APPENDIX A ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE MEMORANDA

APPENDIX A ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE MEMORANDA Appendix A contains temporary Enforcement Guidance Memorandums (EGMs). The NRC Enforcement Manual Change Notice Index, located in the front of the Manual, contains a complete chronological listing of Change Notices, including the issuance of temporary EGMs. Temporary EGMs should be filed chronologically in this Appendix. EGM SUBJECT DATE 96-001(T) Establishment of Maintenance Rule Enforcement Panel 07/03/96... A-3 96-002(T) 10 CFR 50.65 - The Maintenance Rule 08/21/96... A-5 96-003(T) Steam Generator Tube Inspections 09/26/96... A-13 97-004(T) Changes in the Implementation of the Maintenance 02/07/97... A-19 Rule Enforcement Review Panel 97-019(T) Revision of Potential 10 CFR 50.59 Violations 10/24/97... A-21 98-002(T) Disposition of Violations of Appendix R, Sections III.G 03/02/98... A-25 and III.L Regarding Circuit Failures NUREG/BR-0195, Rev. 2 A-1 Rev. 11/98

Appendix A Enforcement Guidance Memoranda THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK A-2 NUREG/BR-0195, Rev. 2

Enforcement Guidance Memoranda Appendix A EGM 96-001(T): ESTABLISHMENT OF MAINTENANCE RULE ENFORCEMENT REVIEW PANEL (July 3, 1996) This memorandum is being issued to provide enforcement guidance concerning a joint NRR/OE/Region review panel which has been established to help ensure that 10 CFR 50.65, "Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants," (the maintenance rule) is enforced in a consistent manner. The panel will include the following: Suzanne Black, NRR member or Richard Correia, NRR alternate Joseph Gray, Deputy Director, OE member or Mark Satorius, OE alternate Designated Regional panel member or alternate Other interested parties may attend by invitation of the panel members. The regional panel member should normally be the projects section/branch chief responsible for the site for which the violation was written or another person designated by regional management. Another regional section/branch chief should be designated by regional management as the alternate regional panel member. General Procedure: The panel will meet to discuss all proposed non-escalated maintenance rule enforcement actions before they are issued. The designated regional panel member is responsible for bringing any proposed violations to the attention of the panel in a timely manner so that the issuance of the inspection report is not unnecessarily delayed. It is expected that all decisions regarding the enforcement action will be made by consensus, all members agreeing. If there is no consensus, the matter will be referred to the Director, Division of Reactor Controls and Human Factors, and the director of the Office of Enforcement for resolution. If needed, they may refer the matter to the Office of General Counsel. The panel shall meet, in person or by telephone conference call, on a schedule that is mutually agreed to by the panel members and that will not unnecessarily delay the issuance of the inspection report. The designated alternate may act for the member. Others including, the regional inspector, resident inspector, project manager, etc., may be asked to attend the meeting or provide input to the discussions. The panel shall maintain a record of all violations that are reviewed by the panel so they will be available for future comparison. Each case, regardless of severity level, will be assigned an enforcement action tracking number. Eventually, these will be used to develop a set of examples which could be added to the enforcement guidance. NUREG/BR-0195, Rev. 2 A-3

Appendix A Enforcement Guidance Memoranda The panel shall continue to review maintenance rule violations until NRC management agrees that such reviews are no longer needed. For the present, it is recommended that the panel plan on performing these reviews for the first two years after the rule takes effect (i.e., until July 10, 1998) or until adequate enforcement guidance, with appropriate examples, is developed and provided to the regions. In addition to the above requirements, all maintenance rule violations that appear to be escalated enforcement actions will be subject to existing escalated enforcement action review process. The Branch Chief, NRR, HQMB should participate in the escalated enforcement action review process. A-4 NUREG/BR-0195, Rev. 2

Enforcement Guidance Memoranda Appendix A EGM 96-002: 10 CFR 50.65 - THE MAINTENANCE RULE (August 21, 1996) This Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) is being issued to provide interim enforcement guidance for evaluating issues that may be identified during maintenance rule inspections of licensee facilities. The enclosed guidelines have been developed in close coordination with the Division of Reactor Controls and Human Factors of NRR. The guidelines in the attachment are intended to provide guidance to the NRC staff to facilitate consistent categorization of severity levels for failing to comply with the requirements of the maintenance rule. It is important to note that these guidelines are not currently contained in the Enforcement Policy and are, therefore, not controlling. They should be used to assist in applying the definition in Section IV of the Policy for: (1) instances of very significant regulatory concerns (for Severity Level II violations), (2) significant regulatory concerns (for Severity Level III violations), or (3) more than of minor concern (for Severity Level IV violations). It is recognized that maintenance issues can overlap with other issues such as quality assurance and operability. For some enforcement considerations, other issues relative to the case may result in another enforcement approach being taken. In some cases, the issues can be categorized by either result or the root cause. For example, in some instances, the root cause may be more significant than the result, whereas in other circumstances, the opposite may hold true. In deciding whether to use the enclosed guidance or the existing Supplement I to the Policy, the selection should normally be whichever provides the higher severity level and the clearer message. The form and philosophy of the rule encourages "maximum flexibility" for licensees in establishing their programs to meet the intent and requirements of the rule. Within these broad requirements, enforcement action would be appropriate for licensees who have inadequately implemented aspects of the rule or whose performance demonstrates a continuing ineffectiveness of maintenance activities. Escalated enforcement would be appropriate where there was a failure to make reasonable efforts to implement the requirements of the rule or where significant degradation of SSCs could have been prevented through effective implementation of the maintenance rule. The following presents general guidance that is more fully expanded in the examples in the attachment:! A single violation would be a Severity Level IV violation NOTE: In considering whether to make a citation for a violation involving a relatively isolated, low safety significant SSC, consider the flexibility in the rule; the risk significance of the SSC; the reasonableness of the licensee's efforts to implement the rule, including consideration of its and industry's prior operating experience; and the licensee's corrective action. If the licensee has acted reasonably, a citation might not be warranted.! A single violation involving a high safety significant SSC that causes a plant transient that would have been prevented by effective implementation of the maintenance rule would be a Severity Level III violation. Supplement I, Example C.9, provides that equipment failures caused by inadequate or improper maintenance that substantially complicates recovery from a plant transient is considered a Severity Level III violation or problem.! Multiple examples of maintenance failures that demonstrate a "programmatic breakdown," would normally be considered a Severity Level III violation. This is consistent with Supplement I, NUREG/BR-0195, Rev. 2 A-5

Appendix A Enforcement Guidance Memoranda Example C.7, which provides that a breakdown in the control of licensed activities involving a number of violations that are related that collectively represent a potential carelessness toward licensed responsibilities is considered a Severity Level III violation or problem.! Multiple examples of maintenance failures of high safety significant SSCs that cause a plant transient or complicate the recovery from a plant transient, indicate a programmatic breakdown in implementation of the requirements of the rule and would be considered a very significant regulatory concern and should be considered for issuance as a Severity Level II violation or problem. The maintenance rule does not supersede any existing requirements, such as those contained in 10 CFR Part 50 (including Appendix B and other sections) or a licensee's technical specifications. These requirements remain in effect for maintenance activities. When preparing notices of violation for maintenance activities, the maintenance rule should be used for citations whenever a licensee has violated a specific requirement of the maintenance rule. When a set of facts indicates that there are violations of both the maintenance rule and another NRC regulation, cite both requirements with only one "contrary to." However, where maintenance violations are caused by licensee activities not covered by the maintenance rule, cite against the requirements of Appendix B or the plant technical specifications. Also, please note that the failure to perform the safety assessment provided for in 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(3) requires special attention. This is addressed in Part A, Paragraph D in the attachment. Because the maintenance rule takes a performance based approach to inspecting licensee maintenance operations (a relatively new technique with limited enforcement experience in these types of performance based inspection activities), it is anticipated that the guidance provided in the attachment will require modification as more inspections are completed and further experience is gained. It is estimated that a minimum of six months will be required until sufficient information can be collected. At that time, the Office of Enforcement expects to revise the Enforcement Policy by adding further guidance to the supplements, after consulting with the Commission. Additional enforcement guidance has been provided in EGM 96-001, dated July 3, 1996, which established a Maintenance Rule Enforcement Review Panel that will meet periodically to review enforcement issues that are disclosed during the performance of maintenance rule and other routine NRC inspections. This should contribute to the consistency of enforcement actions in this area. Attachment: As stated A-6 NUREG/BR-0195, Rev. 2

Enforcement Guidance Memoranda Appendix A ATTACHMENT 1: MAINTENANCE RULE VIOLATIONS I. Examples of Activities That Would Be Violations of the Maintenance Rule: A. Failure to include safety related 1 or non-safety 2 related structures, systems, and components (SSCs) (as defined in 10 CFR 50.65 (b)(1) and (2)) within the scope of the program. 1. Severity Level III - violations involving, for example: a. Failure to include one or more SSCs, where they should clearly be included within the scope of the rule, that as a result of the failure to include the SSC: 1) complicates the recovery from a plant transient or 2) in the case of high safety significant SSCs, causes a plant transient (if this example applies and indicates programmatic failures involving high safety significant SSCs, then a violation at Severity Level II should be considered). b. Failure to include multiple SSCs within the scope of the rule which indicates a programmatic failure to implement the requirements of the rule. 2. Severity Level IV - violations involving, for example: a. Failure to include an SSC within the scope of the rule. 1 All safety related SSCs should be clearly defined in the licensee's quality assurance program and should be identified and included within the scope of the rule. 2 Because of the flexibility in the rule, special consideration needs to be given to determine whether a non-safety related SSC was properly excluded from the scope of the rule. 10 CFR 50.65 (b)(2) governs non-safety related SSCs. In determining whether a violation occurred, consider the reasonableness of the licensee's actions in evaluating industry-wide and plant experience and existing analyses (e.g. FSAR, IPE, etc.) to identify events that would indicate that a particular non-safety related SSC should have been included within the scope of the rule. Since licensees are not expected to consider hypothetical scenarios, it is possible that some SSCs (with no history of industry-wide and plant experience of failures) that were excluded from the scope of the rule, may fail and cause an event. The failure to include such an SSC in the scope of the rule prior to the first failure of the SSC or event would not be considered a violation. However, the licensee would be expected to include the SSC within the scope of the rule following the first failure of the SSC. NUREG/BR-0195, Rev. 2 A-7

Appendix A Enforcement Guidance Memoranda B. Failure to establish goals for SSCs in (a)(1) or performance criteria for SSCs in (a)(2) 3. Establishment of goals that are inconsistent with safety significance or industry experience, where practical, are not considered sufficient goals to meet the rule and would also be violations. 1. Severity Level III - violations involving, for example: a. A single failure to establish a goal for an SSC under (a)(1) or a performance criterion under (a)(2) that: 1) complicates the recovery from a plant transient or 2) in the case of high safety significant SSCs, causes a plant transient (if this example applies with more than one failure and indicates programmatic failures involving high safety significant SSCs, then a violation at Severity Level II should be considered). b. Multiple examples of failures to establish either goals for SSCs under (a)(1) or performance criteria under (a)(2) that indicate a programmatic failure to implement the maintenance rule. c. Multiple examples of the failure to take industry-wide operating experience into account when establishing goals or performance criteria, where industry-wide operating experience was readily available, that indicate a programmatic failure to meet this requirement of the rule 4. 2. Severity Level IV - violations involving, for example: a. A single failure to establish a goal for any SSC under (a)(1) or a performance criterion for any SSC under (a)(2). C. Failure to establish a monitoring program (this would include the failure to take timely and appropriate corrective action in the evaluation of monitoring activities) that adequately supports the goals set under 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) or the performance criteria set under 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2). The monitoring program must be sufficient in scope and frequency to adequately support a determination as to whether SSCs are meeting their assigned goals or performance criteria. 1. Severity Level III - violations involving, for example: a. A single failure to establish a monitoring program that adequately supports a goal set under (a)(1) or a performance criterion under (a)(2) that: 1) complicates the recovery from a plant transient or 2) in the case of high safety significant SSCs, causes a plant transient (if this example applies with more than one failure and indicates programmatic failures involving high safety significant SSCs, then a violation at Severity Level II should be considered). 3 The licensee has the option under (a)(2) of the rule to demonstrate that the performance or condition of the SSC is being effectively controlled through the performance of appropriate preventive maintenance such that the SSC remains capable of performing its intended function. NUMARC 93-01 uses the establishment of performance criteria to accomplish this. The licensee also has the option of not establishing goals or performance criteria if a determination is made that low safety significant SSCs are inherently reliable or could be allowed to run to failure. However this determination must be made and documented in advance of the failure. 4 Evidence that industry-wide operating experience was taken into consideration is not required for every goal. However, if multiple examples of goals and performance criteria are reviewed where industry-wide operating experiences are readily available and examples are not found where the licensee can demonstrate that they were taken into consideration, then the licensee's program indicates a programmatic failure. A-8 NUREG/BR-0195, Rev. 2

Enforcement Guidance Memoranda Appendix A b. Multiple failures to establish a monitoring program that adequately supports a goal set under (a)(1) or a performance criterion under (a)(2) that indicate a programmatic failure to implement the requirements of the maintenance rule. c. A failure to establish a monitoring program that adequately supports a goal set under (a)(1) or a performance criterion under (a)(2) that results in repetitive maintenance preventable functional failures (MPFFs) 5. 2. Severity Level IV - violations involving, for example: a. A single failure to establish a monitoring program that adequately supports a goal set under (a)(1) or a performance criterion under (a)(2). D. Failure to take timely and appropriate corrective action (this would include evaluation of monitoring activities) when a goal or performance criterion is exceeded. Repetitive failures due to inappropriate or ineffective corrective action could be considered a violation under this rule for all SSCs within the scope of this rule or a violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B for safety-related SSCs. 1. Severity Level III - violations involving, for example: a. A single failure to take timely and appropriate corrective action when a goal or performance criterion for an SSC is exceeded (failed) which 1) complicates the recovery from a plant transient or 2) in the case of high safety significant SSCs, causes a plant transient (if this example applies and indicates programmatic failures involving high safety significant SSCs, then a violation at Severity Level II should be considered). b. The failure to evaluate the results of monitoring activities which results in repetitive MPFFs. c. Multiple failures to take timely and appropriate corrective action when a goal or performance criterion is exceeded (failed) that indicates a programmatic failure to implement the requirements of the maintenance rule. 2. Severity Level IV - violations involving, for example: a. A single failure to take timely and appropriate corrective action when a goal or performance criterion is exceeded (failed). 5 Maintenance Preventible Functional Failures (MPFFs) are defined in NUMARC 93-01, Appendix B, as the failure of an SSC within the scope of the Maintenance Rule to perform its intended function, where the cause of the failure of the SSC is attributable to a maintenance-related activity. The staff has endorsed the use of MPFFs as a tool for monitoring SSC maintenance performance in Revision 1 of Regulatory Guide 1.160 (January 1995). NUREG/BR-0195, Rev. 2 A-9

Appendix A Enforcement Guidance Memoranda E. Failure to make a reasonable effort to identify and determine the cause of MPFFs of SSCs covered under (a)(2) would be a violation. Failure to develop a rationale or justification for continuing to cover an SSC under (a)(2) after it has experienced a repetitive MPFF would be a violation. 1. Severity Level III - violations involving, for example: a. Multiple failures to make a reasonable effort to determine the cause of MPFFs of SSCs covered under (a)(2). b. Multiple failures to develop a rationale or justification for continuing to cover these SSCs under (a)(2) after they have experienced a repetitive MPFFs that indicate the programmatic failure to implement the requirements of the rule. 2. Severity Level IV - violations involving, for example: a. A single failure to make a reasonable effort to determine the cause of a MPFF of an SSC covered under (a)(2). b. The failure to develop a rationale or justification for continuing to cover that SSC under (a)(2) after it has experienced a repetitive MPFF. F. Failure to perform the required periodic assessment for the activities described under (a)(3) would be a violation. 1. Severity Level III - violations involving, for example: a. The failure to perform any required periodic assessment which indicated a programmatic failure to meet the requirement of the rule. 2. Severity Level IV - violations involving, for example: a. The failure to include a review of performance and monitoring activities and associated goals and preventive maintenance activities (i.e., all (a)(1) and (a)(2) activities) in the periodic assessment. b. Completing this assessment in an untimely manner 6. c. The failure to take industry-wide operating experience into consideration when performing the periodic assessment. G. Failure to periodically (once per refueling cycle, not to exceed 24 months between evaluations) balance reliability and unavailability due to monitoring/maintenance activities would be a Severity Level IV violation. H. A failure to develop, implement or adhere to any of the procedures developed by a licensee to implement the rule may be a violation and could be assessed as a violation of the licensee's technical specifications or 10 CFR 50 Appendix B. 6 At least one assessment during each refueling cycle provided the interval between assessments does not exceed 24 months. A-10 NUREG/BR-0195, Rev. 2

Enforcement Guidance Memoranda Appendix A 1. Severity Level III - violations involving, for example: a. A single failure to develop or follow procedures involving the maintenance of an SSC that 1) complicates the recovery from a plant transient or 2) in the case of high safety significant SSCs, causes a plant transient (if this example applies and indicates programmatic failures involving high safety significant SSCs, then a violation at Severity Level II should be considered). b. The failure to develop or follow procedures that results in repetitive MPFFs. c. Multiple examples of failures to develop or follow procedures that indicate a programmatic failure to implement the requirements of the maintenance rule. 2. Severity Level IV - violations involving, for example: a. A single failure to develop or follow procedures. II. Examples of Activities That Would Not Necessarily Be Violations of the Maintenance Rule: A. A failure to meet a licensee developed goal under (a)(1) would not be subject to enforcement action as long as appropriate corrective action had been taken when the goal was not met. B. It is intended that licensees be allowed flexibility when establishing goals and not be subject to enforcement on goal selection as long as these goals are reasonably based on safety and industry operating experience. The NRC does not intend to second guess the details of these goals. However, the NRC will review these goals to ensure that they are reasonably based on safety and industry operating experience. C. The details of the monitoring program would not be subject to enforcement action as long as the monitoring was sufficient to adequately support the goals and provided for an evaluation whenever a goal was exceeded (See example of violations C and D above). D. Since the rule states that, in performing monitoring and preventive maintenance activities, an assessment of the total plant equipment that is out of service should be taken into account to determine the overall effect on performance of safety functions, the failure to perform this assessment would not be a violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(3). However, licensees are expected to perform this assessment. If the inspector finds that a licensee is not performing this assessment using the methods detailed in NUMARC 93-01, Section 11, or equivalent methods, then the inspector should consider this to be an issue that should be referred for resolution to NRC management and the Maintenance Rule Enforcement Review Panel, established by EGM 96-001. In a case where this failure to perform a safety assessment contributed to the severity of another violation of the regulations, or exacerbated the consequences of an event or transient, the failure to perform a safety assessment could be taken into account as an escalating factor in any escalated enforcement action. In addition, the failure to consider the overall impact of taking equipment out of service that: (1) exhibits a pattern supporting a programmatic issue, (2) causes the initiation of a plant trip or a transient with the potential for a trip, or (3) demonstrates the potential for a high risk system NUREG/BR-0195, Rev. 2 A-11

Appendix A Enforcement Guidance Memoranda configuration is of significant regulatory concern and should be considered for enforcement action. Depending on the circumstances, the enforcement related action (enforcement conference, Demand for Information, Order, etc.) should be utilized to focus the licensee on the need to modify its maintenance activities because of its demonstrated failure to consider the overall safety impact of removing equipment from service. E. Deficiencies in records and documentation would not in themselves be subject to enforcement. However, if they contribute to an inappropriate action or inaction to correct the performance of an SSC, these record or documentation deficiencies may be cited as contributing factors in an enforcement action. A-12 NUREG/BR-0195, Rev. 2

Enforcement Guidance Memoranda Appendix A EGM 96-003(T): STEAM GENERATOR TUBE INSPECTIONS (September 26, 1996) This memorandum is being issued to provide enforcement guidance for evaluating enforcement issues that may be raised during the review of licensee steam generator (SG) inspections in the areas of steam generator tube surveillance, maintenance, and related program issues. The enclosed guidance regarding the severity level classification primarily focuses on applying Appendix B criteria to SG findings, but does note that 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule) is applicable. The guidance has been developed in close coordination with the Division of Engineering, NRR. Attachment 1 contains guidance in a format similar to the Supplements to the Enforcement Policy for assessing the potential severity level of noncompliances. Concerns relating to specific circumstances should be evaluated against cases contained in Attachment 2. The guidelines in the attachments are intended to provide guidance to the NRC staff to facilitate consistent categorization of severity levels associated with SG tube problems. It is important to note that these guidelines are not currently contained in the Enforcement Policy and are, therefore, not controlling. They should be used to assist in applying the definition in Section IV of the Policy: (1) instances of very significant regulatory concerns (for Severity Level II violations), (2) significant regulatory concerns (for Severity Level III violations), or (3) more than of minor concern (for Severity Level IV violations). The severity level guidance paragraphs in Attachment 1 use the phrase "not being able to fulfill the intended safety function," which is consistent with the Supplements to NUREG-1600. The steam generators have two different types of safety function: to provide an intact RCS boundary and prevent significant offsite releases, and to provide a means for decay heat removal. A gross failure in one SG might prevent the first safety function from being fulfilled even if the other SG(s) remained intact. However, leaks in one or more SGs might still allow the second safety function to be fulfilled by the remaining intact SG(s). Either SG safety function can be considered in determining the severity level of a violation. If both safety functions are impacted, consideration should be given to a higher severity level based on risk considerations. To maintain consistency of enforcement in this area, all cases of violation associated with steam generator tube problems should be paneled in the weekly regional calls. The Branch Chief for Materials and Chemical Engineering Branch, Division of Engineering, NRR, is to be invited to attend the panels to provide the NRC technical perspective. Based on experience in applying this guidance, OE intends to consider appropriate changes to the guidance and changes to the Enforcement Policy after consultation with the Commission. Attachments: As stated NUREG/BR-0195, Rev. 2 A-13

Appendix A Enforcement Guidance Memoranda ATTACHMENT 1: STEAM GENERATOR TUBE INSPECTION VIOLATIONS The steam generators have two different types of safety function: to provide an intact RCS boundary and prevent significant offsite releases, and to provide a means for decay heat removal. A gross failure in one SG might prevent the first safety function from being fulfilled even if the other SG(s) remained intact. However, leaks in one or more SGs might still allow the second safety function to be fulfilled by the remaining intact SG(s). Either SG safety function can be considered in determining the severity level of a violation. If both safety functions are impacted, consideration should be given to a higher severity level based on risk considerations. A. Severity Level I - Violations involving for example: The steam generators (SGs), which are designed to support the prevention or mitigation of a serious safety event, not being able to perform the intended safety function when actually called upon to work, such as due to tube ruptures or gross structural failure, caused by licensee performance deficiencies such as inadequate assessment of or corrective actions for SG tube flaws. B. Severity Level II - Violations involving for example: The SGs, which are designed to support the prevention or mitigation of a serious safety event, not being able to perform the intended safety function, such as due to loss of structural integrity, caused by licensee performance deficiencies such as inadequate assessment of or corrective actions for SG tube flaws. C. Severity Level III - Violations involving for example: 1. One SG not being able to perform its intended plant cooling safety function, such as due to loss of structural integrity, caused by licensee performance deficiencies such as inadequate assessment of or corrective actions for SG tube flaws. 2. The SGs are determined to be degraded to such an extent that the SGs would not have been able to perform the intended safety function under certain conditions, caused by licensee performance deficiencies such as inadequate assessment of or corrective actions for SG tube flaws. 3. Breakdown in the control of licensed activities involving a number of violations that are related or, if isolated, that are recurring violations, that collectively represent a potentially significant lack of attention or carelessness towards licensed responsibilities with respect to maintaining the RCS pressure boundary (SG tubes). The breakdown could be evidenced by, for example, numerous flaw indications not properly dispositioned, with significant program deficiencies in procedure adequacy, procedure adherence, review independence (as required by the licensee's program), or management oversight. D. Severity Level IV (SLIV)- Violations involving for example: Violations in procedure adequacy, procedure adherence, or flaw dispositioning that are of more than minor concern, but which do not amount to a Severity Level I, II, or III violation. E. Minor Violations - Violations involving for example: Isolated procedure errors or mistakes in dispositioning of SG tube flaws with otherwise good licensee programs and good corrective actions, which did not result in exceeding TS limits and if such error or mistakes recurred, they would still be considered minor. A-14 NUREG/BR-0195, Rev. 2

Enforcement Guidance Memoranda Appendix A ATTACHMENT 2: EXAMPLE CASES Case #1 During an outage, a licensee determined that an unexpectedly large number of SG tubes require plugging due to flaw indications that indicated that the tubes were defective (flaws concluded to be greater than the 40% through wall TS limit for returning to service). The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions, which included a re-examination of the previous outage data for the locations that now exceeded TS allowable. All previous determinations for those locations had been that there was "no detectable degradation." The re-examination concluded that one location had not been properly dispositioned during the previous outage and that the affected tube should have been plugged. The affected tube did not fail during the subsequent cycle. The inspector concluded that an inadvertent personnel error had occurred, but that the licensee's programs were acceptable and that the corrective actions were good. Conclusion: - Inadvertent personnel error - no willfulness - One example of failure to follow procedures (Appendix B, Criterion V) - No significant consequences or programmatic concerns - No basis for escalated enforcement - Potential SLIV violation, see Enforcement Manual (EM) 6.3.2.1 - Potential non-cited violation (NCV), see EM 6.3.1 - Potential minor violation, see EM 3.5.c and 6.3.1.1 (if the flaw was a TS violation, a minor violation is not appropriate) Case #2 During an outage, a licensee determined that an unexpectedly large number of SG tubes require plugging due to flaw indications that indicated that the tubes were defective. The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions, which included a re-examination of the previous outage data for the spots that now exceeded TS allowable. All previous determinations for those locations had been that there was "no detectable degradation." The reexamination concluded that many locations had not been properly dispositioned during the previous outage and that the affected tubes should have been plugged. Conclusion: - Many examples of failure to follow procedure (Appendix B, Criterion V) - Significant regulatory concern (SRC) exists - Potential Severity Level III violation - Potential programmatic breakdown (NUREG-1600, Supplement I.C.7) (Per Attachment 1, item C.3) Note: - A programmatic breakdown finding is not necessary if the safety impact is relatively severe. - If all SGs were found to be degraded such that structural integrity could not be demonstrated, then see NUREG-1600, Supplement I.B.1. This case is represented as Attachment 1, item B. - If structural integrity for one SG was lost, then see NUREG-1600, Supplement I.C.2. This case is represented in Attachment 1 as item C.1. - If the structural integrity was not lost but was significantly degraded in more than one SG (and included both safety trains), a SLIII may still be merited, especially if a worst case transient might have resulted in SG tube rupture(s). This case is represented as Attachment 1, item C.2. NUREG/BR-0195, Rev. 2 A-15

Appendix A Enforcement Guidance Memoranda Case #3 During an outage, a licensee applied a technology or method not previously used at the facility. A large number of defects were identified compared with inspections during previous outages. The licensee re-examined the old data and no significant dispositioning problems were identified. NRC conducted an independent review of a sample of the previous determinations. Scenario #1 - NRC identifies no discrepancies - Probable conclusion is that new method simply found "more" - No violation Scenario #2 - NRC concludes small number should have been "defect" - Probable conclusion is no significant programmatic concern - If no SRC, then case is similar to Case #1 Scenario #3 - NRC concludes substantial number should have been "defect" - Probable conclusion: programmatic weakness - If there is a SRC, then case is similar to Case #2 Case #4 Licensee left in service tubes with defects. Licensee asserted that the defects were within the TS limits. The NRC position was that the licensee was not correct. The licensee noted that there was no proof or even evidence that the tubes had been beyond TS limits. Specifically, the licensee plugged many tubes in a current outage and many of the tubes had been left in service two outages ago with defects that were concluded not to exceed TS limits (i.e., not greater than the 40% through wall TS limit). The tubes were not reinspected during the next outage and during the current outage were found well beyond the TS limit (e.g., 80%). The NRC position: it was a virtual certainty that most, if not all, the tubes affected were beyond the TS limit during the previous outage (but were not inspected) and were therefore left in service in violation of the TS. Conclusion: - A violation occurred, based on the preponderance of the evidence - Each affected tube could represent a SLIV - There may be significant programmatic issues - If a SRC was felt to exist, this would be a SLIII - See Zion case, EA 95-118, NUREG-0940, Volume 14, Nos 3 and 4 Note: - After July 10, 1996, the Maintenance Rule becomes effective - Potential violation of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) - NUMARC 93-01 (which most licensees will probably use to implement the Maintenance Rule), page 28, paragraph 9.4.2 states that the frequency of monitoring should be predictive and that monitoring frequency should be adjusted to allow early detection and timely correction. Case #5 A facility licensee was determined to be performing little monitoring for SG tube leakage. The unit TS contained a limit of 150 gpd for SG leakage and the licensee monitoring measures were adequate to detect that the TS limit was met. NRC and industry notifications had occurred concerning SG tube leakage that showed that leaks above 50 gpd could rapidly grow to gross failure. The current technology in use at other sites could A-16 NUREG/BR-0195, Rev. 2

Enforcement Guidance Memoranda Appendix A detect leakage as low as 20 gpd. The licensee had taken no additional actions after the notifications. Actual SG leakage was confirmed to be below 150 gpd. No TS violation occurred. Conclusion - under Appendix B: - Possible violation of requirement to review events or notifications - The requirement comes from NUREG-0737 (imposed by Order), I.C.5, as used in EA 91-182 (NUREG-0940, Vol 11, No. 1, page I.A-1) Note: - After July 10, 1996, the Maintenance Rule becomes effective - Potential violation of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) and (2) - Requirement to monitor against licensee-established goals to provide reasonable assurance that structures, systems, and components can fulfill intended functions - Goals required to take into account industry experience - Failure to monitor that SG leakage was below 50 gpd Case #6 During operation, a facility experienced a major SG tube rupture event. The licensee stabilized the plant and went to cold shutdown to effect repairs. NRC inspection of the event also looked into the cause of the SG tube rupture, including review of the SG tube assessment practices and data from the previous outages. Conclusion - if no assessment problem found (e.g., unexpected loose part): - No violation Conclusion - if assessment deficiencies determined to be root cause: - Potential Severity Level I violation, especially if substantial offsite releases occurred (though such releases are not a prerequisite) - Potential Severity Level III or II violation, if extent of event is considered not to merit a Severity Level I violation, but still to represent a significant or very significant, respectively, regulatory concern. NUREG/BR-0195, Rev. 2 A-17

Appendix A Enforcement Guidance Memoranda THIS PAGE WAS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK A-18 NUREG/BR-0195, Rev. 2

Enforcement Guidance Memoranda Appendix A EGM 97-004(T): CHANGES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MAINTENANCE RULE ENFORCEMENT REVIEW PANEL (February 7, 1997) This memorandum is being issued to provide additional enforcement guidance concerning the joint NRR/OE/Region review panel that was established in July 1996, by EGM 96-001. The purpose of the panel was to help ensure that 10 CFR 50.65, "Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants," (the maintenance rule) would be enforced in a consistent manner. Due to personnel changes in OE, the panel membership has changed to include the following: Suzanne Black, NRR member or Richard Correia, NRR alternate Mark Satorius, Deputy Director, OE member or Dave Nelson, OE alternate Designated Regional panel member or alternate Other interested parties may attend by invitation of the panel members. The maintenance rule enforcement panels should continue to be performed per the guidance in EGM 96-001 with the following exception. If, in the view of the Regional staff 1 the findings from a maintenance rule inspection appears to warrant escalated enforcement action, the matter should be referred directly to a regularly scheduled regional enforcement panel, and not be considered by the maintenance rule enforcement panel. The reason for this change is that experience has shown that having both a maintenance rule enforcement panel followed by a regional enforcement panel is a duplicative process that is not necessary. 1 The Regional staff should informally consult with the other members of the maintenance rule enforcement panel by phone to solicit agreement that the matter reaches to the level of an escalated action. NUREG/BR-0195, Rev. 2 A-19

Appendix A Enforcement Guidance Memoranda THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK A-20 NUREG/BR-0195, Rev. 2

Enforcement Guidance Memoranda Appendix A EGM 97-019(T): REVISION OF POTENTIAL 10 CFR 50.59 VIOLATIONS (October 24, 1997) In order to gain better agency-wide consistency in the area of 50.59 violations, during a time when the staff is also in the process of reconsidering requirements associated with guidance on 10 CFR 50.59, we are establishing a 50.59 Review Panel. The purpose of this panel is to provide confidence that we are: (1) treating violations of 10 CFR 50.59 with an agency-wide perspective, (2) exercising enforcement judgment and discretion in a consistent manner, and (3) not implementing new interpretations of 10 CFR 50.59 without Commission approval. All proposed violations of 10 CFR 50.59 will be submitted to the 50.59 Review Panel for review. Each submittal is to include (1) the draft citation, if applicable 1 ; (2) description of the violation and the facts and circumstances surrounding the violation 2 ; (3) the recommended enforcement action (i.e., severity level, NCV, exercise of discretion, etc.) and if a departure from the enforcement policy is proposed and the basis for the departure; and (4) relevant pages from the FSAR 3. The makeup of the 50.59 Review Panel will be: M. Satorius (MAS), OE; Chairman (Terry Reis (TXR), Backup) F. Akstulewicz (FMA), NRR (Eileen McKenna (EMM), Backup) M. Rafky (LMR), OGC (Cathy Marco (CLM), Backup) Cognizant Regional Enforcement Specialist The panel is to consider the need to exercise discretion to assure that violations are categorized at appropriate severity levels and dispositioned consistently in accordance with the Enforcement Policy. The attachment provides the logic path for resolution of 50.59 issues. The Regions provide the panel members with the necessary background information by COB Tuesday of each week. It is expected that the material will be provided to the 50.59 Review Panel and Backup members via E-Mail. Any material that cannot be provided by E-mail should be faxed using the attachment as a cover sheet. In addition, the attached fax cover sheet should be used by the 50.59 Review Panel members to document their position on the 50.59 issue submitted by the Regions. Further, the 50.59 Review Panel Chairman s copy of the fax cover sheet shall be used as the OE record copy to document the final dispositioning of the 50.59 issue. Information copies of the background information shall be E-mailed and faxed to the NRR Project Manager of the licensee involved in the 50.59 issue. The panel members will independently review the 50.59 issue and coordinate their views to arrive at the 50.59 Review Panel's conclusion on the matter. All the Panel members shall be prepared to converse telephonically via a conference call originated by the 50.59 Review Panel Chairman on Thursday afternoon at 4:00 pm. As the logic diagram indicates, if the region's enforcement recommendation and the 1 A draft NOV would only be provided if the Region was proposing to cite the violation. If the violation meets the NCV criteria or an exercise of discretion is proposed, preparation of a NOV would not be required. 2 This could be met by the Region forwarding the available draft inspection report pages that are available. 3 The FSAR sections would not be required for the panel to perform their review as long as the draft inspection report writeup is sufficiently detailed such that the nature of the FSAR change can be clearly understood. NUREG/BR-0195, Rev. 2 A-21

Appendix A Enforcement Guidance Memoranda panel's conclusion agree, there is no need to conduct a meeting between the Region and the 50.59 Review Panel. If the 50.59 issue at question is a Severity Level IV violation, an NCV, or not a violation, the Region should then issue the action. If the 50.59 issue is considered a violation at Severity Level III or greater, the Region should schedule it for the next Regional Enforcement Panel. For material received from the Region on a Tuesday, the 50.59 Review Panel intends to inform the Region of its agreement or disagreement with the Regional proposal by COB Friday of the week the background information was submitted (following the Thursday 4:00 p.m. conference call with all panel members). If the 50.59 Review Panel hears nothing from the NRR Project Manager by 4:00 pm on Thursday, the Panel will presume the Project Manager agrees with the regional proposal. For those instances where the Region and the 50.59 Review Panel do not agree, it will be necessary to conduct a formal meeting. Consistent with the guidance provided in the previous paragraph, when the 50.59 Review Panel does not agree with the Regional proposal, the Region and the NRR Project Manager is to be informed by COB Friday of the week the background information was submitted. The Region and the 50.59 Review Panel will then conduct a meeting the following Tuesday, at 10:00 a.m., in order to establish consensus. Participants in this meeting should generally be the members of the 50.59 Review Panel, the inspector (or another person who has sufficient knowledge to discuss the facts and circumstances associated with the alleged violation), the Project Manager of the facility, and the cognizant Regional Branch Chief. As the logic diagram indicates, if agreement is reached, the matter is dispositioned as previously described. If agreement is still not reached, the issue will be scheduled and discussed at the next Regional Enforcement Panel. The OE member of the 50.59 Panel will assign an EA number to each case considered, complete a Strategy Form, and fax it to the Region. In order for the Regions to develop their processes and issue any needed regional guidance, this EGM will become effective the week of November 3, 1997, making COB November 4, 1997, the first Tuesday that 50.59 issues will be accepted by the panel. Attachment: As Stated A-22 NUREG/BR-0195, Rev. 2

Enforcement Guidance Memoranda Appendix A DATE: FROM: Enforcement Staff Region TO: Mark A. Satorius (MAS), OE, MS O7-H-5 (301) 415-3431 (Fax) Deliver to T. Reis if M. Satorius is not available Michael Rafky (LMR), OGC, MS O15-B-18 (301) 415-2036 (Fax) Cathy Marco (CLM), OGC, MS O-15-B-18 (301) 415-3725 (Fax) Frank Akstulewicz (FMA), NRR, MS O10-H-5 (301) 415-2300 (Fax) Deliver to E. McKenna if F. Akstulewicz is not available INFORMATION COPY TO: Project Manager, NRR The attached pages ( pages including this cover page) contain background material for 50.59 Enforcement Panel Review. Please ensure the above listed persons are provided this information ASAP. The remaining Panel information has been sent by E-Mail. EA No.: (To be completed by the OE member of the Panel) NUREG/BR-0195, Rev. 2 A-23

Appendix A Enforcement Guidance Memoranda THIS PAGE WAS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK A-24 NUREG/BR-0195, Rev. 2

Enforcement Guidance Memoranda Appendix A EGM 98-002: DISPOSITION OF VIOLATIONS OF APPENDIX R, SECTIONS III.G AND III.L REGARDING CIRCUIT FAILURES (March 2, 1998) Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) staff and regional inspectors have found a number of plant specific problems related to potential fire-induced electrical circuit failures which could prevent operation or cause maloperation of equipment needed to achieve and maintain post-fire safe shutdown. Fire protection inspections conducted in each Region have found that there may exist noncompliance with the regulations that require that facilities be designed such that fire- induced circuit failures (e.g., hot shorts, open circuits, and shorts to ground) will not preclude the ability to achieve and maintain a safe shutdown condition. This memorandum is being issued to provide enforcement guidance concerning inspection findings pertaining to the inability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions due to potential fire-induced circuit failures. An example of the consequences of this type problem is reported in Information Notice (IN) 92-18, "Potential for Loss of Remote Shutdown Capability During a Control Room Fire," which alerted licensees that the circuit logic associated with certain motor-operated valves, when subjected to a single fire-induced hot short, could result in a spurious permissive signal. The spurious signal could cause the valve to operate, bypassing the protective features, and resulting in mechanical valve damage. Such fire-induced damage could impair the capability to shut down the plant and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition. In general, the noncompliance appears to stem, in part, from misunderstanding of the regulatory requirements and inappropriate reliance on a 1992 recommendation from the Nuclear Management and Resources Council, which was not endorsed by the NRC, and may have caused confusion during licensee evaluations. Poor understanding of design requirements has also been cited as a contributing factor. In a letter dated March 11, 1997, the Director, NRR reiterated the staff s position to the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) (formerly NUMARC) that the potential for fire-induced circuit failures to impair the capability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown was within the scope of the existing fire protection regulations. The letter focused on NEI s questions regarding IN 92-18. The information included in the enclosure to the letter explains the NRC staff positions germane to the larger issue of fire-induced circuit failures. That letter is provided as an attachment to this EGM and fully explains the application of the regulations. In a followup letter of May 30, 1997, and later in a meeting of June 4, 1997, NEI informed the staff that the position held by the majority of the licensees differed from the NRC staff positions. To resolve industry s misunderstanding of the regulatory requirements, NRR intends to issue an information notice followed by a generic letter. Violations of these requirements are a significant regulatory concern and are normally categorized at Severity Level III and in certain circumstances may constitute a Severity Level II concern. Based on the apparent widespread misunderstanding of the requirements, enforcement discretion may be appropriate. Accordingly, violations of these requirements should be dispositioned as follows: Case 1. NRC inspection reveals that the condition exists at a facility, the licensee has identified and acknowledged the noncompliances and is taking appropriate compensatory and comprehensive corrective measures within a reasonable time. In these cases, the NRC will normally refrain from issuing a Notice of Violation and proposing a civil penalty consistent with Section VII.B.3 of the Enforcement Policy. Consultation with OE is required. NUREG/BR-0195, Rev. 2 A-25