Contemporary Issues Paper EWS Submitted by K. D. Stevenson to

Similar documents
Required PME for Promotion to Captain in the Infantry EWS Contemporary Issue Paper Submitted by Captain MC Danner to Major CJ Bronzi, CG 12 19

SSgt, What LAR did you serve with? Submitted by Capt Mark C. Brown CG #15. Majors Dixon and Duryea EWS 2005

Military to Civilian Conversion: Where Effectiveness Meets Efficiency

MAKING IT HAPPEN: TRAINING MECHANIZED INFANTRY COMPANIES

Submitted by Captain RP Lynch To Major SD Griffin, CG February 2006

Redefining how Relative Values are determined on Fitness Reports EWS Contemporary Issues Paper Submitted by Captain S.R. Walsh to Maj Tatum 19 Feb 08

Joint Terminal Attack Controller, A Primary MOS For The Future. EWS Contemporary Issue Paper Submitted by Captain M.J. Carroll to Major P.M.

White Space and Other Emerging Issues. Conservation Conference 23 August 2004 Savannah, Georgia

Battle Captain Revisited. Contemporary Issues Paper Submitted by Captain T. E. Mahar to Major S. D. Griffin, CG 11 December 2005

Infantry Companies Need Intelligence Cells. Submitted by Captain E.G. Koob

The Affect of Division-Level Consolidated Administration on Battalion Adjutant Sections

Improving the Quality of Patient Care Utilizing Tracer Methodology

Aviation Logistics Officers: Combining Supply and Maintenance Responsibilities. Captain WA Elliott

Where Have You Gone MTO? Captain Brian M. Bell CG #7 LTC D. Major

Sustaining the Marine Corps Martial Arts Program. EWS Contemporary Issues Paper. Submitted by Captain G.S. Rooker. Major Gelerter / Major Uecker, CG#3

USMC Expeditionary Energy

Rethinking Tactical HUMINT in a MAGTF World EWS Contemporary Issue Paper Submitted by Capt M.S. Wilbur To Major Dixon, CG 8 6 January 2006

The Need for a Common Aviation Command and Control System in the Marine Air Command and Control System. Captain Michael Ahlstrom

Adapting the Fitness Report: Evolving an intangible quality into a tangible evaluation to

Shallow-Water Mine Countermeasure Capability for USMC Ground Reconnaissance Assets EWS Subject Area Warfighting

The Fully-Burdened Cost of Waste in Contingency Operations

Cyber Attack: The Department Of Defense s Inability To Provide Cyber Indications And Warning

DDESB Seminar Explosives Safety Training

Marine Corps Mentoring Program. Contemporary Issues Paper Submitted by Captain T. D. Watson to CG #10 FACAD: Major P. J. Nugent 07 February 2006

No Time for Boats EWS Contemporary Issue Paper Submitted by Captain P. B. Byrne to Major A. L. Shaw and Major W. C. Stophel, CG 3 7 February 2006

Improving the Tank Scout. Contemporary Issues Paper Submitted by Captain R.L. Burton CG #3, FACADs: Majors A.L. Shaw and W.C. Stophel 7 February 2006

ASAP-X, Automated Safety Assessment Protocol - Explosives. Mark Peterson Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board

Mission Assurance Analysis Protocol (MAAP)

Independent Auditor's Report on the Attestation of the Existence, Completeness, and Rights of the Department of the Navy's Aircraft

Electronic Attack/GPS EA Process

US Coast Guard Corrosion Program Office

The Marine Corps Physical Fitness Test: The Need to Replace it with a Combat Fitness Test EWS Contemporary Issue Paper Submitted by Captain E. M.

Marine Officer Promotions: Incentivizing and Retaining Top Performers. Captain Michael J. Lorino

Closing the Barn Doors After the Cows Have Left: MCRC s Solution to the Recruiter Shortfall EWS Subject Area Manpower

Panel 12 - Issues In Outsourcing Reuben S. Pitts III, NSWCDL

Joint Committee on Tactical Shelters Bi-Annual Meeting with Industry & Exhibition. November 3, 2009

Maintaining Mobility. By Major Nick I. Brown and Major Taylor P. White

In 2007, the United States Army Reserve completed its

Blue on Blue: Tracking Blue Forces Across the MAGTF Contemporary Issue Paper Submitted by Captain D.R. Stengrim to: Major Shaw, CG February 2005

terns Planning and E ik DeBolt ~nts Softwar~ RS) DMSMS Plan Buildt! August 2011 SYSPARS

Cerberus Partnership with Industry. Distribution authorized to Public Release

Marine Corps' Concept Based Requirement Process Is Broken

The Need for NMCI. N Bukovac CG February 2009

Opportunities to Streamline DOD s Milestone Review Process

The Shake and Bake Noncommissioned Officer. By the early-1960's, the United States Army was again engaged in conflict, now in

Integrated Comprehensive Planning for Range Sustainability

AUTOMATIC IDENTIFICATION TECHNOLOGY

712CD. Phone: Fax: Comparison of combat casualty statistics among US Armed Forces during OEF/OIF

The Need for a New Battery Option. Subject Area General EWS 2006

Military Health System Conference. Putting it All Together: The DoD/VA Integrated Mental Health Strategy (IMHS)

Chief of Staff, United States Army, before the House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Readiness, 113th Cong., 2nd sess., April 10, 2014.

Wildland Fire Assistance

2010 Fall/Winter 2011 Edition A army Space Journal

Biometrics in US Army Accessions Command

USMC Identity Operations Strategy. Major Frank Sanchez, USMC HQ PP&O

Social Science Research on Sensitive Topics and the Exemptions. Caroline Miner

Report Documentation Page

Unexploded Ordnance Safety on Ranges a Draft DoD Instruction

Defense Acquisition Review Journal

United States Army Aviation Technology Center of Excellence (ATCoE) NASA/Army Systems and Software Engineering Forum

Fiscal Year 2011 Department of Homeland Security Assistance to States and Localities

The Coalition Warfare Program (CWP) OUSD(AT&L)/International Cooperation

United States Military Casualty Statistics: Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom

Shadow 200 TUAV Schoolhouse Training

Screening for Attrition and Performance

The Theater Engineer Construction Battalion:

Lessons Learned From Product Manager (PM) Infantry Combat Vehicle (ICV) Using Soldier Evaluation in the Design Phase

CAAT in Deliberate Urban Attacks

Maintaining Tank and Infantry Integration Training EWS Subject Area Training

Concept Development & Experimentation. COM as Shooter Operational Planning using C2 for Confronting and Collaborating.

MILITARY MUNITIONS RULE (MR) and DoD EXPLOSIVES SAFETY BOARD (DDESB)

Water Usage at Forward Operating Bases

Army Aviation and Missile Command (AMCOM) Corrosion Program Update. Steven F. Carr Corrosion Program Manager

Defense Health Care Issues and Data

Army Modeling and Simulation Past, Present and Future Executive Forum for Modeling and Simulation

ALLEGED MISCONDUCT: GENERAL T. MICHAEL MOSELEY FORMER CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE

Laboratory Accreditation Bureau (L-A-B)

2011 USN-USMC SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE COMPACFLT

Afloat Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations Program (AESOP) Spectrum Management Challenges for the 21st Century

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense and Americas Security Affairs)

AMC s Fleet Management Initiative (FMI) SFC Michael Holcomb

The Security Plan: Effectively Teaching How To Write One

ASNE Combat Systems Symposium. Balancing Capability and Capacity

Creating a Culturally Prepared Marine Corps. Captain Monti Smith. Conference Group Galway Lane. Stafford, VA

Munitions Response Site Prioritization Protocol (MRSPP) Online Training Overview. Environmental, Energy, and Sustainability Symposium Wednesday, 6 May

Integrity Assessment of E1-E3 Sailors at Naval Submarine School: FY2007 FY2011

Dynamic Training Environments of the Future

DOD Native American Regional Consultations in the Southeastern United States. John Cordray NAVFAC, Southern Division Charleston, SC

THE GUARDIA CIVIL AND ETA

Grow the U.S. Army, Again EWS Contemporary Issues Paper Submitted by Captain Travis Trammell to Major Charles Lynn, CG February 2008

Improving ROTC Accessions for Military Intelligence

IMPROVING SPACE TRAINING

DoD Countermine and Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Systems Contracts for the Vehicle Optics Sensor System

MSG-079 C-BML Workshop Farnborough UK, Feb Coalition Battle Management Language 2009 Experimentation

Tim Haithcoat Deputy Director Center for Geospatial Intelligence Director Geographic Resources Center / MSDIS

Rapid Reaction Technology Office. Rapid Reaction Technology Office. Overview and Objectives. Mr. Benjamin Riley. Director, (RRTO)

New Tactics for a New Enemy By John C. Decker

NORMALIZATION OF EXPLOSIVES SAFETY REGULATIONS BETWEEN U.S. NAVY AND AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE

DOING BUSINESS WITH THE OFFICE OF NAVAL RESEARCH. Ms. Vera M. Carroll Acquisition Branch Head ONR BD 251

Office of Inspector General Department of Defense FY 2012 FY 2017 Strategic Plan

Transcription:

Combat Service support MEU Commanders EWS 2005 Subject Area Logistics Contemporary Issues Paper EWS Submitted by K. D. Stevenson to Major B. T. Watson, CG 5 08 February 2005

Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 08 FEB 2005 2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2005 to 00-00-2005 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Combat Service support MEU Commanders 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) United States Marine Corps,Command and Staff College, Marine Corps Combat Development,Marine Corps University, 2076 South Street,Quantico,VA,22134-5068 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR S ACRONYM(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR S REPORT NUMBER(S) 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT a. REPORT unclassified b. ABSTRACT unclassified c. THIS PAGE unclassified Same as Report (SAR) 18. NUMBER OF PAGES 8 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18

Introduction No matter the source of a Marine Officer s commission, it is his potential to lead that begins his career in the Corps. But after a Marine receives his MOS, his potential or at least the perception of his ability to lead either increases if he is a pilot or infantry officer or decreases if he earns a MOS outside of the combat arms arena. By the time a student at The Basic School (TBS) receives his MOS, he already knows, under the current system, whether or not he has the potential to become the Commandant of the Marine Corps, a combatant commander or a Marine Expeditionary Unit Commanding Officer (MEU CO). Because of their leadership ability, operational experience, and professional military education, combat service support (CSS) officer should be considered equally with their ground combat element (GCE) and aviation combat element (ACE) counterparts for command of a Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operation Capable) MEU (SOC). Leadership Ability The Marine Corps requires all of its officers to lead, but the trust that the Corps has in its officer s ability to lead seems to be disproportionate. There has never been a MEU Commander with a background in CSS. A young enlisted Marine, regardless of MOS, has the potential 2

to become a first Sergeant or sergeants Major in any unit, and possible the Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps but the same cannot be said for a lieutenant colonel or colonel in the CSS community. The ability to lead is not exclusive to a particular MOS. Throughout every MOS there are Marine officers that are better leaders than others and there are also officers in every MOS with outstanding leadership skills. Because this is true, MEU commanders should be chosen from the best leaders throughout the MAGTF. If the ability to lead major subordinate commanders is the first trait looked for in a MEU commander, then the ability to make a decision is a close second. At the MEU level, the commander has three command chosen subordinate leaders. A MEU Commander is expected to make decisions based on the information and recommendation made by his subordinate leaders and staff. An officer ability to make an informed decision is not based on his MOS. It is based in part on his operational experience and what he has been exposed to during his career. Operational Experience CSS officers are the groups of officer that serve in every component of the Marine Air Ground Task Force. Because of this experience, some CSS officers are exposed 3

to unique opportunity early on in their careers. For example, a mid grade captain may have already served two of the four elements of the MAGTF before attending his career level school. It is possible for the same captain to graduate from his career school and serve in another element of the MAGTF before becoming a major. Through this opportunity, a CSS officer has been exposed to the challenges of his job throughout the MAGTF. Along with having the opportunity of serving in multiple elements of the MAGTF in a single tour, CSS officers also have more opportunity to command than our GCE and ACE counterparts. No only does a CSS officer have more opportunity to command, he also has the opportunity to command in the FSSG, the Division and in the Air Wing so why not in the command element of the MAGTF as a MEU command? In recent years, reason for not making CSS officer MEU commander have ranged from (1) not having enough experience planning and coordinating fires, (2) not having the ability to order Marines to their death. Prior to the Global War on Terrorism, few officers at the tactical level had any experience at order Marine into harms way. Since the Global on Terrorism, CSS officers have gained invaluable experience. In Iraq and in Afghanistan, CSS officer have conducted patrolling and convoys operations operations that 4

require close coordination of fires and requires unit leader to understand call for fire procedures. Pilots serve as MEU commanders, and not all pilots who serve as MEU commanders have a lot of experience in fires. However, they do have a Battalion Landing Team Commander (BLT), and a Fire Support Officer (FSO) and a Battery commander. These same assets and expertise would be at the MEU commander s disposal regardless of what element of the MAGTF that he specializes. The ethos of the Marine Corps is Every Marine a Rifleman. If this true, does every qualified Marine Officer, regardless of MOS, deserved to be considered for MEU command? Professional Military Education The CSS officer that would likely be competitive for MEU commander is one that has prepared himself through his career. He possesses the leadership needed. He has commanded. He has operational experience in nearly every component of the MAGTF and he has completed the same schools at the career, intermediate and top-level as his GCE and ACE counterparts have that he does not, but he is will not have the same opportunity to command at the MEU level. In some cases, the only difference in his ability to lead at the MEU level is the fact that a Staff Platoon 5

Commander (SPC) at TBS did not think that he would make a good infantry officer. A Marine that goes to the Expeditionary Warfare School (EWS), the Command and Staff College and the War College have either volunteered or worked to get selected to these schools. Regardless of the MOS a Marine Officer earns at TBS, if he proves himself capable over the course of his career he should have the same opportunity to command at any level just as any other qualified Marine Officer. A colonel in the Marine Corps did not achieve that rank without knowing how to lead, without have significant operational experience, and without preparing himself intellectually through the Marine Corps professional military education program. It is the responsibility of a CSS officer to constantly prepare himself to be the MAGTF officer that he can possibly be. It is not good enough for CSS officer to be so specified that they can not function outside of there MOSs. Combat Service Support is only one function that a MAGTF is responsible for performing, therefore; a CSS officer should look at his job as only one quarter of what he is supposed to know. This is why schools outside the combat service support community, such as EWS, are vital to the CSS officer so that he can stay competitive with his peers. 6

Conclusion As officers, we are taught to be MAGTF officer that is to be well rounded in all elements of the MAGTF. In order to become a well rounded MAGTF officer, it takes leadership, operational experience, and a solid professional military education. In the past, for the most part war was symmetrical and there were distinct front and rear lines. It was the classic infantry upfront and suppliers in the rear. In today s Global War on Terrorism, there are no rear and front lines. CSS officers of every MOS are not only performing their MOS specific missions, they are also doing some of the same task of combat and combat support units. This is giving the future CSS colonels invaluable operational experience. No longer can the Marine Corps say that most of its gunfighters are pilots and infantry officers. 7

Bibliography Fuentes, Gidget, MEU Commanders Prepares Unit, www.military.com/newcontent 8 May 2003 Warfield Larry R. II; Captain, USMC; A Chance To Command, Marine Corps Gazette; Mar 2001; Vol. 85, Iss. 3; pg. 51, 1 Wittmayer, Brett C., Capt USMC; Where are the CSS MEU Commanders, Marine Corps Gazette; Aug 2000; Vol. 84, Iss. 8; pg. 47, 2 8