PLATTE CANYON HIGH SCHOOL SHOOTING AFTER ACTION REPORT

PLATTE CANYON HIGH SCHOOL SHOOTING AFTER ACTION REPORT Recommendations for emergency services agencies based on the events of September 27, 2006 at Platte Canyon High School December 31, 2006

DEDICATION THIS REPORT IS DEDICATED TO THE STUDENTS AND STAFF OF THE PLATTE CANYON SCHOOL DISTRICT ENSURING THAT LESSONS LEARNED DO NOT BECOME LESSONS FORGOTTEN. 1

TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary 4 Incident Synopsis 5 Operational Strengths 7 Lessons Learned 10 Incident Command System 10 Communications 12 Public Relations / Media Relations 14 School Operations and Emergency Planning 17 Scene Control and Resource Staging 18 Conclusions and Summary 20 Appendix A: Recommendations and Action Items Timeline 21 Appendix B: Agencies Involved 24 Appendix C: Tactical Repeater Information 25 2

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Park County Emergency Management would like to thank all law enforcement officers, fire officials, EMS personnel, school staff, state agencies and other representatives that took the time to report their experiences and offer their recommendations based on the events of September 27, 2006. Lori R. Hodges Director of Emergency Management Park County PO Box 27 Fairplay, Colorado 80440 3

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY What I do today is important because I am paying a day of my life for it. What I accomplish must be worthwhile because the price is high. -- Albert Einstein The purpose of this document is to provide an overview of the incident at Platte Canyon High School on September 27, 2006. It distinguishes operational strengths and lessons learned, and identifies recommendations for future incidents. Those lessons will hopefully become action items for all involved to take back to their organization to turn lessons learned into positive solutions, minimizing damage and loss of life. Our hope is to share best practices and lessons learned to assist other agencies prior to responding to an incident of this magnitude in their jurisdiction. While we do not want to take away any of the incident strengths, we feel that responders can learn more from lessons learned and corresponding recommendations for the future. This report is limited to an emergency management perspective. It will not outline strategies or tactics of SWAT teams or other response personnel. Instead, it will focus on overall incident management, specifically outlining the following five areas: 1. Incident Command System 2. Communications 3. Public Relations / Media Relations 4. School Operations and Emergency Planning 5. Scene Control and Resource Staging The Platte Canyon High School shooting was not a new tragedy in the State of Colorado or America, but it was just as overwhelming as any other large incident in a small community. In 1999, Jefferson County law enforcement agencies responded to the Columbine High School Shooting. Because of that incident, and the lessons learned in the aftermath, Jefferson County developed a new program for response to violence in our schools. This program became known as Active Shooter, which has since been adopted throughout the nation to improve response to school incidents. Since Columbine, Park County has grown and changed. A few of the lessons learned from Columbine have become part of day-to-day response in Park County, including the new construction of the Platte Canyon High School, development of the Active Shooter program in the Park County Sheriff s Office SWAT Team, and the establishment of a School Resource Officer in the high school to assist with security and emergency planning. We believe strongly that the September 27, 2006 disaster was mitigated due to the ongoing training of the Sheriff s Office SWAT team, strong relationships with outside response agencies, and ongoing training given to members of the school staff. 4

INCIDENT SYNOPSIS On Wednesday morning, September 27, 2006, a stranger walked into the Platte Canyon High School. He entered Room 206, shut the door, and placed his backpack on a desk. The teacher addressed the man and asked what his purpose was in the classroom. The intruder then pulled out a handgun and ordered all male students and the teacher out of the classroom. When the teacher tried to speak with the intruder prior to leaving, he fired one shot from the gun hitting no one. Seven students remained in the room after the rest were ordered to leave. Immediately, the teacher notified staff and a call came into the 911 Communications Center at approximately 11:40am notifying them of a shooter in the high school. One hostage was released before law enforcement arrived on scene. Approximately three minutes later, officers arrived on scene and made entry into the school in an Active Shooter formation. Within minutes they located the shooter and secured the school. The intruder had barricaded himself inside Room 206, and therefore the Active Shooter situation changed into a hostage situation requiring a negotiator. The school was already in lock-down so the remaining Sheriff s Office SWAT Team members began school evacuations, moving students to safety. Incident Command was initially established by fire units, and was transferred to the Sheriff s Office upon arrival of further resources. Two outside SWAT Teams responded to assist the Park County Sheriff s Office SWAT Team. This created a joint SWAT Team inside, as well as a SWAT perimeter around the school. Multiple outside agencies also responded to the scene to assist with scene control, traffic control and crowd control. At approximately 11:47am, the teacher who was originally in the classroom reported that the intruder claimed to have a bomb in his backpack within the classroom and threatened to blow up the school complex. Therefore, the Jefferson County Sheriff s Office bomb squad was requested to assist on scene as well. Over the next several hours, four of the remaining six students taken hostage were released. Upon their release, further information was provided regarding abuse of the hostages. The intruder continued talking to SWAT team members through the hostages until approximately 1:30pm, when all negotiations ceased. The intruder mentioned that something was going to happen at 4:00pm, putting responders on alert. Because of the magnitude of this event, public relations became an enormous task. Not only did personnel have to handle the media coverage of what was occurring at the school, they also had to coordinate information between counties and with multiple agencies to ensure parents were getting appropriate information. A Jefferson County Public Information Officer (PIO) assisted on scene with gathering data and disseminating information to the public. Once the incident progressed, a PIO from Park County was established as well. By 3:00pm all students had been evacuated from the school complex, except for the two still held as hostages. Students were all taken by bus to a local elementary school 5

allowing school staff to assist with student accountability, and giving parents a common location to pick up their children. Just after 3:37pm, the joint SWAT Team made entry into Room 206 after two hours of no contact with the intruder or remaining hostages. Upon entry, the SWAT Team encountered the intruder and two hostages behind a barricade of desks. One hostage ran out of the room immediately to safety, while the other was shot by the intruder prior to exiting the room. SWAT members fired upon the intruder at the same time that he fired upon himself. The intruder was pronounced dead on scene, while the hostage was flown to Denver by Flight for Life and pronounced dead at St. Anthony s Central Hospital. Once the threat was eliminated, investigation teams began working within the school and remained there until the investigation was complete. 6

OPERATIONAL STRENGTHS While inside the gym of the Administrative Building next to the High School, a responder passed a student talking to his friends. This student was sitting, waiting patiently for the buses to arrive that would evacuate him and his friends from the incident to his parents. The part of the conversation that was heard included the complaint about another stupid lock-down drill. This statement, while seemingly random and insignificant, was actually very important. One statement verified that years of training, staff education and student drills had a direct impact on the success of this incident. The students had done countless lock-down drills, and therefore were able to do them in record time and without error. This was probably the greatest strength during the high school shooting. As mentioned previously, several lessons were learned after the Columbine High School tragedy that had a positive impact on this incident. The first involved the assignment of a Park County Sheriff s deputy as the School Resource Officer (SRO). In his capacity, the SRO has assisted the schools with emergency plans, assisted the Office of Emergency Management with risk assessments and vulnerability analyses, and has attended extensive training specific to school incidents. Prior to the Platte Canyon High School shooting, the Park County SRO attended a course on school terrorism, bringing several tools back to our community, increasing safety to our schools. Additionally, prior to the shooting, the risk assessments were completed, with the elementary school assessment just one week before the shooting. The Park County Sheriff s Office SWAT Team spent several days in August and September inside the schools doing staff training and SWAT training for Active Shooter situations. Additionally, one of our previous School Resource Officers is now a County Commissioner, who remained available inside the Communications Center to talk with school staff. This ended up being extremely valuable, as he was familiar with the school as well as the staff. Having someone that the staff knew was a benefit and helped to decrease the stress level inside the school. Another lesson learned after Columbine involved the construction of the High School, which was built after the school tragedy in 1999. During the construction process, the planners took into consideration many of the weaknesses that existed in schools across the nation at the time. It was constructed with the ability to lock-down classrooms and the ability to secure pods or sections of the school for student safety. Additionally, the construction allowed for limited access into the school by securing windows and safety doors, as well as other safety features such as cameras in the parking lot, sprinklered rooms and fire resistant construction. Strong existing relationships between responding agencies was another key to success during this incident. It has been shown in several incidents in the past that if relationships are not in existence before an event occurs, dramatic failures can occur. The shooting, 7

however, proved that with joint training and strong inter-jurisdictional relationships, incidents are better managed and controlled. The Platte Canyon incident is no exception. Jefferson County and Clear Creek County are neighbors of Park County, allowing responders the ability to attend joint trainings and exercises. Most responding agencies, specifically the SWAT Team members, work together and train together on an ongoing basis, allowing for a smooth operation and enhanced safety. Additionally, the fact that requests were made immediately for assistance greatly impacted this incident. In Park County there are often extended response times and specialized teams sometimes have to come from long distances. In this incident, all resources that were needed, and those that may have been needed, were contacted early, ensuring that if the incident escalated we would be fully prepared. Because of past relationships, activities at past incidents, and immediate notification of outside resources, Incident Command saved precious minutes during an intense situation. During the shooting, the Jefferson County Public Information Officer (PIO) used her existing relationship with the media to assist Park County. The media trusted the information they were given, as well as the established schedule and location for press conferences. Understanding the needs of media personnel was also important. Since the information was given every thirty minutes, the media stayed within the designated areas and waited patiently for the next update. While executing news conferences, it was also important to recognize the audience. Because the media was mixed with parents and other community members, the information provided had to be accurate and timely. One of the benefits of having a trained and skilled PIO was that answers to questions were researched and given promptly. Strengths within the school were many. Once again, a strong relationship between law enforcement and school staff is crucial. Many of the Park County deputies spend time in the school, hold meetings in the school, or participate in programs at the school. There is a constant law enforcement presence and most of the students and staff know the officers. Additionally, since many of the officers are involved with the school, they also are very familiar with the building itself. Therefore, when they were given information that the shooter was in room 206, they knew exactly where to go, saving time during the response. Additionally, because of the strong relationship, officers were able to get valuable information immediately, including lists of students, maps and other resources. The maintenance personnel at the school also assisted the SWAT Team and Bomb Squad throughout the incident, allowing for stronger tactical decisions. Finally, the operations center in the District Office was a benefit to administrators as it was easily used as a command post for school personnel During the Snaking Fire of 2002, several communications lessons were learned by school personnel that directly impacted this incident. For one, the school is now equipped with radios for all staff members, with their own frequency, allowing staff to report activities immediately. The school also has a technology director who is assigned to the command post during a large-scale incident in order to communicate with others on scene. Finally, the school has a strong emergency plan, including lock-down procedures, a transportation plan, and procedures for terrorist situations. This plan worked extremely well with 8

regards to the evacuation of students. The buses were contacted and responded without delay. Law enforcement officers were able to escort the buses to and from the scene, allowing all students to be evacuated promptly and safely. The Deer Creek Elementary School staff was instrumental in the execution of the emergency plan by accounting for all students before the buses arrived and before their release to parents. With regards to communications, both Nextel and Verizon phones worked throughout the incident, and responders thought of a Cellular on Wheels (COW) early in the event. This allowed the Public Information Officer (PIO) at the command post to relay updated information to the PIO at the media center for press conferences. The communication between the command post and the media center was critical in keeping the public and the media informed with accurate, timely updates. The assistance from the Colorado Department of Transportation and the Colorado State Patrol was unbelievable throughout the event and beyond. Closing down Hwy 285 in both directions proved to be necessary and beneficial to the operation. Restricting access to the school and the command post allowed for only the most necessary responders to be at or near the scene. The landscape (the canyon) worked to our benefit as well, keeping anxious parents, public and media far away from the actual operation. After the incident, the Colorado State Patrol assisted students and staff with transportation to their homes since the school was closed for investigation. Their continued support after the incident greatly assisted Park County. Additionally, the continued policing of the school after the incident helped students and staff upon returning to classes. 9

LESSONS LEARNED Overall, the response and recovery from the Platte Canyon High School shooting incident was performed in a most professional, positive, caring and safe manner. During the course of this event, responding agencies from three counties operated efficiently and cohesively, providing our community with the best emergency services have to offer. The following observations are presented to assist responding agencies in improving response and recovery actions for all future operations. KEY LESSONS 1. Rural areas are not immune to violence in our communities, especially with regards to schools. 2. The Incident Command System works best when utilized to its full capacity. 3. Federal, State and Local partnerships are essential for successful response and recovery operations following a large-scale incident. 4. Interoperable communications must be strengthened and supported to overcome multi-jurisdictional communications differences and to strengthen mutual aid response. 5. Strong media and public relations are a key ingredient to successful outcomes. INCIDENT COMMAND Lesson #1: An Active Shooter situation creates a challenge for incoming resources due to the first team making immediate entry into the building instead of establishing command. Discussion: At the beginning of the Platte Canyon incident, the initial four law enforcement officers on scene entered the school in an Active Shooter formation to attempt to eliminate the threat. Because of this, and because of the fact that an emphasis on incident command was not typically a part of Active Shooter training, officers did not establish command early in the incident. This created some communications difficulties with some of the first agencies to arrive on scene. Once the situation changed from active shooter to a hostage situation, incident command was established solving many of these issues. Recommendation: Law enforcement personnel should establish command whenever engaged in an incident; ensuring habits are created prior to a large-scale emergency. In all Active Shooter situations, the first person on scene after the initial entry team will establish command, and will transfer that command to a commanding officer if needed when further resources arrive. 10

Lesson #2: It is incredibly important to have one command post with a Unified Command structure when dealing with multiple agencies and resources to streamline communications and avoid confusion. Discussion: The Incident Command System was weakened early in this incident due to the immediate response of multiple agencies, three separate command posts, and the development of different ICS structures within the incident. The Incident Command Post must also be clearly identified and accessible to all personnel. The use of command vests will minimize confusion because all key personnel will be clearly and immediately identified. A Unified Command structure, consisting of both law enforcement and fire personnel, works well in a school shooter situation. This allows the law enforcement personnel to concentrate on SWAT operations, while the remainder of the incident operations are controlled by the second IC. Recommendation: In all future operations, one command post must be clearly identified and all personnel should wear established vests to avoid delays and confusion. The Unified Command structure should be reviewed and practiced. Lesson #3: The Incident Commander at any major incident has a dual problem: information overload and too many people demanding attention. People will often get frustrated when they have important information and they are unable to get it to those who need it. Discussion: The Sheriff acted as Incident Commander once a hostage situation was verified. An overwhelming amount of requests were made for his time in order to make decisions or answer questions. This could be streamlined during future operations by assigning a staff member to the commander, who is qualified to prioritize actions and able to minimize information overload for the incident commander. This staff member should receive all reports and prioritize them accordingly, to ensure that the IC has all information needed to make timely decisions. Additionally, a scribe should be assigned as needed to record all events on scene and all requests made to the Commander. Recommendation: Assign an additional staff member to assist the Incident Commander (or Incident Commanders in a Unified Command Structure) in the decision-making process and to record information as it comes in. Lesson #4: When an incident begins to grow, it is important to assign qualified Command Staff and Section Chiefs to assist the IC with overall incident management, expanding the ICS structure as needed to maintain control. Discussion: Due to the expanding nature of this incident, personnel became overwhelmed with duties and assignments. When extra personnel and resources arrived, it was difficult to track and control assignments. Several of the ICS positions could have been filled early in order to assist the IC with incident management. For one, a Liaison Officer 11

would have been an asset due to the multiple agencies that responded from three different counties. Fire and EMS established a Liaison Officer immediately, which helped once the incident expanded, but a need still existed for other disciplines. The Liaison Officer keeps a running tally of resources on a white board so that all agencies or departments can be easily contacted when needed. The establishment of a Public Information Officer is crucial in any incident to ensure that appropriate and accurate information is released in a timely manner. The Logistics Section is beneficial to assist with resource requests and extended operational needs such as food, facilities and equipment. The Planning Section is able to check-in and track resources and personnel appropriately, and establishes and post assignments. All of these assignments would have created a better communications network and increased scene control. Recommendation: Utilizing personnel in Command Staff positions, as well as the different sections of ICS, will assist with information overload and dissemination. Lesson #5: The early activation of the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) would have allowed for better communications between counties, the region and the state, further assisting the incident management. Discussion: Jefferson County activated their EOC once the hostage situation was confirmed. Because of this, they were able to communicate with the Colorado Division of Emergency Management throughout the incident in case further state resources were required. Park County has just begun work in establishing an EOC, and therefore did not activate during this event. In future operations, activation of the county EOC will greatly enhance on-scene operations and resource support. Recommendation: Park County should continue educating and training personnel to activate and operate the county Emergency Operations Center, strengthening incident management capabilities. COMMUNICATIONS Lesson #6: Interoperable communications is crucial to all large incidents involving out-of-county resources. Discussion: Park County resources use the VHF system. West of the county, responding agencies use the same system, but many of the counties to the east use the 800 MHz system. This creates a problem whenever Park County has an incident involving outside resources. Regardless of which system we choose, the ability to connect into another system remains an issue. Because the three counties work together on a regular basis, these issues were not a surprise and were quickly resolved. The combined SWAT Team carried radios for both systems allowing them access to all outside communications. Additionally, the mobile command post carries an Incident Command Radio Interface (ICRI) module that has the ability to connect two different systems into one. Due to past 12

problems with the ICRI, however, it was decided not to use it on this incident. There were also problems with both VHF and 800 MHz inside the school building. Responders had difficulty getting outside to the command post and other responders. Recommendation: All responding agencies should continue to explore avenues that will connect communications systems, in order to streamline transmissions and ensure adequate information dissemination, and develop a plan for the addition of equipment in the future. Further training is necessary on available gateway equipment, such as the ICRI module in order to use it to its full capacity (see Appendix C for further information on this unit). Lesson #7: The 911 Communications Center must be given information on an ongoing basis from the ICP in order to decrease confusion and poor information relay. Discussion: In the initial stages of this incident, information was coming into the 911 Communications Center so fast that they had difficulty delivering information. Fire units responded before being paged because they heard the call on the radio. Additionally, information was not being given to the Center by the ICP in a timely manner, creating further tension because of repeat telephone calls and a lack of new information. This was partially due to the delay in establishing command on scene, and also due to the number of requests and resources being aired over the radio. Recommendation: A Communications Liaison should respond to the scene of any large incident to take the burden off the Incident Commander, and to ensure appropriate information gets back to the 911 Communications Center. Lesson #8: During a multi-agency response, communications failures are likely if agencies do not have access to shared frequencies. Discussion: Mutual aid agencies need to be able to communicate effectively with their neighbors. Therefore, common frequencies must be established that can be used on all large-scale incidents. The communications plan (ICS Form 205) from all arriving agencies should be available on scene in order to program radios as needed. Park County has been working on streamlining many of our frequencies, and we are creating a short list of frequencies to be used on all large-scale incidents. Recommendation: Radios must have the ability to hold multiple banks, ensuring that frequencies are available during multi-agency responses. Additionally, all mutual aid resources should designate specific frequencies to be used on all multi-agency events to avoid confusion. 13

PUBLIC RELATIONS / MEDIA RELATIONS Lesson #9: Any delay in establishing a local Public Information Officer (PIO) for the incident can cause frustration for the media and the public. Discussion: Park County did not have a PIO initially assigned to the incident. This delay caused media agencies to report incorrect information. Students inside the school gave the media information, which was often false and misleading. Parents and the media were sent to the same location for information, but were not given the information in a timely manner. Additionally, because information was not readily available to the public, many parents became panicked and a mob formed outside the Bailey Substation waiting for instructions. By the time the PIO arrived from Jefferson County, poor information was already out to the public and damage control became a priority. The assignment of a designated county PIO will help to establish strong relationships with local media. It will also allow for ongoing training in public and media relations and ensure that incident sensitive material is handled appropriately. Recommendation: A Public Information Officer should be established in Park County in order to minimize the dissemination of incorrect information and to minimize undue stress to citizens. Once the PIO is established, an alternate should be assigned, and both should be trained to work with the media in emergency situations. Lesson #10: The availability of correct and timely information on an emergency scene is essential to the media and the public. Discussion: Several delays in relaying information occurred during the shooting incident. This was mainly due to the lack of resources available to the PIO from Jefferson County. Initially, it would have been beneficial for the PIO to be in direct contact with the 911 Communications Center. Media and citizen phone calls were coming in to the dispatch center and the PIO s cell phone at an incredible rate. Each would have been better able to handle the chaos if they had established a relationship with each other prior the PIO s arrival at the command post and media center. Additionally, it would be beneficial to assign specific personnel to the PIO during news conferences to ensure that all questions are answered accurately and timely. This also would help in correcting any misinformation as soon as possible. Frustrated dispatchers spent valuable time contacting individual TV stations to rectify misinformation. This could have been handled during a news conference so that everyone could hear it and make the necessary changes. Specific representatives that would have been helpful include a school official and a local law enforcement officer. These representatives would not necessarily have to speak with the media. Instead, they would be available to help answer a variety of questions that may be outside the PIO s area of knowledge or expertise. Examples include: number of students attending Platte Canyon High School, basic information about security, evacuation and lockdown procedures, the SRO program, how often drills are conducted, check-in procedure for school visitors, 14

directions to Deer Creek Elementary School, etc. This problem is obviously linked directly to staffing. If resources are not available on scene, this will be a more difficult problem to resolve. Recommendations: It is incredibly important to schedule frequent news conferences in order to ensure that the appropriate information is disseminated to the public. Additionally, when resources are available, key personnel should be available to assist the PIO with news conferences and media questions. Lesson #11: If the media is not assigned to a specific location for news conferences, that is controlled by law enforcement personnel, they can easily become sidetracked with emotional outbursts from anxious parents or traumatized students. Discussion: As mentioned previously, both parents and media were initially directed to the Sheriff s Office substation. This led to a large crowd of people with no way to control information. Once again, this led to several incorrect reports being aired on news stations, as well as a distraction from information that was critical to the public. By assigning a media center or Joint Information Center (JIC), the media will focus on the emergency response ensuring one clear message to the public. Direct law enforcement presence is also a necessity at the media center or JIC. This can directly effect media behavior during down time. It also clearly defines areas where the media cannot go. Recommendation: In order to control the flow of information from a scene, the media center should be designated to an area where only the media has access. This area should be secured by law enforcement officials throughout the incident. Lesson #12: PIO knowledge, skills and abilities in an overwhelming media response incident are imperative. Discussion: The Jefferson County PIO had an abundance of resources available to assist her in her duties due to connections that were established in advance. Park County found these connections to be incredibly valuable, illustrating the need for the Park County PIO to create local media connections for the future. Recommendation: Park County s PIO needs to establish a network involving all media outlets and other PIO s throughout the region. Lesson #13: Just as in any other transfer of command, it is important for the PIO to transfer all information about the incident to the new PIO, and ensure that the media is informed. Discussion: Park County established a local PIO several hours into this incident. Since Jefferson County had been assisting Park County up until that point, the Jefferson County 15

PIO was in the best position to give the new PIO all the information needed to step into the role. Additionally, if the media is not given the new contact information, miscommunication can continue to occur. Recommendation: When the PIO responsibility shifts from one person to another, a full briefing should occur. Once the transfer is complete, the media should be informed. Always give the media a place to go and a person to talk to. Lesson #14: Victims Advocates organizations need to be notified and updated at regular intervals to assist in dealing with the public and those personally affected by the emergency, such as students and staff members of the school. Discussion: During the course of working any disaster, people often let stress build up to the point of being overwhelmed. The responders of this incident continued to show care and concern for one another long after the incident s conclusion. One of the benefits to both responders and the public was the assistance given by the Victim s Advocate (VA) organizations from both Jefferson and Park Counties. In order to strengthen this service in the future, we need to strengthen our relationship with other VA organizations throughout the region, and we must tie the VA s into the command post to ensure better information flow. During the shooting, we had VA s at the substation attempting to calm parents and other citizens without good information to pass on to the public. The early activation of Victims Advocates Teams, along with their continued presence at the Incident Command Post, will greatly enhance communications between responders and the public. Recommendation: Strengthen Victims Advocates services in large-scale emergencies through increased training and inter-jurisdictional relationships. Assign a member of Victims Advocates to the Incident Command Post to help relieve the burdens placed on the command staff and VA s from a lack of information. Lesson #15: Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM) is a tool that can be used on any stressful incident to assist responders, but it is often misunderstood and if used incorrectly, can create more harm than good. Discussion: The Platte Canyon shooting was the largest incident in Park County s history requiring CISM. Several meetings were conducted following the Platte Canyon incident. Many were within 24 hours, while some continued into the week. At a few of the first debriefings, we experienced difficulty in managing attendance. This changed the format of the debriefing into an informational meeting, making it more difficult to reach those responders who needed the debriefing the most. Additionally, there was confusion about who should be at the various different meetings. Once you mix responders with citizens and outside investigators, the meaning changes dramatically. Therefore, information about CISM needs to be distributed to responders, and Park County should develop a procedure for the use of CISM in future operations. 16

Recommendation: Park County needs to develop a procedure for the use of Critical Incident Stress Management, outlining the various models and how to use it most effectively. SCHOOL OPERATIONS AND EMERGENCY PLANNING Lesson #16: Accountability of all students can be difficult during school evacuations, and therefore must be evaluated continuously throughout the incident. Discussion: After the high school was evacuated, the students and staff were sent to the field near the school and to the Administrative Building within the complex. Immediately, staff was needed to ensure that all students remained in one location and that all were accounted for. The school staff did an excellent job of getting student lists to law enforcement personnel, and of controlling students within each area. Once those students were evacuated onto buses to leave the complex, school staff members assisted emergency responders by accounting for students enroute, and ensuring they were released to their parents. The evacuation of students would not have gone so well had it not been for the school staff s expertise. Due to limited county resources, the dependence upon school staff was paramount. Establishing a mechanism for quick access to individual class rosters would assist law enforcement personnel with quickly determining the whereabouts of all students on campus. Additionally, adding staff duties during evacuations to the current emergency plan would assist in streamlining available resources and further help law enforcement with student accountability. Recommendation: Within the school emergency plan, develop a cooperative effort between school staff and emergency responders for student accountability during evacuations, and provide training for all involved. Lesson #17: Media and public relations programs are necessary within the school district to ensure proper parental notifications and accurate information dissemination. Discussion: During the initial stages of this incident, there was a lot of false information airing over news stations regarding the location of students and evacuation points. This caused undue stress to parents and a large amount of confusion regarding when and where students should be picked up. The school currently has no mechanism for contacting parents and notifying them during an emergency. In a situation such as this, it is imperative for the school to have outlets to contact both media and citizens to provide accurate and timely information. Recommendation: Park County school districts should establish and train a PIO for all emergency situations. This individual would be in charge of contacting the media directly, establishing a program for parental notification, and developing a rapport with the PIO for the incident to ensure a unified message is given. 17

Lesson #18: School communications capabilities must be tied in with responding agencies to ensure adequate information flow. Discussion: All emergency responders had radios to use for incident communications, and all school staff had access to radios within the school complex. The problem, however, is that the school channels were not available to law enforcement personnel, requiring resources to relay needed information. Recommendation: The addition of school channels into law enforcement radios will alleviate the strain on limited resources during emergency situations, and allow school officials direct contact with responders. Lesson #19: School emergency plans should have a traffic control plan for evacuation points, as well as back-up locations for large-scale incidents. Discussion: All students were taken by bus to the Deer Creek Elementary School to be checked in and released to parents. This allowed school staff to maintain accountability of students until they were picked up. It also allowed them to verify the identity of parents before release of students. While having one evacuation point for parents to pick up students was a benefit to school staff and emergency responders, it caused a large traffic flow problem around the elementary school. For future operations, a traffic flow plan would be beneficial to maintain a one way in and one way out procedure. The school district may also want to look into other locations that can handle a larger number of vehicles and people. Recommendation: Incorporate a traffic control plan into the school emergency plan for all evacuation scenarios. This plan should include alternate locations for large numbers of vehicles and/or people. SCENE CONTROL AND RESOURCE STAGING Lesson #20: Resource management and personnel accountability are crucial for scene security and proper incident management. Discussion: During any large-scale incident, there will be multiple resources responding to the scene, as well as several that self-deploy. Capturing all of the resources as they arrive will become vital to overall scene management. Overseeing all of these resources and their assignments is another key ingredient to success. During the shooting, there were a few instances where resources arrived on scene prior to being requested, and where resources started a job assignment without the knowledge of the incident command post. This can cause serious safety concerns for responders and civilians. 18

Park County was awarded Incident Command equipment last year that was utilized on scene at this incident. The mobile incident command trailer can be utilized to assist with accountability and duty assignments. While available tools were used appropriately in some instances, this area could be improved through proper training on the trailer capabilities and continued education during future exercises. Recommendation: Plan future exercises to include personnel accountability and resource management challenges, allowing command staff the ability to use current equipment to its fullest capacity. Lesson #21: Controlling access to the Incident Command Post becomes a greater necessity in high visibility incidents. Discussion: Throughout this incident, keeping personnel in the command post as well as out became a problem. In became a necessity to tape off the area to allow the Incident Commander to focus on the scene instead of the increasing demands for his attention. By limiting access, we were able to better prioritize needs and requests. It also ensured that those who needed to remain in the command post remained visible and accessible. Recommendation: Establish and secure the Incident Command Post as soon as practical in expanding incidents involving multiple resources. 19

CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY This incident was an example of the harm that can be caused by one individual when bent on destruction. The intruder randomly chose to terrorize our school and our students, reminding us all that when people want to cause harm they will find a way to accomplish that task. Due to prior planning and the actions of our emergency responders, however, the amount of destruction was minimized. This incident illustrated the high level of professionalism and dedication by our emergency responders, and an equally high dedication to the community by our citizens. Immediately after the incident, schools, citizens and responders began working to improve our community and our response capabilities. The lessons listed within this document have been evaluated and discussed, ensuring that those lessons will become strengths in future operations. 20

Appendix A: Recommendations and Action Items Timeline Lesson Recommendation Responsibility for Completion Projected Completion date 1 Emergency Services personnel should establish command whenever engaged in an incident, ensuring habits are created prior to a large incident. Park County Emergency Services Ongoing 2 One command post must be clearly identified and all personnel should wear established vests to avoid delays and confusion. The unified command structure should be reviewed and practiced. Park County Emergency Services Ongoing 3 Assign an additional staff member to assist the Incident Commander in the decision-making process and to record information as it comes in. 4 Utilizing personnel in command staff positions, as well as the different sections of ICS, will assist with information overload and dissemination Park County Emergency Services Park County Emergency Services 5 Park County should continue educating and training personnel to activate and operate the county EOC, strengthening incident management capabilities. Park County Emergency Management 6a 6b Continue to explore avenues that will Park County Telecommunications and connect communications systems, in Park County Communications Center order to streamline transmissions and ensure adequate information dissemination, and develop a plan for the addition of equipment in the future. Further training is required on available gateway equipment, such as the ICRI module, in order to use it to its full capacity. 7 A Communications Liaison should be established from the 911 Communications Center, to respond to the ICP on any large incident or when requested by command. 8 All county radios should hold a group of similar frequencies to be used on all large-scale events. Park County Telecommunications and Park County Communications Center Park County Communications Center Park County Emergency Services Ongoing Ongoing Dec-07 Jul-07 Jul-07 Jan-07 Jul-07 21

9a 9b Park County must establish a Public Information Officer in order to minimize the dissemination of incorrect information. The PIO should be trained to respond to various incidents that are likely to occur in the county. Park County Emergency Management Park County PIO 10 Key personnel should be assigned to Park County Emergency Services assist the PIO with news conferences and media questions. 11 In order to control the flow of information from a scene, the media center should be designated to an area where only the media has access. This area should be secured by law enforcement officials throughout the incident. 12 The Park County PIO needs to establish a network involving all media outlets and other PIO's throughout the region. 13 When the PIO responsibility shifts from one person to the other, a full briefing should occur and the media should be informed. 14a 14b Strengthen Victims Advocates services in large-scale emergencies through increased training and interjurisdictional relationships. Assign a member of Victims Advocates to the ICP to help relieve the burdens placed on the command staff and VA's from lack of information. 15 Park County needs to develop a procedure for the use of CISM, outlining the various models and how to use it most effectively. 16 School District emergency plans should include student accountability procedures to assist emergency responders during large incidents. 17 Park County School Districts should establish and train a PIO for all emergency situations. Park County Sheriff's Office Park County PIO Park County PIO Park County Victims Advocates Park County Victims Advocates Park County Victims Advocates Park County Schools and Park County Sheriff's Office SRO Park County Schools 18 Law enforcement radios should Park County Sheriff's Office and include school specific channels to be Fairplay Police Department used in emergencies. Dec-06 Dec-07 Ongoing Ongoing Dec-07 Ongoing Dec-07 Ongoing Jul-07 Jul-07 Dec-07 Jul-07 22

19 Incorporate a traffic control plan into the school emergency plan in all evacuation scenarios. 20 Plan future exercises to include personnel accountability and resource management challenges, allowing command staff the ability to use current equipment to its fullest capacity. 21 Establish and secure the Incident Command Post as soon as practical in expanding incidents involving multiple resources. Park County School Districts and Park County Sheriff's Office SRO Park County Emergency Management Park County Emergency Services Dec-07 Dec-07 Ongoing 23

Appendix B: Agencies Involved Park County Elk Creek Fire Protection District Northfork Fire Protection District Park County Communications Park County Coroner s Office Park County Office of Emergency Management Park County Sheriff s Office Park County SWAT Team Park County Victims Advocates Park County District Attorney s Office Platte Canyon Fire Protection District Platte Canyon Rescue Platte Canyon Schools / Transportation Jefferson County Inter-Canyon Fire Protection District Jefferson County Bomb Squad Jefferson County PIO Jefferson County Sheriff s Office Jefferson County SWAT Team Jefferson County Victims Advocates Lakewood Police Department Clear Creek County Clear Creek County SWAT Team Other Colorado Agencies Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms American Medical Response Colorado Bureau of Investigations Colorado Department of Education Colorado Department of Transportation Colorado State Patrol Colorado State Victims Advocates Division of Emergency Management Division of Wildlife Fairplay Police Department Federal Bureau of Investigation Flight for Life 24

Appendix C: Tactical Repeater Information Supplied by Mark Hall, Jefferson County White Paper on Tactical Repeaters In spite of an engineer's best intentions, he cannot guarantee 100% signal coverage throughout a system and users will invariably come across an area where there is little to no radio coverage, compromising incident communications, safety and security. Several solutions to this critical issue include employing human repeaters to relay messages, using bi-directional amplifiers (BDA's), and deploying portable repeaters or products like the Incident Commander's Radio Interface (ICRI ). Using an ICRI offers several advantages over any other solution, including: 1) It does not tie up as much manpower as a human repeater would, which is critical in this day and age of overtaxed public safety resources, 2) It is more powerful and reliable than a simple BDA, 3) It is significantly less expensive to own and operate than most portable repeaters, offering a better cost/performance ratio, and finally, 4) It offers greater flexibility by being able to operate not only in-band (i.e. VHF-VHF), but can just as easily function as a cross-band/tactical interoperability solution (VHF-UHF-800-Nextel-etc.) when accommodating the varied radio assets of different responding units. Example missions for the ICRI as a tactical repeater: SWAT HIDTA / Narcotics cases Urban and wildland search and rescue Hostage situations Urban and wildland fire suppression Evidence collection / crime scene work Covert vehicle convoys (one vehicle housing 2P with concealed antenna) Suspect search Mutual aid responses Body wire re-transmitting on land mobile radios Mass casualty incidents Joint terrorism task forces HAZMAT insertion teams 25

Example applications for the ICRI as a tactical repeater for public safety agencies: In buildings where radio signals do not reach into places like the enunciator panel, stairwells, malls, casinos, back hallways, etc. At elevator shafts which can assist in transmissions between building floors. In an adjacent building that all parties can "see" with their radios. Below grade in basements, tunnels, mine shafts, caves, etc. In canyons, over cliffs, etc. Below decks on ships The tactical repeater application requires a user to secure a handheld radio operating on a simplex/talk-around channel to the cable reel or, with an adapter, to the end of the cable itself, and to bring that radio into an area of poor/no radio coverage. All units working in this dead zone would communicate with each other and with the incident commander via their simplex channel. Users in Hazmat Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) would utilize their in-suit radios for this purpose. The other end of the cable/cable reel would be plugged into the ICRI, which is connected to one or more radios capable of reaching the repeater/talk group where the incident commander or operations officer is working. 26

An ICRI-2P with two radios, a handset and a cable reel. 250' cable reel can be daisy-chained out to a total of 2000' without suffering loss of audio signal. Handset allows ICRI to double as a base station radio. 27