CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web

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CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS We 98-120 F Updted Septemer 2, 1998 Irq Crisis: U.S. nd Allied Forces Alfred B. Prdos Specilist in Middle Est Affirs Foreign Affirs nd Ntionl Defense Summry A uild-up of U.S. forces in the Persin Gulf egn in Octoer 1997, in response to Irq s refusl to cooperte fully with the work of U.N. wepons inspectors. As the crisis worsened in erly 1998, force levels climed to over 35,000 U.S. militry personnel, pproximtely 275 comt ircrft, nd 40 ships, including two ircrft crriers, supplemented y smll llied contingents. Though much smller thn the mssive colition ssemled fter Irq invded Kuwit in 1990, U.S. officils elieved this force cple of conducting significnt militry strikes ginst Irq if necessry. An greement in lte Ferury 1998 verted confronttion, ut expnded force levels were continued until June. Following redeployments in June, U.S. forces returned to their pre-crisis level of pproximtely 20,000 militry personnel in the Gulf. This report will e revised when significnt chnge occurs in force levels in the Gulf region. Relted reding includes CRS Issue Brief 92117, Irqi Complince with Cese-Fire Agreements nd CRS Report 98-114, Irq: Interntionl Support for U.S. Policy. U.S. Forces Build-up The defet of Irq y the U.S.-led colition in erly 1991 led to drstic reduction in U.S. force levels, which hd reched 540,000 in the Persin Gulf region t the height of the wr. Until lte 1997, U.S. troop strength in the Gulf fluctuted etween 14,000 nd 20,000, of whom mjority were emrked on ships, with smller numers sed in Sudi Ari nd other Gulf countries. These contingents helped enforce no-fly zone over southern Irq (Opertion Southern Wtch), prticipted in trining nd joint exercises with Gulf rmed forces, gurded U.S. militry equipment prepositioned in Gulf countries, nd provided limited deterrent to potentil moves y Irq or possily Irn. Approximtely 200 U.S. comt ircrft nd 20 ships (frequently including n ircrft crrier) were in the region t ny given time. In Octoer nd Novemer 1997, the United Sttes responded to Irqi efforts to ostruct the work of U.N. wepons inspectors y sending dditionl ships nd ircrft to the Gulf, including two ircrft crrier groups, six F-117A stelth fighters to Kuwit, eight B-52 omers to the Indin Ocen islnd of Diego Grci (British territory), nd 32 other Congressionl Reserch Service The Lirry of Congress

CRS-2 comt ircrft to Bhrin. As the crisis intensified, Secretry of Defense Willim Cohen nnounced dditionl deployments on Ferury 4. These reinforcements, which egn moving to the Gulf region in mid-ferury, included 19 more fighters nd omers, the th 24 Mrine Expeditionry Unit (over 2,000 comt personnel) ord ships, nd Army vition nd mechnized units (pproximtely 5,000-6,000) which joined 1,500 Army troops tht were lredy in Kuwit. Tle 1 shows U.S. forces in the Gulf t the height of the uild-up, s well s U.S. ir contingent sed in Turkey (techniclly outside the Gulf region ut committed to 1 enforcing no-fly zone over northern Irq). Some U.S. militry ssets in the region might not hve een ville for use in the event of militry opertion ginst Irq, notly the 24 fighter ircrft in Turkey nd the 50-60 fighter ircrft in Sudi Ari. Sudi uthorities re reluctnt to permit ir strikes ginst Irq from Sudi ses, lthough they reportedly were willing to llow opertions y non-comt support ircrft. Even without the use of Sudi-sed fighters, the U.S. re commnder Generl Anthony Zinni expressed the view tht U.S. forces in the region could crry out very sustntil opertion ginst Irq. 2 Tle 1. U.S. Forces in Persin Gulf Region (Ferury to My 1998) Loction Personnel Ships Comt Aircrft Aflot--5th Fleet 19,000 20 103 F-14, FA-18, EA-6B c Aflot--MSC 189 22 --- Kuwit 7,000-8,000 --- 12 F-117A; 6 F-16; 18 A-10 Sudi Ari 5,000-6,000 --- 50-60 F-15, F-16 Bhrin 1,500 --- 36 F-15, F-16; 3 B-1 Other Gulf 100 --- (support ircrft) Turkey (Opertion Northern 1,300 --- 24 F-15, F-16 Wtch) Diego Grci 100 --- 14 B-52 Totls (not dditive) pprox. 35,000 40+ pprox. 275 d Including two ircrft crriers. Militry Selift Commnd. Numer of ships (minly supply ships) chnges with some frequency. c Plus 870 civilin mriners, 64 scientists. Numers of personnel fluctute. d Press cited 300-350; my hve included support ircrft s well s comt ircrft. Sources: Deprtment of Defense; Press. The numer of personnel in smller Gulf sttes nd Diego Grci represents estimtes. 1 According to Defense Deprtment spokesmn on My 26, 1998, t one point during the crisis U.S. forces in the Gulf region peked t 44,000. This strength figure proly ws reched during rief period in Ferury when there were three ircrft crriers in the Gulf. 2 Steven Lee Myers, U.S. Will Not Ask to Use Sudi Bses for Rid on Irq, The New York Times, Fe. 9, 1998, p. A1.

CRS-3 Allied Forces (Non-U.S.) Widespred reluctnce in the interntionl community to resort to force ginst Irq prevented the United Sttes from ssemling lrge multintionl force like the 35- memer colition tht defeted Irq in 1991. The United Kingdom deployed n ircrft crrier nd ssocited units to the Gulf; Cnd sent frigte nd trnsport ircrft; nd Austrli nd New Zelnd sent tnker nd surveillnce ircrft, respectively, together with smll contingents of commndos. Other donor countries offered dministrtive nd logisticl rther thn comt units: Argentin, Denmrk, nd Hungry promised medicl nd humnitrin tems. Polnd offered n nti-chemicl unit, nd the Czech Repulic nd Romni offered unspecified militry support, if needed. Totl llied forces deployed or committed cme to less thn 4,000 personnel, only frction of the roughly 210,000- strong llied force committed during the 1991 Gulf wr. Other sttes indicted their willingness to support militry ction. On Mrch 4, Under Secretry of Stte Thoms R. Pickering told foreign journlists tht there is now colition of some 20 sttes who will engge in militry opertion ginst Irq if it should tke plce. Presumly, the totl of 20 sttes included the llied countries mentioned ove, ut Secretry Pickering did not nme the countries or indicte the degree of support they might provide. 3 Tle 2 shows llied forces in the Gulf region t the height of the uild-up. None of the six countries comprising the Gulf Coopertion Council (GCC, consisting of Sudi Ari nd five smller Gulf neighors) committed themselves to prticipte in militry cmpign ginst Irq. Consequently, the tle does not include ny of the pproximtely 300,000 militry personnel serving in the rmed forces of GCC countries, which were key memers of the llied colition in 1990-1991. It is possile tht one or more of these countries might hve decided to ply n ctive role in cmpign if the sitution hd developed into more serious confronttion. A likely cndidte might hve een Kuwit, where memories of the 1990 Irqi invsion re still fresh. Kuwit put its 16,000-memer rmed forces on higher stte of lert during the crisis. For further informtion on llied support nd positions of other countries regrding the present crisis, see CRS Report 98-114, Irq: Interntionl Support for U.S. Policy. 3 According to news report, Stte Deprtment officils met with mssdors of over 30 countries (10 more thn the numer cited in the Pickering riefing) tht hd promised to provide troops or other support to militry colition. Ptrick Worsnip, Clinton wrns Irq to comply-- or else, Reuters news wire, Mrch 3, 1998, 00:50 AET. It seems likely tht most of these countries offered modest logisticl support rther thn troop deployments.

CRS-4 Tle 2. Allied Forces Committed to the Persin Gulf Region Country Personnel Ships Comt Aircrft Argentin 100 --- --- Austrli 250 --- 2 tnkers (Boeing 707) Belgium unknown 1 --- Cnd 300-400 1 2 tnkers (KC-130) Chile 41 --- 5 helicopters Denmrk 33 --- 1 trnsport (C-130) Hungry 50 --- --- Netherlnds unknown 1 --- New Zelnd 70 --- 2 surveillnce ircrft (P-3K) Norwy 20-30 --- 1 trnsport (C-130) Polnd 216 --- --- United Kingdom 2,500 5 20 Torndo; 25 Hrrier Frigte Including one ircrft crrier Notes: (1) Aove forces were promised, ut not ll were ctully deployed. (2) In ddition, the Czech Repulic nd Romni reportedly offered contingents if needed. Sources: Press Redeployments Although the crisis esed following the greement reched etween the U.N. Secretry Generl nd the Irqi ledership on Ferury 23, the United Sttes mintined its enhnced force levels in the Gulf for nother three months. On Mrch 4, Secretry of Stte Mdeleine Alright, quoting President Clinton, told sucommittee of the House Appropritions Committee tht Our soldiers, our ships, our plnes will sty there in force until we re stisfied Irq is complying with its commitments. During My, s the crisis continued to recede, Administrtion officils ecme incresingly concerned tht the lrge-scle U.S. militry presence in the Gulf ws ffecting U.S. force rediness nd creting domestic prolems for U.S. llies. On My 26, President Clinton ordered reduction of U.S. forces, eginning with the return of one of the two ircrft crriers, the U.S.S. Independence, to the Pcific. The Independence deprted the Gulf region on My 27. Other withdrwls took plce in erly June: the Air Expeditionry Force in Bhrin (pproximtely 40 comt ircrft); ll 12 F-117A Stelth fighters in Kuwit; rigde nd other ground force units in Kuwit; nd some of the 14 B-52 omers nd support ircrft in Diego Grci. Allies egn withdrwing their contingents s well.

CRS-5 Defense officils nnounced tht t lest one ircrft crrier would remin in the Gulf for the foreseele future nd nother would e nery in the Mediterrnen. A Defense spokesmn sid the United Sttes will mintin tsk force of pproximtely 1,200 ground force personnel in Kuwit lmost constntly to conduct trining with Kuwiti forces on equipment prepositioned in Kuwit, long with multiple lunch rocket system ttery nd dditionl helicopters. In ddition, ccording to Defense officils, the United Sttes is keeping very powerful force of cruise missiles in the Gulf region. Besides these forces, other contingents re remining in the Gulf to continue enforcing overflights of southern Irq (Opertion Southern Wtch), mintining mritime interception opertions, nd conducting trining ctivities with Gulf llies. According to Defense officils, fter the withdrwls, U.S. forces in the Gulf will verge pproximtely 20,000, vrying perhps s much s 2,000 ove or elow tht level, nd 150-200 ircrft. Tensions with Irq incresed lte in the summer of 1998. In spite of its Ferury 23 greement to permit unfettered ccess y U.N. wepons inspectors, the Irqi Government nnounced on August 5 tht it would end coopertion with the U.N. Specil Commission (UNSCOM) chrged with conducting wepons inspections until certin demnds were met. (One of these demnds, reportedly, is the reconfigurtion of UNSCOM in such wy s to reduce U.S. nd British influence in the commission.) On August 12, 1998, the Defense Deprtment pulic ffirs officer told reporters tht We hve very strong force redy to, nd le to, defend our interests nd to put pressure on Sddm Hussein if necessry. Totl U.S. strength in the Gulf s of August 12, he sid, ws 19,650 personnel, including 11,000 silors nd Mrines (mostly emrked on ships), 5,900 Air Force personnel, 2,300 Army personnel, nd 450 in joint hedqurters. He mintined tht U.S. forces in the Gulf re more powerful thn they were efore the uild-up tht egn in lte 1997 (for exmple, the numer of cruise missiles is out twice the numer in the region lst yer), nd pointed out tht they cn e reinforced sustntilly within 48 hours if need rises.