SACT s REMARKS to. COTC Panel 1 «The Road to Warsaw: Strategic Perspectives. Norfolk, December 9th. As delivered

Similar documents
SACT s REMARKS to JFTC ALL HANDS

SACT s remarks to UN ambassadors and military advisors from NATO countries. New York City, 18 Apr 2018

SACT s KEYNOTE at. C2 COE Seminar. Norfolk, 05 July Sheraton Waterside Hotel. As delivered

SACT s remarks at the ACT 15 th Anniversary Flag Raising Ceremony Norfolk, 13 June 2018

SACT REMARKS to the HIGHER CENTRE FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE STUDIES Madrid, 24 June 2014

Berlin, 18 March (24 min)

THE DEFENSE PLANNING SYSTEMS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS

Wales Summit Declaration

Challenges of a New Capability-Based Defense Strategy: Transforming US Strategic Forces. J.D. Crouch II March 5, 2003

PART III NATO S CIVILIAN AND MILITARY STRUCTURES CHAPTER 12

9. Guidance to the NATO Military Authorities from the Defence Planning Committee 1967

ALLIANCE MARITIME STRATEGY

The best days in this job are when I have the privilege of visiting our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen,

Nuclear Forces: Restore the Primacy of Deterrence

***** 5 July 2016 ***** 12:00- Opening of the Accreditation Office / Delivery of media passes at PGE National 18:00 Stadium, Warsaw

Strong. Secure. Engaged: Canada s New Defence Policy

The future of innovation in view of the new EU policies: Europe 2020, Innovation Union, Horizon Nikos Zaharis, SEERC December 29, 2011

To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace.

European Parliament Nov 30, 2010

NATO MEASURES ON ISSUES RELATING TO THE LINKAGE BETWEEN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM AND THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

ABOUT THE MILITARY COMMITTEE (MC)

NATO's Nuclear Forces in the New Security Environment

Smart Defence International Seminar - INCIPE Conference

Reconsidering the Relevancy of Air Power German Air Force Development

Department of Defense DIRECTIVE. SUBJECT: Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy (ASD(ISP))

THE MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA

NATO -1- NATO UNCLASSIFIED 29 September 2009 PO(2009)0141. Permanent Representatives (Council) Deputy Secretary General

The State Defence Concept Executive Summary

DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND THE DEFENSE CAPABILITIES INITIATIVE

FORWARD, READY, NOW!

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE REPUBLIC OF LATVIA. The State Defence Concept

NATO UNCLASSIFIED. 6 January 2016 MC 0472/1 (Final)

Executing our Maritime Strategy

SUMMARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINES. for FY 2011 and beyond

HOMELAND SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE-4. Subject: National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction

Headline Goal approved by General Affairs and External Relations Council on 17 May 2004 endorsed by the European Council of 17 and 18 June 2004

A Call to the Future

Introduction. General Bernard W. Rogers, Follow-On Forces Attack: Myths lnd Realities, NATO Review, No. 6, December 1984, pp. 1-9.

The Marine Corps Operating Concept How an Expeditionary Force Operates in the 21 st Century

Air Force Science & Technology Strategy ~~~ AJ~_...c:..\G.~~ Norton A. Schwartz General, USAF Chief of Staff. Secretary of the Air Force

The Physicians Foundation Strategic Plan

We Produce the Future

11 July 2018 PR/CP(2018)074

America s Airmen are amazing. Even after more than two decades of nonstop. A Call to the Future. The New Air Force Strategic Framework

RECORD VERSION STATEMENT BY LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN M. MURRAY DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY, G-8 AND

MULTINATIONAL LOGISTICS SUPPORT AND NATO PLANNING PROCESS

Restructuring and Modernization of the Romanian Armed Forces for Euro-Atlantic Integration Capt.assist. Aurelian RAŢIU

Go Tactical to Succeed By Capt. Ryan Stephenson

International Conference Smart Defence (Tiranë, 27 April 2012) The concept of Smart Defense (Intelligence) in the context of Kosovo

This block in the Interactive DA Framework is all about joint concepts. The primary reference document for joint operations concepts (or JOpsC) in

ALLIED JOINT PUBLICATION FOR OPERATIONS PLANNING (AJP 5) AS NEW CHALLENGES FOR MILITARY PLANNERS

A Call to Action for the Navy Reserve

Department of Defense DIRECTIVE. SUBJECT: Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P))

NATO s Special Meeting in Brussels Addressing Current Priorities and Restating Core Values

Department of Defense DIRECTIVE

GLOBSEC NATO ADAPTATION INITIATIVE

CHIEF OF AIR FORCE COMMANDER S INTENT. Our Air Force Potent, Competent, Effective and Essential

Perspectives on the 2013 Budget Request and President Obama s Guidance on the Future of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Program

THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF THE MARITIME (AS DELIVERED) 22 OCTOBER 2015 I. INTRO A. THANK YOU ALL FOR HAVING ME HERE TODAY, IT S A PRIVILEGE TO SPEAK

Public Affairs Operations

NATO s new Strategic Concept and the future of tactical nuclear weapons

On 21 November, Ukraine

Future Force Capabilities

PART V COMBATING NEW THREATS AND DEVELOPING NEW CAPABILITIES

2009 ARMY MODERNIZATION WHITE PAPER ARMY MODERNIZATION: WE NEVER WANT TO SEND OUR SOLDIERS INTO A FAIR FIGHT

Summary report of the FINABEL Conference. COS PME II-2015 Meeting. Trencin, Slovakia, 21 april From Dr Pierre-Emmanuel Thomann, IERI, Brussels

China U.S. Strategic Stability

Setting Priorities for Nuclear Modernization. By Lawrence J. Korb and Adam Mount February

Capability Solutions for Joint, Multinational, and Coalition Operations

Strategy Research Project International Fellow

38 th Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

MC Network Modernization Implementation Plan

Strategic Vision. Rapidly Delivering Cyber Warfighting Capability From Seabed to Space. Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command

AUSA Army Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy Symposium and Exposition November 2018 Cobo Center, Detroit, MI. Panel Topic Descriptions

UNCLASSIFIED. R-1 ITEM NOMENCLATURE PE F: Requirements Analysis and Maturation. FY 2011 Total Estimate. FY 2011 OCO Estimate

Department of Defense DIRECTIVE

The 8 th International Scientific Conference DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE 21st CENTURY Braşov, November 14 th 2013

VISION MISSION. Deliver and sustain a full-spectrum surface combat force.

The 38 th Security Consultative Meeting Joint Communiqué

UNCLASSIFIED R-1 ITEM NOMENCLATURE FY 2013 OCO

SEEKING A RESPONSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS INFRASTRUCTURE AND STOCKPILE TRANSFORMATION. John R. Harvey National Nuclear Security Administration

Su S rface Force Strategy Return to Sea Control

Envisaged national contribution to the attainment of the commitments

Global Vigilance, Global Reach, Global Power for America

Student Guide: Introduction to Army Foreign Disclosure and Contact Officers

Methodology The assessment portion of the Index of U.S.

FINAL DECISION ON MC 48/2. A Report by the Military Committee MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT

Describe the picture. Who is responsible for the creation of the Iron Curtain? Which superpower s perspective is this cartoon from?

Prepared Remarks for the Honorable Richard V. Spencer Secretary of the Navy Defense Science Board Arlington, VA 01 November 2017

USAFE - AFAFRICA USAFE-AFAFRICA PROFESSION OF ARMS CENTER OF EXCELLENCE (PACE) INTEGRATION TEAM

UNCLASSIFIED. UNCLASSIFIED Office of Secretary Of Defense Page 1 of 7 R-1 Line #73

Canada s Space Policy and its Future with NORAD

UNCLASSIFIED R-1 ITEM NOMENCLATURE

The National Military Strategy of the United States of America

5 June 2018 DOCUMENT C-M(2018)0025 (DNK-OVERVIEW) NATO DEFENCE PLANNING CAPABILITY REVIEW 2017/2018 DENMARK OVERVIEW

The Future of American Airpower Remarks by General David Goldfein Chief of Staff of the Air Force At the American Enterprise Institute

Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) first collaborative PESCO projects - Overview

Defense Technical Information Center Compilation Part Notice

U.S. Nuclear Strategy After the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review

Precision Strike Annual Review 11. Pacific Region

Transcription:

SACT s REMARKS to COTC Panel 1 «The Road to Warsaw: Strategic Perspectives Norfolk, December 9th As delivered Général d armée aérienne Denis MERCIER 1

Ambassador, Generals, Admirals, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a great honour to welcome such a distinguished audience to our Chiefs of Transformation Conference. On the anniversary of the first official negotiations for the Washington Treaty in 1948, this gathering symbolizes the persistence of the Transatlantic Bond and the idea at the heart of this Treaty: bringing Nations together to address their future security challenges in order to preserve peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area. This conference takes place at a key moment for the preparation of the next Summit. It is also an opportunity for me to present to you my vision for Transformation, driven by the will to provide operational commanders and Nations with the means to fight and win current and future wars. My presentation will be in two parts: First, a description of the strategic context influencing our Transformation and my short-term expectations in the run-up to Warsaw. Second is my plea to all of you, stakeholders of Transformation: to look beyond Warsaw, to set the ambitions and requirements for an enhanced model of Alliance s forces, able to respond to the current security environment, but also to offset our potential adversaries in a 15 years range at least. *** 2

The Summit in Warsaw will acknowledge the diversity and simultaneity of threats that our Alliance faces, some of which could affect many Allies in their own territories. But these threats are not new and were already identified in the 2010 Strategic Concept, a Concept which aside from a few assumptions, remains entirely valid. Indeed, as stated by Secretary General Stoltenberg in his Long-term Adaptation paper, NATO must, and will, remain committed to fulfilling its three core tasks. For military entities, these tasks must be translated in military strategic effects which, collectively, will enable us to defeat all the threats we will face. Recent events in Ukraine and in the South have brought the question of deterrence to the forefront. There is undeniably a need for the Alliance to identify and oppose the full range of threats (at 360 degrees) that could undermine the Alliance s centre of gravity: its cohesion. This is a discussion we had early October with Timo Koster and the Defence counsellors. During this panel, I will ask Timo to describe the principles and key tenets of credible deterrence and defence against all potential adversaries, from the International Staff perspective. 3

Through our current work in ACT, we try to define a posture that is credible at both the political and military levels; one that will enable the Alliance to deliver not only deterrence but all the required effects. This is what I see as the main output of our Transformation: how to build the Alliance s appropriate and credible posture, now and in the future. NATO s posture is built upon the right mix of conventional, nuclear and missile defence forces at the appropriate level of readiness, with the responsiveness required to deploy, sustain operations and redeploy rapidly. I would like to stress that the readiness and responsiveness of our current forces are the critical drivers for success. And to be militarily credible today and in the future, the posture must rely on a solid, modern and efficient foundation which I call NATO s Capacity. This capacity should build on what we have, and develop through prioritization of six interrelated focus areas: Command and control, Logistics/Sustainability, Collective training and exercises, Partnerships, Manpower and Capabilities. This capacity already exists and is probably our Alliance s main strength, allowing us to permanently or on short notice plan and conduct operations. 4

Military adaptations are ongoing in this field, in particular through the Readiness Action Plan. I will kindly ask LGen (Michel) Yakovleff to describe SHAPE s views on further military adaptations to support the Alliance s posture. In addition to its military credibility, the Alliance must ensure the credibility of its posture at the political level. Without getting too much into detail, this requires demonstrating NATO s ability to deliver the strategic military effects through: high end exercises, an innovative Industry, the ability to develop and maintain strong Partnerships, a clear will to provide the appropriate level of resources, and the effectiveness of our Nations and our Alliance s resilience. These activities must be supported by a strong political will and be conveyed by a coherent and comprehensive strategic communication plan. As already said, our Alliance must transform to adapt its posture to face future challenges. Therefore, to come to my second point, it is our responsibility to look well beyond Warsaw. 5

And here I would welcome LTG Marc Schissler s military advice on long term adaptation from a Military Committee perspective. To my view, if we take a good look at technological and operational progress, it appears we are on the brink of multiple powerful breakthroughs. Platforms and weapons will extend their ranges and perform their missions with increased autonomy. The exponentially increasing flow of unstructured data will continue to grow, and so will the data management requirements; Available time for decision-making will continue to decrease when it comes to dealing with certain types of weapons such as Ballistic missiles - and especially with the development of high velocity assets. Adversaries will innovate at an always increasing high pace thanks to both the widely available dual technologies, and their ability to share their findings swiftly through open networks. We must assess what the impact of these evolving trends will be on our posture in order to lead our Transformation. Out of the 6 above-mentioned priorities, Command and Control is the key to transforming our military capacity. 6

Future Command and Control will all be about providing the capabilities to both ensure permanent strategic awareness and decision making in a timely manner. Resilience, speed and distribution of control will become key tenets of an enhanced command and control system. These attributes will require capabilities allowing handling of large amount of data, so that current and future C4ISTAR systems can be integrated and made interoperable. We have already foundations for that, built upon parallel initiatives such as the Federated Mission Networking, Air or Maritime C2, Joint ISR, the Airborne Future Surveillance Capability and many others. Such a system will undoubtedly take the form of a cloud architecture, and its construction will therefore require that we work more closely with companies which have the necessary know-how on complex architectures, management of big data or artificial intelligence, among others. So it will be my question to Patrick Auroy to give us his perspectives on contemporary challenges and their implications on the development of innovative technologies. I will invite him to tell us how he thinks we could better leverage Industry in all 28 Nations, to help ensure that the Nations capabilities can be part of this future system of systems. 7

The NDPP cycle will continue to be one of the main engines in building NATO s capacity. It would help set the long-term requirements while identifying during each cycle the capability shortfalls to be filled by Nations or groups of Nations. But building NATO s capacity should not be done, or I would even say could not be done by NATO on its own. With 22 out of 28 Nations being members of both the EU and NATO, there should be greater synergy and more frequent exchanges of views on capability targets, while preserving the autonomy of the European Union and NATO planning processes. I m glad M. Jorge Domecq was able to join us today. He will certainly mention ways to facilitate future cooperation and to better identify capability gaps solutions. He might also describe how ACT and the European Defence Agency could work together on further harmonizing their respective terminologies and database systems for capability development. This should be part of the broader discussions on the necessary cooperation to be found between NATO and the European Union to define an efficient and comprehensive answer to hybrid strategies and all challenges. *** 8

I will quote Peter Drucker to close my short introduction: Long-range planning does not deal with the future decisions, but with the future of present decisions. So, I would like to see this panel, and the whole conference, push our Transformation forward and help our Alliance maintain its advantage now and in the future. Looking at the depth of my questions to our panellists, we have a challenge: the time to answer your questions! And now I leave the floor for the introduction of our panellists by BGen Sommer. Henrick. 9