The Science (and Politics) of Missile Defense Steve Fetter University of Maryland, College Park Philosophical Society of Washington 9 November 2001
Outline A brief history of missile defense A description of the proposed National Missile Defense (NMD) system The vulnerability of this type of system to countermeasures Other missile defense concepts Politics of missile defense
A Brief History: 1950s-1972 Nike Sentinel Safeguard PAR Phased Array Radar 5-megaton Spartan warhead Sprint and Spartan interceptors
A Brief History: 1950s-1972 Nike Sentinel Safeguard
ABM Treaty of 1972 The US and the USSR Considering that effective measures to limit ABM systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms Have agreed: Article I Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual region except as provided for in Article III of this Treaty.
A Brief History 1983 Reagan star wars speech, SDI born 1991 End of the Cold War Gulf War, Iraqi Scud attacks 1993 SDIO BMDO, focus shifts to theater defense 1995 Contract for America: NMD by 2003 1996 Clinton NMD plan; talks with Russia begin 1998 Rumsfeld Report Taepo-dong launch by North Korea 2001 Bush: withdraw from ABMT, deploy NMD
National Missile Defense Act of 1999 It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate) It is the policy of the United States to seek continued negotiated reductions in Russian nuclear forces.
Proposed NMD System Concept
Proposed NMD System Components
Satellites in high orbits detect the hot plume of the enemy missile, cue radars
Satellites in low orbits use LWIR to track warheads in space
Radars track incoming warheads X-Band Radar Upgraded Early Warning Radar
Ground-based Interceptor (GBI) is launched
Kill vehicle uses LWIR to home on the warhead, destroying it by colliding with it: hit-to-kill intercept
Clinton plan: start small, add additional interceptors, sensors, sites over time Intended capability GBIs Other sensors IOC Cost (billion) C1 small (5 RV) attack, no CM 20-100 UEWR 2005-07 $30 Alaska *Does not include $11 billion for SBIRS-low C2 small attack w/cm 100 XBR at GBI sites FB-XBR, SBIRS-low DSP SBIRS-high 2010 $36 * C3 larger attack with better CM 125 AK 125 GF 2011 $49 *
Hit-to-kill intercept has proved difficult: Of 22 tests of exoatmospheric hit-to-kill systems (4 HOE, 2 ERIS, 4 LEAP, 8 THAAD, 4 NMD), only 6 have scored a hit Recent problems often related to quality control; BMDO criticized for rush to failure Tests unrealistic (no decoys or one balloon decoy, one-on-one engagements in one head-on, short-range geometry), using surrogates (beacon/gps, low-acceleration booster) Nevertheless, reliable hit-to-kill intercept should be possible in test situations
The proposed NMD system and any similar system is unlikely to work against a real adversary A country or group able to build (or buy) an ICBM, RV, and nuclear or biological warhead, would also be able to build (or buy) effective countermeasures to an exoatmospheric hit-to-kill system However absorbed a commander may be in the elaboration of his own thoughts, it is sometimes necessary to take the enemy into account. Winston Churchill
Countermeasures A Technical Evaluation of the Operational Effectiveness of the Planned US National Missile Defense System Andrew M. Sessler (Chair), John M. Cornwall, Bob Dietz, Steve Fetter, Sherman Frankel, Richard L. Garwin, Kurt Gottfried, Lisbeth Gronlund, George N. Lewis, Theodore A. Postol, David C. Wright Union of Concerned Scientists MIT Security Studies Program April 2000 Available at http://www.ucsusa.org
Three countermeasures examined in detail: biological submunitions nuclear warhead with antisimulation balloons nuclear warhead with cooled shroud Each countermeasure defeats midcourse hit-to-kill systems (NMD, THAAD, NTW) can be deployed by new missile state, without flight testing
Biological Submunitions submunitions or bomblets are the preferred method of delivering CBW agents better coverage of target better dispersal efficiency 100 bomblets/missile, 2 kg anthrax/bomblet, could result in ~100,000 deaths dispense bomblets soon after boost phase ends, before interceptors can reach payload design of dispensing mechanism, submunitions straightforward
Antisimulation Balloon Decoys Instead of making decoys look like warheads, make the warhead look like a decoy Enclose warhead in a mylar balloon; also release many empty balloons (1 lb each) Trajectories, radar/ir signatures almost identical Empty balloons could display diversity of signatures (size, shape, temp, mass, spin) Even a hit may not destroy warhead inside Implementation not difficult
Cooled Shroud Place nuclear warhead in a shroud cooled with liquid nitrogen Million-fold reduction in IR signal (at 10 µm) Thousand-fold reduction in detection range Warhead is detected too late for homing Current KV does not use visible light for homing, but night launch (or polished surfaces) would prevent this Implementation not difficult (~100 kg extra mass)
Countermeasures Video
Other NMD Concepts Improved midcourse defense Improved discrimination radars to monitor dispensing of warhead, decoys lasers to push balloons Destroy everything Nuclear-armed interceptors Multiple miniature kill vehicles Terminal defense Atmosphere strips away decoys, but too many targets to defend
Many advantages: Boost-phase Defense destroy entire payload booster easier to detect, track, and destroy defended area much larger Key disadvantage: Must be close to launch point, at launch time space-based systems in orbit land, sea, or air-based systems near enemies could not intercept missiles launched deep inside Russia or China
400 Flight profiles of typical and fast-burning ICBMs Altitude (km) 300 200 100 250 s 320 s Locations shown at 5 second intervals Altitude (km) 200 100 0 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 Flight profiles of GBI and Navy Theater-Wide Interceptor 130 s 0 200 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 Range (km) 70 s 8.5 km/s 55 s 5.5 km/s
Boost-phase Engagement d u t i t l A 400 300 200 100 GBI at 150 s Location of ICBM when interceptor is launched Intercept point if interceptor launched 95 s after ICBM ICBM at 250 s GBI at 100 s 0 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 Range (km)
North Korean missile attacks on Moscow, Washington, Chicago, San Francisco, and Honolulu
North Korean missile attacks on Moscow, Washington, Chicago, San Francisco, and Honolulu Moscow Washington Chicago San Francisco Honolulu Vladivostok
Moscow Boost-phase Engagement Washington DC Chicago San Francisco Range of GBI 100 Seconds After Launch Last Chance Intercept If GBI Launched 125 Seconds After ICBM Launch Range of GBI 125 Seconds After Launch Honolulu Honolulu Intercept Points If GBI is Launched 50 Seconds After ICBM is Launched Intercept Points If GBI is Launched 100 Seconds After ICBM is Launched End of North Korean ICBM Powered Flight Range of GBI 150 Seconds After Launch Range of GBI 190 Seconds After Launch Interceptor Burnout Speed! 8.5 km/se c
Boost-phase Engagement Washington DC San Francisco Honolulu Honolulu Range of Boost -Phase GBI 190 Seconds After Launch Range If Interceptor Launched Within 60 Seconds of ICBM Launch Interceptor Burnout Speed 8.5 km/sec ICBM Launch Point
Boost-phase Engagement Washington DC San Francisco Honolulu Honolulu Range of Boost -Phase GBI 190 Seconds After Launch Range If Interceptor Launched Within 60 Seconds of ICBM Launch Interceptor Burnout Speed 8.5 km/sec ICBM Launch Point
Other Modes of Delivery ICBMs are not the only (or even the best) way to deliver nuclear or biological weapons: short-range ballistic missiles or cruise missiles launched off ships airplanes covert delivery (e.g., shipping container on commercial ship) Third-world ICBMs are less reliable and more effective than other modes of delivery Unlike missiles, no return address
International Politics of NMD Russia and China worry about U.S. NMD want to deter the U.S. from threatening interests even if ineffective, politicians might not believe it; might worry that U.S. believes it is invulnerable Russia and China would react to NMD countermeasures; more missiles/warheads; higher alert rates; other modes of delivery These reactions could decrease U.S. security