SCIENCE AND SECURITY IN A POST 9/11 WORLD: A Report Based on Regional Discussions Between the Science and Security Communities Committee on a New Governmental-University Partnership for Science and Security Committee on Science, Technology, and Law Policy and Global Affairs
CONTEXT September 11, 2001 Anthrax attacks International terror threats Growing global economic competition Significant and growing concerns that responses to these have actually hurt US security and competitiveness 2
SECURITY CONCERNS 1. Porous US borders could allow terrorists to enter the country and attack US citizens posing as university students. 2. Terrorists might use US advanced technology learned at US universities against us. 3. State actors could gain access to advanced technologies of military significance at our universities. 4. Foreign countries seek to penetrate US universities for purpose of obtaining early access to technology in order to supplant US capabilities and reap the economic gains for themselves. 3
Committee Members JACQUES S. GANSLER (NAE), co-chair, chair, Vice President for Research, University of Maryland ALICE P. GAST (NAE), co-chair, chair, President, Lehigh University ARTHUR BIENENSTOCK,, Special Assistant to the President for Federal Research Policy, Stanford University LOUANN BURNETT,, Assistant Director of Environmental Health and Safety and Biosafety Officer, Vanderbilt University KAREN COOK (NAS), Professor of Sociology, Stanford University JOHN A. GORDON,, General (ret.), U.S. Air Force GARY HART,, Wirth Professor of Public Policy, University of Colorado MICHAEL J. IMPERIALE,, Professor of Microbiology and Immunology, University of Michigan RICHARD A. MERSERVE (NAE), President, Carnegie Institution of Washington JULIE T. NORRIS,, Director Emeritus, Office of Sponsored Programs, Massachusetts Institute of Technology ELIZABETH RINDSKOPF PARKER,, Dean, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific 4
Committee Members have served or are serving in the following organizations: CIA Defense Science Board Department of Defense Department of Energy Department of State National Nuclear Security Administration National Science Advisory Board on Biosecurity National Security Agency National Security Council National Regulatory Commission Senate Armed Services Committee and Intelligence Oversight Committee U.S. Air Force U.S. Commission on National Security for the 21 st Century, and White House Office of Science and Technology Policy 5
STUDY PROCESS/COMMITTEE CHARGE THREE REGIONAL MEETINGS: To bring together faculty, research administrators, government officials from research and national security agencies, and congressional members/staff To focus on: a. restrictive clauses in federal contracts and grants b. dissemination of scientific information c. sensitive but unclassified information d. management of biological agents in academic research To issue a report identifying the committee s s findings from the workshops and the committee s s recommendations 6
MEETING LOCATIONS Inaugural Meeting: Washington, DC Regional Meetings: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Georgia Institute of Technology Stanford University 7
WHO WE HEARD FROM: Current/Former Government Representatives CDC CIA Congressional Research Service Department of Commerce, Export Administration, Bureau of Industry y and Security Department of Defense Department of Homeland Security Policy Office; Science and Technology Directorate; Information Sharing and Collaboration FBI House Science Committee Los Alamos National Laboratory NIAID NIH NSF Office of National Counterintelligence Executive OSTP U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission 8
WHO WE HEARD FROM: Universities Brown University Cornell University Duke University Emory University Emory School of Medicine Georgia Tech Harvard University Harvard University Medical Center MIT Stanford University UC-Berkeley UCLA UC-System University of Georgia University of Maryland University of Michigan University of Pittsburgh University of Washington 9
WHO WE HEARD FROM: Organizations Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld American Association for the Advancement of Science American Association of University Professors American Society for Microbiology Arnold & Porter Association of American Universities Bancroft & Associates Booz Allen Hamilton Center for Security Policy Consortium of Social Science Associations Council of Graduate Schools and Teaching 10
WHAT WE HEARD: THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN NATIONAL SECURITY US leadership in science and technology leadership gained in significant part through interchange of ideas within the international community (both here and abroad) is central to achieving national security in the economic and defense context of the 21 st century. 11
WHAT WE HEARD: THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN NATIONAL SECURITY US political leaders must understand and help all Americans understand, that US has no exclusive ownership of ideas or knowledge and that scientific discoveries and technological advances made in US often rely on knowledge created outside our borders and/or by non-us citizens at our universities and companies. 12
WHAT WE HEARD: THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN NATIONAL SECURITY Although prudence requires close stewardship of most harmful and dangerous products of human ingenuity, unnecessarily closing ourselves off from the world will only isolate us from an increasingly integrated and competitive global community; and harm both our security and economic competitiveness. 13
WHAT WE HEARD: THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN NATIONAL SECURITY The unknowable nature of when, where, and what the next threat will be requires reliance on a broad-based based talent pool as well as on fundamental, long-term, collaborative research programs. Important advances made as a result of long-term basic research are critical to maintaining economic competitiveness and to meeting challenges of future technological threats and human health concerns. 14
WHAT WE HEARD: RESEARCH POLICY The basic policy of the nation was stated by President Reagan in NSDD-189, and reaffirmed by NSC Director Rice, as Basic Research is to be open (regarding publications, foreign participation, etc.) This is not being implemented by either the Federal Government (via SBU, Deemed Export Control interpretations, publication restrictions, foreign meeting attendances, foreign student and scholar restrictions, etc.) nor by industry in subcontracts to universities. 15
THE COMMITTEE S S VIEW Security concerns cannot be dismissed or disregarded. Nonetheless, we must strive to keep US universities open welcoming students and scholars from around the world while while limiting access when warranted and placing appropriate restrictions on narrow and well-defined high-risk areas. 16