US Senate Committee on Homeland Security Hearing on Preparedness and Response July 10, 2013

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Transcription:

US Senate Committee on Homeland Security Hearing on Preparedness and Response July 10, 2013 Chairman Carper, Ranking Member Colburn, distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today about the impact of the terrorist bombing at the Boston Marathon on Patriots Day, April 15, 2013. On that day at 2:50 PM, 2 bombs exploded 12 seconds and 550 feet apart near the finish line of the Boston Marathon. Two terrorists killed 3 people at the scene: 8 year old Martin Richard and 23 year old Lingzi Lu, a graduate student at Boston University in front of the Forum Restaurant; and 29 year old Krystle Campbell at the finish line. There were multiple amputations. Every ambulance and police transport vehicle available transported nearly 300 people to world-class hospitals. Within 22 minutes, the scenes were cleared and a 12 block perimeter was set. All 19 victims admitted in critical condition, survived due to exceptional medical care and the use of tourniquets. The perpetrators were identified in video footage and the photos were publicly released on Thursday night, April 19 th. The release of these photos started a rapid chain of events: The execution of MIT Police Officer Sean Collier A carjacking and pursuit that ending in Watertown that included shots fired and explosives thrown at officers

A shootout with the bombers leading to the critical injury of Officer Richard Donohue. One terrorist, Tamerlan Tsarnaev was killed, and the other Dzokhar Tsarnaev fled. A massive manhunt for Dzokhar Tsarnaev ensued in a 20 block perimter This included a city shelter-in-place that began in Watertown and extended to all of Boston, as well as house to house searches throughout Watertown. The discovery and arrest of Tsarnaev in a Watertown backyard boat. Both terrorists were captured within 102 hours from the time of the initial explosions. This success was the direct result of dedicated training, an engaged and informed public and an unprecedented level of coordination, cooperation and information sharing on the line, by 120 local, state and federal agencies. I would like to thank President Obama and his Administration, particularly the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice for the valuable assistance Boston received before, during and after this tragic event. Preparedness training provided through the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) and other federal funding set a framework for multiple jurisdictions to work with one another in a highly effective manner. These agencies, including EMS and medical personnel utilized federally funded Urban Shield training exercises and several table top exercises to collaborate in scenarios similar to those that occurred during this investigation. The importance of

this training is best illustrated in the efficiency and success of the response and subsequent investigation. These trainings and testing procedures revealed operational issues and allowed us to correct them prior to April 15 th. UASI funding also provides highly trained analysts in the Boston Regional Intelligence Center (BRIC), critical to the Department s daily decision-making, intelligence gathering, deployment and information flow, coordination and communication with law enforcement and other first responders. Boston also received important technology that would not be possible without Federal funding. Command posts, armored vehicles, robots and other safety equipment contributed to the safety of officers and success of the investigation. While all agencies, trainings, and equipment worked as seamlessly as possible on the ground, it is clear that there is a need for improvement in our communication and information sharing with federal partners. In the aftermath of the Marathon bombings, the FBI improved information sharing, but policies and practices for information and intelligence sharing must be consistent across all JTTFs. The current language of the JTTF MOU should be reviewed, including its restrictions and suggested changes to the language and practices that members of the Major Cities Chiefs Association believe need to be addressed. Chiefs want to strengthen the partnership between the Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security and the police in urban areas. For example, the Association proposes regular briefings by Federal agencies on any and

all threats to the community. These revisions are critical as we all work to prevent further violent extremist attacks in this country. We are also meeting with the Senate Intelligence Committee to examine how best to share classified threat intelligence and other matters that I cannot address in an open hearing. Another challenge that occurred immediately after the explosions was the overload to cell phone service. They were rendered completely useless as a means of communication at the scene. The capacity of the cell phone companies was overrun by the general public usage, forcing first responders to rely exclusively on radios. Based on this experience, satellite phone technology is not effective for indoor command posts and communication across multiple bodies as they do not have the capacity to effectively function. Communications assistance from the Department of Homeland Security is an example of how this Committee has made a difference. The DHS Office of Emergency Communications conducted an exercise during a previous Boston Marathon to test and train for communications interoperability. Based on lessons learned from this DHS assistance and funding for technology, our emergency radio communications system worked without incident even though all cell phones went down during the crisis. In the past the police, fire and EMS personnel would not have been able to communicate because of our different radio systems. I want to reiterate that law enforcement needs a common and secure radio bandwidth in a public safety spectrum

dedicated exclusively to public safety use, as it is the only way to communicate during an event of this magnitude. We thank Congress for approving the D Block and look forward to working with FirstNet and the Department of Commerce to implement this long overdue legislation. Boston and our partner agencies rose to the challenges we faced and in large part, were successful based on the support and assistance from the community. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss, reflect, and provide lessons learned that may assist my colleagues across the nation and the world. Thank you.