War zone Syria: Russian and US interventions assessed

War zone Syria: Russian and US interventions assessed [Content preview Subscribe to Jane s Defence Weekly for full article] During the past two years, operations by Russia and the United States in Syria have intensified as Moscow and Washington have sought to bolster their allies in the region. Tim Ripley assesses the progress of these rival operations In October US-backed allies finally captured Raqqa, the capital of the Islamic State, after a fourmonth siege. A few weeks before Russian-supported Syrian troops broke the Jihadi group s threeyear siege of the eastern city of Dayr al-zawr. Islamic State fighters seemed to be in full retreat across Syria. Moscow and Washington have thus recently had good news to celebrate from Syria, yet only two years before the situation was very different. Syrian President Bashar al Assad s depleted armed forces were in retreat across the country in the face of advances by the Islamic State and an alliance of anti-government groups. At the same time the United States was struggling to find any local allies in Syria that might be willing and capable to take the fight to the Islamic State militants. Geopolitical context The strategic objectives, tactics, and equipment employed by the Russians and the US-led coalition in Syria during the past two years have been very different. A Syrian Arab Army T-62 tank fires into the eastern city of Dayr al-zawr during an operation against the Islamic State on 2 November. (AFP/Getty Images ) 1711818 Page 1 of 10

For the United States the six-year-long war has proved to be one of its most challenging foreign engagements since the end of the Cold War. In 2011 the then-us president, Barack Obama, along with the British, French, and several Gulf Arab states, came out strongly in favour of the rebellion against the Assad government. The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) led an operation to channel arms and other support to the rebels, while US-backed diplomatic and political engagement was initiated to build up opposition political groups as an alternative government that could eventually take over from Assad. In the aftermath of the 2013 crisis regarding the use of chemical weapons by Assad s forces, however, the United States and its allies recoiled from directly attacking the Damascus government. The rise of the Islamic State in 2014 and its offensive into Iraq that captured Mosul and nearly led to the fall of Baghdad forced the United States to form a military coalition to defeat the Jihadi group. Soon US-led coalition aircraft and special forces were mounting air strikes and raids into Syria to hit Islamic State command and logistics infrastructure. As Iraqi government forces were rebuilt in 2015 and began to strike back in 2016, the United States started to look for a local ally that could take the fight to Islamic State sanctuaries in Syria. This created a dilemma for policy makers in Washington, London, and Paris: they wanted to defeat the Islamic State, but at the same time the Syrian civil war was still raging and many rebel groups they were supporting showed little inclination to fight the Islamic State as well as Assad. In addition, the factions that were most able or capable of taking on the Islamic State came with major political baggage. The Syrian government army was still loyal to Assad, whom the United States and its allies wanted to overthrow. Moreover, the Kurdish fighters of the People s Protection Units (YPG) were anathema to the Turkish government, which at the time was a major NATO ally, providing key air bases for US aircraft that were conducting strikes on Islamic State territory. To take the fight to the Islamic State in Syria would therefore come at a political cost for Washington. For Moscow, intervention in Syria came with none of the political complications facing the Americans. President Vladimir Putin viewed Assad as a long-established Russian ally and was not going to allow Assad and his government fall victim to what Moscow dubbed another USsponsored regime change operation. The overthrowing of Libyan leader Moammar Ghadaffi in 2011, along with the ousting of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych in 2014, added to Putin s resolve to back Russia s friend in need in Damascus. Local partners [Continued in full version ] The divergent and often contradictory political objectives of the United States and its major allies in Syria meant that they struggled to find reliable local allies. The first USD350 million in train and equip funding for anti-assad rebels ended in farce when it emerged in 2015 that only four or five US-trained fighters had survived for more than a few days after they returned to Syria from neighbouring countries. In 2015 President Obama changed tack. While the CIA continued to help channel arms to rebel groups fighting Assad in northwest and southern Syria, the US military was directed to expand links with the Kurdish YPG in northern Syria and build up its forces so that they could launch an offensive against the Islamic State capital, Raqqa. In a bid to assuage Turkish and other regional political sensitivities, the United States created a political umbrella group dubbed the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). This was pitched by Washington as containing both Kurdish and Arab fighters, rather than being controlled solely by the YPG. Several hundred US special forces Page 2 of 10

operatives were eventually sent to advise, train, and co-ordinate SDF units and during late 2016 the SDF s revitalised forces began to advance across northern Syria. Syrian Democratic Forces fighters on the eastern front line of Raqqa on 24 September as they battled with the support of US special forces to clear the last remaining Islamic State jihadists holed up in the city. (Bulent Kilic/AFP/Getty Images ) 1711819 However, the US military operation with the SDF was kept very separate from the CIA-led alliance with the moderate rebels of the Free Syrian Army (FSA). This ultimately led to the SDF and FSA facing off against each other in northwest Syria early this year in a standoff that had to be diffused by the US advisors and sponsors of each group. Force packaging [Continued in full version ] The US-led intervention in Syria eventually grew to involve several hundred personnel on the ground, backed by air power operating from bases across the Middle East under the umbrella of Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF OIR), headquartered in Kuwait. The CJTF OIR special operations component led the mission in Syria and by early this year had established a network of several bases across northern Syria, including a dirt airstrip north of Raqqa capable of receiving Boeing C-17 Globemaster III and Lockheed Martin C-130J Hercules transport aircraft and near that a forward arming and refuelling point that could accommodate more than a dozen helicopters. Page 3 of 10

A US Air Force C-17 Globemaster III from the 816th Expeditionary Airlift Squadron sits on the ramp at Al Udeid Airbase, Qatar, before conducting combat airlift operations for US and coalition forces in Syria in support of Operation Inherent Resolve on 27 October. (USAF/Tech Sergeant Gregory Brook ) 1711814 The core mission of the 900-strong US special operations task force in Syria was to provide advisor teams to work with SDF militia groups, including acting as forward air controllers. Indirect fire support was provided by a US Marine Corps (USMC) M777 155 mm howitzer battery and a US Army High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) element deployed north of Raqqa. Page 4 of 10

US marines with the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit fire an M777 howitzer during a fire mission in northern Syria as part of Operation Inherent Resolve on 24 March. (USMC/Corporal Zachery C Laning) 1711812 Meanwhile, air power remained at the heart of the US intervention, both to provide surveillance and to strike at Islamic State targets. The US Combined Air Operation Centre (CAOC) at Al Udeid Airbase in Qatar was central to co-ordinating US and coalition air operations across Iraq and Syria. Almost every aircraft type in the inventories of the US, British, and French forces have been involved in operations over Syria since late 2014. Parallel to the CJTF OIR-controlled element, US Central Command has been involved in providing training to FSA-linked groups in southern Syria. The most prominent of these groups set up a base at Al Tanf on the Syria-Jordan border. While CIA co-ordination and logistic elements were reported to be operating in Jordan and Turkey to channel Raytheon BGM-71 TOW anti-tank missiles and other arms to moderate rebel groups, US President Donald Trump ordered the mission to be closed down in July. A Russian Sukhoi Su-35 lands at Humaymim airbase in Latakia province, northwestern Syria, on 4 May 2016. The conflict in Syria, which erupted in 2011, quickly escalated into a multifaceted war that has killed more than 270,000 people and forced millions from their homes. (Vasily Maximov/AFP/Getty Images) 1711811 To co-ordinate and control all its military operations in Syria, Russia set up a headquarters in Damascus headed by an officer with the rank of colonel-general (equivalent to a Western four-star officer) who controls a number of force elements. The largest and most prominent of these is the Russian air group at Humaymim airbase, which operates fast jets including Sukhoi Su-30s and Su- Page 5 of 10

35 fighters, Su-24 bombers, Su-34 multirole strike aircraft, and Su-25 ground attack aircraft. The air group also boasts Forpost unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs derived from the Israeli Searcher 2 platform), Tupolov Tu-214 multisensor surveillance aircraft, and Beriev A-50 airborne radar and command aircraft. A contingent of Russian attack helicopters, including Mil Mi-28s, Mi-24/35s, and Kamov Ka-52s, is also based in Syria at a number of forward operating locations close to the various battlefronts. An air operations centre has been set up at Humaymim air base to control all Russian air operations in Syria, as well as to co-ordinate long-range cruise-missile strikes into the country. Following the loss of an Su-24 bomber to a Turkish F-16 in November, Russia made its first deployment of S- 400 strategic air defence systems into Syria, although they have not yet been used in action. Pantsyr-S1 point defence systems were also sent to Syria and have been seen in locations around the country to counter any airborne threats. Russian ground forces have played a major role in operations in Syria. The Spetsnaz, or Russian special forces, have received considerable prominence for their work as forward air controllers and battlefield advisors with Syrian troops. An artillery group equipped with 2S65 MSTA-B 152 mm towed howitzers, BM-27 Uragan multiple rocket launchers, TOS-1A thermobaric-warhead rocket launchers, and Urlan-10 hand-launched mini-uavs has operated on several Syrian battlefields. Shore-based Bastion anti-ship missiles were also deployed in the land-attack mode in 2016. KBM 9K720 Iskander theatre ballistic missiles were spotted at Humaymim airbase in early 2016 but no reports have emerged of them being fired in anger. Weapon system performance [Continued in full version ] On the US-coalition side there have been no major equipment surprises. The majority of aircraft and air-delivered ordnance, artillery, and land-attack missiles employed in the Syrian campaign had already been used extensively in recent campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. Page 6 of 10

Two F-22 Raptors fly above Syria in support of Operation Inherent Resolve on 7 August. The presence of F-22s has given the US-led coalition a fifth-generation edge in the skies over Syria, although no confrontations with Russian aircraft in the region have occurred. (USAF/Staff Sergeant Trevor T McBride ) 1711813 The one notable debut was the first combat use of the Lockheed Martin F-22A Raptor fifthgeneration air-superiority aircraft. Raptors led the first coalition strike packages to enter Syrian air space to attack Islamic State targets on 22 September 2014. US air commanders in the Middle East decided to use F-22s to lead this and subsequent operations close to Syrian surface-to-air missile (SAM) threats because of the uncertainty about how the Damascus government would react to US incursions into its airspace. The deployment of Russian Su-30s, Su-34s, and Su-35s to Syria in 2015 made the presence of the fifth-generation Raptors in theatre increasingly important, just in case a stand-off developed with Moscow s air power. US air commanders reported that the F-22s performed well in the air-to-ground role and ensured that US aircraft always had advantageous positions over Russian aircraft and SAMs, even though the two sides never exchanged fire. USAF CV-22B special operations Ospreys, along with USMC MV-22Bs, have been a vital component of US operations in Syria due to their combination of range and speed with a vertical landing capability. (IHS Markit/Patrick Allen) 1715229 The other US aircraft that proved its worth in Syria was the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor due to the large distances covered by US special forces in the north of the country. Turkish hostility to US co- Page 7 of 10

operation with the Kurds in northern Syria meant that during much of the early phase of the operation US special forces missions had to be mounted out of Iraq and relied on V-22s to get them to many Kurdish positions. The aircraft's vertical landing capability, combined with its range and speed advantages over other rotary-wing assets, meant it was the transport of choice for US special forces operatives heading into Syria. The US Air Force special operations CV-22B and the USMC MV-22B have both been operated extensively over Syria. On the Russian side there have been more combat firsts, including the Novator Design Bureau Kalibr ship- and submarine-launched cruise missiles; Raduga Design Bureau Kh-55 and Kh-101 air-launched cruise missiles; Tupolov Tu-95 and Tu-160 strategic bombers; Su-30, Su-34, and Su- 35 tactical fighters; Ka-52 and Mi-28 attack helicopters; Su-33 carrier-borne strike fighters, and the Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft carrier. Although the deployment of big double-digit Russian S-300 (SA-10 Grumble ) and S-400 (SA-21 Growler ) SAM systems has attracted considerable attention, they have yet to be used in anger. In August, however, the Russian military claimed that its Pantsyr-S1 air defence systems had shot down 12 hostile UAVs in Syria. In terms of ground systems Russian Gaz Tigr light armoured utility vehicles and Kamaz Typhoon mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles have been deployed extensively in Syria. A significant first for the Russian Army was the airlifting of a MARM road bridge and PMM-2M amphibious bridging ferry sets to Syria to build a bridge across the Euphrates in September while under attack from bombs dropped from Islamic State UAVs developed from commercial hobby drones. A still from Russian TV news footage broadcast on 25 September showing Russian military personnel on a MARM bridge they constructed across the Euphrates to enable Syrian troops to expand their bridgehead on the eastern side of the river near Dayr al-zawr city. (RT) 1709191 [Continued in full version ] The power of precision When comparing the performance of US and Russian hardware in Syria, the issue of precision needs to be addressed. The US-led coalition places great emphasis on its precision-strike operations, from manned aircraft as well as its General Atomics MQ-1/9 Predator/Reaper UAVs, to reduce civilian casualties: an approach that has characterised US-led air operations throughout the Syrian campaign. Page 8 of 10

The widespread employment of MQ-1s and MQ-9s to provide persistent 24/7 surveillance of Islamic State territory has also allowed the US-led coalition to identify, track, and then strike at high-value targets, including several individuals accused of being involved in terrorist attacks in Western Europe. Airbus Defence and Space imagery showing a Russian Forpost unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and its operations hangar installed at Humaymim Air Base in Syria. () 1700889 Although the Russians made repeated claims that they had also struck at Islamic State and other rebel leadership targets in Syria, Russian aircraft do not appear to have made extensive use of precision-guided munitions. Out of their workhorse strike jets the Su-24, Su-25, and Su-34 only the Su-34s routinely seem to have employed precision-guided weapons, while the older Su-24s and Su-25s have relied on dumb bombs, albeit released by recently upgraded bombing computers. Western laser- or GPS-guided weapons routinely achieve a circular error of probability (CEP) of within a couple of metres, whereas the bombing computers used on the latest variants of the Su- 24 and Su-25 have a CEP of 10 25 m, according to Russian aerospace sources. Bomb damage assessment videos from Syria released by the Russian Ministry of Defence seem to confirm this. While such a level of accuracy and destruction provides a useful capability against large buildings, artillery positions, and soft-skinned vehicles in the open, it is more problematic when employed against high-value targets, such as individual people or vehicles. There have also been widespread reports of civilian casualties from Russian air attacks in Syria. Page 9 of 10

[Continued in full version ] For the full version and more content: Jane's Defence Industry and Markets Intelligence Centre This analysis is taken from Jane s Defence Industry & Markets Intelligence Centre, which provides world-leading analysis of commercial, industrial and technological defence developments, budget and programme forecasts, and insight into new and emerging defence markets around the world. Jane s defence industry and markets news and analysis is also available within Jane s Defence Weekly. To learn more and to subscribe to Jane s Defence Weekly online, offline or print visit http://magazines.ihs.com/ For advertising solutions visit Jane s Advertising Page 10 of 10