PRISON LAW OFFICE General Delivery, San Quentin CA Telephone (510) Fax (510)

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PRISON LAW OFFICE General Delivery, San Quentin CA. 94964 Telephone (510) 280-2621 Fax (510) 280-2704 www.prisonlaw.com Ms Terry McDonald Mr. Richard Subia Mr. George Giurbino California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 1515 S Street Sacramento, CA Director: Donald Specter Managing Attorney: Sara Norman Staff Attorneys: Rana Anabtawi Rebekah Evenson Steven Fama Penny Godbold Megan Hagler Alison Hardy Corene Kendrick Kelly Knapp Millard Murphy Lynn Wu via email Re: CDCR STG Prevention, Identification and Management Strategy 3/01 version 5.5 Dear Terri, Rich and George: Thank you for discussing this new policy with us and for providing us with an opportunity to comment on the draft STG policy. We appreciate the difficult task that you face in balancing the security and safety of prisoners and staff with the need for accurate and reliable classification decisions and humane prison conditions. We do not believe that the current policy fully serves these important interests and therefore we appreciate the fact that the Department has decided to revise certain aspects of the way it identifies and treats prisoners who are found to be members of a gang or security threat group. The new policy benefits from two main revisions. The proposed revisions make the gang identification process somewhat more objective by assigning points to the different types of information used in the validation process. Although we have some concerns about the details, which we explain below, we applaud the general approach. The new policy also provides a mechanism for prisoners who are validated as gang members and associates to get out of SHU without having to debrief, and it shortens by two years the amount of time it takes to be released from SHU with conforming conduct. We believe that the policy could be greatly improved and the Department s interests enhanced by further revisions to the policy. The policy is almost silent on what we believe is the most important subject reducing the number of prisoners who take active roles in the gangs while in prison. The policy should provide specific direction on gang prevention efforts that the Department is going to undertake. We believe any such strategy will only be effective if there are constructive and safe alternatives to gang Board of Directors Penelope Cooper, President Michele WalkinHawk, Vice President Marshall Krause, Treasurer Felecia Gaston Christiane Hipps Margaret Johns Cesar Lagleva Laura Magnani Michael Marcum Ruth Morgan Dennis Roberts

Page 2 involvement in the general population. Without such alternatives, the forces that create the gang problem that now plague the Department will continue, and prisoners assigned to SHU based on gang affiliation will have less incentive to participate in the step-down program. Another major concern is that the validation and classification processes still rely too heavily on association rather than behavior. Although this revision is an improvement over the current policy, prisoners can still be validated and housed in SHU without having been found to have committed any misconduct. Since SHU is the most restrictive housing within the CDCR and should be reserved for those who are the most dangerous, it makes little sense to house prisoners in SHU if there is no objective evidence that they have committed any serious violence, including organizing or conspiring to commit violence. Our last major concern is that although well-intentioned and an improvement over the current practice, the step-down process has several flaws. First, it is too long. Prison staff do not need four years of observation to determine whether a prisoner can safely be released to the general population, especially if he is participating in a program. We believe 18 months is sufficient. Second, the policy relies solely on conforming behavior to determine whether the prisoner can be released from SHU. Instead, the policy should require prisoners to make a clear commitment to both change their behavior and participate in jobs and programs designed to promote successful reintegration into the general population. If the prisoner refuses he remains in SHU until prison staff believes he can be released. If he elects to and does participate then he should be provided with assistance through programs and with meaningful incentives that approach the general population privileges by the end of the step down process. Because the process is shorter a classification review should be held every 60 days instead of every six months. Third, positive behavior and participation should be richly rewarded. The incentives in the policy are hardly noticeable until the end of the process. Prisoners who complete each step should have more canteen, monthly phone calls, exercise, photographs and property at each successive step. In addition to the general concerns outlined above, we describe below additional areas where we believe the policy could be improved. 1. STG designation should be restricted to violent groups. No group should be considered an STG absent a documented history of violence or serious illegal acts. Therefore, delete the criteria on page 14 that states Absent a documented history of violence a group that is a potential threat[] to institutional security can be considered an STG. Broadening the STG definition to include political or religious groups weakens the effort to contain gang violence.

Page 3 2. Prisoners should only be validated as STG members if there is reliable evidence that they engaged in violent gang behavior. a) No prisoner should be validated based solely on information that they associate with gang members. Only prisoners for whom there is reliable evidence that they engaged in violent behavior in concert with a gang or conspired, aided etc. such behavior should be eligible for validation. b) There should be a process for an independent evaluation of the information used to validate a prisoner as a gang member, including a substantive review of the information relied upon, and an independent evaluation of whether such information has sufficient indicia of reliability. This is essential given the lasting import of the initial IGI determination, the potential for serious error, and the current lack of any ability to get a substantive review of a validation once the validation is finalized. See, e.g., Lira v. Cate, N.D.Cal. No. 00-0905 (Sept. 30, 2009). c) The association (p.22) and staff information (p. 21) source items for identifying gang members are far too vague. The policy should make clear that these source items do not include such associational acts as using the same table/telephone/exercise equipment as gang members. Similarly, the self admission category (p. 23), should not include statements that prisoners make in connection with who they may house with (i.e., I can house with whites ). Given the current segregation in CDCR prisons, using this kind of information as indicia for identifying suspects, associates or members of gangs would cast far too broad a net. d) It is unclear how some source items show gang membership/ how the point system relates to reliability of evidence. E.g., the other agencies category does not describe what type of information might be provided by such other agencies, yet nonetheless this category is assigned 4 points. The same is true for the vague categories of visitors, staff information, and association. e) The source item entitled offenses (p. 23) is defined so broadly as to encompass acts that do not have a gang nexus. (e.g., dispute between individuals where one is a non-validated affiliate of an STG.) 3. STG certification and gang validation should be based on current dangerous behavior, not stale evidence. The criteria for categorizing a group as a Security Threat Group (p. 13-14) should include a requirement that the information be current. We believe two years is reasonable.

Page 4 The source items used to validate a person as a gang member or associate (p. 19-24) should also be current. Using stale evidence would not serve the purpose of reducing gang activity and violence, and might result in validation of prisoners who have themselves already disassociated with their former gangs. The policy appropriately provides that STG-I associates may not be placed in the SHU for acts that are more than 48 months old. 4. The gang suspect category must be eliminated. The gang suspect category (p. 18) is inappropriate and overly broad, and must not be used, as contemplated, for decisions that impact the institution s daily program needs. First, it will cast too far wide a net, since anyone who has a conversation with a gang member (see p. 23), or wears the wrong clothes (p. 19) can be considered a suspect. Second, making decisions, such as, e.g., imposing modified programs, on persons in the suspect category would violate their constitutional rights. 5. The Policy Provides Too Few Alternatives to Gang Involvement. The gang prevention section is weak and suggests insufficient attention has been given to this key topic. The intertwined issues of prison gangs and violence will not be solved by giving prisoners videos and paperwork. CDCR should promote policies and practices that reduce the power and influence of gangs. For example, the Department should examine whether steps could be taken to address: a) the current practice of inmate groups screening new prisoners by not allowing certain central file documents into housing units; b) racial segregation by creating new opportunities for activities but requiring that the activities be integrated, such as was done at Pelican Bay; c) generally providing better protection for prisoners who choose not to house/associate with gangs but do not want to go to an SNY yard. 6. Prisoners who have not recently committed or conspired to commit violent acts should not be sent to the SHU. SHU housing should not be used for any prisoner who has not recently committed serious violent acts, or conspired with a gang to do so.

Page 5 The division between STG-I and STG-II appears to be just a renaming of gangs and disruptive groups. (p. 36) It is unclear what purpose this serves, except with respect to criteria for placement in the SHU. Under the draft policy, any prisoner who is a validated member of an STG-I will automatically be placed in the SHU, even if he has not engaged in any violent acts. (p. 36). An associate of an STG-I can be sent to the SHU if he has been involved in serious disciplinary behavior and/or displaying gang behaviors (p.36), and a STG-II offender can be placed in the SHU for engaging in repetitive gang behavior (STG-II, p. 36). Any of these policies could be used to send someone to the SHU for associating with gang members, even if the prisoner did not engage in any violent acts. Instead of making a distinction between types of STGs, and different types of members of STGs, CDCR should change the rules governing who can be sent to the SHU, so that only validated prisoners who have recently engaged in violent gang behavior can go to the SHU. 7. Miscellaneous concerns a) Arrest and crime reports are not reliable sources of information about gang membership. (see p. 24). Inclusion of information about potential gang involvement in police reports should not earn seven points toward gang validation. Seven points should only be awarded for testimony in court transcripts or probation reports. b) Confirmed criminal gang behavior (p.7) states that information is confirmed if it is referred to the [IGI[ for confirmation. Information merely referred for confirmation should not be considered confirmed. c) Cut the first sentence of the definition of Criminal gang behavior (p.7). Criminal gang behavior should be limited to acts that lead to and includes the commission of an unlawful act or violation of policy demonstrating a nexus to a criminal gang. Any behavior that does not meet that definition should not be included. d) The monitored status appears to be indefinite (see p. 18). It should be timelimited, so that a prisoner may at some point fully disassociate himself, and be considered clear of suspicion of gang involvement. e) We understand that the debriefing process (p. 37) was not the focus of this policy change. However, we recommend that appropriate time limits be applied to the debriefing process, so that it does not become too lengthy, and that privileges be provided to prisoners during debriefing along the lines of the step-down process.

Page 6 Thank you for considering these suggestions. We would appreciate the opportunity to discuss them with you in the near future. Sincerely, /s/ Donald Specter /s/ Rebekah Evenson cc: Katherine Tebrock (by email)