San Bernardino Terror Attack

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San Bernardino Terror Attack Fireguard FDNY Center for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness

Dec. 2 nd, 2015, San Bernardino: Militant Homegrown Jihadist Duo Conducts Terror Attack at Holiday Party Planned attack on gathering attended by male perpetrator Confined to banquet room and immediate area; shooters left scene Secondary sites 1) Street where shootout occurred 3½ hours after initial attack 2) Jihadists home and garage Weapons: semi-automatic rifles and pistols; IEDs 14 killed, 22 injured

Attack Initial Phase Married couple, Syed Ritzwan Farook (28) and Tashfeen Malik (29), leave six-month-old daughter with Farook s mother at their shared home in Redlands, Calif., on premise of doctor s appointment. Farook arrives early to Inland Regional Center in San Bernardino where staff meeting/training event is being held. Farook leaves abruptly, possibly under apparent angry circumstances, as event is transitioning from meeting to holiday luncheon. 10:59 am: Farook returns to gathering with Malik, both wearing ski masks and dressed in black tactical-style clothing. The pair open fire in the banquet room with assault rifles, expending 65-75 rounds. 11:00 am: First 911 calls received 11:03 am (approx): The masked assailants are seen calmly leaving the premises in a black SUV. 11:04 am: Police begin to arrive on scene. Witness describes suspects and vehicle to police. 11:07 am: First San Bernardino Fire units arrive San Bernardino Fire @SBCityFire SBFD units responding to reports of 20 victim shooting incident in 1300 block of S. Waterman. SBPD is working to clear the scene. 2:14 PM 2 Dec 2015 3,763 Retweets 964 Likes

Attack Response Phase 11:05 am: SWAT team works with police and sheriffs deputies to clear first floor of building turn hot zone to warm 11:05 am -12:25 pm (approx): Medic embedded with SWAT team works initial triage of banquet room with assistance from police officers, who carry wounded outside for initial bandaging, then to squad cars for transport to fire department treatment area Site of shooting outlined in red Patient care area dotted circle Before 12:25 pm (approx): IED discovered in building after wounded removed; bomb squad called in

Final Confrontation 3:00 pm: Police obtain address of Farook s Redlands home and head there for surveillance, but instead chase attackers as they flee the home. 3:25 pm: Police pursuit culminates in shootout on street (East San Bernardino Blvd, about three miles from original attack site) Farook was shot after exiting stopped vehicle and Malik was shot while firing at police from back seat.

Key Takeaways 1) Inspired Attack Modality 2) Target of Opportunity 3) Hit and Run Attack 4) Crowdsourcing Intelligence 5) Rapid Tactical Response

Inspired Attack Modality Modality was typical of attacks inspired by terrorist propaganda. ISIS encourages inspired attacks now they occur more frequently Characteristics of Attack: 1) Target was close to home Personal connection to target 2) Not a suicide mission Attempted escape 3) Intended additional attacks Had weapons for other targets 4) Imperfect execution Explosives did not detonate Characteristics of Attackers: 1) American citizen/resident One attacker was born and raised in U.S. 2) Self-radicalized No direct contact with terrorist organization 3) No combat experience Limited experience with weapons

Inspired Attack vs. Directed Attack San Bernardino (2015) Inspired by terrorist propaganda Single attack location Not suicide attempted escape Inexperienced attackers Explosives malfunctioned Attackers showed no prior terrorist activity Paris (2015) Directed by ISIS operatives Multiple coordinated attacks Suicide attackers Combat experienced attackers All explosives functioned Several attackers were known to authorities

Similar Inspired Attacks Boston (2013) Two attackers detonated bombs at Boston Marathon, killing 3 Attackers were American citizens (raised in U.S.) No combat history Not suicide attack attempted escape Killed a police officer after bombing and intended additional attacks Chattanooga (2015) Lone gunman shot at military recruitment centers, killing 5 Attacker was American citizen (raised in U.S.) No combat history Not suicide attack killed in police shootout Attacked 2 nd target after initial shooting Attackers at both incidents had no direct contact with a terrorist organization

Target of Opportunity Ease of availability, not strategic importance, makes target attractive 1) Easily accessible, no security 2) Crowds of people present 3) Limited symbolic or strategic significance Inland Regional Center as Target of Opportunity Longtime work place of shooter = easy access and escape Pre-attack surveillance, attack rehearsal easily facilitated. Farook attended annual holiday gathering/meeting prior year Other targets of opportunity discovered in investigation Before meeting Malik, Farook planned attacks with a friend in 2012 Prior targets included: Farook s former college and a nearby highway

Workplace as Target of Opportunity Fort Hood 2009 Homegrown/self-radicalized jihadist (Nidal Hasan) (Legal) purchase of semi-automatic firearm Accumulation of thousands of rounds of ammunition First entered gathering as insider then opened fire Selected victims (uniformed over civilians) Initial report of three shooters 13 killed, 30 injured Attempted escape, killed in shootout San Bernardino 2015 Homegrown/self-radicalized jihadist (Farook) (Legal) purchase of semi-automatic firearms (neighbor) Accumulation of thousands of round of ammunition First entered gathering as invitee then left, came back and opened fire Selected victims (confined to coworker gathering) Initial report of three shooters 14 killed, 22 injured Attempted escape, killed in shootout

Hit and Run Attack Not a suicide mission Armed and ready for confrontation, but seek to escape. While attackers may be willing to die, suicide/fedayeen* is not the plan Attackers plan to survive initial attack in order to carry out further attacks Attackers may be found with an arsenal of weapons Response concerns Law enforcement and other uniformed responders are legitimate targets Secondary devices are of great concern Number and whereabouts of attackers must be clarified *Fedayeen (Arabic:, fidāʼīyīnف دائي ين "those who sacrifice themselves") Derives from the word, fidāʼفداء which means redemption. Literally, someone who redeems himself by risking or sacrificing his life.

Hit and Run vs. Suicide Attack Hit and Run 1) Boston 2013 (blow & go) 2) San Bernardino 2015 (shoot & scoot) Characteristics: Two attackers Immediately left scene Planned additional attack(s) Willing to kill their way to escape Suicide/Fedayeen 1) Mumbai 2008 (fedayeen) 2) Paris 2015 (suicide/fedayeen) Characteristics: Small groups of attackers Secondary Devices Responders Targeted Delayed patient care due to standoff

Crowdsourcing Intelligence Information from the public was key to attack response Witness on scene told PD the attackers left the scene in a black SUV Tip from neighbor led police to find attackers as they left their home Wounded coworkers were able to identify Farook by name Information from the public could have also helped identify suspicious behavior

Suspicious Activity Reporting Neighbors noticed suspicious activity at the attackers house, but did not report it Neighbor noticed many packages being delivered and increased activity in the garage. Source did not report due to fear of profiling Neighbors, friends, and family can often notice signs of radicalization before an attack Several hurdles to suspicious activity reporting: Fear of being considered racially prejudiced Unfamiliar with reporting procedure Hesitant to be involved in criminal investigation

Rapid Tactical Response The rapid tactical response was critical in minimizing fatalities Police were on scene within 4 minutes of call SWAT team was at a nearby active shooter drill They already had proper equipment They were on-scene quickly The SWAT team medic was present As SWAT cleared the area, the medic used white tape to triage patients Patients were then brought to exterior site Sprinkler system and fire alarm activation complicated response

San Bernardino FD Operations Fire Department operations were limited to patient care The first medic on scene was a San Bernardino firefighter who responded as part of the SWAT team This firefighter was embedded in the SWAT team as their medic and was specially trained for these incidents Later arriving firefighters also entered the warm area to assist in patient care and removal Entry made after area secured by PD

Prepared by the FDNY Center for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness 411 Shore Road, Bayside, NY 11359 watchline@fdny.nyc.gov (718) 281-8411 DISTRIBUTION: FOUO: This document is provided for your information and use. It is intended for firefighting, EMS, law enforcement, security, antiterrorism and intelligence personnel. Further dissemination should be limited to a minimum, consistent with the purpose of supporting effective law enforcement and security of installation personnel, equipment and facilities. This document shall not be furnished to the media or any other agencies outside of those in support of homeland security and public safety missions. It contains information that may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552) and/or the Freedom of Information Law (New York Public Officers Law, Sections 87 & 89).