RTC on PP For Nuclear Materials and Facility The Presentation of Final Exercise Aishite imasu Group On 19 th -30 th October, 2015 Japan Atomic Energy Agency Integrated Support center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security
The Members of Aishite imasu Group Position Title Family Name Given Name Organization Country Instuctor Mr Nakamura Yo ISCN, JAEA Japan Leader Ms Indragini JAEA Research Fellow / BATAN Indonesia Member Ms. De Jesus Teresita Guerrero Philippine Nuclear Research Institute Philippines Member Ms. Kraikaew Jarunee Office Atomic of Peace Thailand Member Member Member Member Mr. Artmonov Vitalii Viktorovich National Guard of Ukraine Ukraine Mr. Lathdavong Phonesavanh Mr. Ozkara Ali Ministry of Science and Technology Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEA) Laos Turkey Mr. Thon Mao Ministry of Mines and Energy Cambodia
OUTLINE Scenario Design Basis Threat Adversary Sequence Diagram Effectiveness of Existing PPS at Bugatti Effectiveness of Upgraded PPS at Bugatti 4
Scenario Bugatti management is concerned that the current PPS may not meet protection requirements to protect against a sabotage attack of the PTR reactor with potential HRC release; The adversary has 20kg of tools and explosives and required 45 seconds to perform sabotage at the target; Bugatti management has determined the minimum protection requirement for PPS effectiveness (PE) is 0.85. or > 0.85 The Sabotage occurred during Night shift
DBT Adversary attributes and Characteristics Type of Adversary Likelihood of Potential Action Motivation Capabilities Attributes and Characteristics Number of attackers 6 Type of Weapons Explosive Transportation Power and Hand Tools Technical skill Level of Funding Infrastructure Insider Protestor, Criminal and Terrorist Theft, Sabotage Ideological, Economic Automatic Rifle High Explosive, many Large Truck Variety of hand tools Sophisticated use of high explosive Create a radiological release A lot of funding Some infrastructure Passive
Bugatti facility Diagram Offsite P3 Vehicle Entrance P4 Delivery Vehicle P 2 Personal Entrance P1 CAS building Concrete Fence Limited Access Areas Vehicle gate P8 Emergency vehicle gate Personal gate Fence Protected Areas D60 windows Main gate P6 Building Roof Reactor hall Roof Cooling Area 20cm Concrete Wall 30cm Concrete wall PTR Building D60 D60/1 Door 30cm Concrete wall Reactor hall Roof Cooling Area Reactor Hall
Existing PPS at Bugatti Facility
* * 2.5 meter concrete panel wall
Adversary Response time Description Unarmed Guard Local Police Military Alarm communication time 1 1 1 Alarm assessment time 45 45 45 Communication with GPM 75 25 50 Preparation time 30 5 90 Travel time 45 240 660 Onsite 0 90 90 Total response time 196 406 936
Response Response Force Number Night Cumulativ e number Time remaining No Jump With Jump PN Observation Guard 2 2-31 -15 0 Physical Local patrol 4 6-241 -225 0 Deadly Force Military 10 16-771 -755 0
Existing PPS AT Bugatti-P E P E P I P N P I (MVP) : 0 P N : 0 P E : 0 17
Upgraded PPS
UPGRADING PPS AT LNRI PHYSICAL PROTECTION INTEGRATES: Personnel Procedures Equipment 19
Description Guard (with Rifle) Local Police (Barrack Inside the Facility) Military Alarm communication time Alarm assessment time Communication with GPM Preparation time Travel time On site deployment time Total response time 1 1 1 20 20 20 15 15 20 5 5 30 10 10 60 0 5 10 51 56 141
Upgrading Data for Detection, Delay and Response
* Local Police Video motion Guard
Vibration Sensor BMS Grid Mesh High S Padlock Video Motion Roof Light Active Infrared Sensor Glass Break Chain-link Fence
Response Response Force Number Night Cumulativ e number Time remaining No Jump With Jump PN Physical force Guard 5 5 470 286 0.30 Physical force Local patrol 5 10 465 280 0.96 Deadly Force Military 10 20 401 217 1
UPGRADING PPS AT Bugatti-P E P E P I P N Elements No Military With Military Notes PI (MVP) 0.932 0.932 PN 0.96 1.0 PE 0.89 0.93 Path with Jump 28
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS Memorandum of Understanding Bugatti with other stakeholders: police and military - backup for normal and emergency situation - Joint exercise Lighting around facility to optimize assessment Location of Secondary Alarm system and Central Alarm System Sufficient training for guards Maintenance of equipment Performance Testing: subsystem and whole (personal-proceduresequipment) Insider Threat: Preventive and Protective Measures Nuclear Security Culture Enhancement and Education 29
Conclusion - Bugatti Facility is increasing the PPE Elements Before After PI 0 0.932 PN 0 0.96 PE 0 0.89 For an Effective Physical Protection System, upgrading the following - Increase Probability of Detection (PD) by adding Intrusion Detection Sensors and number of personnel; - Increase delay time by adding delay barriers; - Decrease response time; - Increase number of competent response force; - Review procedures.
Learning Local language Countries Local Language English Philippines SALAMAT PO Cambodia Laos Ukraine Turkey Thailand Indonesia SAUM ARKOUN KHOP JAI DJA KU YU TER SEK KUR LER KHOP KHUN TERIMA KASIH Thank You Very mush
Thank you very much for your attention Any Question for Our Group?