World nuclear forces, 2014: key country overviews 1

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World nuclear forces, 2014: key country overviews 1 Summary The data released today by SIPRI shows that while the overall number of nuclear weapons in the world continues to decline, none of the nuclear weapon-possessing states are prepared to give up their nuclear arsenals for the foreseeable future. At the start of 2014 nine states the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea possessed approximately 4000 operational nuclear weapons. If all nuclear warheads are counted, these states together possessed a total of approximately 16 300 nuclear weapons (see figures 1 and 4) compared to 17 270 in early 2013. Overall inventories are declining (see figures 2 and 3), primarily due to the United States and Russia continuing the drawdown of their nuclear arsenals as a result of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START) and unilateral reductions. But the pace of reductions appears to be slowing compared with a decade ago. At the same time, all the nuclear-armed states are modernizing their remaining nuclear forces and appear determined to retain sizeable nuclear arsenals for the foreseeable future. The USA and Russia continue to reduce their arsenals but at a slower pace than a decade ago and have extensive modernization programs underway for their remaining nuclear delivery systems, warheads, and production facilities. The nuclear arsenals of the other smaller nuclear-armed states are considerably smaller, but all are either developing or deploying new weapons or have announced their intention to do so. Reliable information on the status of the nuclear arsenals and capabilities of the nuclear-armed states varies considerably. The USA has disclosed substantial information about its stockpile and forces, and the UK and France have also declared some information. Russia refuses to disclose the detailed breakdown of its forces counted under the New START treaty (even though it shares the information with the USA), and the US Government has stopped releasing detailed information about Russian and Chinese nuclear forces. China, India and Pakistan are the only nuclear weapon states that are expanding their nuclear arsenals, while Israel appears to be waiting to see how the situation in Iran develops. There is an emerging consensus in the expert community that North Korea has produced a small number of nuclear weapons, as distinct from rudimentary nuclear explosive devices. 1 This material is based on the data and analysis that will be published in SIPRI Yearbook 2014 (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2014). 1

Figure 1: World nuclear forces, 2014 2

The United States As of January 2014 the USA maintained an estimated arsenal of approximately 2100 deployed nuclear warheads, consisting of roughly 1920 strategic and 184 non-strategic warheads. In addition to this deployed arsenal, about 2660 warheads were held in reserve and another 2550 warheads were awaiting dismantlement, for a total US stockpile of roughly 7300 warheads. The USA continues to reduce its strategic nuclear forces pursuant to New START, although the total reductions made since the treaty entered into force in February 2011 have been modest. So far the USA has implemented the treaty mainly by reducing socalled phantom weapons launchers that are no longer assigned nuclear weapons but still accountable under the treaty because they still carry nuclear-related equipment. Over the next decade, the USA plans to spend up to $350 billion on modernizing and maintaining its nuclear forces. This includes designing a new class of missile submarines to replace existing Ohio Class Trident submarines beginning in 2031; studying options for a next-generation land-based intercontinental ballistic missile to replace the current Minuteman III force; and procuring a new Long-Range Strike Bomber to begin replace existing bombers from the mid-2020s. In addition, over the next two decades the USA will complete the full-scale production of an improved nuclear warhead for Trident II D5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles and begin modernization work on two others, while building new nuclear weapons production and simulation facilities. In June 2013 the US Department of Defense published a new presidential nuclear weapons employment strategy guidance, known as Presidential Policy Directive 24 (PPD-24), that set out broad directions for how the military should plan for the potential use of nuclear weapons in the 21st century. The guidance contained some modest steps to reduce the numbers and role of nuclear weapons. At the same time, it retained core principles that guided US nuclear planning during the cold war and reaffirmed the current structure and alert posture of US strategic forces. Figure 2: Nuclear forces of the 5 legally recognized nuclear-weapon states, 1970 2014 3

Russia Russia maintains a nuclear weapons stockpile of an estimated 4300 warheads. Approximately 1600 of these warheads are deployed on long-range land- and seabased ballistic missiles and at heavy bomber bases. Roughly 2000 warheads for nonstrategic weapon systems are in central storage. An estimated additional 3500 retired warheads are awaiting dismantlement, giving a total inventory of approximately 8000 warheads. Russia is in the middle of a broad upgrade of its strategic nuclear forces that over the next decade will retire all Soviet-era inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The old missiles are being replaced on a less-than-one-for-one basis by five different mobile- and land-based versions of the SS-27. Initially a single-warhead ICBM, the SS- 27s introduced over the next decade will all be carrying multiple warheads. A new heavy ICBM with multiple warheads is also in development with expected deployment around 2020. Russia is building a new class of ballistic missile submarines to replace the Soviet-era submarines. The new Borey-class submarines each carry 16 Bulava (SS-N-32) sealaunched ballistic missiles with multiple warheads. The Bulava is still in development following several unsuccessful test launches. Until the Borey class can take over, the remaining Delta IV submarines will be maintained in order to serve as the sea-based deterrent. The Tu-95 Bear and Tu-160 Blackjack heavy bombers are undergoing modernization to serve as the air-based leg of the Russian triad of strategic forces until the new PAK- DA long-range bomber becomes operational from the mid-2020s. Russia s large arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons is getting old, but part of it is being modernized. The Su-24 Fencer fighter-bomber is being replaced by the Su-34 Fullback, while the SS-21 short-range ballistic missile will be replaced by the SS-26 Iskander missile. A new nuclear-powered attack submarine (Yasen) is about to enter service with a new long-range sea-launched cruise missile. China China maintains an estimated total stockpile of about 250 nuclear warheads. It is widely believed that in peacetime China stores its nuclear warheads in storage facilities separate from their delivery vehicles and that they are not ready for immediate launch. Of its planned triad of land, air and maritime nuclear forces, only the land-based ballistic missiles and nuclear-configured aircraft are currently considered operational. Approximately 190 of the total stockpile of 250 warheads are assigned to these forces. China continues to modernize and moderately expand its nuclear arsenal by replacing ageing silo-based missiles with newer road-mobile delivery vehicles, aimed at developing a more survivable force and strengthening its nuclear retaliatory capabilities. China s sea-based nuclear deterrent appears to be near operational capability. Three of 4

its Type 094 (Jin class) SSNBs appear to be in operational service, with a possible fourth boat under construction. The associated missile system, the JL-2, also appears to have overcome technical difficulties and is believed to become operational within the next two years. China is also expanding its conventional ballistic missile programme and has deployed dual-capable medium and short-range ballistic missiles. Mixing conventional and nuclear missiles poses a critical risk of mistaken escalation of a conflict, as an adversary would not be able to determine whether the missile fired is armed with a conventional or nuclear warhead. Figure 3: The total warhead holdings of all nuclear weapon-possessing states (the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan and Israel), 2010 14 5

India India is estimated to have an arsenal of 90 110 nuclear weapons. This figure is based on calculations of India s inventory of weapon-grade plutonium as well as the number of its operational nuclear-capable delivery systems. India s nuclear weapons programme is based primarily on plutonium. It plans to build six fast breeder reactors, which will significantly increase its capacity to produce plutonium for weapons. A prototype fast breeder reactor is nearing completion at the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research and is expected to achieve first criticality by the end of 2014. India is also currently expanding its uranium enrichment capabilities. A new unsafeguarded gas centrifuge facility appears to be under construction at the Rare Metals Plant near Mysore. India s expanded centrifuge enrichment capacity has been motivated by plans to build new naval propulsion reactors, but the potential excess capacity could also signify its intent to move towards thermonuclear weapons by blending the current plutonium arsenal with uranium secondaries. India s nuclear doctrine is based on the principle of a minimum credible deterrent and no-first-use of nuclear weapons. There has been no official statement specifying the size of the arsenal required for a minimum credible deterrent but according to the Indian Ministry of Defence it involves a mix of land-based, maritime and air capabilities (a triad ). In 2013 India continued work on several new types of advanced nuclear-capable ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. This included a test-launch of a submarinelaunched missile that will be deployed on India s first indigenously built nuclearpowered submarine, INS Arihant. In 2013 India also conducted a second successful test-launch of a new road-mobile missile, the Agni V, which will reportedly have a near-intercontinental range ballistic missile and be capable of reaching targets throughout China. The missile is expected to be inducted into service in 2015. Pakistan Pakistan is estimated to possess about 100 120 nuclear weapons for delivery by aircraft and land-based missiles. Pakistan continues to develop new types of nuclearcapable medium and short-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. This suggests a growing concern in Pakistan about being able to counter India s superior conventional forces and nascent ballistic missile defences. Pakistan is expanding its capacities to produce fissile material for military purposes. Pakistan s current warhead designs are believed to use HEU. Pakistan is expanding its main plutonium production complex at Khushab, Punjab. The complex currently consists of three heavy water nuclear reactors and a heavy water production plant. Work on a fourth heavy water reactor appears to have started in late 2010 and is reportedly halfway to completion. It remains unclear whether Pakistan intends to construct a fifth reactor at the Khushab site. It is widely believed that each of the four existing reactors has a capacity 6

of 40 50 megawatts-thermal. The Khushab nuclear complex, combined with Pakistan s continuing HEU production, could increase Pakistan s annual nuclear warhead production capacity several-fold, depending on the country having sufficient capacity to reprocess spent fuel as well as an adequate supply of uranium to fuel the reactors at Khushab. Figure 4: World nuclear forces, 2014 7

North Korea Based on public information about its past plutonium production activities, it is estimated that North Korea has built 6 8 nuclear weapons. In 2013 North Korea initiated a major effort to refurbish and modernize its plutonium production capabilities. Commercial satellite imagery indicated that North Korea appeared to have begun producing fuel rods for the restarted nuclear research reactor at its Yongbyon nuclear complex following extensive renovation work. The reactor is estimated to be capable of producing approximately one bomb s worth of plutonium per year. North Korea is known to have a uranium-enrichment programme, including a centrifuge enrichment plant located in a former metal fuel rod fabrication building at Yongbyon. However, it remains unclear whether North Korea has produced highly enriched uranium (HEU) for military purposes. The airborne samples that were collected by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty Organization s International Monitoring System after North Korea s third nuclear test explosion, in February 2013, were inconclusive in determining whether the nuclear device had used HEU as the fissile material, rather than plutonium, which was believed to have been used in the two previous tests. North Korea also has an active ballistic missile programme. There is no public evidence to date that it has developed a sufficiently compact nuclear warhead or other key technologies for a nuclear-armed ballistic missile. 8