ASG SPEECH TO DIPLOMATIC ACADEMY THE CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE OF NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS

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ASG SPEECH TO DIPLOMATIC ACADEMY THE CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE OF NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a privilege to be in Moscow and I am grateful to Professor Bazhanov for hosting me today in this important institution. I welcome the opportunity to be able to discuss with you the vast potential for NATO-Russia cooperation, and to offer NATO s perspective on some of the key issues in our relations today. Among NATO s partners, Russia holds a special place. It is the only nation, with which NATO sits on an equal basis in the NRC, and the only nation, with which we aspire to build a strategic partnership, as we have stated in NATO s Strategic Concept. This is because, 1

together, NATO and Russia bear a joint responsibility for the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area. Our security is intertwined through our common geographic space, but also our shared histories and cultures. We also face common security threats and challenges. By combining our efforts, we can more efficiently combat these threats. The results of our efforts on security are testament to this. This means that any uncertainty, mistrust or tensions between us have a negative effect on our common security environment. So the partnership between us is a serious business. It s for all these good reasons that more than 15 years ago, we took the decision to cooperate, and laid down in a political declaration at the highest level that NATO and Russia do not consider each other as adversaries. 2

It s also why over ten years ago we created the NATO-Russia Council, which remains a unique framework for joint discussions and decisions between NATO and Russia. And why, three years ago in Lisbon, we agreed to build a strategic partnership and bring our relations to a new level. We are already doing a lot together. We have a dynamic political dialogue where we address on a regular basis a range of key security issues. We do not shy away from the areas in which NATO and Russia continue to have different views. Sharing our concerns and being open about our own motivations increases mutual understanding and helps to bring our positions closer together. Most recently, we have addressed a number of important topics ranging from events in the Middle East and in particular Syria, to the situation in North Korea, to the potential for 3

cooperation on missile defence. Afghanistan has also remained a key focus for our dialogue in the Council. These discussions take place very regularly and at high level. Ambassadors meet on a monthly basis. Defence Minister Shoygu was just in Brussels at the end of October, to attend an NRC Defence Ministerial for the first time in his current capacity. Foreign Minister Lavrov will again be in Brussels early December. This dialogue is also strengthened by frequent meetings of military representatives and more than 15 sub-committees and working groups with all 29 member nations of the NATO-Russia Council. Our track record on practical cooperation is impressive. Today, as a result of these efforts, we are at an all time high in terms of the breadth and depth of our joint activities against common security challenges. 4

Our joint work on Afghanistan is the most substantive area of NRC cooperation. Together we are working to improve regional capacity against the threat of narcotics trafficking. A threat that all NRC nations continue to face. Since 2006, the NRC Counter Narcotics Training Project has been training counter narcotics officers from across Afghanistan and Central Asia. Working together with the United Nations Office against Drugs and Crime, this NRC Project has now trained over 3000 counter narcotics officers. With the NRC Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund, together we are supporting the Afghan Air Force s helicopter fleet of Russian-made Mi- 17 and Mi-35 helicopters. This NRC Trust Fund provides helicopter maintenance training to Afghan technicians in Russia, and has begun delivering helicopter spare parts that have been identified as vital needs for the Afghan Air Force. As we speak, the latest group of technicians is currently undergoing training in 5

Novosibirsk. The second phase of the Project NRC will see more training for technicians as well as support for the medical evacuation capability of the Afghan National Army. Since 2008 Russia has also provided transit arrangements for ISAF, which has been fundamental in assisting with the much needed supplies for troops in Afghanistan. This assistance is even more important in view of NATO s plans for redeployment. Beyond 2014 and the end of the ISAF mission, we re keen to explore more ways in which we can work together towards greater security in Afghanistan. We are looking at possible cooperation in training Afghan security forces on countering-improvised Explosive Devices and de-mining. We are also working together to counter the threats posed by terrorism. In many ways the need to combine efforts in the fights against 6

terrorism was a key factor in the NRC s creation in 2002. In the wake of the horrific events of 9/11 we all recognised a common threat and the need to work together against it. And as we have tragically seen through events in London, Madrid, Moscow and most recently Volgograd terrorism remains a severe threat to us all. But our efforts over the last 10 years have borne fruit. This September, NRC nations tested our Cooperative Airspace Initiative an NRC capability we have built together to detect and respond to the threat of air terrorism. Air traffic controllers in Moscow, Warsaw, Ankara and Oslo worked together to detect a hijacked aircraft. Then fighter jets from Russia and Poland in one scenario, and from Russia and Turkey in the next scenario, were scrambled to respond to this situation, and worked together to escort the aircraft to safety. Our military cooperation has also stepped up. In the Gulf of Aden, NATO ships involved in NATO 7

Operation Ocean Shield and the Russian navy are working together against the threat of piracy to international shipping. They meet at sea, they share situational data about the activities of pirates, and they conduct joint exercises to improve their ability to work together. All these examples show that our cooperation makes sense; politically, practically and militarily. However, our relationship continues to face challenges. We have some fundamental disagreements, which stand in the way of our ability to do work together on some of the most serious security challenges we face. The question of how to go forwards on missile defence is a case in point. The proliferation of ballistic missile technology and weapons of mass destruction is a real and growing threat to NATO countries, Russia and globally. We 8

don t have disagreements with Russia on this basic threat assessment to our security. Where we disagree is how to cooperate together in the most efficient possible way. In moving forward with its own defence plans, NATO is often accused of ignoring Russia s concerns. However, let me emphasise that our offer for ambitious missile defence cooperation with Russia is unique among NATO s partnerships. It was made in parallel with the decision to defelop our own system this is significant. It means we saw our own system developed in close partnership with Russia. NATO has also made some concrete proposals on how missile defence cooperation may look like. First, we proposed to establish two joint missile defence centres: a NATO-Russia Missile Data Fusion Centre and a NATO-Russia Planning Operations Centre. We believe that by working side-by-side with us Russia will gain the insights it needs to alleviate its concerns 9

about NATO s missile defence intentions and capabilities. Second, we also proposed to develop jointly a transparency regime, based on a regular exchange of information about our respective missile defence capabilities. This would provide the predictability both NATO and Russia seek in the field of strategic stability, as well as the system parameters Russia is interested in. Such co-operation would not only provide the assurances Russia needs about NATO s intentions. It would also bolster both our missile defense systems by increasing mutual security through a flow of information and confidence through transparency. Yet, NATO s offers remained unanswered, and this discussion has moved to the public domain, and away from the experts. Instead, the opposite should be the case. The experts 10

should work out the physics without pressure and instrumentalization in the media. Generally, despite all the good co-operation we have, there continues to be a lack of trust between us, even though it is long after the end of the Cold War. This is often evident even in the joint activities which allow for constant interaction among us. The main question for the future of our relationship is: How can we move beyond this mistrust? Clearly, trust is not something you can develop overnight. Nor does it materialize on its own. It is only through concrete actions and the political will to take a step forward, that we can try to build a more trusting foundation for our relations. At NATO, we see openness and transparency, particularly in military matters, as one of the main enablers towards greater trust. Greater transparency with regard to our military 11

exercises, deployments close to our borders, including non-strategic nuclear weapons, as well as well more generally, with regard to our military strategy and doctrines. NATO and Russia both conducted exercises this fall. Military exercises are a normal practice for us all. But they can easily lead to misperceptions and misunderstanding. For example - I have seen how the Russian press has characterized NATO s STEADFAST JAZZ Exercise as NATO practicing an Article 5 scenario against Russia. This is just not the case. This exercise was based on a fictitious scenario and was deliberately designed to test our forces across the full range of their potential tasks. It is the 18 th time it is held, and is not aimed at any country. But do you believe us when we say this? This is why transparency is key. This is why we briefed Russia in advance, and have invited Russian 12

observers. To avoid any misinterpretations or misperceptions. We appreciated that Russia responded to this by providing a briefing on ZAPAD before it took place, and also invited NATO military staff to observe a tactical event during the exercise itself. This was a positive first step forward, but more can and should be done. Ladies and gentlemen. NATO s special partnership with Russia is rooted in our core belief that only by working together can we build a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro- Atlantic area. Let me stress - at NATO we want to build security with Russia. Not against Russia, and not on Russia s borders. We want NATO and Russia to be strategic partners who can genuinely work together without barriers against the myriad of threats that we face in today s complex security environment. 13

Much has been done over the last 16 years. There is a lot more to do. There is no magic solution to our outstanding problems. And let s be frank, what has been and will remain key is the political will to move forward with this relationship. I do not think there is any alternative to it. 14