Humanitarian Response Consortium - Typhoon Nock-Ten "the first step to real localization"

Humanitarian Response Consortium - Typhoon Nock-Ten "the first step to real localization" Table of Contents Summary 1. HRC Background 2. How Typhoon Nock-Ten produced localized response 3. How FE and TSC contributed to HRC Capacity and ability to lead Prepared by: Kevin Lee HRC Coordinator Input: Esteban Masagca (Project Oversight Committee) Ria Barrera (Project Manager) Date: May 9 2017 Rev: 2 for FE and TSC Project Page 1 of 10

Summary Christmas day for the island of Catanduanes was not a celebration but a day of disaster as Typhoon Nock-Ten made landfall. The Humanitarian Response Consortium (HRC), a consortium of local development organizations that come together to provide humanitarian response services, monitored the situation and on December 27th decided that it would make and assessment and initial response. The HRC has been operating since 2010 and has localized the way that it implements response. However this was the first response that it has done where it has had the capacity to initiate the response and lead for response mobilization. This was a small scale response where access to resources was limited for INGO's due to the government's position on assistance needed, combined with some national political issues and the timing over Christmas reducing capacity available to assess and respond. These factors, combined with the capacity developed by the HRC under the START Network funded Financial Enablers project allowed the HRC to localize the response from initiation to completion. Primarily this was due to having financial resources in its Quick Response Fund allowing it to mobilize, without reliance on outside funding sources and logistics capacity. By assessing and responding the HRC formed strong local relationships with communities and local government so that when resources were made available for the response the implementation was effective and efficient. Funding flexibility due to negotiation from a position of power allowed the HRC to adapt to the changing situation meeting the highest and most pressing needs. Currently the theory of change is that localization is a key to effective response. In the past the HRC has proved that this is true in regards to implementation of response as empathy and local knowledge combined with technical expertise is the best combination. With the increased capacity the HRC was able to shift the balance of power and initiate response with more control over resource management (however resource access is still limited). This increased control over resources and the use thereof allowed implementation to flow smoothly, and was able, within the scope of a small scale response, provide the affected population a voice in the recovery process. The HRC believes that in the future there not only will be more large scale emergencies but also many smaller emergencies such as this one. Because of the frequency, changing funding picture and the governments increased capacity and desire to be more independent this will be more of the norm and localized response will be the only way that INGO's will be able to provide response. The HRC has shown that it is possible for local organizations to take the lead and responsibility from initiation. One of the largest unplanned outputs was a result of this small response situation where coordination between implementing organizations, local and international, and government was initiated and facilitated by the HRC, taking on the role traditionally performed by UN agencies. This is further evidence that if local organizations want to take on the responsibility of response they can within the Philippine context. Page 2 of 10

1. HRC Background The Humanitarian Response Consortium was formed in 2010 through the efforts of Oxfam GB and the 5 original members. This was an effort to localize response capacity by leveraging development local NGO's so as to also provide response through the lens of long term development and empathy with local impacted communities and government. Since the formation there was a series of capacity development activities, building up of procedures and then also actual responses. This started with a small response for flooding in Central Mindanao and Central Luzon 2011 as well as a large scale response to Tropical Storm Sendong that impacted Cagayan De Oro and Iligan City. Since that response the HRC also responded with a 7 month response to Typhoon Pablo in December 2012, the Bohol Earthquake in 2013 as well as working as separate agencies in Typhoon Haiyan December of 2013. In addition to this the HRC individual organizations have responded on their own to smaller incidents such as displacements due to conflict in Mindanao. Who is in the HRC: A Single Drop for Safe Water inc./single Drop Consultancy Services inc. A hybrid organization that works to strengthen the WaSH governance and technical capacities of strategic partners. Peoples Disaster Risk Reduction Network (PDRRN) PDRRN is an NGO committed to working for sustainable development among vulnerable communities through community-based Disaster Risk Reduction (CBDRR). It functions as a support for community-based disaster response organizations (CBDROs), and addresses critical issues in global warming, good governance, and food security and low productivity. PDRN works with vulnerable groups towards building the capacity of communities to effectively protect them from harm. Rural Development Institute of Sultan Kudarat (RDISK) RDISK envisions the attainment of self-determining rural communities whose development is founded on equity, ecological sustainability, gender fairness, respect for people s rights and culture, and the economic, sociocultural and political empowerment of the marginalized rural sectors and peoples. The HRC is currently working on expanding its membership to meet geographical and strategic program needs to be more effective in the field. Currently, HRC works in the sectors of: Emergency Food Security and Vulnerable Livelihood: Food Distribution (Lifesaving needs only) Cash Transfer program (where markets are functional) Cash for Work programs (WaSH services/facilities, Shelter recovery) Inputs for livelihood recovery (agricultural, fishing, small business) Emergency Shelter Emergency shelter material distribution Kitchen and return kit distribution Recovery shelter repair programs Page 3 of 10

Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Emergency Water supply (trucking, repairs to water systems, distribution of water kits) Emergency Sanitation (latrine repair and construction, sludge disposal) Water Quality Monitoring Hygiene Kit distribution and Hygiene Promotion WaSH committee support for camps and highly impacted communities Solid Waste Management and drainage support Recovery WaSH facility construction and support (well drilling/pump installation, permanent latrine construction, water system repair, latrine repair kit distribution) Advocacy and Coordination Active in cluster and coordination systems Advocacy on critical issues for vulnerable groups Creating space for dialogue between government and communities. Camp Management and Community Organization Facilitation of Camp Management Structures Developing feedback and dialogue systems for camp and community residents Capacity development of camp and community leaders 1 Hygiene Promotion with DOH/HRC Bladder by HRC in conjunction with LGU Water Trucking Distribution of emergency shelter materials Distribution of kitchen essentials 1 HRC Background from HRC Briefer rev 2 2 From HRC assessment report January 3 2017 Page 4 of 10

2. How Typhoon Nock-Ten produced localized response The Storm and its impact December 22, 2016, Severe Tropical Storm (STS) Nina (international name: NOCK-TEN) entered the Philippine Area of Responsibility (PAR) and developed into Typhoon (TY) category with 215 kph winds while moving towards the land mass of Luzon. On December 25, 2016 at around 6:30 morning, Typhoon Nina made the first of the eight (8) landfalls in the municipality of Bato, Catanduanes spoiling the supposed Christmas celebration of the people of Catanduanes. Based on the report of the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC Sit Rep 12, January 2, 2016), approximately 98,771 families or 487,8825 persons were preemptively evacuated to safer grounds before Typhoon Nina hit the country on December 25, 2016. The Typhoon affected a total of 446,496 families, or 1,986,960 persons from 1,7169 barangays of Bicol, CALABARZON, MIMAROPA and Eastern Visayas regions. No major casualties were recorded though a total of 70,015 houses were totally damaged and 178,365 houses partially damaged. Power supply has been cut-off in most affected areas due to damaged posts and distribution lines though being restored. The event incurred approximately Php 5,183,994,117.35 costs of damages in agriculture and social infrastructures. Five (5) provinces subsequently declared state of calamity namely Marinduque, Quezon, Camarines Sur, Albay and Catanduanes due to the devastation made by Typhoon Nina to lives, livelihoods, properties, infrastructures and disruption of the normal functioning of communities 2. 2 From HRC assessment report January 3 2017 Page 5 of 10

HRC Response and why it was localized From December 22 the HRC was monitoring the storm and its potential impact. As the storm made land falls the monitoring tracked government reports, media as well as using local contacts to validate information. Decision and starting assessment Over the 26th and 27th media and government information was short on data and was at odds from local information. Communication due to the impact of the storm to the initial landing sites were also limited. The HRC decided on its own to mount a comprehensive assessment of Catanduanes on the 27th due to the lack of comprehensive information, Catanduanes is the 16th poorest province and moves by the government that indicated that a large scale response would not be happening. Because of increased financial Localization Impacts 1. Decision to assess made by HRC on its Own 2. Capacity to assess without other resources capacity the HRC used its Quick Response Fund and organized its own logistics and schedule. This also was done at the same time as the UN/Government joint assessment (which was 1 day only). Initial Assessment and Response In a departure from our past practice with INGO partners the HRC intentionally took supplies so as to provide assistance while assessing the situation. Supplies from UNICEF's Manila Warehouse were supplied, with logistical assistance from Oxfam plus one of their media staff augmented the HRC team (6 staff), which travelled by land and sea to Catanduanes. During the next week a comprehensive assessment was made in conjunction with small scale response activities in partnership with the Local Government Units and augmented by supplies from Oxfam. These included: Distribution of household disinfectants Hygiene Promotion material distribution, sessions and training of LGU officials Setting up Water Bladders and management systems Distribution of hygiene, water and new born kits Distribution of emergency shelter materials Water Quality Monitoring Water system repair with cash for work systems Localization Impacts 1. From Assessment to Assessment and Response 2. Close coordination and implementation with LGU's 3. Leveraged Resources from UN/INGO's for rapid response 4. Comprehensive analysis Page 6 of 10

Resource Mobilization This is where reliance of international agencies is the highest as the HRC is still working out strategies to diversify its resource pool. However because the HRC was proactive and in the field it was able to negotiate from a position of strength with its traditional funders as it was already in the field. Also changed its strategy from the past where the field team designed the response, needs based, and this was then put into proposal and negotiated by the HRC. In the past assessment was provided direct to INGO's that formulated the proposal. Proposal was written such that there was flexibility in the response so that the HRC could respond rapidly to the changing situation. This was also written based on needs, capacity and experience without any consideration of back donor considerations compromising the proposal. There was some negotiation as it was completed but this did not impact effectiveness. Note also that proposal writing used budgeting systems already in place which speeded up the process. Because of existing local resources in the Quick Response Fund the HRC was able to start implementation while the money was being downloaded. This bridging funding allowed the HRC to mobilize on site 2 weeks earlier. Localization Impacts 1. Needs based resource mobilization based on local mandates 2. Flexibility written into proposals due to local control of RM. 3. Financial controls and ways of working maximized use of resources. Unfortunately due to the nature of the emergency, political considerations and the fact that this was early in the financial year resource mobilization for phase 2 and early recovery work was not funded. Though this was a failure there were attempts to localize funding where other non-traditional funders were approached. During the response the financial system in place allowed the HRC to increase scope of services supplied by utilizing funds that would not be used. There was also some reallocations that were submitted and approved by the funder of the response (Oxfam) with only clarificatory questions. In addition to this there was in-kind supplies mobilized from Latter Day Saints Charities. This was an extended process and the response was complete when it was mobilized. In order to be able to distribute these supplies a major reallocation of funds was submitted which took out the review workshop process and put that within another project to free up funds to support the logistics of this shelter distribution. In addition to these resources, the project implementation with LGU's allowed the use of government resources, such as staffing, transport, warehousing etc. Because of this extension Oxfam was able to utilize their excess funds for a small livelihood intervention while the team was still on site at the end of the project extension. Page 7 of 10

Implementation of Response This is the HRC's strength. A consortium culture has been strategically developed and the staff's ability to build empathy for not only the communities and individuals impacted, but also just as importantly the official duty bearers so that we fill our role to meet the gaps and empower the government and communities to meet their needs. A full report of the implementation is almost completed. However the most important highlights of how the HRC leveraged the fact that it is a consortium of local organizations with both humanitarian and development mandates. Sectors covered included WaSH, Shelter, Livelihood. The impact of local knowledge and empathy that impacted these interventions include: WaSH o o Shelter o o Activating the mandated "Local Drinking Water Quality Monitoring Committee" to take charge of monitoring water quality and arresting any breakouts Mobilizing the Barangay Councils to manage water bladders and the distribution Facilitating discussion and resulting in partnership and implementation for rebuilding houses in a relocation site. This mobilized TESDA (Technical Education and Skills Development Authority), the LGU and Latter Day Saints Charities to rebuild more resistant housing for the relocation site residents who are among the most vulnerable impacted populations. Building shelter committees to ensure equitable distribution of shelter supplies. Localization Impacts 1. Maximization of the capacities and resources of the local government and communities. 2. Built the capacity of the community and LGU to not only respond to this disaster but be better prepared for the future 3. Provided the community a voice in the recovery planning process to make it more equitable and cognizant of vulnerable populations 4. Localized the coordination system for local and international NGO's. o Maximizing and holding local suppliers accountable. o Maximizing the logistics capacities of LGU's and communities Livelihood o Utilizing local community and LGU's to identify beneficiaries o Tried using Philippine money transfer service to control distribution of cash as it is the most prevalent company. Page 8 of 10

However the larger impact where localization was key was where the HRC worked with the Local Governments and Communities to help facilitate their recovery plans. This included Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with communities to identify the real issues and then working with LGU's in workshops to assist in developing their recovery plans. These are mandated by law and vitally necessary for mobilizing resources. Traditionally these are done by the LGU, based on infrastructure damage and issues that they perceive. This process provided the community a voice in the process to ensure that the real needs are met and to also ensure that the recovery is more equitable and includes socio, physical and economic vulnerabilities. The highlight of the implementation was that the HRC took on the coordination role that is commonly done by UNOCHA, UN Agencies and government. In this case the cluster system at the national level was deactivated and devolved to the local level. There was no call for international assistance and hence the UN wasn't on site. The HRC contacted all the known players in the area and managed coordination meetings, produced the 3W's and led the coordination efforts with the LGU's. This effort included coordinating the Philippine Red Cross, START Network consortium, CRS and others. PINGON (Philippine International NGO Network) recognized these efforts. Focal Group Dialogue for Recovery Planning Transparency documentation Page 9 of 10

3. How FE and TSC contributed to HRC Capacity and ability to lead The HRC is involved in both the Financial Enablers (FE) and Transforming Surge Capacity (TSC) Projects by the START network. These are both instrumental in building the capacity of the HRC: TSC Project Has started 4 NGO local NGO networks to coordinate activities and share information. This was done assisting in building the assessment and a complete picture of the impact. Though unused gave the HRC potential to increase staffing quickly. Financial Enablers Project Quick Response Fund (QRF): o Allowed HRC initiation of assessment and response o Provided bridging finance to start response earlier Pre-Positioned Stocks: o Gave capacity for initial response. IEC materials, Aquatabs etc. Note that also used supplies from other stakeholders. Contingency Planning and Budget/Proposal Templates: o Roll out more efficient Financial system improvement o Real-time Budget Variance Allowance All of these capacities reduced dependence on international actors. The control over how we did the assessment was mainly capacitated by the QRF whose resources allowed us to initiate and provide response which allowed us to negotiate from a position of knowledge and power as we had resources on the ground. We also managed to negotiate, to ensure that the QRF was topped up, hence retaining the power in the future. This response was evaluated as part of the FE Project stocktaking so that weakness' identified will shape the balance of our capacity development initiatives under this project. Page 10 of 10