Presenter: David J. Trachtenberg, Deputy Undersecretary Of Defense, Policy February 16, 2018 Remarks by Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy David J. Trachtenberg on the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, National Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington TRACHTENBERG: Good morning. It's -- it's a pleasure be here at National Defense University. I'd like to thank President Roegge and the entire NDU team for the invitation to come speak to you today, along with General Hyten, about the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. In thinking about how to structure my remarks, I was reminded of the old story about the gentleman who considered himself to be an expert in -- in a certain subject matter, and he was told that he would be a luncheon speaker, and he would be able to speak for 15 minutes. And he got very incredulous, and -- and upset and angry. And -- and -- and thinking that he was the world's preeminent expert on the topic, he said to his host, "Fifteen minutes. How do you expect me to tell this audience everything I know about this topic in 15 minutes?" To which his host responded, "Well, sir, I advise you to speak slowly." (Laughter.) With that in mind, I will try to speak slowly. Let me begin by noting that President Trump's first national security presidential memorandum, which was issued one week into the new administration, directed the Department of Defense to undertake the fourth review of U.S. nuclear policy, posture and programs since the end of the Cold War. The Department of Defense, with significant input from Strategic Command, conducted this review, along with the Departments of State and Energy, in consultation with allies and experts from inside and outside the government. The resulting 2018 Nuclear Posture Review is consistent with prior reviews in its definition of U.S. nuclear roles, policy and deterrence strategy. In fact, many -- in many respects, the review reaffirms long-standing bipartisan principles of U.S. nuclear policy, while at the same time recognizing the reality that a much more challenging nuclear threat environment has emerged since the previous 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. Now, eight years ago, the 2010 NPR made several assumptions about the nature of the strategic environment that served as a foundation for its vision of achieving the global elimination of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, none of those assumptions proved out. For example, first, the 2010 NPR argued that U.S. relations with Russia and China had changed fundamentally since the days of the Cold War, and it assumed that the prospects for military confrontation had declined dramatically. Second, it asserted that engagement could result in greater Russian and Chinese restraint in their nuclear programs and postures, which would reassure and stabilize their regions.
Third, it stated that if the United States reduced the role and numbers of U.S. nuclear weapons, that the rest of the world would move in the same direction, reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in international affairs. And fourth, it held that while the reassurance mission of U.S. nuclear weapons remained, the deterrence challenge was fundamentally different. A nuclear arsenal built for stable deterrence of other nuclear powers had, in the 2010 NPR's words, "little relevance to the challenge of preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism." The world is, in many respects, much different today than it was then. What we have seen over the past decade is the return of great power competition; not necessarily a return to the Cold War, but the emergence of a new, complex and threatening security environment. In 2010, Russia altered its military doctrine to state that NATO was its top threat, a position it reiterated in 2014. That same year, Russia invaded Ukraine, supported a bloody secessionist civil war, and used military force to attempt to change long-established borders in Europe. Rather than reducing the salience of nuclear weapons, Russian leadership made explicit nuclear threats, brandishing their nuclear weapons in a way we had not seen in a generation. Like Russia, China is attempting territorial revisionism against its neighbors through the threat of the use of force. In 2011, China began its creeping militarization of the islands in the South China Sea. China has also threatened U.S. allies and partners in the region in disputes over territorial boundaries and claims to contested island territory. At the same time, rogue states like North Korea have repeatedly made explicit nuclear threats to the United States and our allies in the region. North Korea is working aggressively to hold our homeland at risk. And while Iran's nuclear future remains uncertain, its malign activities and hegemonic aspirations in the Middle East are not. Further, it is clear that our attempts to lead by example in reducing the numbers and salience of nuclear weapons in the world have not been reciprocated. Since the 2010 NPR, Russia, China and North Korea have increased the numbers, capabilities and salience of their nuclear weapons, a topic which I suspect General Hyten may discuss in greater detail. The international restraint reflected in U.S. nuclear policies did not result in the rest of the world following the same path. This is not a unique conclusion of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, but it is shared by our allies, with whom we consulted extensively during this review, and by senior figures in -- in the previous administration. In contrast to the actions of potential adversaries, the United States has built no new types of nuclear weapons or delivery systems, other than the F-35, for the past two decades. In fact, the numbers of nuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal has declined by more than 85 percent since it -- since its Cold War height. We have, instead, sustained our nuclear deterrent with life-extension programs, keeping systems and platforms literally decades beyond their designed service life. Former Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter rightly observed that
if there is an arms race underway, the United States is clearly not a participant. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review prioritized to -- preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism over the goal of deterring other nuclear part -- other nuclear powers. However, in this increasingly challenging threat environment, some potential adversaries may now have the mistaken belief that limited nuclear-first-use threats or escalation could provide them with a military or political advantage. The 2018 NPR responds not by changing long-standing tenets of nuclear policy that have bipartisan support, but by emphasizing those capabilities needed to correct adversary miscalculations and thereby effectively deter the use of nuclear weapons. In this regard, I'd like to address three of the corresponding outcomes of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review: the reprioritization of nuclear roles, the clarification of our nuclear policy, and the recommendations for deterrence capabilities, each of which has been subject to considerable mischaracterization in much of the public commentary today. First, the 2018 NPR returns deterrence of nuclear attack against us, our allies and partners to the top priority of U.S. nuclear policy. Now, given the changes in the security environment, this, we believe, is a prudent, realistic and necessary change. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review makes clear that our nuclear posture must contribute to the goals of deterring nuclear and nonnuclear strategic attack, assuring U.S. allies and partners, achieving our objectives should deterrence fail, and hedging against the risks of an uncertain future. The NPR also emphasizes that U.S. nuclear policy will contribute -- will continue to contribute to U.S. nuclear non-proliferation goals by maintaining support for the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and by sustaining the extended deterrent for allies. Extended deterrence, the so-called nuclear umbrella, promotes non-proliferation by reducing the need or incentive for allies to acquire or obtain their own nuclear arsenals. Second, to strengthen deterrence, the 2018 NPR notes that the United States will only consider the use of nuclear weapons in response to extreme circumstances that threaten our vital interests. The NPR clarifies what nonnuclear scenarios might fall into this category, while maintaining a measure, a prudent measure, of strategic ambiguity intended to bolster deterrence. Contrary to some commentary, the Nuclear Posture Review does not go beyond the 2010 NPR in expanding the traditional role of nuclear weapons. What is important is not the means of attack that a potential adversary chooses. It is the extreme circumstances and strategic effect of the attack that will govern our choice of responses. As adversary non-nuclear capabilities continue to advance, U.S. policy must make it clear that non-nuclear strategic attacks that would have catastrophic effects on the American people and our allies must also be deterred.
This clarification is not only consistent with the 2010 NPR, which acknowledged a role for nuclear weapons in deterring select non-nuclear attacks, but is broadly consistent with the policy of every administration from President Truman forward. The intent is to enhance deterrence by reducing the potential for adversary miscalculation. Third, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review recommends two nuclear programs to strengthen U.S. capabilities to deter attack and assure allies. First is the modification of a small number of existing submarine-launched ballistic missiles to include a low-yield option. Second is the pursuit of a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile. Now, General Hyten may address -- may discuss these in greater detail, but the point I'd like to emphasize here is that neither of these capabilities outlined in the 2018 NPR is new or lowers the threshold for nuclear use, which remains extremely high. These specific capabilities are recommended to strengthen the deterrence of war and the assurance of allies, thereby helping to ensure that nuclear weapons are not employed or proliferated. Effective deterrence is about tailoring our capabilities to a potential adversary's calculations regarding the use of nuclear force to ensure that it never can appear to be a useful option. We must assess our capabilities relative to the doctrine, exercises, statements, threats and behavior of potential adversaries. The capabilities recommended by the 2018 NPR are tailored to raise the threshold for nuclear use and to do so with minimal changes to U.S. nuclear posture. Let me be clear here: The goal of our recommendations is to deter war, not to fight one. If nuclear weapons are employed in conflict it is because deterrence failed. And the goal of the 2018 NPR is to make sure that deterrence will not fail. Modernization of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, adoption of tailored deterrence strategies with flexible capabilities, and clarification of the roles of nuclear weapons all send a strong deterrence message to potential adversaries, while also reassuring our allies. Finally, the 2018 NPR helps ensure that our diplomats speak from a position of strength. Russia has little incentive to negotiate seriously about nuclear reductions without a robust and ongoing U.S. modernization program. In fact, the 2018 NPR calls for the modernization of all three legs of our strategic nuclear triad. Russian leaders have essentially said as much, that they have little incentive to negotiate seriously about further nuclear reductions. As Secretary Mattis recently testified, Russia is unlikely to give up something to gain nothing. Critics who favor eliminating U.S. nuclear systems in the face of what is clearly an expansive Russian nuclear modernization effort I believe are undermining America's greatest bargaining leverage and the prospects for future arms agreements. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review is one of several important reinforcing U.S. national security documents meant to guide U.S. policy in an increasingly complex and challenging world. Much as we might prefer otherwise, nuclear weapons are a regrettable necessity in the real world, as Colin Gray has said.
After the slaughter of two world wars, they have prevented large-scale great power conflict for more than seven decades. This is not a trivial outcome. In an era of renewed great power competition, adversaries, allies and the American people should know that the United States has the will and the flexible resilient nuclear forces needed to protect the peace. Before turning things back over to my host, I'd like to thank those here today at the National Defense University for the opportunity briefly to present the department's work and engage in an informed discussion on these issues which I believe are absolutely vital to our nation's security. Thank you all for your attention. I appreciate it. (APPLAUSE) -END-