air force and act as a credible deterrent. While Iran's longer-range missiles tend to grab international headlines, it has continued to develop weapons to target the GCC states. In a largely overlooked development, it revealed in August 2010 the existence of its new Qiam ('Uprising') missile, which is designed to replace the Shahab-1 (the Iranian 'Scud- B') and Shahab-2 ('Scud-C'). Iran has displayed multiple new Qiam rocket motors on two occasions since March 2014, when 44 could be seen in Iranian media coverage, suggesting this is a serious programme. Although presumed to be a further development of the 'Scud' series, the Qiam lacks the protruding stabilisation fins of its predecessors. Iranian officials have said this gives it a longer range and makes it harder for radar to detect. Page 2 of 9

IRGC personnel prepare to launch a Qiam missile in August 2010. (Fars News Agency ) 1331652 "The geometric characteristics of this missile are close to [those of the] Shahab-1, but it does not have wings," General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, the commander of Iran's ballistic missile forces, said in an interview published in November 2014. "[As a result] its range suddenly increased from 300 km to 800. This means its capabilities had improved and new capacities were created." Page 3 of 9

The Iranian MoD has released this photograph that appears to show 44 Qiams without warheads, suggesting the finless short-range ballistic missile is being rolled out on a significant scale. (Iranian MoD) 1525932 Fateh series Iran has developed short-range solid-fuel ballistic missiles as well as continuing to work with liquid-fuel 'Scud' technology. It unveiled the Fateh-110 - its equivalent of the Tochka - in May 2001, claiming it was a highly accurate weapon system. This accuracy may have been achieved by using commercial GPS/GLONASS to update its inertial navigation system, which would be vulnerable to jamming in a high-intensity conflict. Several improved versions of the missile have since been unveiled that have extended its range from 200 km to 250 km and then supposedly to 300 km for the third-generation model that was unveiled in August 2010. The fourth-generation Fateh-110-D1 unveiled in August 2012 was said to have a more accurate guidance system, but no further range increase was announced. In the most recent development Iran unveiled the Fateh-313 missile on 22 August, claiming it has a range of 500 km. As with the Qiam, this additional range would enable Iran to target more locations in the GCC states, launch attacks with different trajectories and directions, and increase the amount of Iranian territory from where the missiles could be launched. At the same time the Fateh-313 has the advantage of being a solid-fuel missile that does not require the regular defuelling and cleaning that are needed to prevent dangerous levels of corrosion in its liquid-fuelled counterparts. The limited amount of imagery the Iranians released of the Fateh-313 suggested it is the same size as the Fateh-110, which would mean it could be fired from the same launchers. If this is the case, the additional range must have been achieved by improving the missile's flight characteristics so it benefits from more aerodynamic lift; using a more powerful and efficient propulsion system; and/or reducing its weight, with the most obvious savings coming from decreasing the size of its warhead and constructing its airframe from a lighter material. The available photographs of the Fateh-313 displayed on 22 August show the missile is different in several aspects to the Fateh-110. Its rear fins are shorter and the finlets in front of them are a different shape: changes that hint at improved flight characteristics. The guidance unit appears to be larger, but this has come at the expense of the nose section that carries the warhead, not the propulsion section. This would suggest the Fateh-313's payload is significantly smaller than that of Fateh-110, which is generally said to be 500 kg. Page 4 of 9

A comparison of the Fateh-313 missile that was unveiled on 22 August with earlier versions of the Fateh- 110. (IHS/Iranian President's Office/Iranian Ministry of Defence) 1641787 Air-breathing threat It now appears that the GCC is threatened by cruise missiles as well as ballistic ones. In March Iran unveiled the Soumar cruise missile and claimed it had gone into serial production. Unsurprisingly, it appeared to be dimensionally identical to the Soviet Kh-55 missile. Ukrainian officials revealed in 2005 that 12 Kh-55 missiles were illegally sold to Iran (as well as another six to China) without their nuclear warheads in 2001. The main difference is that the Soumar was redeveloped as a groundrather than air-launched weapon. The Soviets only integrated the Kh-55 with the Tu-95 and Tu-160 strategic bombers, but the Iranians could potentially have used their Su-24 strike aircraft as launch platforms. However, a ground-launched version would have a better chance of surviving in a high-intensity conflict in which Iranian air bases were heavily targeted. Lifting sanctions With the exception of the Russians, few observers expect Iran's missile programmes to slow down in the wake of the 14 July Vienna agreement aimed at curbing its ability to produce nuclear weapons. (Russia is arguing that the agreement means the US does not have to deploy the ballistic missile defences in Europe that Moscow believes undermines its strategic deterrent capability.) The sanctions imposed on Iran's importation of most military equipment will be lifted if it adheres to the terms of the deal, which is officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), for five years. The sanctions on ballistic missile technologies will be lifted eight years after the implementation of the JCPOA. Page 5 of 9

The lifting of the arms embargo will allow Iran to develop a modern air force that would arguably reduce its reliance on ballistic missiles. However, it will take massive investment over many years for the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) to catch up with its Gulf counterparts. Gulf missile defence programmes Four of the GCC states - Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE - are currently in the process of responding to the growing Iranian threat by upgrading their existing missile defence systems or procuring new ones. Their requirements have been outlined by the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), which has to notify Congress of all major arms sales to foreign countries. The contracts for Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programmes run by the US military are then announced by the US Department of Defense (DoD), although some of the relevant contracts are either not released, short on detail, or do not mention the recipient countries, making it difficult to build a complete picture. Kuwait The DSCA announced in December 2007 that Kuwait had requested upgrades for six Patriot radars. Kuwait has five Patriot fire bases, each with a fire unit consisting of a radar and five launchers, so the DSCA request suggested it has a spare radar that can be rotated while others are repaired or that it intends to acquire an additional fire unit. Kuwait also requested upgrades to 60 of its existing PAC-2 missiles to take them to the GEM-T standard. Raytheon says the GEM-T has a new digital fuze that performs significantly better against high-speed tactical ballistic missiles, as well as a low-noise oscillator that improves its ability to acquire and track small aircraft and cruise missiles. Kuwait also requested 80 PAC-3 missiles, which are smaller than the PAC-2 missiles and designed to destroy an incoming threat by directly hitting it rather than by exploding a warhead in the target's proximity. While the original Patriot system was entirely produced by Raytheon, the rival US company Lockheed Martin makes the PAC-3 missile as well as the launcher modification kits that are needed to fire it. Each modified launcher can be loaded with 16 PAC-3 missiles or four PAC-2s. Page 6 of 9

A PAC-3 missile launch. (Lockheed Martin) 1643515 The UAE The DSCA announced the UAE's Patriot programme at the same time as Kuwait's in December 2007, with the notification saying it had requested nine fire units, each with four launchers, as well as a spare radar and launcher; 288 PAC-3 missiles; and 216 GEM-T missiles. The subsequent contract announcements did not state how many fire units Raytheon was actually contracted to deliver to the UAE, although Lockheed Martin was awarded a contract for 16 PAC-3 launcher modification kits, suggesting the Emirates would get four fire units if they each had four launchers as outlined in the DSCA notification. That dovetails with four newly constructed Patriot fire bases that can be seen around Abu Dhabi, Al-Ayn, and Dubai in GoogleEarth satellite imagery. These are all laid out in the same way with four launchers now deployed on pads in a square formation. However, two new Patriot fire units with three launchers have also been deployed at existing air defence sites around Abu Dhabi. This suggests the UAE has six fire units, although some of their launchers might not be capable of firing PAC-3 missiles. Qatar Qatar has opted for the same Patriot-THAAD mix as the UAE. The DSCA announced in November 2012 that Doha had requested two THAAD fire units, each with six launchers, and 150 interceptors. The THAAD package also included an unidentified early warning radar in addition to an AN/TPY-2 for each of the fire units. At the same time Qatar requested 11 Patriot fire units, each with four launchers, as well as 768 PAC- 3 missiles and 246 GEM-T missiles. Page 7 of 9

This materialised into Raytheon being awarded a USD2.4 billion contract in December 2014 to supply 10 Patriot fire units to Qatar by April 2019. Qatar was also one of several recipients of PAC-3 missiles and the launcher modification kits needed to fire them that will be produced under contracts awarded to Lockheed Martin in October 2014 and July 2015. The early warning radar was apparently identified in a July 2013 DSCA notification, which said that Qatar had requested an AN/FPS-132 Block 5, which is the latest iteration of the radar used by US Strategic Command to detect and track Russian intercontinental and submarine-launched missiles. A THAAD system launches a missile during a March 2009 test that saw it successfully intercept a target simulating a separating ballistic missile. (US Missile Defense Agency) 1352121 Saudi Arabia Surprisingly, regional heavyweight Saudi Arabia has been lagging behind its neighbours in placing orders for new missile defence systems. In November 2012 the DSCA announced that the kingdom had requested the recertification of up to 300 of its existing PAC-2 missiles, but the DoD does not appear to have announced a contract covering this work. Two years later the DSCA announced that Saudi Arabia had requested 202 PAC-3 missiles and the associated modification kits for 36 of its existing Patriot launchers. The first PAC-2 contract that covered deliveries to Saudi Arabia, as well as several other countries, was awarded to Lockheed Martin on 23 July. Calls for co-operation The US has been encouraging the GCC states to integrate their various missile defence assets into a single network that is better able to counter the Iranian threat. The idea is that all their radars would create a Page 8 of 9

combined air picture and the most appropriate asset would be used to engage incoming missile threats, even if that meant one country launching interceptors against missiles that are not heading towards its own territory. "Sometimes to defend one nation effectively you might need a radar system in a neighbouring nation, because of everything from the curvature of the Earth to wind patterns," the then US secretary of state Hillary Clinton said after the inaugural GCC Strategic Co-operation Forum in March 2012. "It is the cooperation - what they call interoperability - that we now need to really roll up our sleeves and get to work on." Copyright IHS Global Limited, 2015 For the full version and more content: IHS Jane's Defence Industry and Markets Intelligence Centre This analysis is taken from IHS Jane s Defence Industry & Markets Intelligence Centre, which provides world-leading analysis of commercial, industrial and technological defence developments, budget and programme forecasts, and insight into new and emerging defence markets around the world. IHS defence industry and markets news and analysis is also available within IHS Jane s Defence Weekly. To learn more and to subscribe to IHS Jane s Defence Weekly online, offline or print visit http://magazines.ihs.com/. For advertising solutions contact the IHS Jane s Advertising team Page 9 of 9