Miistry of Defece Reserve Forces LONDON: The Statioery Office 12.25 Ordered by the House of Commos to be prited o 28 March 2006 REPORT BY THE COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR GENERAL HC 964 Sessio 2005-2006 31 March 2006
Figure 1 overleaf executive summary
1 The Miistry of Defece (the Departmet) has used Reserves at uprecedeted levels i the last te years. Reserve Forces have oce more become a itegral ad vital part of the Uited Kigdom s defece capability. Regular officers who have commaded Reservists i the field emphasise the importace of their cotributio. Over 12,000 Reservists have bee deployed o operatios i Iraq (Operatio TELIC) sice they started i 2003; they cotributed 12 per cet of persoel i the warfightig phase ad o average 11 per cet for the operatio to date. I some areas the Armed Forces would be hard pressed to operate without Reserves. Reservist medical persoel provided approximately 50 per cet of the persoel for field hospitals over the etire period. 2 Reserve Forces maily cosist of approximately 36,000 Voluteer Reserves, the largest elemet beig the Territorial Army, ad some 52,000 Regular Reserves (former Regular service persoel who retai a liability to be called up) (Figure 1). Reserves perform a variety of differet roles i the Armed Forces: some like doctors, urses ad liguists have specialist skills whilst others supplemet geeral military capabilities. The Departmet has emphasised its commitmet to the cotiuig use of Reserves ad cosiders Voluteer Reserve Forces to be its first choice for deploymet o operatios ahead of the Regular Reserve. The Departmet is refiig its thikig about the future use ad structure of Reserve Forces but this work is yet to be completed ad implemeted. I particular, it is workig towards greater itegratio with Regular persoel to improve Reservists access to traiig ad equipmet ad to brig closer those Reserve ad Regular persoel who are most likely to deploy together. 3 The Departmet has successfully developed a culture where Voluteer Reservists expect to serve o operatios at some stage. Ideed, icreasigly the majority of ew recruits give a desire to serve o operatios as oe of the reasos they joied the Reserve Forces. I the log term, the Departmet iteds to maitai Reserve Forces pricipally for large-scale operatios. 1 The Departmet cotiues to use a sigificat umber of Reserves o smaller scale operatios pricipally because of the high level of commitmet overseas ad udermaig of certai trades i the Regular Armed Forces. 4 Post-operatioal reports by the Departmet showed that Reservists had provided a very valuable cotributio to Operatio TELIC ad praised their adaptability ad high skill levels, although some commaders cited examples of their limitatios, for example, some Reservists were less physically fit tha eeded for such a testig climate. The capability provided by Reserve Forces was greatly ehaced whe they had bee properly traied (routiely ad just prior to deploymet), mobilised ad itegrated with their Regular couterparts. 5 The skills brought by Reservists from their civilia life have bee ivaluable durig Operatio TELIC, particularly sice the ed of the warfightig. The Departmet has hitherto ot had systematic kowledge of these civilia skills but iteds to develop a database. The Departmet recogises that it would oly be appropriate to ask Reservists to voluteer to use these skills whe the Departmet s civilia staff, other Govermet Departmets or cotractors could ot be used because of the security situatio. 1 Depedig upo the ature of the operatio, for the Lad compoet a small-scale operatio is defied as aroud battalio-sized (500 to 1,000 persoel); brigade-sized (3,500 to 5,000) for a medium-scale operatio; ad roughly divisio-sized (10,000 to 20,000) for a large-scale operatio. Reserve Forces 1
6 The Departmet has little uderstadig of the costs of Reserve Forces, which ca be difficult to separate from the cost of other parts of the Armed Forces. We collated ad aalysed cost data o the Reserve Forces. We estimate the cost to be some 440 millio i 2004-05 icludig pay, operatig costs ad overheads 2 ad the additioal costs of deploymet which were oly aroud 22.5 millio. We recogise that this is ot the full cost. The Departmet is cotiuig to improve its data o the umber of Reservists, traiig udertake by them, ad their chagig availability for operatioal deploymet, ad, therefore, o the capability they provide, but it is ot yet i a strog positio to judge the cost-effectiveess of Reserve Forces. 7 The Departmet faces a umber of challeges i sustaiig the future use of the Reserve Forces. All of the Voluteer Reserves are below stregth, with the highest maig levels, at December 2005, i the Territorial Army at 81 per cet of curret requiremet. The Departmet has more recetly bee successful i icreasig the umber of ew recruits but turover is still high, which has a kock o effect o the umber of persoel traied ad available for deploymet. Overall, maig has steadily declied util recetly whe there have bee early sigs that it has stabilised. There are difficulties i providig traiig for Reservists, caused by problems with schedulig, resource costraits ad the lower priority they are give. The Departmet is addressig these problems i part through greater itegratio with Regular uits, but esurig a adequate supply of fully traied Reservists to meet operatioal requiremets will require sustaied ad cocetrated efforts. 8 May Reservists cite persoal, family ad employmet pressures as reasos for leavig but may also give reasos such as iadequate support ad o loger a challege which could be addressed by the Departmet. The Departmet has doe much to improve support give to Reservists ad their families, however, it accepts that there is more to be doe ad cotiues to work to improve this level of support still further. The Departmet has recetly improved the arragemets for remueratig Reservists whe o deploymet, esurig that either they or their civilia employers are uduly disadvataged fiacially by the mobilisatio, ad is improvig its targetig of Reservists for deploymet ad the legth of the period of otice through Itelliget Mobilisatio. Recet measures have bee adopted to offer Reservists greater medical support o retur from deploymet, the effectiveess of which will eed to be moitored by the Departmet. Overall Value for Moey 9 It is difficult to sustai operatios umerically without the Reserves ad there are specialist skills which are more cost-effectively met by Reservists because they are eeded ifrequetly. Equally, Reserve Forces could ot substitute for the capability provided by large parts of the Regular Armed Forces, give the iheret limitatios i traiig time ad that they are ot able to deploy as quickly as high readiess forces. Decisios o the balace betwee Regulars ad Reserves are made, therefore, i large part o the basis of the military requiremet. 10 It is difficult to quatify the extet of the costeffectiveess of Reserve Forces as the Departmet has limited maagemet iformatio o their costs ad capabilities. Noetheless, o the basis of our aalysis of costs ad our work to draw together iformatio o capability, the evidece idicates that Reserve Forces provide good value for moey. Reservists are oly paid whe o deploymet ad for the days they sped traiig together with a aual bouty rewardig their commitmet. Give our estimate of the total cost of the Reserves of 440 millio, which are ot the full costs, this would imply that the approximate cost of a member of the Territorial Army, for example, is some 10,000 a year whe ot deployed. This compares with a cost of 55,000 a year for a soldier i the Regular Army. These cost comparisos should, however, be treated with care. The costs for Reserves are ot full costs; they exclude, for example, the use made by Reservists of existig Regular ifrastructure. Noetheless, this compariso suggests that the use of Reserves is a cost-effective optio where that use does ot impact adversely o their availability for future requiremets or o Reservists, their families ad employers. 11 The utility ad value of the Reserve Forces have bee highlighted by experiece o recet operatios. As a result, the Departmet has already itroduced or is plaig a umber of improvemets top how it maages ad supports the Reserves. The Departmet must build o these efforts to deliver improvemets to capability ad to esure the log-term sustaiability of Reserve Forces. O the whole, ay ivestmet required to achieve such improvemets would likely be modest relative to the gais i effectiveess made. 2 Costs of equipmet ad some estate costs are excluded. 2 Reserve Forces
CONCLUSIONS ad recommedatios 12 The Departmet has set out clearly the strategic roles it evisages for Reserve Forces i the future except for the umbers of o-specialist Reservists that it would deploy o operatios oce its operatioal commitmets retur to plaed levels. Whilst it may be some time before operatioal commitmets dimiish or Regular maig improves, it is importat that Reservists uderstad how they will be used i the future. Havig successfully established a culture of mobilisatio, the Departmet eeds to maitai it across the Reserve Forces as a whole. Recommedatio 1: The Departmet should clarify ad commuicate better its policy regardig the use of Reserve Forces whe its commitmet to operatios is withi the levels it plas for ad whe it ears full maig i the Regular Forces. It should develop ad implemet detailed guidelies about how Royal Naval Reserve persoel are to be used o edurig operatios ad for routie stadig tasks. 13 I plaig chages to the balace of roles withi the Territorial Army, the Departmet took as its startig poit that the overall umber of persoel should remai the same. Withi this headlie figure, decisios about the size ad shape of the Territorial Army ifatry took ito accout the eed to sustai a sigificat level of use o edurig operatios. Other areas of the Territorial Army were resized to meet future requiremets, particularly to mout a large-scale operatio. Recommedatio 2: As ad whe operatioal commitmets reduce, the Departmet should review the balace betwee the Territorial Army ifatry ad other areas of the force. The Departmet should take ito accout our cost aalysis, recogisig that the cost drivers are about the geographical distributio of the Territorial Army cetres ad the admiistrative overheads ivolved i maagig persoel. Therefore, the margial cost of maitaiig oe extra Reservist is ot great. 14 The Departmet has made great strides i improvig the processes through which Reservists are mobilised. It is crucial that the Departmet cotiues to give Reservists ad their employers 28 days formal otice of mobilisatio ad additioal iformal early warig of possible deploymet. It is also importat that the Departmet cotiues to mobilise first those who voluteer for deploymet where this is cosistet with operatioal requiremets. 15 Most but ot all Reservists have bee called out to perform roles for which they have bee traied. I particular, the Departmet has recogised that pre deploymet traiig is essetial for Reservists, ad has icreased the legth of mobilisatio accordigly. All Reservists receive some pre-deploymet traiig at Mobilisatio Cetres. The Departmet agrees that, wherever possible, Reservists should also be give traiig with the Regular uit they are to joi but this has ot happeed for all Reservists. Recommedatio 3: I the light of cocers raised by commaders i the field, the Departmet should review the stadards that Territorial Army Reservists are required to achieve at the Mobilisatio Cetre. I additio, the Departmet should udertake to provide mobilised Reservists, wheever possible, with a further period of traiig to eable them to itegrate with the Regulars with whom they will deploy, irrespective of the phase or type of operatio they are to serve o. Recommedatio 4: The Departmet should take steps to esure that commaders i the field are made aware, before deploymet, of the traiig that idividual mobilised Reservists have udertake ad of ay limitatios i their operatioal capability. Reserve Forces 3
CONCLUSIONS ad recommedatios cotiued 16 The capability delivered by Reservists i operatios improves whe they are properly maaged. This requires the presece, i theatre, of officers ad o-commissioed officers who are aware of the differeces betwee Reservists ad Regulars, with the iformatio they eed to look after them. Recommedatio 5: The Departmet should esure that, where Reservists are deployed, they have ready access to officers ad o-commissioed officers who uderstad the particular pressures o Reservists whe they are deployed ad the support systems available to them. It should also esure that Reservists always deploy with the ecessary admiistrative data to avoid mistakes ad delays, for example i payig them. 17 The Departmet accepts that, if it is to cotiue deployig Reservists o operatios, there must be more cohesio betwee Regular ad Reserve Forces. The Departmet is implemetig greater itegratio betwee Regulars ad Reserves i the Army, Royal Navy ad Royal Air Force. However, there are challeges to be overcome, ot least the differet workig patters of Regular ad Reserve persoel. Recommedatio 6: The Departmet should esure that Regular Forces, whe plaig ad carryig out their traiig programmes, take proper accout of the traiig eeds ad availability of affiliated Reserve Forces. Recommedatio 7: The Departmet should make decisios o the curret ad future use ad structure of Reserve Forces i the light of a full rage of iformatio about Reservists, their traiig, their cost, ad the capability they deliver. I particular, the Departmet should: cotiue to improve its iformatio o the umbers of Reservists ad their traied or utraied status; take further our work to aalyse the extesive iformatio available o the performace of Reserve Forces o operatios; ad collate iformatio about the cost of Reserve Forces usig our template, to calculate their full ad margial costs. 18 Some Reservists provide valuable military capability durig their traiig days, for example, Reservist aeromedical evacuatio specialists retur casualties from overseas bases icludig Cyprus. However, i some areas, this is happeig to such a extet that Reservists traiig as a whole is at risk. Recommedatio 8: The Departmet must udertake work to establish the proportio of Reservists traiig days that are beig used to deliver military capability, so that it ca quatify this importat, but curretly uspecified, aspect of their value. The Departmet must take care to esure that the delivery of capability by Reservists durig traiig days does ot critically limit the overall breadth of the traiig that they receive. 19 The Departmet s requiremet for Army Regular Reserves o a large-scale operatio assumes a higher success rate i mobilisig Regular Reservists tha has previously bee achieved. Recommedatio 9: The Departmet should develop robust systems to maage those Regular Reservists it is most likely to require ad to esure that their traiig is up to date. Iformig valuable persoel of their ogoig liability as Regular Reservists will be of key importace i esurig that they ca be mobilised whe ecessary. Recommedatio 10: I recruitig Reservists, the Departmet must esure that robust etry stadards for aptitude, fitess ad health are maitaied ad applied. 4 Reserve Forces
20 All Reserve Forces cotiue to be sigificatly uder stregth, ad turover of persoel cotiues to be high. Total umbers i all Reserve Forces have cotiued to declie steadily util recetly. There is some idicatio that this dowward tred has stabilised i recet moths but it is too soo to tell if this will be sustaied. Recommedatio 11: I focusig o retetio, the Departmet should: implemet the recommedatios i this study about improvig Reservists' experiece of deploymet; esure that the leadership of Reservists at all levels is of a high quality; make available worthwhile ad challegig core traiig, where possible reducig the umber of cacelled courses, ad provide Reservists with access to the ecessary equipmet; ad icrease the amout of adveturous traiig, which ehaces Reservists ejoymet ad also improves their fitess ad team ethos. 21 Whilst civilia employers are geerally supportive of the Departmet s policy of deployig Reservists o peratios, it ackowledges that this support may be eroded if curret levels of use cotiue, especially whe idividual Reservists are called out o a secod or subsequet occasio. 22 Reservists ad their families make little or o use of Defece welfare services util they are deployed as they live i the civilia commuity. The Departmet has addressed some of the issues surroudig welfare support to deployed Reservists, but ackowledges that more eeds to be doe ad plas to address this. Recommedatio 12: The Departmet should focus its attetio ad resources o those welfare services which are most used by Reservists ad their families, especially those provided by local Reserve uits. I particular, it should: esure that iformatio supplied to Reservists families is writte i plai Eglish; esure that all Territorial Army regimets have adequate, dedicated provisio of welfare support, ad that similar measures are available for Royal Naval Reservists ad Royal Auxiliary Air Force persoel; ad improve the welfare support available to the families of deployed Voluteer Reservists who live far away from the Reserve uit with which they trai ad those Regular Reservists who have o uit. Recommedatio 13: The Departmet should address the issues about the provisio of medical support to Reservists oce they have retured from a deploymet. I particular, the Departmet should: udertake to provide medical treatmet to all Reservists ijured o operatios to eable them to rejoi their civilia lives ad careers as quickly as possible; istitute procedures for the diagosis ad treatmet, through Defece Medical Services, of Reservists who develop metal health problems as a result of operatioal deploymet after the demobilisatio process has bee completed. Reserve Forces 5