Should the Achievement of the Air Supremacy Be Awaited for the Ground Operation During A Struggle Between Two Equally Equipped Forces

Should the Achievement of the Air Supremacy Be Awaited for the Ground Operation During A Struggle Between Two Equally Equipped Forces Author : Aykut COŞKUN If we lose the war in the air, we lose the war, and we lose it quickly. Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery SUMMARY: The final stage of a serious long lasting political conflict among countries is a struggle or a fight that will take place among the armed forces of those subject countries supported with the elements of their national power. Although the threat today is likely to be expected from a highly skilled powerful air force of several small countries rather than a of a country, the progress experienced during the last years shows that having a conflict similar to the one between the super powers during the Cold War cannot be ruled out. Within the context of an armed conflict, the planning of a joint operation to be executed by the main elements of the armed forces (Ground, Navy and Air Force), enforces us to follow a risk based approach in order to minimize the possible casualties. The level of the risk contained in the operation environment is closely connected with the quality and the quantity of the threat. The elimination of the existing threat will definitely decrease the level of risk and as a consequence will also help ensure the execution of the operation effectively. With in this context, the elimination of the threat and the provision of the support of friendly air force are closely connected with the effectiveness of the operation executed by the ground based forces (army and navy), those in nature have a poor capability against the air power elements. Therefore, the achievement of air superiority in the battlefield occupied by ground forces is becomes very important so that the number of casualties is minimized and air support is provided to the subject ground forces. The gain-loss consideration, derived from criteria developed at the planning stage, will enforce whether or not the achievement of the air superiority should be awaited during the period of air superiority struggle. In this article, two options have been studied in the framework of several scenarios based on SWOT analysis technique. First, ground forces join the operation together with the air force in close synchronization during and before the air superiority achieved, and second, ground forces join the operation just after the air superiority is secured so that the possible level of casualty is minimized. Both options were tested under the same circumstance that assumes two equally equipped and balanced forces are having a fight against each other in a high density conflict situation. As the result of the study, the operation launched out together with all elements of the armed forces in close coordination and synchronization proved to be the best solution. Only the quantitative characteristics of both sides were taken into consideration during the study, the qualitative characteristic such as level of the training, motivation etc. were disregarded. Keywords: Air Superiority, Joint Operations, Air Support, Ground Operations, Concept of Air Superiority Air superiority in NATO Glossary of Abbreviations; "that degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another that permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea, and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by opposing air forces." (NATO Glossary, 2010) Matter that wished to emphasize with air superiority, the subject of B-1

obtaining air superiority in operational environment without interrupted by hostile air threat against ground elements. Air superiority can be obtained with the result of targeting hostile country's airpower elements, can be performed in operational environment land, sea and air forces bring to freedom of movement committed contributions to joint operations' success. It also provides committed contributions to joint operation's success. Air superiority is expressed with echeloned degrees and information on the subject is to be varied in different sources. In rating of air superiority, by using mathematical expressions distinction can't provide clear examples, with only expressive distinction rating method is also cannot provide a healthy distinction. Scale of Air Superiority (Hughes, C. Achieving and Ensuring Air Dominance, Air Command and Staff College,) ENEMY AIRPOWER HAS TOTAL AIR DOMINANCE (NO FRIENDLY AIRPOWER PRESENCE OR EFFECTIVENESS) ENEMY AIRPOWER HAS AIR SUPREMACY ENEMY AIRPOWER HAS AIR DENIAL ENEMY AIRPOWER HAS LOCALIZED AIR SUPERIORITY FRIENDLY AIRPOWER HAS LOCALIZED AIR SUPERIORITY ENEMY AIRPOWER HAS AIR DENIAL FRIENDLY AIRPOWER HAS AIR SUPREMACY FRIENDLY AIRPOWER HAS TOTAL AIR DOMINANCE (NO ENEMY AIRPOWER PRESENCE OR EFFECTIVENESS) Rating of air superiority in the table above there is no clear example. Because of this reason, situation wanted to be expressed can be perceived differently in people's mind. In order to create the same perception, measures are objectified, with program that developed with MATLAB software, in the table below. In this study, scale is used as a rating method, shown below. Numeric Statement of Air Superiority Degrees (ÖZDEMĐR, H.Đ. 2010 ) Üstünlük Derecesi Anlamı Etkinlik Ölçütü 0 Enemy Airpower has total Air Dominance %0 1 Enemy Airpower has Powerful Air Supremacy %1-20 2 Enemy Airpower has Air Supremacy %21-40 B-2

3 Equality %41-60 4 Friendly Airpower has Air Supremacy %61-80 5 Friendly Airpower has Powerful Air Supremacy %81-99 H Friendly Airpower has total Air Dominance %100 An Overview of Air Superiority Air superiority may be provided in either on a specific area or the whole operational environment. Furthermore, operational conditions may require specific air superiority in an according period of time for a specific mission. The effort cost to obtain air superiority depends on the time period and the size of the field that for air superiority. The estimated obtaining time of air superiority after the beginning of operation depends in addition to these two factors with the force difference in quantity and quality between two belligerent countries. It must also be emphasized that the fact of operational environment to contain indeterminations brings a lot of things to effect the predestination of the operation. However, up to now, when one analyze performed air operations, except in very exceptional cases, one can mention when air operations conducted between two separate air forces, if there is a critical power difference between them, stronger side can obtain air superiority at the end of a certain period of time. The more power difference between both sides, process of obtaining air superiority will be shortened in that rate. If we look at examples from past operations, "Beka Valley Operations" air battles between Israel and the Syrian Air Forces in 1982, Israeli Air Forces which gained an advantage on Syrian Air Forces with F-15 and F-16 aircrafts, the most powerful combat jets of that time, Israeli Air Force obtained air superiority at the end of second day (Adam J. HEBERT, 2007). As a more distinct example of power difference between two forces, Operation Desert Storm, in 1991 between Iraq and Allied forces, is a more distinguished example. Air superiority operations took place through the entire six weeks of the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Allied control of the air over Iraq was achieved, however, for all practical purposes during the earliest hours and even minutes of combat (Benjamin S. LAMBETH, 1993). In the case of two different air forces' power equal to each other gaining air superiority is not easy. Hence, air battles between Germany and England which can be assumed equal forces in 1940; lasted 59 days and performed in four phases. At the end of this period, both sides couldn't obtain air superiority. Likewise, India-Pakistan war started in 1965 and lasted 48 days, at the end of the war air superiority couldn't obtain by any sides (Fricker JOHN 1965). Examples in history are showing us, strength comparison between two Air Forces on quality and quantity, in case of both sides have equal strength, it is vague that which side obtain air superiority and when. Because of this vagueness, when should ground operation to be started, is a difficult subject to decide for decision makers. In a battle with equal forces, air superiority can be obtained by allied country in a long time or it can never be obtained. At this point, in order to B-3

eliminate air threats against ground forces, a plan that about starting ground operation after obtaining air superiority, could represent a faulty decision. Air Superiority on Performing Ground Operation Histories of the world, countries are unable to achieve their political objectives by diplomatic means every time, so conflicts between countries solved with armed conflicts time to time. Battle's ultimate goal is to reach political objective. The facts which will guide to the achievement of the political objective are the facts which construct the "Recently Planned Situation" of warfare. In order to reach Recently Planned Situation of warfare, size of force that to be used against hostile country with size of possessed Air, Land and Naval Forces', can be changed by depending "Recently Planned Situation" criteria. Air, Land and Naval Forces can be needed to use jointly or separately in a high-intensity conflict will be risen depending on. Ground elements for performing ground operation, threat can come from hostile country's ground elements; it can also come from hostile country's air forces which operate in operational environment air space. Ground elements respond threatened by air elements; the operation and operational environment's asymmetry, because of reasons that weapon systems' capabilities and elements' speed differences in force shifting in operational environment considered very difficult to achieve. For this reason, the greatest threat to ground forces, are air forces which cannot be eliminated by ground elements' organic weapons. Result of hostile air forces' elimination with allied forces to be obtained air superiority in operational environment will provide air support that will support contribution to ground forces and this will keep casualties minimum in ground operation. Used air, Land and Naval Forces' in a high-intensity operation, if there are no surface-tosurface missiles, which can penetrate remotely to hostile elements, in ground forces inventory, naturally decision makers won't want to perform any operations until the elimination of hostile air forces. If there are missile systems that can fire to thousands of kilometers to hostile territories in ground forces' inventory, at beginning of operation, ground elements can use their long-range missile systems to hostile forces from depth of allied country without approaching hostile country's borders. Therefore, allied ground elements in depth of the ally country, naturally, operation can be performed in operational environment that air superiority will progress in favor of ally. Depending air superiority level, no critical air threat expected. Using these long-range missiles in inventory, hostile country's barycenters that wanted to penetrate and/or critical capabilities can penetrate these targets. (Depending on missile range and capability, inventory quantity and operational environment's physical conditions) Beginning of the operation should be with these weapon systems. Finally, it shouldn't be forgotten that main difference between launching ammunition with surface-to-surface systems and launching ammunition with air-to-ground systems is ammunition can be used, is approached with air platforms (aircrafts/uavs) if there are long-range surface-tosurface missile systems, which are no need to be approached with air platforms, in ground forces' inventory, these missile systems should be used without exposed threats like aircrafts/uavs However in equal forces' battle, in case of there are no long-range systems, which elements should start the operation? Should all elements be used at the beginning of operation at the same time? Or else obtaining air superiority by air forces should be waited then after ground elements should be included? These questions, which will be sought by decision makers, are analyzed by using SWOT analysis method. B-4

The Acquisitions of Process of Obtaining Air Superiority and the Losses There are a lot of factors which will affect decision makers' decisions about beginning operation simultaneously. Those prominent ones; power difference between forces and ending time of operation. In case of high level of power difference between conflicted sides, more powerful side's acceptable risk will naturally be low. Therefore, before starting ground operation obtaining air superiority would be the most riskless way for ground elements' supported by allied air force and not to be exposed by air threats. For instance, the main factor for allied forces commences ground operation after airpower superiority was gained during the first and the second gulf operation was the huge difference of power between both sides. The way to be followed during such instance is clear. However, for the conditions that both sides have equal balance of power, the question of with which elements the operation should be commenced becomes a bigger problem for the decision makers. The main problem to be solved when equal forces are at war is the evaluation of both contributions of ground elements in the condition that air, ground and naval elements begin the war concurrently and the acceptable rate of casualties caused by hostile air forces to the ground elements. When the contributions of ground elements to the operation and the acceptable casualties caused by hostile air forces to the allied ground elements are evaluated, if the contributions of ground elements to the operation become prominent, ground elements should be used from the beginning of the operation. Because, in such case who will have air superiority and when will be unknown and in this case ground elements will have to wait for superiority of air forces to start the operation and they will not participate in the operation. On the other hand, hostile air forces causing casualties for allied elements will mean that the hostile will have to sacrifice from the effort they would put for having superiority in air. In this case, the competition of having superiority in air will result negatively for the hostile air forces, though they will cause casualties for the allied ground elements in the beginning. Therefore, once the hostile will lose the superiority in air, they will not threaten allied ground elements. Because of this, the situation which in the beginning seems as on behalf of the hostile would turn as being on behalf of allies and this has been seen a lot throughout the history. During the Second World War Germany-England battles, in the beginning Germany had invested 60% of her airpower in having superiority in air and invested the rest for strategically support for assaults and ground operations. And England had invested almost all of her airpower in having superiority in air. Such approach from Germany caused casualties for English ground elements in the beginning, however during the later phases of the operation Germans lost the superiority in air. Another example; during the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war, India similarly invested 60% for air superiority combat and 40% for the support of ground elements however they realized the mistake after air superiority combat resulting against them and they invested all the air effort for air superiority. The main factors to be evaluated for the gain-loss analysis related to whether to wait for air superiority when equal forces are at war, which are described above, are figured on scales. B-5

Figure 1: Gain-loss analysis in waiting for having superiority in air. In the scales depicted above, the two factors to be decided according to the predominant respect are the main factors that will lead the decision. Yet, there are also other factors to be evaluated. To find a detailed answer for the question a gain-loss analysis needs to be done in certain scenarios. Therefore the subject will be studied further using SWOT analysis in certain scenarios while including other factors. In all of the scenarios below it is assumed that allied and hostile air, naval and ground forces are equal and the hostile ground elements begin the operation concurrently, and countries' armed forces' trainings, moral levels, and similar factors are excluded in the evaluation. Scenario 1: Allied ground elements will participate in operation after the obtainment of air superiority and during the strife for air superiority enemy will make an intense effort to assault allied ground elements. In scenario 1, before the obtainment of air superiority by allied country, ground elements will not participate in the operation and it is uncertain to determine how long this last and which side will obtain air superiority among close powers. Therefore, if air superiority is obtained by hostile forces, ground elements will not participate in the operation at all. Strength * Allied ground elements will be exposed to less air threats because they are not deployed within the operation area. (Exposure to threats is relatively more than scenaria-2, less than scenaria-3 and scenaria-4.) * Mutual response among allied elements will be minimum. B-6

Weaknesses Opportunities Threats * Contributions of allied ground elements to joint operation will be missed out. * All kinds of targets will not be able to penetrate because the operation will only be run by air power. * Operation will not be accomplished by allied forces in a short time. * Synergy will not be able to brought, parallel assaults will not be able to conduct and therefore power efficiency won't be provided with coordinated fire support. * Air superiority strife will be able to turned in favor of friends at the rate of hostile forces' support to ground elements. * It is unknown how long will the air superiority strife will last and in whose favor will it result. * Deployment area of units will be exposed to slight air threat because ground elements have not moved to operation area deployment. * Because ground elements will not start the operation without the obtainment of air superiority, only air power might not be enough to win the operation and war might be lost. In this scenario, hostile country mistakenly reserved a major part of its air efforts into supporting ground operation instead of winning the strife for air superiority. Therefore, in the beginning of the operation, hostile air power and hostile ground elements supported by hostile air power will suffer attrition because of the allied ground elements. Moreover, because allied ground elements will not be able to start the operation until the obtainment of air superiority, hostile ground elements will advance its operation without any resistance. However, air superiority might turn in favor of the friends at the later stages of the operation because hostile forces resort a major part of its air efforts into supporting ground elements. Scenario 2: Allied ground elements will participate in operation after the obtainment of air superiority and during the strife for air superiority, enemy will make a low effort to assault allied ground elements. Strength * Allied ground elements will be exposed to the least of air threats of all scenarios because they are not deployed within the operation area. * Mutual response among allied elements will be minimum. Weaknesses Opportunities - Threats * Contributions of allied ground elements to joint operation will be missed out. * All kinds of targets will not be able to penetrate because the operation will only be run by air power. * Operation will not be accomplished by allied forces in a short time. * Synergy will not be able to brought, parallel assaults will not be able to conduct and therefore power efficiency won't be provided with coordinated fire support. * It is unknown how long will the air superiority strife will last and in whose favor will it result. * Because ground elements will not start the operation without the obtainment of air superiority, only air power might not be enough to win the operation and war might be lost. B-7

In this scenario, hostile country reserved a major part of its air efforts into winning the strife for air superiority. Because allied ground elements will not be able to start the operation until the obtainment of air superiority, hostile ground elements will advance its operation without any resistance. It is uncertain in whose favor strife for air superiority will result and it should be expected that strife for air superiority would not shortly end and advancement of hostile ground elements unilaterally within this time would progress in favor of the hostile forces. Scenario 3: Allied Air-Ground-Naval elements will start the operation simultaneously and during the strife for air superiority, enemy will make an intense effort to assault allied ground elements. Strength Weaknesses Opportunities Threats * Contributions of allied ground elements to joint operation will be utilized. * Operation is expected to be accomplished by allied powers in a short time. * Synergy will be able to brought, parallel assaults will be able to conduct and therefore power efficiency will be provided with coordinated fire support. * Allied ground elements will be exposed to air threats the most compared to all scenarios of their deployment within the operation area. * Mutual responses amount allied elements might be experienced during joint operation. * Air superiority strife will be able to turned in favor of friends at the rate of hostile forces' support to ground elements. * It is unknown how long will the air superiority strife will last and in whose favor will it result. * Because allied ground elements move to operation area deployment, they will be exposed to intense air threats because hostile forces will support ground elements with air power. In this scenario, hostile country mistakenly reserved a major part of its air efforts into supporting ground operation instead of winning the strife for air superiority. Therefore, in the beginning of the operation, hostile air power and hostile ground elements supported by hostile air power will suffer attrition because of the allied ground elements. However, hostile forces, who resort a major part of its air efforts into supporting ground elements, will begin to lose air superiority at the later stages of the operation. Therefore strife for air superiority will move towards allied forces, allied air power, who obtained air superiority, will be able to support ground elements effectively thereafter. Hostile air power will not be able to support ground elements after losing strife for air superiority. Air and ground operations will advance in favor of friends. Scenario 4: Allied Air-Ground-Naval elements will start the operation simultaneously and during the strife for air superiority, enemy will make a low effort to assault allied ground elements. Strength * Contributions of allied ground elements to joint operation will be utilized. * Operation is expected to be accomplished by allied powers in a short time. * Synergy will be able to brought, parallel assaults will be able to conduct and therefore power efficiency will be provided with coordinated fire support. B-8

Weaknesses * Allied ground elements will be exposed to air threats more than scenario-1 and scenario-2, less than scenario-3 compared to all deployment scenarios. * Mutual responses amount allied elements might be experienced during joint operation. Opportunities - Threats * It is unknown how long will the air superiority strife will last and in whose favor will it result. * Because allied ground elements move to operation area deployment, allied ground elements will be exposed to certain air threats. Result would still be uncertain because both sides follow a rather similar way in this scenario. Each one of the 4 scenarios has their powerful and weak sides. Comparing these 4 different scenarios would be useful in determining the most preferable scenario. In this context, spider web analysis, evaluated each scenario within the criterion of SWOT analysis, is below. Table 2: Comparison of each scenario with the spider web analysis method. B-9

Scenarios are scored from 0 to 5 within the criterion in the figure. Scores of the analysis are given after the evaluation in the sense of allied country and the highest score for each criteria is at the level of 5, which symbolizes the exterior of periphery. Determining scenarios' scores on the basis of each criteria and present the scenario that constitutes the external periphery and therefore is the most desirable was aimed with this analysis. In this context, scenarios 3 and 4, which are based on the basis of simultaneous operation of allied Air-Ground-Naval elements, stand out as the most desirable. Conclusion Military operation might be inevitable to solve a problem when peaceful ways fail to solve inter-states problems. Various points such as intensity of the dispute, red lines of the countries and their military abilities are the determinant factors of the high or low intensity of a possible warfare. Within today's conjuncture, a high intensity military operation is desired to be accomplished in a short time due to political, economic factors and international public opinion. Therefore, this matter plays a decisive role in planning and performance of the military operation. Obtaining an air superiority using Air-Ground-Naval forces constitutes importance about movements of ground elements without being exposed to hostile air threats. When we examine the recent high intensity warfare, it can be observed that obtaining air superiority is to a large extent proportionate to power balance and it is uncertain to determine which side will obtain air superiority between equal powers of the power balance and how long will it take to obtain air superiority. The question of whether to use all elements at the same time or wait for air forces to obtain air superiority and utilize ground elements in the beginning of a warfare between equal forces was attempted with the evaluation of SWOT analysis of 4 different scenarios. Examining the results, it is uncertain to determine the result and time of that strife for air superiority between equal forces during a possible warfare. Therefore, ground elements, which do not participate in the operation in order not suffer casualties due to air original threats and is planned to participate after the obtainment of air superiority, would stand inactive until the end of the operation in case air superiority is not obtained by allied air power or obtained by hostile air power. In this case, contributions of all three forces will be missed out and if hostile forces begin the operation with three forces simultaneously, utilizing only air power would be insufficient. When ground elements are deployed in operation and begin the operation, they might be exposed to air threat and ground elements might still be exposed to air threat when they are not deployed in operation and do not begin the operation. At this point, while strife for air superiority continues the side, which leaves out a portion of its air effort to assault hostile ground elements, would capitulate the strife for air superiority and if they continues with this mistake they will not be able to support ground elements after losing air superiority even if it has provided air support to ground elements. Therefore, when ground operation begins simultaneously with air operation, maybe a small portion of air effort will be used to assault hostile ground elements because both sides are in a strife for air superiority. Therefore, ground elements will not be exposed to a major air threat against hostile forces that follow a true operation style. In the case when hostile forces resort a serious effort to assault allied ground elements without obtaining air superiority mistakenly, they will most probably lose the air superiority and at this point allied air forces will be able to provide sustainable and increasing air support to ground elements. B-10

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