Tokyo drift? CBRNe Convergence 2010, 2-5 November, Rosen Plaza, Orlando, Florida. More information on

Similar documents
NBC Preparedness in Hospitals

Scenario Based Logic Modeling Tool for Planning and Mitigation of Terrorist Events

Osaka Municipal Government

Facing biological interventions: coming back to the experience of firefighters of Paris. Pt2.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives (CBRNE) ANNEX 1 OF THE KNOX COUNTY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PLAN

Assistance Response under Chemical Weapons Convention

Frameworks for Responses to Armed Attack Situations

Civil Protection Operational Management Plan of Japan Atomic Energy Agency (Provisional translation)

52nd Civil Support Team

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives (CBRNE) TERRORISM RESPONSE ANNEX

Section 2 Frameworks for Responses to Armed Attack Situations

103rd WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION CIVIL SUPPORT TEAM- GENERAL FACT SHEET

NATO MEASURES ON ISSUES RELATING TO THE LINKAGE BETWEEN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM AND THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Canadian Federal Response to a BW Incident 1. Submitted by Canada

ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY ADMINISTRATIVE CODE CHAPTER 375-X-2 DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF ASSISTANT DIRECTORS TABLE OF CONTENTS

Unit 7. Federal Assistance for Mass Fatalities Incidents. Visual 7.1 Mass Fatality Incident Response

Overview of SCDF CBRE Response & Operations Civil Emergency (Ops CE)

GAO COMBATING TERRORISM. Use of National Guard Response Teams Is Unclear. Report to Congressional Requesters. United States General Accounting Office

FIRE AND DISASTER MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION ACT

Reform of Japan s Nuclear Safety Regulation

Why CBRNE? John Devlin, MD, FACEP. GA Poison Center / Emory University / Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

TERR RISM INCIDENT ANNEX

S/1381/ May 2016 Original: ENGLISH NOTE BY THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT ESTABLISHMENT OF A RAPID RESPONSE ASSISTANCE TEAM

SERBIAN ARMED FORCES TRAINING COMMAND CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL RADIOLOGICAL NUCLEAR CENTRE (CBRN CENTRE) CHEMICAL LIVE AGENT TRAINING

Jordan Nuclear Security Measures

Damages and Response to Great East Japan Earthquake. Guidance of medical service division, Health policy bureau, MHLW, JAPAN

Emergency Support Function (ESF) 8 Update Roles and Responsibilities of Health and Medical Services

COURSE CATALOGUE. Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence Centre of Excellence VYSKOV, CZECH REPUBLIC JCBRN COE

NYS Office of Homeland Security Upcoming Training Course spotlights and schedule

COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY

Italy s air CBRN mindset

San Francisco Bay Area

FEMA s Role in Terrorism Preparedness and Response Plan

Terrorism Consequence Management

Fronting up to malathion

CHAPTER 246. C.App.A:9-64 Short title. 1. This act shall be known and may be cited as the "New Jersey Domestic Security Preparedness Act.

GAO COMBATING TERRORISM. Use of National Guard Response Teams Is Unclear

Homeland Security in Israel

Term / Acronym Definition Source

Combat the Threat. Terrorist Chemical Attack. By Colonel Scott S. Haraburda

ANNEX R SEARCH & RESCUE

The Title 32 Initial Response Force

<Introduction> <Reply to the recommendations>

Presentation to the Advanced Planning Briefing for Industry. Dr. Dale Klein

French response against nuclear/radiological threat and risks

NOTE BY THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL

Chemical Terrorism Preparedness In the Nation s State Public Health Laboratories

Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-18

Public Health Emergency Preparedness

WP6.2.6 Baltic CWA Contingency Plan: National contingency plans in Finland

Lesson Five. Public Health Law and Ethics

Florida s Public Health Preparedness Has Improved; Further Adjustments Needed

AMBULANCE S ERVICE NHS AMBULANCE SERVICE NATIONAL RESILIENCE

Bay Area UASI. Introduction to the Bay Area UASI (Urban Areas Security Initiative) Urban Shield Task Force Meeting

University of Pittsburgh

Mid-term Targets of the Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices Agency (PMDA) *(Provisional Translation)

Section 3 Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation

Towards a European Non-Proliferation Strategy. May 23, 2003, Paris

The Role of Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in Responding to the Great East Japan Earthquake

CBRN Response Enterprise (CRE) - Capabilities Brief -

Emergency Preparedness Near Nuclear Power Plants

Department of Defense DIRECTIVE

EPA's Radiological Emergency Response Program

DSMA NOTICE 01. Military Operations, Plans & Capabilities

1 Nuclear Weapons. Chapter 1 Issues in the International Community. Part I Security Environment Surrounding Japan

HOMELAND SECURITY BUREAU

COURSE CATALOG. Safety Through Preparedness

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR and EXPLOSIVE (CBRNE) PLAN

URBAN SHIELD OVERVIEW

Center for Domestic Preparedness (CDP)

Emergency Scenarios. National Response Plan. Example: Goiânia, Brazil September Goiânia Radiological Accident. Goiânia Public Health Impacts

For Accelerating the Reconstruction from the Great East Japan Earthquake. February 2014 NEMOTO Takumi, Minister for Reconstruction

NYC Radiological Planning

IUPAC Safety Training Program at DOW Benelux, Terneuzen, The Netherlands

COMMAND MCI PROCEDURE FOG #1

Bay Area UASI FY 2012 PROJECT PROPOSAL FORM

Introduction to Bioterrorism. Acknowledgements. Bioterrorism Training and Emergency Preparedness Curriculum

STATEMENT BEFORE THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Chapter 2 Governance of the Education Sector and Disaster Risk Reduction

Capital Offence June www orld.com.cbrnew

Brief introduction of the emergency response mechanism of public health incidents the ministry of health of china

Guarding America...Defending Freedom

Russia News. Focus on a more operational partnership. issue 3. NATO-Russia Council (NRC) defence ministers meet informally in Berlin

Nuclear Disaster Guidelines. for Preparedness, Response and Recovery. (Version: March 31, 2016) (English Translation)

Guidelines for Responding to a Chemical Weapons Incident

Fukushima and JSDF Difficult communication between off-site and on-site

THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK INTENTIONALLY

Applying Radiation Protection Issues to Hospitals Radiological Emergency Preparedness

The New Roles of the Armed Forces, and Its Desirable Disposition

ABSTRACT INTRODUCTION

NHS Emergency Planning Guidance

National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements Homeland Security Recommendations Related to Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism

Nuclear & Radiological Field Training Center. Don Bowes National Security Complex Oak Ridge, Tennessee (865)

PINE BLUFF ARSENAL ADVANCED PLANNING BRIEFING TO INDUSTRY

Impact of Proliferation of WMD on Security

RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM (REPP)

COORDINATING CB ENGAGEMENT SCENARIOS WITH THE CBRN DATA MODEL

FIRE TACTICS AND PROCEDURES HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 12 October 19, 2005 TECHNICAL DECONTAMINATION TASK FORCES 1. INTRODUCTION

ANNEX V TERRORIST INCIDENT RESPONSE

Summary Report for Individual Task Write the CBRN Portion to Brigade's Tactical Standard Operating Procedures (TACSOP) Status: Approved

Transcription:

Dr Tomoya Saito, research fellow at Keio University, looks at CBRN defence capability in Japan 15 years after the subway sarin attack in Tokyo J apan experienced several biological and chemical attacks and attempted attacks by the cult group Aum Shinrikyo in the 1990s. In particular, the Tokyo subway sarin attack in 1995 demonstrated a new type of successful scenario for the largescale attack of a civil population in an urban area by a chemical agent. In the 15 years since this horrible terrorist act, how has Japan developed and improved CBRN terrorism preparedness? In this article, the capability development following the attack on civilians and the Japan Self Defence Forces (JSDF) will be reviewed. On 20 March 1995, at around 8am, members of Aum Shinrikyo dispersed the nerve agent sarin in five subway vehicles in Tokyo. More than 5,500 people were affected and rushed to the hospital, and 12 died. The ambulances could transport only 463 victims, and most patients visited the hospital on foot, in taxis or private vehicles, etc. No primary decontamination was performed on-site and, more importantly, first responders and health care workers involved in the initial response were not wearing personal protective equipment. As a result, approximately ten per cent of fire department personnel who responded to the incident and 23 per cent of the hospital staff in St Luke s International Hospital which accepted 640 victims on the day experienced secondary exposure. Although the police could identify the agent within two hours in its crime laboratory the fire department, which did not have instruments that could detect sarin at that time, announced the agent was acetonitrile in the first report based on the on-site detection. The Japan Ground Self Defence Force s (JGSDF) 32nd infantry regiment in Tokyo was dispatched as a disaster relief squad, with the support of three chemical protection units, in response to the request from the Governor of Tokyo for environmental decontamination. At that time, no official policy noted which entities should perform on-site decontamination, but the SDF performed the onsite decontamination using the five per cent caustic soda and the Fire Defence rinsed the decontaminated sites in water. The SDF confirmed the completion of decontamination by doffing masks as well as using M8 detector paper and AP2C detectors. The Subway sarin attack was an international wake-up call for a new type scenario, but it was not effective for the Japanese government. Although the attack revealed the necessity of training and equipment for detection, personal protection and decontamination, and cooperation between first responder agencies, governmental-level action did not start until the end of 1990s and the 9/11 attack. For example, the Model for Co-operation by Local Institutions Involved in NBC Terrorism Response issued by the executive board of the Japanese Government s Council on NBC Terror Countermeasures, which defines the primary role of each first response organisation, was not published until November 2001. As the Fire Defence service in Japan is organised at a municipal level, and there are 803 Fire Defence district headquarters over the country (as of 1 April 2009), their size and technical capability level may be different. Although the introduction and upgrading of NBC response equipment was started at the local level after the sarin attack, the anthrax attack in the United States in 2001 promoted them to the national level. To prepare for the Korea- Japan football World Cup in 2002, the Fire and Disaster Management Agency (FDMA) distributed 150 sets of level-a chemical protection suits, chemical and biological detection equipment, decontamination shower units and decontaminant Hospital staff at a Tokyo exercise T. Saito 20 CBRNe WORLD Autumn 2010 www.cbrneworld.com

Now sold as Thermo Scientif ic TruDefender FT When every second counts, reliable results are at at your fingertips. From the makers of FirstDefender, the revolutionary TruDefender FT handheld FTIR system enables identification of an even broader range of unknown chemicals right in the hotzone. TruDefender FT FirstDefender To learn more or register for an upcoming seminar, call +1.978.642.1132 or visit www.ahurascientific.com/cbrne

disseminators to major fire department headquarters in major cities, including those hosting World Cup games. This cost approximately 1.7bn yen from the supplementary budget of FY2001. In addition, all emergency services were equipped with gas masks. After that, district fire departments were subsidised by the state to purchase Level-A suits, biological detection equipment, a decontamination shower unit and a decontaminant disseminator from FY2002, and a hazmat response vehicle (Super Hazmat) from FY2004. In FY2006, the FDMA established Advanced Rescue Teams (in 51 Fire Defence Headquarters of major cities) and Special Advanced Rescue Teams (in the Tokyo Fire Department and 16 HQs in government-designated cities) to strengthen their capability to respond to natural and man-made disasters all over the country. Under this effort, Advanced Rescue Teams or higher level teams are required to have equipment for responding to NBC events, such as chemical protective suits, level-a suits, radiation protection suits, toxic gas measuring instruments, decontamination showers and decontaminant disseminators; this would make them into units capable of responding to NBC disasters and operating in the hot zone. In addition to the equipment issued to the Advanced Rescue Teams, Special Advanced Rescue Teams are required to have special disaster vehicles for NBC events, and chemical and biological detectors. The most advanced Fire Defence service in Japan is the Tokyo Fire Department (TFD). TFD is the largest Fire Defence service in Japan, staffed with 18,000 personnel and covering almost all areas of the Tokyo Metropolis. For NBC disaster measures, Hazardous Materials (Hazmat) Units were first launched in 1990, equipped with the level-a suit and analytical instruments. In 2002, in addition to the nine Hazmat Units, the Fire Rescue Task Force (FRTF), which is a highly specialised and dedicated unit for NBC events equipped with an insideprotected special disaster vehicles and a decontamination vehicle with three shower rooms, was launched in the 3rd Fire District Hyper Rescue. The FRTF was called out for 164 events in 2009. In addition to the annual three-day exercise in TFD, every district HQ performs NBC exercises events twice a year. Although the CBRN preparedness of medical countermeasures and facilities in hospitals is under review, most hospitals may have no, or very limited, capacity. Chemical substance analysers were installed in 73 emergency medical centres, prompted by several malicious chemical contamination incidents in FY1998. After the 9/11 attacks, gas masks, protective suits and decontamination facilities were installed in critical care centres using the supplemental budget of FY2001. Although the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) has provided the subsidy for purchasing basic equipment for CBRN disasters since FY2006 such as chemical protective suits and decontamination facilities in critical care centres and core disaster hospitals it is impractical for most hospitals to purchase them with their very limited budget under current economic circumstances. The Advanced Emergency Medical Centre of Nippon Medical School owns its own NBC medical command and decontamination vehicle, though it is a very exceptional case. Preparedness for medical countermeasures is another issue. We have to consider the legal frameworks for emergency use of unlicensed products because, out of 45 licensed products for 37 CBRN agents in the US, only 26 (58 per cent) were licensed or available in equivalent products in Japan. A request for the fast track review even for a Mark-I kit was rejected recently. The basic operation plan for medical response at the pre-hospital stage and at the critical care centre has been established by taskforces funded by the MHLW; the unified training programme for NBC disasters, meanwhile, is provided for the Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT) as an advanced training course by the Japan Poison Information Centre (JPIC). Currently, every prefecture has at least one DMAT team trained in the NBC disaster course, but the legal framework to support deployment of DMAT to encounter NBC disasters is not well established. A shift of emphasis from showering to dry decontamination to improve decontamination procedures is still under discussion. Pre-decontamination medical intervention is under trial in the field exercise of Exercises for Civil Protection, which raised many issues. For example, even if auto-injectors were available, emergency life-saving technician in the Emergency Medical Services are not allowed to administer antidotes to victims in the way UK paramedics are. In addition to establishing the legal framework, DMAT should be trained to work in the warm zone. Information on the police CBRN response capability is quite limited in public. At the time of the Tokyo subway sarin attack, the police did not have much expertise in responding to chemical weapons; they had to borrow chemical protective suits from the JSDF. After the incident, the police started to install chemical protective suits, detectors and decontamination instruments for the riot police unit in the prefectural police HQs, and to organise NBC terrorism response units. Counter-NBC terrorism squads, which have a higher level of NBC response capability, were established in the Metropolitan Police Department and Osaka Prefectural Police Headquarters in FY2000, and in additional seven prefectural police headquarters after the 9/11 attacks. The NBC squads are equipped with a counter- NBC terrorism vehicles, chemical protective suits, biochemical protective suits, biochemical/chemical agent detectors, etc. The NBC squads belong to the riot police unit, except for the NBC Terrorism Investigation Unit, which is dedicated to NBC events in the Metropolitan Police Department and which belongs to the Public Security Mobile Investigation Unit in the Public Security Bureau. The Squad s members are trained in the JGSDF Chemical School. When any terrorist attack takes place, the roles of the police are to arrest the perpetrators, collect evidence and to rescue the victims. The NBC squads mission is to advance to the site promptly and, through co-operation with relevant agencies, detect and remove causative substances, rescue victims and provide evacuation guidance. The Squad may also be responsible for the decontamination. The police are regularly conducting joint training with relevant organisations such as fire defence and SDF. SDF had been prepared for C and RN agents, but not much for B agents. The JGSDF chemical school was established in 1956. Its subordinate chemical protection unit 101, which was dispatched during the Tokyo subway sarin attack and the Tokai village nuclear accident in 1999, have been the SDF s central capability for C and RN events. The chemical school is the only schedule-1 substance production facility in Japan. The chemical school also educates civilians, such as personnel from the police, fire defence, coastguard and SDF, on chemical defence. As any biological weapon activity was taboo due to the unfavorable 22 CBRNe WORLD Autumn 2010 www.cbrneworld.com

Bruker Detection years of 50 innovation Performance Reliable detectors... the best IMS based TIC and CWA detectors in their class! Bruker Detection is the world leader for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear detectors. Since 30 years our company has been the expert for development, engineering and manufacturing of easy to use and military hardened reliable detection equipment. Contact us for more details and a system demonstration! www.bruker-detection.com think forward CBRNE Defence

legacy of Unit 731 in the Second World War, the SDF had not taken action for biological weapons before the incremental growth of threat by North Korea in the late 1990s and the US anthrax mailing attack. The improvement of anti-nbc weapons capabilities was included in the Mid-term Defense Programme from FY2001 and from FY2005 a five-year plan which defines Japan s policy regarding defence capabilities. The Medium to-long-term Defense Technology Outlook published in 2007 by the Technical Research and Development Institute (TRDI), Ministry of Defence (MoD), stated that Japan lacks measures against biological agents in particular. TRDI would overcome the technological challenges of realising detection and protection equipment for biological agents within five years. An upgrade of the Chemical Weapon Defence Units into NBC Weapon Defence Units by installing biological alerting functions began in 2006. The JGSDF has a Chemical Weapon Defence Unit or an NBC Weapon Defence Unit, which are equipped with NBC reconnaissance vehicles (which are called NBC vehicles despite the fact they lack a biological detection function at this time), decontamination vehicles, chemical protection suits and biological and chemical detectors in every nine divisions and six brigades. The Chemical Protection Unit 101 also acquired biological alerting instruments and a biological reconnaissance vehicle, so was renamed the NBC Weapon Defense Unit in 2007. In 2008, this unit was re-formed as the Central NBC Weapon Defence Unit under the Central Readiness Force to have enhanced flexibility of operation. The Central Readiness Force also established the NBC Countermeasure Medical Unit equipped with a mobile biological laboratory and negative-pressured field wards, which is responsible for lab testing and treatment of victims. Handheld biological detection devices and newlydesigned NBC reconnaissance vehicles which carry all NBC detection modules in one vehicle will be introduced within a few years. The research and development of portable automatic sensors for chemical agents, as well as decontamination sets, are also on the way. The co-operation between the SDF and civilians were enhanced after the sarin attack, and is now promoted in the Exercise for Civil Protection. The difficulty posed by the need to operate the SDF onsite at the initial stage of an incident lies in how they would be dispatched and operated under the law. Basically, if NBC weapons are used and considered as an armed attack, the SDF will conduct defence operations to counter the armed attack and rescue victims. If it is not categorised as an armed attack but an incident in which the general police alone cannot maintain public security, the SDF will conduct public security operations to suppress the armed attack and rescue victims co-operating with related agencies. Even if the incident does not fall into the category of these operations, the SDF will conduct disaster relief dispatches and civilian protection dispatches in response to the request from the local government to support related agencies such as information gathering on the damage, decontamination, transportation of victims and medical activities. The SDF has never conducted defence operations, public security operations and civilian protection dispatches. It has, however, had much experience with disaster relief dispatches, under which the SDF were operating even before the subway sarin attack. Considering the difficulty of identifying the cause of an attack was terrorism, and these strict control systems which may take time for action, the SDF would be operated under the disaster relief dispatch at the initial stage and its major role would be the large-scale environmental decontamination, taking advantage of their capability in this areas rather than rescuing victims. Its role would, however, be determined by a request from the local government. The Law concerning the Measures for Protection of the People in Armed Attack Situations etc. (Civil Protection Law) enacted in 2004 aims to make the whole nation fully prepared for armed attack situations and emergency response situations, including NBC weapon attacks, and to thereby implement appropriately and promptly measures to protect the people in such situations. The Exercise for Civil Protection defined in this law has promoted the collaboration and cooperation between the police, the fire department, local government, the SDF and the national government, which will be expected in these situations, including NBC weapon attacks. Since FY2005, each of the 47 prefectures has experienced tabletop exercises or field exercises. A field exercise on chemical and biological terrorism has been performed, and one on an attack using radiological substances is planned for next January for the first time. Exercises for Civil Protection have also been used as good opportunities to test the co-operation with hospitals and DMAT for providing onsite medical care and to try several new concepts such as a pre-decontamination medical care and mental health care. The Okinawa G8 summit in 2000 and the 9/11 attacks, rather than the Tokyo subway sarin attack, were the national turning point in Japan to start prepareing for CBRN events. Funding for preparedness has been event-based, however, such as for G8 summits and sports events. The Civilian Protection Law enacted in 2004 enhanced NBC preparedness in local government. First responders are better prepared than ever, but the hospitals and medical care are lagging relatively far behind. In addition to CBRN, medical care for E is another concern due to the lack of experience in our country. Although the government created a position specifically dedicated to countermeasures against NBC threats in the Cabinet Secretariat for the first time last year, NBC issues are still vertically organised and fragmented at the governmental level. For better CBRN preparedness in Japan, more interdepartmental and inter-organisational collaboration and co-operation should be enhanced to maximise the limited resources in this field. For example, promoting R&D in this area, and collaboration between the military and civilians, should be necessary. Research and development is underway for mobile biological and chemical detection devices, stand-alone biological detection systems and level-a protection suits, funded by the MEXT. The challenge is the lack of facilities in our country at which to test these devices using real agents, however. JGSDF possesses a facility for chemical agents but does not have the capacity for R&D purposes. The promotion of knowledge-sharing and networking experts by enhancing dialogue among stakeholders from the government, private industries and academia is now underway at Keio University Global Security Research Institute (at which I work as a project manager) under a Project for Science and Technology for a Safe and Secure Society funded by MEXT. It also provides a seminar series and workshops on the interdisciplinary issues in Chemical and Biological defence. Last but not least, more centralised leadership and longterm commitment at the governmental level is expected. 24 CBRNe WORLD Autumn 2010 www.cbrneworld.com