Changes in the Nature of Modern War and Implications on Air Power

Changes in the Nature of Modern War and Implications on Air Power Air power applied in a vast range of situations, from the delivery of nuclear weapons to casualty evacuation and disaster relief, played a crucial role in 20 th century warfare. It offered a range of policy choices for application of force for political purposes, because, by its very nature, offers tremendous capabilities for offensive strike. Throughout this period of time the nature of war has been undergoing some basic changes providing the pointer to the nature of war in the 21 st century. The security environment has been changing and the tools of warfare as well as the instruments of air power have been improving due to: - Advances in technology, - the moving of warfare toward increasing degree of mobility and mechanization, - the destructive potential of nuclear weapons, - - the increasing vulnerability of modern states even to conventional war, - the reduced levels of defense spending and arms acquisition and, - the power shift in favor of trade, technology and financial control. Together with these developments there was a need for an air power theory: to describe, explain and even predict how and why air power can provide advantage in military operations. It was broadly recognized that one must first create desirable parameters of an airpower theory before developing a feasible airpower strategy 1. My thesis today is that in order for the airmen to develop these desirable parameters of the air power theory, followed by a feasible airpower strategy, they should recognize and immediately incorporate the changes in the nature of war, the contextual realities. It was not the case so far, with a tremendous cost in lives, resources and post war failures. As Giulio Douhet said: Victory smiles upon those who anticipate changes in the nature of war. The Evolution of Airpower Theory and Strategy In its early years, airpower was a supporting capability to existing land power. The advent of flight afforded ground commanders the first real look beyond the horizon with spot and track of enemy positions and movement,

providing communication between ground forces and some level of air to ground attack against selected targets. USAF B.Gen Billy Mitchell recognized and articulated the new airpower theory, based on the empirical evidence of access and speed to areas inside enemy s territory, enabling an additional element to the new air power strategic strike. Prior to WW II, the first airpower strategy, a bombing strategy, based on the axioms of the new airpower theory concluded that given the right type of bomber airplane with the appropriate self defending capabilities, air power could target the industrial base of enemy vital centers 2. The term decisive was added to existing airpower theory, suggesting airpower had the potential to produce war ending strategic effects. However, this air power bombing strategy failed to meet its prewar objectives. It failed to fully recognize the inability of bomber aircraft to effectively defend themselves from enemy fighters and extensive ground to air defense, the inaccuracy of bombing on intended targets and even more it failed to recognize the adaptive nature of enemy creativity. The airpower thinkers at the time failed to recognize that: when the axioms of the theory are challenged by new context, the resulting strategy will likely need to modify 3. Data from the entire WW II European campaign showed that the airpower axioms of access and speed were supported, the axiom of strategic strike was partially supported and the axiom of decisiveness was not supported. However, in the Pacific campaign the airpower with two flights accomplished the most game changing events in warfare history, it ended the war, with the axioms of strategic strike and decisiveness empirically proven. Based on the proven airpower theory of the four axioms, a formal airpower strategy was adopted by USAF from middle 40s into the early 80s; nuclear operations, delivered by aircraft, independent of other services, mainly defending the bipolar standoff with the Soviet Union. However the real time requirements of limited war in Korea, Vietnam and Gulf War I, within a highly political context demanded a more flexible response a response the fighter centric airpower strategy effectively provided, led by the contextual changes. In early 90s, in relation to the context at the time, the strategy developed

from airpower theory became doctrine with three requirements emerged from the attributes of the fighter centric perspective: the ability to gain and maintain air superiority the ability to strike coveted enemy infrastructure the ability to target fielded combatants These three capabilities, although missing the axiom of decisiveness, they met the axioms of airpower theory (access, speed, strategic strike) and translated those axioms into operational airpower strategy which worked when applied, in terms of airpower effectiveness, as in Six Day War of 1967 and the first Iraq war in 1991. However, as the initial bombing strategy in WW II and the Cold War strategic bombing strategy, it failed to effectively translate airpower theory in a limited politically constrained context and to adapt to the context of asymmetric and unconventional war. Changing Context - Unchanging Strategy The first, the supreme, the more far reaching act of judgment that a statesman and general officer must make is to try and determine the type of war upon which one is embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor turning it into something alien to its nature. Carl von Clausewitz As the greatest theorist of War stated, failure to take into account all the complexities of the given context will always result in a less than optimum strategy. This is what exactly happened throughout the 1990s when airpower strategy failed to expand or adapt to the emerging contextual realities. The fighter centric airpower met the context of the first Gulf War but when it changed to an asymmetric, unconventional engagement the strategy needed to adapt. In Somalia there was no requirement to gain and maintain air superiority, little to no coveted infrastructure to target and not easily identifiable fielded military forces, usually mixed with the population.

In Afghanistan and Iraq, as long as the context of the conflict fell within the parameters of air superiority, targeting coveted infrastructure and attrition of fielded forces, existing air power strategy was appropriate and successful. Once both conflicts transitioned into asymmetric, counterinsurgency operations the existing fighter centric airpower strategy failed to translate airpower theory into appropriate airpower strategy relative to the existing and emerging context, prior to hostilities. The USAF and Allied Air forces began modifying air power strategy to meet real time context requirements. Operations urgently required tactical airlift, special operations, ISR supported by UAVs, close air support and cooperation with ground forces. However the Air forces involved failed to, properly and prior to hostilities, organize, train and equip for such operations although they were able to adapt their airpower strategy to better meet the required asymmetric context but not to the level required. Better preparation to coordinate within the joint forces might be essential especially in a context where ground forces have primacy in the fight. Operation Unified Protector over Libya is another example of missing the context. The ground forces were totally outside the JFC Naples command structure, the politico military gap became apparent between the Alliance s Foreign Ministers call for Gaddafi to leave power against the legal interpretations of UNSCR 1973, while no cultural advisors were involved to help in understanding Libyan events and interpreting the passivity shown by the population in Tripoli 4. Current Future Context Nowadays, the focus of power shifted in favor of trade, technology and financial control. Oil and gas remains the only resource which might trigger armed conflict at the level of an interstate war, while the decolonization process starting in the middle of 20 th century ensured that populations could no longer be kept under control against their will. Warfare in the second half of 20 th century has been sifting towards greater mobility and firepower opening additional areas of opportunities for air power to influence the course of warfare on the ground, due to its ability to disrupt and destabilize the momentum of maneuvers besides its ability to impose kinetic shock.

Nuclear weapons have limited the aim, scope and extend of war among states that posses such capabilities because of their tremendously destructive potential which might lead to a mutual suicide undermining any possible political option. Modern and developing states are increasingly vulnerable even to conventional war, because of the high value assets they posses which have been acquired through investments of scarce recourses. The only option available to states to use destructive force for political purposes is through limited conventional war and the use of coercive military force without necessarily resulting in war. Regular inter-state war, in the classical Clausevitzian concept, is unlikely to remain a viable instrument of politics in the 21 st century, but long range strike capabilities of certain components of military power are particularly suited for such coercive use of force for political purposes. Given the increasing vulnerabilities of modern states to even conventional war, it is inevitable that states will seek to adopt doctrines and strategies for prevention of war rather than seek war, as an instrument of politics. Deterrence therefore is likely to assume greater importance in the coming decades, together with Defense and ISR capabilities, required to respond more rapidly even to the potential for sudden and surprise attacks. Only Air Power has the basic attributes to be able to perform this function with a degree of efficiency. During the Cold War Air Power was the primary vehicle for strategic nuclear deterrence to avert war. In the years ahead air and missile power will be the central tool for conventional deterrence and controlled punitive strike or coercive diplomacy. Technology advances have been reversing the time space dimension of warfare. Wars are now likely to be expanded in space and compressed in time. In this fundamental change the information action cycle is of great importance demanding an accelerating speed in response. Control and management of time could be more important than the revolution in information warfare. Airpower by its nature has the capacity to accelerate speed of response needed if destructive power has to be applied effectively on the inside of the enemy s information decision action cycle.

With all the above, the operational environment in future would be airpower critical with a predominant influence on the course of battles at sea and on land. Air operations will need to be deeply integrated with land and sea operations. The Changed Essence of Air Power Airpower with stealth technology, improved battle space awareness, increased aircraft survivability and increased weapons accuracy has made possible the effects of massing without having to mass which is a big part of the essence of air powers new leverage. Precision in weapons delivery has dramatically redefined the concept of mass while the leverage of stealth technology minimized the resources requirements 5. With the technology advances we can increase reliance on force projection vs force deployment, aiming to control adversary systems rather than destroy them. After all, the essence of Air and Space power lies on the ability to project power from the air and space to influence the behavior of people or the course of events 6. Through its modernization airpower produces situations which can subsequently be exploited by ground forces in greatly reduced numbers, with greatly reduced casualties and greatly reduced costs. Airpower, by its strengths, through context limitations, offers to the Joint Force Commander: Increasing situational awareness of friendly forces, air dominance over an enemy s territory, enforcing no fly and no drive zones and engaging enemy armies effectively from stand off ranges, keeping a high operations tempo as the current generation aircrafts show improved reliability, maintainability and sustainability. Future Airpower Theory - Strategy With all the above the axiom of access exceeds the geographical dimension and given the advent of space and cyber operations may also mean access to enemy digital networks, privacy and secure communications. Consideration of both offensive and defensive operations is required focusing on the expansion, complexity and redundancy of the networks. Access of any object, in the current operational reality, even with the minimum size, sound or enemy footprint is extremely limited. Manned flight won t be undetected anymore.

Detection capabilities of ground to air weapon systems are still increasing at relatively low cost while the stealthy aircraft production has reached its maximum, in terms of cost / benefit ratio. Small undetectable systems (sensors and weapons) must be developed. Airpower strategy must conceptualize smaller unmanned systems, RPAs and pure drones, difficult to track and target, capable of ISR and attack with autonomous capabilities for the entire mission, countering threats in seconds rather than the time required for human based decisions. The speed, besides its traditional meaning must also include electrical transmissions, measured in terms of digital and decision making speed. Speed in its traditional sense will no longer provide an advantage in the context of new detection capabilities, advanced radar and targeting systems and global communication networks. It remains relevant for peace time garrison operations or humanitarian efforts only. In contested areas aircraft survivability is likely to minimize. In future operations no country will be capable of gaining and maintaining air superiority due to future detection and targeting technologies. The advantage might come from the speed at which we can deny air operations through our ground to air defenses, processing ISR data into information. Speed in this sense is less about technology and more about immediate determination of the context at the time. To materialize such a strategy, investment in highly capable intelligence gathering services is required, as well as in cyber training, expertise and processes. Strategic strike must now take into account civilian casualties that are no longer socially acceptable and the influences on global economies which now include multinational infrastructure with multinational workforce. Strategic strike will require the accuracy for engaging single nodes of vulnerability without degrading entire networks, capabilities to temporarily degrade systems, preventing the enemy of making effective decisions, without destroying it s entire infrastructure. Effects Based Operations could make the frame for the planning of the strategic strikes of the future. Desired effects (for what purpose at each level of war) should determine the methods of engagement. Effects based approach links military, economic, information and diplomatic instruments of power to conduct security strategy in depth 7. As for the axiom of decisiveness, despite the case in Japan and maybe the 1991 Gulf War, future planning of military operations should be based on synergy through the full range of military capabilities.

In most cases ground and sea maneuver is depended on airpower control but all the services have their own contribution in order for the Joint Commander to meet the main objective. Future Challenges Today we need a relevant airpower theory and a strategy to translate that theory into actionable reality. Strategy must offer elements of how and why operations will be conducted. In the context of new technologies capabilities, the true revolution lies on our ability to operationalize new technologies, to encourage creative thinking and innovative concepts, together with the building of common, modular, multirole platforms. We ll require new ways of command and control to optimize desired effects with effective utilization of the information directly from the battle space. Using 4 th and 5 th generation fighters as sensors is an example of proper exploitation of advances in technology. New capabilities of long range sensor /shooter aircraft require a new way of designing the force through the proper linking with friendly ground, sea and space assets. Unmanned systems, RPAs and pure drones, difficult to track and target, capable of ISR and attack with autonomous capabilities for the entire mission, are still the challenge of the future. Airpower proponents must argue convincingly to those of other services that, under certain contextual realities, there is a better way through air and space power to win a war not fighting their private war for air superiority and strategic bombing only, but providing the support required by the ground commanders. It is time to emphasize not just airpower s unique characteristics, but the features it shares with other forms of warfare. There is a need to review critically the image of strategic bombardment put forward by the early theorists of air power since it has become discredited over the years as a result of its stress on the targeting of innocents. The speed at which Air Power can deny air operations through ground to air defense, processing ISR data into information remains a challenge. Speed in this sense is less about technology and more about immediate determination of the context at the time with the appropriate, in time decision making. Rather than simply modernizing the means of executing traditional military responses, we need to capitalize on air and space power to yield solutions based on the desired end state of peace and stability.

That will require not just education as to the effects of aerospace power, but also a seat at the table so the political decision makers understand the options air and space power provide, meeting the challenges of a complex security environment, under the circumstances of the context which changes the nature of war. Notes 1. USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Developing Future Air Power Strategy 2. J.F.Shiner, The Coming of the GHQ Air Force, 1925 1935. 3. USAF SAASS, Jeffrey j. Smith, Future Air Power Strategy. 4. NATO Defense College, Research Division, Strategic Lessons Learned from OUP in Libya. 5. Desert Storm Target Analysis (unclassified data), 19 April 1991, by David A. Deptula, USAF Gen (ret). 6. British Air and Space Power Doctrine. 7. Aerospace Education Foundation, Effects Based Operations, by D. Deptula, USAF Gen (ret).