File No WORLD TRADE CENTER TASK FORCE INTERVIEW EMS LIEUTENANT ADAM BRYNES. Interview Date: October 16, Transcribed by Nancy Francis

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Transcription:

File No. 9110092 WORLD TRADE CENTER TASK FORCE INTERVIEW EMS LIEUTENANT ADAM BRYNES Interview Date: October 16, 2001 Transcribed by Nancy Francis

2 MR. RADENBERG: Today's date is October 16th, 2001. The time is 1244 hours. This is Paul Radenberg of the Fire Department of the City of New York. I am conducting an interview with Lieutenant Adam -- LIEUTENANT BRYNES: Brynes, B-r-y-n-e-s, Shield No. 0109. MR. RADENBERG: -- assigned to EMS Battalion 57 of the Fire Department, City of New York. We are conducting the interview at EMS Battalion 57 regarding the events of September 11th, 2001. A. I was assigned as conditions 572 on 9-11-01. I received a call from the Brooklyn North dispatcher to switch over to Citywide and respond to Manhattan for a report of a signal 1040. I responded over the Brooklyn Bridge, came around by City Hall, noticed an ambulance treating approximately five people. At this point Tower 1 was engulfed in flames and heavy smoke condition, and the ambulance turned out to be 10 William, Tour 2. They were treating some soft tissue injuries and some burns and some respiratory distress patients, and their location was in front of City Hall by -- what street is that? Between Park Place and Barclay Street off of Centre Street there.

3 I was trying to receive additional resources for transport of these patients to the nearest facility. I had difficulties -- I couldn't raise anyone on any of the tactical channels to have any further ambulances deployed to me. So I assisted in treating these patients with 10 William when we heard a loud explosion and noticed Tower No. 2 engulfed in flames. At that point further attempts to get in touch with Citywide or any operations officer at the MCI were unsuccessful, at which point I remember Tower 1 collapsing. I assisted 10 William in getting everybody in their ambulance and I directed them to transport to the nearest 911 facility. At that point I continued down Broadway. I reached about Dey Street. I was attempting to get to the command post to assist in this incident when I was engulfed by tremendous amounts of debris and smoke and dust, making any further travel impossible. During this time I had numerous people banging on my command car for help. I decided that, in the best interests of my personal safety, that I would egress from that location. Prior to doing so, I exited my vehicle and grabbed as many people as I could into

4 my command car and then I proceeded to turn around and I drove from the location with approximately six people in my command car that were all suffering from severe trauma. I advised the Citywide dispatcher that I needed a place to transport the personnel. The dispatcher did not know if any of the treatment areas still existed, so at that point I concluded that the nearest place I could get to was Beth Israel Hospital, and I started transporting those six individuals to the hospital. At that point I noticed another command car, a Fire command car, behind me, trying to get through the traffic, and that command car followed me up until about 14th Street and Park Avenue, at which point that command car died. I went up to the command car and found Lieutenant Monroe, who was suffering from acute stress regarding this incident, like all of us. She had about five people in her command car that were suffering from trauma and associated injuries from this event. I got back on the Citywide frequency and requested two ambulances to my location to take care of all these people, but after a few minutes I realized that the likelihood of receiving an ambulance at that

5 time was not going to be expeditious, and in an effort to provide the best care I could to these approximate eight to ten people, I decided to take Lieutenant Monroe and all of the people in her command car in my command car, where I transported everyone to Beth Israel Hospital. After getting everyone into the hospital, I land lined Citywide advising them that I had brought Lieutenant Monroe into the hospital and about eight civilians and requested further instruction. At that point I was directed to respond to -- what they had at that time was a Battery Park command center. I traveled across town from Beth Israel down to the West Side Highway. En route down the West Side Highway, I noticed a group of EMS personnel and ambulances and a Chief and I mistakenly took that to be the command center. When I approached the Chief, whose name I cannot recall at this time, he told me that he would need my assistance gathering the personnel to set up a staging area. I assisted in that for about 20 minutes, when I heard reports of a massive gas leak and there was a massive evacuation. I saw numerous people in vehicles driving north up the West Side Highway to evacuate the

6 immediate area. I was told that there was a massive gas leak and that we needed to evacuate. So we evacuated all personnel to Chelsea Piers, where a new staging area was set up. I assisted in logistics at that staging area, at which point I met up with Chief Kowalczyk, who requested that I transport him down to the command center that was established on West Street and Chambers Street at that time. I responded down to West Street and Chambers Street with Chief Kowalczyk and his aide. I was given direction at that point to become a staging officer for all extra resource personnel that were sent in, and we established a treatment command center at Stuyvesant High School auditorium, at which point, sometime later, I was directed then to become the transport officer for the operation, where I responded to, again, West Street and Chambers. I assumed transport operations for some period of time, several hours. Then I was directed to the command post, where I became the recording officer for Chief Kowalczyk and Chief McCracken, until about 2000 hours, at which point I was relieved and I retrieved my command car and responded back to Battalion 57, where I signed out at 2100 hours on

7 09-11-01. That basically is my recollection of my operations on that date and time. Q. The people that you had in your car and that Lieutenant Monroe had in her car, as far as you know, they were all civilians? A. Yes. As far as I knew, they were all civilians. I didn't see anyone in any uniform and no one at that time identified themselves as being a uniformed member of any service. Q. When you came down from Beth Israel, you said you were coming down the West Side Highway? A. Correct. Q. Do you remember how far, about how close you got to the incident when you came across the Chief and -- A. I believe that I stopped somewhere maybe 20 blocks south of Chelsea Piers. If they were named streets, I didn't see a name on them. But it was about 15 blocks south of the Chelsea Piers, about 15 blocks south of that. Q. What is Lieutenant Monroe's first name? A. Amy Monroe. Q. Do you know what battalion she's at?

8 A. She is Chief McCracken's aide. Q. Do you remember the collapse of the second tower? A. No. All I remember is that I found out about the collapse of the second tower when I got to Beth Israel Hospital. Q. So immediately after the collapses, the collapse of the second tower, you didn't actually make it down to the Trade Center complex? A. During the collapse of the second tower? Q. Yes. A. No. Q. In that period? A. No. Because I got stopped, you know, I was coming down West Side Highway and I got stopped there before I got down any further. By the time I got back to the command center with Chief Kowalczyk, No. 2 building had collapsed. There were massive fires everywhere, so we weren't allowed to go south of Chambers Street at that time. I do remember seeing the collapse of 6 World Trade Center. Was it 6 or -- I think it was 6. Did 6 drop? It was one of them, 6 or 3 or 7. I just remember watching the collapse of another building at

9 that time and that got us pretty nervous because there was, again, a big smoke-like cloud coming towards us and I just remember everyone at the command center running for cover until after that blew over. But that's the only other building I saw collapse. I think it was No. 6. I think, I'm not sure, but I think it was No. 6. Somebody told me it was No. 6 that had collapsed. That's the best I can remember it. It was without a doubt a very hectic and totally uncontrolled environment. But that's what I can recollect. Q. When you first got into Manhattan, you met up with 10 Willie? A. Correct. Q. Are they a Fire unit or voluntary? A. They're a private, voluntary unit. Q. Do you remember what hospital they're from? A. I'd like to say New York Hospital, but I can't be sure. Q. Okay. A. Tony Brooks was one of the paramedics. I remember him because I used to work with him as a medic before he left EMS. Q. From the time that you were with 10 Willie

10 until you started to transport up to Beth Israel and found that Lieutenant Monroe was behind you, did you see any other Department personnel? A. No, not that I can recall. Q. Any other thoughts or comments that you'd like to add? A. No. I'd just be interested in going over the post-mci critique about the incident. I've had some concerns regarding communication ability during something like this. I felt that something can be done in the future to allow us a better communication capability when something this big happens. I'm not saying that anything necessarily failed in this case, but I think that something could definitely be improved on to probably help our ability to perform our job. That's about it. MR. RADENBERG: Okay. The time is now 1301 hours and the interview is concluded.